51 orders · Page 1 of 2
The High Court held that the Tribunal possesses an inherent power of procedural review to recall its orders, especially when passed in violation of the principles of natural justice or by fraud. This inherent power is distinct from the power of substantive review or rectification. Furthermore, the Court found that Rule 25 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, explicitly provides for the setting aside of an ex-parte order and restoration of an appeal if the respondent appears afterwards and satisfies the Tribunal that there was sufficient cause for non-appearance. Therefore, the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the assessee's recall applications solely on the ground of lacking review power. The impugned orders of the ITAT were set aside, and the matters were remanded to the ITAT for reconsideration of the assessee's applications for recall of the judgments dated 23.10.2017. The ITAT was also directed to consider whether any adjournment application was moved and considered before the final order was pronounced. The appeals were allowed with no order as to costs.
The Tribunal held that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) wholly lacked jurisdiction to pass the impugned order dated 30.11.2015. The reasoning was based on the principle of merger. The CIT(A)'s original order dated 02.12.2013, which held that NOIDA was eligible for exemption under Section 194A(3)(iii)(f) and thus the bank was not required to deduct TDS, had merged with the ITAT's order dated 07.08.2015. Consequently, by 30.11.2015, there was no subsisting order of the CIT(A) that could be subjected to rectification proceedings. The Tribunal also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd., emphasizing that revenue officers are bound by decisions of appellate authorities and that the operation of an order cannot be stayed merely because it is under appeal. Furthermore, Section 154(1-A) of the Act, which allows amendment of an order in relation to matters other than those decided in appeal, was also not applicable as the issue of NOIDA's eligibility for exemption under Section 194A(3)(iii)(f) was indeed considered and decided by the ITAT. The Tribunal noted that even on merits, the Supreme Court had affirmed the eligibility of NOIDA for exemption. Therefore, the rectification order was quashed, and the writ petition was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the deduction and deposit of tax by the assessee Bank on the interest income of FDRs by adjustment under Section 194A(4) before the close of the financial year does not absolve the assessee from penalty under Section 271C for not deducting tax at the time of credit of such income as stipulated under Section 194A(1). The Court found that the failure to deduct tax at source at the time stipulated under Section 194A(1) made the assessee liable for penalty under Section 271C. Regarding Section 273B, the Tribunal found that the assessee's contention of bonafide failure due to previous Section 197 certificates and computer system error was not reasonable. The Tribunal noted that in earlier years, when Section 197 certificates were not submitted, TDS was deducted, and the software was updated subsequently. Therefore, there was no reason for error in the relevant years. The finding of the Tribunal that the cause was not reasonable was a finding of fact, which the Court would not disturb. Consequently, the two questions raised in the appeals were answered against the assessee Bank, and it was held that there was no reasonable cause for not deducting tax at source so as to grant the benefit of Section 273B. The appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer is obliged to decide the objections filed by the assessee against the 'reasons to believe' by a speaking order, as established in GKN Driveshafts (India) Limited Vs. Income Tax Officer (2003) 259 ITR 19 (SC). Since the objections of the petitioner had not been considered and decided, the Tribunal deemed it proper for the petitioner to await this decision. The Tribunal, therefore, declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction at that stage. The operative direction was that the respondent authority must decide the objections before making the reassessment. The Tribunal also suggested that the petitioner could pursue the pending appeal for assessment year 2010-11 and requested expeditious disposal by the appellate authority. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer is obliged to decide the objections filed by the assessee against the 'reasons to believe' by a speaking order before proceeding with reassessment. The Tribunal noted that the petitioner's objections had not been considered or decided. Therefore, the Tribunal deemed it proper for the petitioner to await the decision on their objections. The Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction by directing the respondent authority to decide the objections before making the reassessment. The petitioner was also advised to pursue the pending appeal for the assessment year 2010-11, and the appellate authority was requested to consider expeditious disposal. The writ petition was disposed of with these observations.
The Tribunal held that the respondent authority is obliged to decide the objections filed by the petitioner by a speaking order before proceeding with the reassessment, following the ratio laid down in GKN Driveshafts (India) Limited Vs. Income Tax Officer (2003) 259 ITR 19 (SC). The Tribunal observed that since the objections had not been considered and decided, it was proper for the petitioner to await the decision on their objections. The Tribunal declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction at that stage and disposed of the writ petition with a direction that the respondent authority must decide the objections before making the reassessment. The Tribunal also advised the petitioner to pursue the pending appeal for assessment year 2010-11 and expressed an expectation for expeditious disposal by the appellate authority. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the respondent authorities are obliged to decide the objections filed by the petitioner by a speaking order before proceeding with the reassessment. This principle is derived from the Supreme Court's decision in GKN Driveshafts (India) Limited Vs. Income Tax Officer. The High Court, therefore, did not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction at that stage. Instead, it directed the respondent authority to decide the petitioner's objections before making the reassessment. The Court also advised the petitioner to pursue the pending appeal for assessment year 2010-11 and requested the appellate authority for expeditious disposal. The writ petition was disposed of with these observations.
The Tribunal declined to intervene in the matter at this stage, holding that the assessment proceedings would not cause prejudice to the petitioner. The court reasoned that questions regarding the misuse of the power of attorney, receipt of sale consideration, and other ancillary issues are questions of fact that cannot be adjudicated in writ proceedings. These issues must be decided in the pending civil suit. The petitioner has an alternative remedy to challenge the reassessment, if any, in an appeal, where he can also question the jurisdiction. The court cited the Supreme Court decision in Commissioner of Income Tax and others Vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal (2013 357 ITR 357 (SC)) to support its decision to decline intervention due to the availability of an alternative remedy. The writ petition was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that no substantial question of law arose for consideration in the appeal filed by the assessee. The Tribunal noted that the KVIC certificate was not filed before the Assessing Officer (AO) as it was not available with the assessee at that time. The certificate was obtained and filed before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)]. The Tribunal found that when new evidence (the KVIC certificate) was filed before the CIT(A), the CIT(A) should have called for a remand report from the AO. Instead, the CIT(A) allowed the exemption under Section 10(23B) based solely on the certificate. The Tribunal also acknowledged that the AO had not applied his mind to the exemption claim in light of the KVIC certificate because it was not filed before him. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that the claim for exemption should be examined by the AO in light of the KVIC certificate. Consequently, the appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that no substantial question of law arose from the appeal. Regarding the first issue, the Tribunal found that the AO correctly denied exemption under Section 11 due to the violation of Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(3), as the bus owned by the trust was used by a college run by the trustee's family, not by the trust itself. This constituted a diversion of trust property for private benefit. The Tribunal noted that the amount in dispute (depreciation of Rs. 3,124/-) was very small, citing the Supreme Court judgment in Alexander George vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax. The Tribunal did not explicitly address the second and third issues as distinct points but implicitly upheld the AO's actions and the determination of the assessee's status as AOP by dismissing the appeal. The appeal was dismissed as having no merit.
The Tribunal dismissed the departmental appeal, upholding the deletion of the addition of Rs. 2.60 crores. The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer's addition was based on certain unsigned draft MOUs and a presumption that the assessee had invested Rs. 2.60 crores in the Karaka Property. The CIT(Appeals) had categorically stated that there was no evidence on record to suggest that the assessee had paid anything in excess of Rs. 1.5 crores. An affidavit filed by Shri Ashok Dalal, who was not a related person, was considered self-serving by the AO. The CIT(A) also noted that no corroborative evidence was recovered during the search, no corresponding assets were found, and there was no evidence to prove the investment of Rs. 2.60 crores. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the addition was based on conjectures and surmises without any basis. Therefore, the Tribunal found no valid ground to interfere with the findings of the CIT(A), especially when the addition was made solely on the basis of presumption. The Tribunal concluded that no question of law arose as the matter was sealed by findings of fact, and answered the question in favour of the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the centralization of cases belonging to a particular group with a single Assessing Officer for coordinated, proper, and comprehensive investigation, examination of seized documents, and meaningful assessment is permissible under Section 127 of the Act. The Tribunal found the impugned orders to be neither arbitrary nor based on irrelevant or extraneous considerations. The reasons recorded by the respondent for centralization, including the origin of the search from Ghaziabad and the efficiency of handling seized material and assessment if cases are centralized there, were deemed valid. The Tribunal relied on two Division Bench judgments of the same Court in Virendra Kumar Jain and Vijay Kumar Pradeep Kumar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors. (2006) and Preeti Elhence Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (2014) to support its view. Consequently, the Tribunal found no error of law and dismissed the writ petition.
The Tribunal held that the addition made on account of bagasse was based solely on the recoveries made by another sugar factory. The assessee contended that it had produced material before the AO demonstrating its recoveries, and that all transactions were duly recorded in its books of account. The Tribunal found that the matter required reconsideration due to the AO's unsubstantiated addition and the assessee's submissions. Consequently, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to itself for reconsideration of the facts and the material already on record. The Tribunal directed that the matter on remand shall be decided in accordance with the law. The issue regarding sugarcane loss was not explicitly decided, as the appeals were disposed of on remand.
The High Court held that the Tribunal's presumption of valid service, based solely on the fact that the notice was not returned unserved, was erroneous. The Court noted that the CIT(A), after considering the AO's report in response to directions under Section 250(4), had found that the assessee was not residing at the old address (109, North Idgah Colony, Agra) and had moved two years prior. The assessee had also filed his return at his new address (2, Rishi Marg, Shahganj, Agra), which was available with the department. Sending the notice to the old address, despite the department possessing the correct address, was considered wholly erroneous. Therefore, the presumption of service drawn by the Tribunal could not be sustained. The High Court set aside the Tribunal's order and allowed the appeal, answering the questions of law in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
The High Court held that the issues raised in the appeal were primarily questions of fact, not law. All three authorities (AO, CIT(A), and ITAT) had concurrently found that the assessee could not substantiate the exponential increase in expenditure on consumables. The Court noted that the assessee failed to produce any supporting evidence before any of the authorities. The AO had made a liberal disallowance of only 10% of the claimed expenditure on consumable stores, which was permissible under Section 145 of the Act, especially when the assessee failed to substantiate a more than 100% rise in expenditure compared to the preceding year, while production increased marginally. The Court found no illegality or incorrectness in the orders passed by the AO and affirmed by the CIT(A) and ITAT. The questions of law were answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that "Tahbazari" does not fall within the ambit of Section 206C(1C) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court reasoned that "Tahbazari" is not an item enumerated in the section for TCS collection. It was further held that "Toll Plaza" does not include "Tahbazari" because there is no toll set up for collecting "Tahbazari" when a license for its collection is issued. The Court found that "Tahbazari" has a different connotation and is not a toll. Therefore, the Court disagreed with the Tribunal's view that "Tahbazari" is a toll or indistinguishable from a "Toll Plaza". The impugned order of the Tribunal was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. The questions formulated were answered in favour of the appellant-assessee. The operative direction was to set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was not liable for payment of interest under Section 8(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The reasoning was based on the fact that the assessee had never admitted any liability for purchase tax and had consistently disputed the taxability of the transactions. The Tribunal, following the Supreme Court's interpretation in *Commissioner of Tax vs. H.A. Corporation*, stated that "admittedly payable" tax means tax payable under the Act on turnover disclosed in accounts or admitted in returns or other proceedings. Since the assessee disputed its liability and deposited the tax under protest, it could not be considered "admitted tax" or tax "admittedly payable" for the purpose of Section 8(1). The Tribunal also noted that the High Court's previous judgment had indicated it was open for the assessee to agitate its claim regarding interest. Citing *R.P. Chemical Works v. Commissioner of Sales Tax* and *Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Hindalco Industries Ltd.*, the Tribunal concluded that no interest can be charged on a turnover not admitted by a dealer. The impugned order of the Tribunal was quashed, and the assessing authority was directed to redetermine the interest in view of Sections 8(1-A) and 8(1-B) of the Act.
The Tribunal held that it is an admitted fact that the assessee failed to furnish books of account, expense vouchers, and computer-generated copies thereof, despite multiple opportunities before the AO, CIT(A), and the Tribunal. The Tribunal found that this non-production constituted a deliberate attempt to conceal particulars of income. The reasoning was that since the books were maintained on a computer, computer-generated copies could have been produced even if physical books were lost. The Tribunal concluded that the non-production of books of account amounts to concealment of particulars of income. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order that had deleted the penalty and restored the AO's penalty order. The ratio is that deliberate non-production of books of account, especially when computer-generated copies are available, amounts to concealment of income, justifying penalty under Section 271(1)(c). The appeal was dismissed, and the questions of law were answered in favour of the Revenue.
The High Court held that there was no merit in the appeal. The Court referred to Section 2(28C) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which defines 'Joint Commissioner' to include an 'Additional Commissioner'. Therefore, sanction accorded by the Additional Commissioner was valid. The Court also cited judgments from various High Courts, including Dharam Pal Singh Rao Vs. Income-Tax Officer and others, Arun Kumar Maheshwari and another Vs. Income-Tax Officer, and Smt. Maya Rastogi Vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax and others, which supported this interpretation. Consequently, the notice under Section 148 was considered valid, and the assessment order was not without jurisdiction. The question of law was answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal was justified in setting aside the order passed by the CIT(Appeals) upholding the AO's order under Section 201(1)/201(1A). The Court reasoned that the Department had taken inconsistent stands. In the assessment proceedings under Section 143(3), the default for non-deduction of TDS on payments to regional distributors was treated as falling under Section 194-C, and this assessment order had attained finality, having been upheld by the Tribunal and this Court. However, in the subsequent proceedings under Section 201(1)/201(1A), the Department sought to treat the same non-deduction as a default under Section 194-H. The Court held that Section 201(1)/201(1A) does not authorize the Department to treat the same default under two different provisions. Pursuing the default under Section 194-H in Section 201 proceedings amounted to an impermissible review of the assessment order that had already become final. Therefore, the inconsistent stand of the Department was deemed erroneous and bad in law. The questions of law were answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. The appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the prerequisite conditions for invoking Section 145(3) of the Act were met. The purchases from artisans were not completely verifiable, and the AO rightly rejected the books of accounts. The Tribunal found no error in the lower authorities' orders regarding the rejection of books and the addition of Rs. 64,65,114/-. Regarding the second issue, the Tribunal held that the interest income of Rs. 17,19,484/- earned on FDRs was not derived from the business of export and was rightly excluded from the computation of eligible profit under Section 80HHC. The Tribunal reasoned that interest on FDRs, earned on surplus funds, has no direct bearing on the assessee's export business and should be assessed as income from other sources. The interest paid on loans taken against FDRs had already been allowed as a deduction. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's findings on both issues, finding no infirmity in the impugned order. The questions of law were answered against the assessee and in favour of the department.
The Tribunal held that the present writ petition was not maintainable due to the principle of res judicata, as a previous writ petition on the same cause of action had already been dismissed on merits. Furthermore, the Tribunal found no merit in the petitioners' claims. The court noted that the assessment proceedings under Section 153-A were not yet finalized, and the petitioners had not cooperated, causing delays. The Tribunal distinguished the cited Supreme Court case of Chironjilal Sharma, stating it applied to a different set of facts where assessment proceedings were completed. In the present case, the entire unexplained amount found at business premises and bank accounts was seized to meet potential tax liabilities after assessment. Therefore, the amount could not be released, and no interest was payable at this stage as the liabilities were yet to be determined. The writ petition was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the petitioner's claim for refund of warehouse charges of Rs. 3,09,740/- is rejected. The reasoning is that the Department was entitled to secure the tax liability by retaining goods. The petitioner failed to furnish the full bank guarantee of Rs. 63,85,000/- as directed, leading to the retention of 1200 bags of sugar. Had the petitioner complied, the entire stock would have been released, and warehouse charges would not have been incurred. Therefore, the fault lay with the petitioner, not the Department. Regarding the second prayer for interest on Rs. 6,24,260/-, the Tribunal noted that the tax liability exceeded the seized assets. While the Settlement Commission waived interest under Section 234B, it upheld interest under Sections 234A and 234C. The petitioner's claim for interest from the date of seizure/auction was rejected as the issue remained alive until the Settlement Commission's final order on February 25, 2015. The Tribunal directed the respondent-authority to release Rs. 6,24,260/- with interest at 12% per annum from February 24, 2015, till the date of actual payment, to be completed within four weeks.
The High Court held that the true value of closing stock must include any tax, duty, or cess payable or incurred by the assessee to bring the goods to their condition and location as of the valuation date, as per Section 145A of the Income Tax Act. The court noted that Section 145A, introduced w.e.f. April 1, 1999, was clarificatory and applicable to prior assessment years, including the one in question. The taxable event for excise duty is the manufacture or production of excisable goods, as per Section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Therefore, it is immaterial whether the excise duty has been paid or its payment postponed. The valuation of goods is not affected by the accounting system used or the deferral of payment. The court answered both questions in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue, setting aside the ITAT's order. The appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that 'Rooh Afza' is neither a fruit drink nor a fruit juice nor a processed fruit. It is a 'Non Fruit Syrup/Sharbat' which is a concentrated sugar syrup. The Tribunal found that the product does not fall under any specific entry in Schedules I, II, III, and IV of the U.P. VAT Act, 2008, and therefore, it correctly falls under the residuary entry in Schedule V. The Tribunal reasoned that while the product is known as 'sharbat' in common parlance, it does not meet the criteria for being a 'fruit drink' or 'fruit juice' as per the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, and the Fruit Products Order, 1955. Licenses issued to the assessee authorized the manufacture of 'Non Fruit Syrup/Sharbat'. The Tribunal found no perversity in the concurrent findings of fact by the fact-finding authorities, including itself. The Tribunal answered all three questions of law in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The operative direction was that the revisions fail and are dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the petitioner's submission that exemption under Section 12-A of the Income Tax Act automatically entitles them to house tax exemption was without substance. The Court noted that the petitioner's counsel failed to provide any material to support this contention. Furthermore, the Court observed that previous orders from February 5, 2015, indicated that assessment orders existed against which the petitioner had filed objections. The Tribunal found that several factual disputes were involved in the matter of house tax assessment, which could not be effectively adjudicated in a writ petition. Therefore, the Tribunal was not inclined to interfere and dismissed the writ petition, while leaving it open for the petitioner to avail the remedy of appeal if advised.
The Tribunal found no substance in the petitioner's submissions. Perusal of the sale deed, stamp duty records, certificate from the Deputy Registrar, and the order from the District Magistrate clearly indicated that the property was purchased in the name of Chandra Mohan Tiwari, the petitioner, and not as a trustee/agent for any trust. No documentary evidence was produced by the petitioner to establish that the property was purchased on behalf of the trust. The Tribunal noted that the petitioner's return was filed in an individual capacity and the trust had not disclosed the purchase in its return. The Tribunal also observed that the reassessment proceedings under Section 147 are for assessing income that has escaped assessment, and the petitioner could present evidence during these proceedings. Without going into the merits of the case, the Tribunal was satisfied with the initiation of reassessment proceedings and dismissed the writ petition, granting liberty to the petitioner to raise his grievances before the competent authority and adduce evidence.
The Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the Assessing Authority (respondent no. 2) to decide the application filed under Section 220(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dated 27th March, 2018, within a period of two weeks from the date a certified copy of this Court's order is placed before it. The Court also directed that no coercive steps be taken against the petitioner until a decision is reached on the aforesaid application. The petitioner undertook to file the certified copy of the order within one week. The core principle applied is that a pending application for stay of demand under Section 220(6) should be adjudicated promptly, and coercive recovery should be deferred until such adjudication.
The Tribunal disposed of the writ petition by directing the Assessing Authority (respondent no. 2) to decide the application filed under Section 220(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dated March 27, 2018, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the Court's order. The Tribunal also directed that no coercive steps should be taken against the petitioner until a decision is reached on the Section 220(6) application. The petitioner undertook to file the certified copy of the order within one week. The core principle here is that while the merits of the demand were not decided, the procedural fairness of deciding the stay application before enforcing the demand was upheld.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order dated January 12, 2018, passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Basti, is unsustainable. The reasoning is that the appellate authority failed to record any reasons for rejecting the petitioner's submissions, which violates the principles of natural justice. The judgment extensively quotes Supreme Court pronouncements emphasizing that reasoned orders are essential for transparency, fairness, and to ensure proper application of mind. The absence of reasons makes an order lifeless and indefensible, especially when subject to further challenge. The ratio decidendi is that a judicial or quasi-judicial order, particularly one that is appealable, must be supported by written reasons to be legally valid. The Tribunal quashed the impugned order and remitted the matter back to the Divisional Commissioner, Basti, with a direction to decide the appeal afresh by passing a speaking and reasoned order after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties, preferably within eight weeks.
The Tribunal answered the questions of law in favour of the assessee and against the department. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in CIT Vs. Red Rose School. It found that the assessee had already started and commenced its charitable activities, a fact also noted by the Commissioner. The Tribunal was satisfied with this commencement of activities. Therefore, it concluded that this was sufficient to allow the application under Section 12AA of the Act at that stage. The Tribunal did not explicitly address the second and third questions of law in detail in the provided text, but by answering the questions in favour of the assessee and dismissing the appeal, it implicitly found against the department's contentions on those points. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal filed by the Commissioner.
The Tribunal held that the questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. The Tribunal found that the AO's order and the Tribunal's own order had discussed each aspect of the matter. The AO had taken into account that the assessee was exporting shoes and that fluctuations in accounts were due to exchange rates. On other counts, such as travelling expenses, there was a complete discussion, and the expenses were found to be justified. The Tribunal explicitly stated that after examining the entire record, it found nothing erroneous in the AO's order and no prejudice caused to the revenue. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court decision in Malabar Industries Company Limited Vs. CIT to conclude that the revisional order passed by the CIT was not valid. The Tribunal had examined each head questioned by the CIT, including the difference in pairs of footwear manufactured, travelling expenses, and health insurance expenses of the partner, and concluded that the AO had made no error. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the assessment order. The appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal noted that the objects of the trust were charitable, running an educational institution. However, concerns were raised regarding the trusteeship being limited to a specific family, excluding the public, and the unclear utilization of the trust's earnings. The Tribunal distinguished between public and private trusts. Due to these doubts concerning the expenditure and utilization of profits and earnings, the matter was remanded to the Tribunal. The Tribunal was directed to record a finding on how the profits and earnings of the trust are expended and utilized within three months. The questions of law were to be answered after this finding. The appeal was disposed of finally with no costs.
The Court addressed Question 1, concerning the deletion of the Rs. 12,00,000/- addition for 'liaison fee'. The Court noted that Smt. Asha Peterson was paid this amount for the promotion and sale of flats. The AO's doubt stemmed from a lack of details, and the fact that no such claim was made in the previous year. However, the Court emphasized that each financial year stands on its own. Crucially, the ITAT had recorded a finding of fact that the assessee's business was selling flats, flats had been booked and sold, and Smt. Peterson's services were utilized for selling these flats. Given this finding of fact by the Tribunal, the Court held that no provision of Section 37(1) of the Act was contravened. Therefore, the finding and reasoning of the Tribunal were upheld, and Question 1 was answered in favour of the assessee. The Court also noted that Questions 2 and 3 were covered by a separate decision of the Court. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court addressed each question of law. For question 1, it held that the issue regarding deduction under Section 80IB(10) had already been decided in favor of the assessee in a related appeal concerning a sister concern. The Court relied on the Apex Court's decision in CIT vs. M/s. Veena Developers, which allowed the benefit of deduction under Section 80IB(10) as it stood prior to April 1, 2005. The amendment was held to be prospective, and the provision at the relevant time did not stipulate conditions regarding the shape and size of commercial activities on residential plots. For question 2, the Court found that the Tribunal's conclusion that development activities were carried out on the plot concerned was a finding of fact, and thus, this question was answered in favor of the assessee. Regarding question 3, concerning the license fee, the Tribunal had extensively discussed the accounting systems used by the assessee and concluded that no tax had escaped and there was no loss to the revenue. Therefore, this question was also answered in favor of the assessee. The appeal was dismissed based on these findings.
The High Court upheld the order of the ITAT. The Tribunal had concluded that interest under Section 220(2) is payable on the final amount assessed against the assessee, which was Rs. 4,07,990/-, and not on the original total amount. The Court reasoned that interest under Section 220(2) can only be charged when there is a crystallized demand and the assessee fails to pay the tax on that ascertained amount within the stipulated period. Since a categorical finding of fact was that the amount ultimately found due was Rs. 4,07,990/-, the ITAT's view was deemed correct. The questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court upheld the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT). Regarding the first issue, the Court found no error in the Tribunal's conclusion that since there was no cogent material or evidence to establish any violation of the provisions of Section 12AA(3) of the Act, the retrospective cancellation of registration was illegal, bad in law, and not justified. The Tribunal had found that the show cause notice was issued based on doubts. Therefore, the ITAT's decision to set aside the cancellation was upheld. Regarding the second issue, the Court agreed with the Tribunal's conclusion that the cancellation was not justified. The Court did not separately address the specific reliance on the Allahabad High Court case but affirmed the Tribunal's overall reasoning that the cancellation was illegal. The questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. The appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that both the CIT (Appeals) and the ITAT had conclusively found that the assessee was not able to establish the issue relating to mutuality on facts. The CIT (Appeals) had specifically held that the assessee was engaged in general banking business and not solely activities between two cooperative societies. Based on these findings of fact, the Tribunal decided the questions of law in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The appeal was dismissed. No specific issue was left undecided.
The Tribunal held that both the CIT (Appeals) and the ITAT had conclusively found as a matter of fact that the assessee was not able to establish the issue relating to mutuality. The CIT (Appeals) had specifically observed that the assessee was engaged in general banking business, not solely activities between two cooperative societies. Based on these findings of fact, the Tribunal decided the questions of law in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The appeal was dismissed. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal decided all three questions of law in favor of the assessee and against the Revenue. Regarding question 1, the Tribunal noted that the issue of depreciation on foreign exchange fluctuation had already been decided against the Revenue in CIT v. Woodward Governor India (P) Ltd. (2009) 312 ITR 254 (SC). For question 2, the Tribunal relied on multiple judgments, including Autolite India Ltd. v. CIT (2003) 264 ITR 117 (Raj), which held that expenses incurred on issuing shares or debentures, including prospectus-related costs, are eligible for Section 35D benefits. Therefore, questions 1 and 2 were decided against the Revenue. Concerning question 3, the Tribunal found concurrent judgments from the CIT and the Tribunal that pre-operative expenses, incurred before the business commenced or existed, are capital expenditures. The Tribunal upheld the capitalization of these expenses and the allowance of depreciation, as they were incurred prior to the business setting up and profit generation. The appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that a deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could only be assessed in the hands of a person who is a shareholder of the lender company, not in the hands of a borrowing concern in which such shareholder is a member or partner having substantial interest. The Tribunal noted that the assessee-company was admittedly not a shareholder of the lender company. Therefore, the addition made on account of deemed dividend was deleted. The Tribunal relied on the Delhi High Court's decision in CIT v. Ankitech (P) Ltd. & Ors., which held that the legal fiction created by Section 2(22)(e) enlarges the definition of dividend but does not extend to broadening the concept of shareholders. The circular relied upon by the Revenue was also held to be not binding. The question of law was answered against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. The appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the order passed by the AO on the petitioner's objections dated 09.10.2017 did not specifically deal with the petitioner's objection that the material relied upon for reopening was already on record. The Tribunal noted that this issue had engaged the AO's attention earlier, as evidenced by a communication dated 19.02.2015. The Tribunal was not satisfied with the revenue's argument that no specific ground was taken on this question. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal decided to remand the matter back to the AO to pass a fresh order on the petitioner's objections after providing an opportunity of hearing. The decision on the objections would be based on the material already on record. The reassessment proceedings were to be kept in abeyance until the fresh order was passed within one month.
The High Court allowed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court referred to its own prior judgment in Income Tax Appeal No. 284 of 2010, dated January 2, 2018, which dealt with similar issues between the same parties. In that judgment, the Court had concluded that the development and construction of the housing project were integral and that the commencement of earth filling/levelling prior to October 1, 1998, meant the development and construction had commenced before the stipulated date. Consequently, the assessee failed to satisfy the third condition for the benefit under Section 80IA(4F) read with Sections 80IA(5) and 80IB(10). The ITAT was therefore not justified in granting the benefit. The questions of law were answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
The High Court held that the questions of law were already answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee in a previous judgment (Income Tax Appeal No. 284 of 2010 dated January 2, 2018). The reasoning provided in that prior judgment, which the current court adopted, stated that the development and construction of the housing project are integral to each other. Since the filling or levelling of the earth, which is part of the development, commenced prior to October 1, 1998, it was deemed that the development and construction had commenced before the cut-off date. Consequently, the assessee failed to satisfy the third condition for the grant of benefit under Section 80IA(4F) read with Sections 80IA(5) and 80IB(10). Therefore, the ITAT was not justified in granting the benefit of Section 80IB(10). The questions of law are answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The appeal is allowed.
The High Court allowed the Revenue's appeal and dismissed the Assessee's appeal, setting aside the Tribunal's judgment and restoring the Commissioner (Appeals)'s order. The Court held that the search and seizure operations were conducted against the assessee, M/s. Verma Roadways, despite minor discrepancies in the authorization and panchnama titles. The Court found that the assessee participated in the proceedings by seeking extensions and explanations, without initially disputing the validity of the search warrant. Therefore, the Court concluded that the proceedings under Section 132(1) and the subsequent block assessment under Section 158 BC were not invalid. The Court distinguished the case from situations where Section 158 BD would be attracted, as the search and seizure were conducted on the assessee's premises and the collected material pertained to the assessee. The Court found that the various authorities cited by the assessee were not applicable due to the different factual matrix. Consequently, all questions raised by the Revenue were answered in its favor, and the questions raised by the Assessee were answered against it. The Court found that the Tribunal erred in holding the assessment proceedings invalid.
The Tribunal held that HSCI cannot be given a different treatment regarding its status as a company in which the public is substantially interested, simply because its shares are held to the extent of 99.99% by Honda Japan. The Tribunal reasoned that Honda Japan, being listed on the stock exchange, would be considered a company in which the public is substantially interested. Consequently, its Indian subsidiary, HSCI, should also be treated as a company in which the public has substantial interest. Therefore, the provisions of Section 2(22)(e) of the Act were not attracted, and the loan given by HSCI to the assessee could not be treated as a deemed dividend. The Tribunal further emphasized the principle of judicial discipline, citing the Supreme Court decision in Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija Vs. Collector, Thane, Maharashtra, AIR 1990 SC 261, stating that coordinate benches of the Tribunal should refrain from passing contrary orders in similar matters and should follow the view of previous benches. The Tribunal found the view taken by its coordinate benches to be justified. The question of law was answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. The appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that for the first issue, the deduction under Section 80IB(10) was legally correct. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Apex Court in CIT vs. M/s. Veena Developers (2015) 277 CTR (SC) 297 and a Division Bench decision of this Court in CIT vs. Arif Industries Ltd. (2017) 395 ITR 102 (All). These judgments established that the amendment to Section 80IB(10) was prospective, and the unamended provision did not stipulate any restrictions on commercial activities on the residential plot for claiming the deduction. Therefore, the first question was answered in favor of the assessee. Regarding the second issue concerning the addition of Rs. 80,400, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had deleted an addition of Rs. 6,70,000 vide an order dated May 27, 2008. As the Revenue had not filed any appeal against the CIT(A)'s order, the Tribunal concluded that the resultant interest of Rs. 80,400 should also be allowed for Assessment Year 2003-04. Thus, the second question was also decided in favor of the assessee. The appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal committed a manifest error of law in upholding the denial of Form 'C' to UPPTCL. The registration certificate issued in Form 'B' explicitly allowed for the purchase of specified goods for power transmission at concessional rates under Section 8(4) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The assessing authority's reasoning that 'power transmission' was not covered by Section 8(3)(b) was based on a misconstruction of the provision. The Court held that 'distribution of power' is broad enough to include transmission, and even if not, it falls under 'any other form of power'. Furthermore, the denial of Form 'C' was inconsistent with the fact that the same authorities had routinely issued Form 'C' for six other contracts awarded to UPPTCL. The Court also noted that amendments to registration certificates operate prospectively and that authorities cannot pre-judge the genuineness of a requisition for forms. Consequently, the denial of Form 'C' was deemed unwarranted and illegal. The Court directed the Commercial Tax Authorities to issue Form 'C' to UPPTCL for items included in Form 'B' liable under Section 8(1) of the Act.
The High Court held that the assessee was not trading in shares, and its business was the sale of motorcycles and parts. It was admitted that shares received as capital assets were in the name of the partnership itself and did not form part of the firm's capital account. Therefore, the claim made by the firm under Section 36(1)(iii) read with Section 14A for deduction in favour of partners was not allowable, as such deduction can only be granted to a firm. The Court agreed with the opinion of the Third Member of the Tribunal that since the assessee failed to establish that the capital assets received were ever part of the firm's capital account, the deduction allowed under that head could not have been allowed and was rightly disallowed. Regarding other aspects, the Tribunal had recorded that the assessee is a firm and was assessed as a firm. Consequently, the questions of law were answered against the assessee and in favour of the department. The appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer at Varanasi lacked jurisdiction to assume the case on December 28, 2011, because the order transferring the case from Kanpur to Varanasi had been stayed by the High Court on March 11, 2011, and this stay was in effect at the time the Assessing Officer assumed jurisdiction. The High Court's subsequent dismissal of the writ petition on December 10, 2013, did not validate the assessment made during the subsistence of the stay. The Tribunal found that the concurrent views of the CIT and the Tribunal were correct. The High Court found no substantial question of law and considered the matter to be purely factual. The appeal was dismissed.