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25 orders from the Allahabad High Court.
Most recent orders on record, 2021–2025.
The High Court held that regardless of whether the amended Section 148-A statutorily mandated an opportunity, the precedential law established in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd v. Income Tax Officer (2003) 259 ITR 19 (SC) required the Assessing Authority to afford a minimal opportunity to the assessee to object to the initiation of re-assessment proceedings before they are undertaken. The Court found the revenue's objection to be hyper-technical and that the rule of law under Article 141 of the Constitution, as reinforced by the GKN Driveshafts judgment and the statutory principle in Section 148-A, mandates such an opportunity. The Court directed that the petitioners must file their returns by October 31, 2025. Thereafter, the Assessing Authority must provide the petitioners with the information relied upon within one week. The petitioners will then have two weeks to file objections, and the authority must pass a reasoned speaking order within two weeks of receiving objections. If re-assessment proceedings are initiated, the first date must be fixed with at least thirty days' advance notice. The Court noted that jurisdictional issues could be raised later if they survive.
The High Court quashed and set aside the impugned order dated 17.06.2025 passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found that the writ petition and its annexures clearly indicated that sufficient cause was shown for the delay in filing the Income Tax Return. The Court was of the view that the concerned officer should have been lenient with regard to the condonation of delay application. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay was allowed. The petitioner was directed to file its income tax return within a period of two weeks from the date of the order. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions.
The High Court held that no interference was required at this stage. The Court reasoned that the notice issued was merely a summons requiring the petitioners to appear and produce documents, either personally or through an authorized representative. The Court viewed this as a procedural step in the assessment process. Consequently, the High Court directed the petitioners to appear before the concerned authorities on October 14, 2025, at 11:00 A.M., explicitly stating that no adjournment would be granted. The writ petition was disposed of with this direction. No specific issue regarding the merits of the assessment or the validity of the summons beyond its procedural nature was decided.
The Court directed the authorities to pass a reasoned order in accordance with law within 12 weeks from the date of the order. This order was to be passed after granting an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner. The Court explicitly stated that all points of law, including the point of limitation, shall be kept open before the authorities. The Court did not decide on the validity of the reassessment proceedings themselves but rather on the procedural aspect of the unaddressed objection. The operative direction was for the authorities to consider the petitioner's objection and pass a reasoned order.
The High Court held that orders passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in all such matters, along with any consequential proceedings, were required to be quashed and set aside. The Court directed the Assessing Officer to allow the petitioner to file fresh objections, including jurisdictional ones, and to dispose of these objections in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal. The petitioner was granted four weeks to file these objections and was assured an opportunity of hearing. The Court clarified that the assessee could pursue all rights and remedies except those concluded by the Supreme Court judgments. It also noted that the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 112, 113, and 114 of Rajeev Bansal regarding orders passed under Section 148A(d) beyond time would apply.
The High Court held that orders passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and any other consequential proceedings in such matters are required to be quashed and set aside. The Court directed the Assessing Officer to allow the petitioner to file fresh objections. These objections are to be disposed of in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal. The petitioner is permitted to raise new objections, including jurisdictional ones, and rely on other applicable Supreme Court judgments. The objections are to be filed within four weeks, after which the authority must grant a hearing and pass orders in accordance with the law. The assessee is also at liberty to pursue all rights and remedies, except for issues already concluded by the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal. The Court also noted that observations made in paragraphs 112, 113, and 114 of Rajeev Bansal regarding orders passed under Section 148A(d) beyond time shall apply.
The High Court held that orders passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in all the aforementioned matters, and any consequential proceedings, are required to be quashed and set aside. The Assessing Officer is directed to allow the petitioner to file fresh objections. These objections must be disposed of in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal. The petitioner is granted liberty to raise new objections, including jurisdictional ones, and rely on other applicable Supreme Court judgments. The objections are to be filed within four weeks. The authority must then provide a hearing opportunity and pass orders as per law. The assessee can pursue all rights and remedies except those concluded by the Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal judgments. Observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 112, 113, and 114 of Rajeev Bansal regarding orders passed beyond time shall also apply.
The High Court held that orders passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and any consequential proceedings in all such matters are required to be quashed and set aside. The Assessing Officer is directed to allow the petitioner to file objections once again. These objections are to be disposed of in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal. The petitioner is permitted to raise new objections, including jurisdictional ones, and rely on other applicable Supreme Court judgments. The objections are to be filed within four weeks, after which the authority must grant a hearing and pass orders in accordance with law. The assessee is also at liberty to pursue all rights and remedies, except for issues already concluded by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases. The Court also clarified that observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 112, 113, and 114 of Rajeev Bansal regarding orders passed beyond time shall apply.
The Tribunal held that the orders passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in all such matters, including the present one, and any consequential proceedings, are required to be quashed and set aside. The Assessing Officer was directed to allow the petitioner to file fresh objections, including jurisdictional ones, and to dispose of these objections in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal. The petitioner was granted liberty to raise new objections and rely on other applicable Supreme Court judgments. The petitioner was to file these objections within four weeks, and the authority was to grant a hearing and pass orders accordingly. The Tribunal also clarified that the assessee is at liberty to pursue all rights and remedies, except for issues concluded by the judgments of Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal. Further, for orders passed under Section 148A(d) beyond time, the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 112, 113, and 114 of Rajeev Bansal were to apply. The ratio decidendi is that reassessment proceedings initiated under Section 148 based on notices issued between April 1, 2021, and June 30, 2021, are subject to the principles laid down in Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal, and if found to be invalid, fresh opportunities for filing objections must be provided.
The High Court held that the orders passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in all such matters, including the petitioner's, and any consequential proceedings, are required to be quashed and set aside. This decision is based on the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal and Union of India vs. Ashish Agarwal, which dealt with the validity of notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act from April 1, 2021, to June 30, 2021. The Court directed the Assessing Officer to allow the petitioner to file fresh objections within four weeks, including jurisdictional ones, and to dispose of these objections in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court. The petitioner is also permitted to rely on other applicable Supreme Court judgments. The Assessing Officer must grant an opportunity of hearing before passing orders. The Court also clarified that observations made in paragraphs 112, 113, and 114 of the Rajeev Bansal judgment regarding orders passed beyond time shall apply.
The High Court held that orders passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and any consequential proceedings, in all such matters, are required to be quashed and set aside. The Assessing Officer was directed to allow the petitioner to file fresh objections, including jurisdictional ones and those based on other applicable Supreme Court judgments, within four weeks. After the objections are filed, the Assessing Officer must grant an opportunity of hearing and pass orders in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal. The assessee is at liberty to pursue all rights and remedies except those concluded by the Supreme Court judgments. The Court also noted that observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 112, 113, and 114 of Rajeev Bansal regarding orders passed under Section 148A(d) beyond time shall apply.
The Allahabad High Court held that orders passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in matters concerning reassessment notices issued between April 1, 2021, and June 30, 2021, are required to be quashed and set aside. This decision is based on the Supreme Court's judgments in Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal and Union of India vs. Ashish Agarwal, which have settled the issue of the validity of such notices. The court directed the Assessing Officer to allow the petitioner to file fresh objections, including jurisdictional ones, within four weeks. The Assessing Officer must then provide an opportunity for a hearing and pass orders in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court. The assessee is permitted to pursue all legal remedies except those already concluded by the Supreme Court's rulings. The court also noted that observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 112, 113, and 114 of the Rajeev Bansal judgment regarding orders passed beyond time would apply.
The High Court held that the orders passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in all such matters, including the petitioner's, and any consequential proceedings, are required to be quashed and set aside. This decision is based on the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal and Union of India vs. Ashish Agarwal, which have decided the issue regarding the validity of notices issued under Section 148 from April 1, 2021, till June 30, 2021. The court directed the Assessing Officer to allow the petitioner to file objections again and dispose of them in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court. The petitioner is at liberty to raise new objections, including jurisdictional ones, and rely on other applicable Supreme Court judgments. These objections are to be filed within four weeks, after which the authority must grant a hearing and pass orders. The assessee is also free to pursue other rights and remedies, except for issues concluded by the Supreme Court judgments. The court also noted that observations made in paragraphs 112, 113, and 114 of Rajeev Bansal (supra) regarding orders passed under Section 148A(d) beyond time shall apply.
The High Court held that orders passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in all such matters, and any consequential proceedings, are required to be quashed and set aside. The Assessing Officer was directed to allow the petitioner to file fresh objections, including jurisdictional ones, and to dispose of these objections in accordance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal. The petitioner was granted liberty to raise new objections and rely on other applicable Supreme Court judgments. The authority was directed to grant an opportunity of hearing and pass orders in accordance with law. The assessee was also given liberty to pursue all rights and remedies, except those concluded by the Supreme Court judgments. The Court also made it clear that observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 112, 113, and 114 of Rajeev Bansal regarding orders passed beyond time shall apply.
The High Court held that the order dated April 7, 2025, passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 2(1)(1), Kanpur, rejecting the petitioner's rectification application under Section 154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was in violation of the principles of audi alteram partem and natural justice, as it was passed without granting an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Consequently, the impugned order was quashed and set aside. The Court directed the authorities to grant an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner in accordance with law before disposing of the Section 154 application. The ratio decidendi is that an order passed without affording a hearing, when such a hearing is contemplated or required by principles of natural justice, is unsustainable and liable to be set aside.
The Tribunal, in light of the submissions made by the revenue, directed the respondent concerned to ensure that the refunds are received by the petitioner within a period of 8 weeks from the date of the order. The Tribunal emphasized that all efforts should be made by the respondent concerned to ensure this outcome in accordance with law. No specific issue was left undecided, as the matter was resolved based on the revenue's submission regarding the refund processing. The operative direction was for the expeditious release of the refunds to the petitioner.
The Tribunal, in light of the submissions made by the respondents, directed the concerned respondent to ensure that the refunds are received by the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of the order. All efforts were to be made by the respondent concerned to ensure this compliance in accordance with law. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions. No specific finding on the entitlement to the refund was recorded, as the issue was resolved based on the respondent's submission regarding processing and expected disbursement.
The High Court allowed Writ Tax No. 71 of 2025 and dismissed the Customs Appeals. The Court found that the department's actions in drawing samples and sending them for testing were motivated and suspicious, lacking adherence to established guidelines and regulations. Specifically, the Court noted that the department sent a second sample for testing without an application from the importer, contrary to Regulation 9(9) and 9(10) of the Food Safety and Standards (Import) Regulations, 2017. The Court also observed that the time limits for analysis under the FSSAI Guidelines were flouted. The earliest report from M/s Fare Labs Pvt. Ltd., which indicated the commodity as 'roasted areca nuts' with 3.39% moisture content, was deemed the most authentic and reliable, meeting the guidelines of FSSA and the Customs Department. The Court found no plausible reasons for denying the benefit of this report to the importer. Consequently, the seizure memo dated 10.03.2025 was quashed, and the imported commodity was directed to be released on usual compliances, subject to the condition that the importer provides for treatment of the nuts by 'Gamma Irradiation process' as per BARC recommendations. The Court clarified that it only dealt with the classification issue and not other avenues of import or issues not raised.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the petitioner had failed to point out any extraordinary or exceptional circumstances to bypass the statutory alternative remedy of appeal. The Court noted that the parameters for exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are well-settled and should be exercised sparingly, only in exceptional circumstances, even when an alternative remedy exists. The judgment cited the Supreme Court's decisions in Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited vs. MB Power (MP) Limited and Radha Krishan Industries vs. State of H.P. to emphasize that when a statute prescribes a remedy, that remedy must be pursued before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226. The Court found no failure of natural justice or lack of jurisdiction in the proceedings. The determination made by the assessing authority, based on the material on record, was open to appeal. Therefore, the petition was dismissed, leaving it open for the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy.
The Tribunal was correct in allowing the assessee's appeal and quashing the order passed by the PCIT under Section 263. The Tribunal thoroughly examined the record and found that the AO had issued six notices under Section 142(1) along with questionnaires, to which the assessee provided extensive replies (approximately 300 pages) and documentary evidence. The AO discussed each reason for scrutiny, recorded findings based on the evidence, and concluded that no adverse inference could be drawn. The Tribunal itself reviewed the issues of dividend income exemption and unsecured loans, finding that all material was produced before the AO and verified. Therefore, the Tribunal's conclusion that the PCIT's reasons, based on Explanation 2 to Section 263 regarding the AO's failure to make inquiries or verification, were without basis and contrary to the record, was sound. The Tribunal found the PCIT's order to be without jurisdiction. The High Court found no perversity in the Tribunal's findings and no substantial question of law arose.
The Tribunal held that while the impugned notice contained the necessary details and grounds for its issuance, its concluding part, which directed the petitioner to reply regarding tax and penalty and warned of an order under Section 74(9) if no reply was furnished, was problematic. However, the notice was not considered patently illegal or without jurisdiction, as it did contain the foundation of the case, namely, the allegation of no actual supply of goods. Therefore, the Tribunal did not quash the notice but relegated the petitioner to the remedy of filing a reply. The petitioner was permitted to file a reply within one month, specifically addressing the fact that goods were indeed supplied by M/s Raghav Enterprises. The Tribunal also directed that the SIB report would not be considered final and would be subject to the Assessing Authority's decision, which would consider the petitioner's reply, evidence, and offers. The ratio is that a show cause notice must lay the foundation of the case and indicate the proposed action, but if the foundation is present, the assessee should be allowed to respond, even if the proposed action is not clearly stated.
The High Court held that the maintainability of a writ petition against an order under Section 148A(d) is distinct from the scope of adjudication available. The limited scope under Article 226 is confined to the existence of information suggesting escaped assessment, in view of the scheme of the Act. The Supreme Court in Red Chilli International Sales directed the High Court to consider the reply and the order under Section 148A(d) because the issues were not examined, not to endorse that a writ petition is not maintainable. The Supreme Court in Anshul Jain observed that reassessment proceedings under Section 148 offer more exhaustive examination and remedies. The Court found no merit in the challenge to the order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148. The order passed under Section 148A(d) is subject to the final reassessment order under Section 148, and any observations on merits by the assessing authority do not prejudice the assessee's rights. The writ petition was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were without jurisdiction and fundamentally defective. It was undisputed that the transferor company, M/s Kanpur Builders Pvt. Ltd., did not exist as a corporate entity on March 28, 2021, when the reassessment notice was issued, as it had merged with the petitioner (transferee company) effective April 1, 2014, for AY 2015-16. The income for AY 2015-16 was correctly assessed in the hands of the petitioner/transferee company, as evidenced by the original assessment order dated December 30, 2017. The Tribunal found the revenue's reliance on Mahagun Realtors (P) Ltd. to be inapposite, as that case did not involve a lack of fundamental jurisdiction in reassessment proceedings. The reassessment notice was inherently defective and incurable. Furthermore, no notice was ever issued to the petitioner company. The assessing authority also failed to examine the original assessment order passed in the petitioner's case, which had taken note of the merger and the property sale, making it difficult to establish a valid 'reason to believe' that income had escaped assessment. Consequently, the impugned reassessment order against the transferor company was set aside for lack of jurisdiction. The Court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the order dated March 29, 2022, and leaving it open for the revenue to proceed in accordance with law, considering Section 150 of the Act and the observations made.
The Tribunal held that the petitioner is entitled to a refund of Rs. 16,00,000 seized from him, along with interest. The reasoning is based on the fact that the existence of the AOP, in whose status the block assessment was made, was disbelieved by the Tribunal in its order dated January 20, 2005, which has attained finality. The subsequent reassessment order was also set aside and attained finality. The Tribunal found that there exists no demand against the petitioner arising from the seizure of cash, nor any other demand that would allow the revenue authorities to detain any part of that amount. Applying Section 132B(4)(b) read with Section 244A(1)(b) of the Act, the petitioner is entitled to interest at the rate of 1.5% per month from the expiry of 20 days from the last authorization issued against him, arising from the seizure/detention of Rs. 32,34,600, up to the date of actual payment on the amount of Rs. 16,00,000. The Tribunal did not find it a fit case to award any further amount by way of cost or compensation, as the block assessment order was made in the status of AOP, and the Tribunal quashed the entire assessment proceedings without allowing regular reassessment. The operative direction is that the writ petition is allowed, and the petitioner is entitled to the refund of Rs. 16,00,000 along with interest as calculated.
The Tribunal held that the petitioner's 'tax dues' were 'quantified' before the cut-off date of 30.06.2019. The Tribunal relied on the definition of 'quantified' in Section 121(r) of the Scheme, which means a written communication of the amount of duty payable. It further relied on a CBIC Circular issued under Section 133 of the Scheme, which clarified that an admission of duty liability in writing by a person during an enquiry or investigation would be considered a 'written communication' and thus 'quantified'. The Tribunal found that the director's statement admitting duty liability of Rs. 45,38,231/- on 13.05.2016, along with the earlier panchnama amount, constituted a quantified amount. The Tribunal also held that the CBIC Circular was binding and enforceable, even if it appeared to enlarge the scope of the Scheme, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Customs, Calcutta Vs. IOCL and UCO Bank, Calcutta Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, W.B. The reasoning of the Designated Committee was found to be contrary to law. The impugned order was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Designated Committee to issue the necessary SVLDRS-3 form. The petitioner was granted thirty days to deposit the amount and obtain a Discharge Certificate.