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The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises for consideration. The Court noted the undisputed facts that the approval to the draft assessment order under Section 153D was granted on December 31, 2017, for 38 cases, including the assessee's, by a single approval letter. The Court found it humanly impossible for the Approving Authority to have perused the material for 38 cases in one day and applied its independent mind. Therefore, the Tribunal's conclusion that the approval was a mechanical exercise of power, vitiating the proceedings, was not perverse or contrary to the material on record. The Court emphasized that Section 153D requires prior approval for 'each assessment year' and that the approval must reflect an application of mind to the facts and material on record, as held by the Apex Court in Sahara India vs. CIT and Others (2008) 300 ITR 403 (SC). The Court dismissed the appeal as devoid of merit.
The Court held that no substantial question of law arises for consideration. The Tribunal's conclusion that the approval under Section 153D was mechanical was based on undisputed facts. The Approving Authority granted approval for 123 cases, including those of the respondent-assessee, on 30.12.2017 and 31.12.2017, with the final approval on 31.12.2017. The Court found it humanly impossible for the Approving Authority to have applied an independent mind to appraise the material of 123 cases in one day. The reasoning of the Tribunal, relying on the Apex Court's observation in Sahara India vs. CIT (2008) that the approval must not be an empty ritual and must reflect an application of mind to the facts of the case, was upheld. The conjoint reading of Sections 153A and 153D mandates separate approval for 'each assessment year'. Therefore, the Tribunal's finding that the mechanical approval vitiated the proceedings was not perverse or contrary to the material on record. The appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order dated March 30, 2022, was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner had participated in the proceedings, filed detailed responses, and specifically requested a personal hearing through video conferencing, which was acknowledged by the authorities. The assessment order did not indicate that any hearing was granted or provide reasons for denial. The Tribunal noted that Section 144B(7), effective from April 1, 2022, mandates personal hearings via video conferencing if requested by the assessee. Since the petitioner's request for a hearing was not addressed, the assessment order was found to be procedurally deficient. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the assessment order and remitted the matter back to the competent authority/National Faceless Assessment Centre to pass a fresh assessment order after providing the petitioner with a due opportunity of hearing, including fixing a date for personal hearing through video conferencing. The issue regarding the constitutionality of the omission of Section 144B(9) was not expressly decided.
The High Court held that a writ of mandamus directing the release of seized jewelry under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not the appropriate remedy in this case. The Court observed that the petitioner's claim for the release of seized items should be pursued through the appropriate administrative channels within the Income Tax Department. Consequently, the Court relegated the petitioner to approach the Director General of Income Tax (respondent no. 3). The Court directed that upon receipt of a fresh application from the petitioner within two weeks, along with a copy of the order, respondent no. 3 shall look into the matter and take necessary action in accordance with the law. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions.
The Tribunal noted that the petitioner had already approached the appellate authority under Section 55 of the UPVAT Act challenging the assessment order. Therefore, the petitioner was granted liberty to challenge the demand raised in the order dated August 31, 2019, by filing an interim application in their pending appeal. The grounds raised in the writ petition concerning the recovery would be open for agitation in this interim application. The Tribunal directed that if such an interim application is filed, the competent appellate authority must decide it by passing a reasoned and speaking order, addressing all points of objection in accordance with the law. The prayer for refund of tax and penalty illegally realized in the absence of a demand notice was also to be considered by the appellate authority. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions.
The High Court disposed of the writ petitions, holding that the challenge to the orders of the Settlement Commission entertaining the applications was premature. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in K. Jaya Prakash Narayanan's case and judgments from the Punjab and Haryana, Delhi, and Andhra Pradesh High Courts, the court reasoned that the validity of an order entertaining a settlement application is not required to be gone into at that preliminary stage. The final order of the Settlement Commission can be challenged by availing appropriate remedies, at which stage all issues, including the maintainability of the application, will be open for consideration. The court noted that the Settlement Commission has discretion at the stage of Section 245D(1) to admit a case based on a prima facie view, and the aspect of admission, except in exceptional circumstances, cannot be a subject of judicial review. The petitioners were granted liberty to address the issue of maintainability in the pending writ petitions challenging the final orders of the Commission.
The High Court held that the writ petitions filed by the Department are premature and liable to be dismissed. The Court relied on the enunciation of law from the Supreme Court in K. Jaya Prakash Narayanan's case and similar views expressed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s C & C Constructions, the Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax vs. Income-Tax Settlement Commission, and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax and another vs. Settlement Commission (IT & WT) and another. These judgments authoritatively hold that an order passed by the Settlement Commission merely entertaining an application under Section 245C cannot be subject to challenge at that interlocutory stage. The validity of such an order, including issues of maintainability like full and true disclosure and payment of tax, can be raised by the aggrieved party (either the Department or the assessee) only after the final order under Section 245D(4) of the Act is passed, by availing appropriate remedies. Therefore, the High Court declined to entertain the petitions at this stage, dismissing them as premature. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to discharge the burden of proof required under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. While the assessee disclosed the source of the deposit, they could not establish the nature of the transaction. The three conditions – identity of the creditor, capacity of the creditor to advance money, and genuineness of the transaction – were not adequately proved by the assessee. Consequently, the burden did not shift to the revenue to prove otherwise. The Tribunal found that the reliance placed by the assessee on the cited judgments was of no benefit. No substantial question of law arose for consideration. The appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the Assessee's argument that mere filing of an appeal within the statutory period automatically treats it as 'not in default' cannot be accepted. Section 220(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, clearly vests discretion with the Assessing Officer to impose conditions for treating an Assessee as not being in default, subject to the circumstances of the case. However, the Tribunal also noted that this discretion is not absolute and must be exercised within the four corners of the law, with justification. The Tribunal found that neither the Deputy Commissioner nor the Principal Commissioner had properly considered the three basic principles for stay applications: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss, as laid down by the Delhi High Court in Tata Teleservices Limited. Consequently, the impugned orders were set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax for a fresh consideration of the stay application, with a direction to pass an appropriate order within two weeks after affording a personal hearing to the petitioner.
The Tribunal held that the order dated 30.7.2020 passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was a non-speaking order. The language of the impugned order did not disclose the mind of the adjudicating authority concerning the objections raised by the assessee. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Ashish Agarwal, highlighting that Section 148A was introduced to streamline the procedure, mandating the Assessing Officer to conduct an enquiry, provide an opportunity of being heard, and pass an order on the basis of material available, including the assessee's reply. Since the impugned order failed to demonstrate consideration of the assessee's reply and lacked proper reasoning, it could not be sustained. The Tribunal rejected the revenue's request for time to file a counter-affidavit, stating that reasons must be evident from the order itself. Consequently, the order was set aside, and the matter was relegated for fresh consideration in accordance with the law.
The High Court did not decide the merits of the case. Instead, it disposed of the writ petition by directing the petitioner to appear before the adjudicating authority on the scheduled date of hearing, October 17, 2022. The Court observed that the petitioner should present all objections to the show cause notice, including the issues of limitation and jurisdiction. The adjudicating authority is mandated to consider all objections raised by the petitioner, both in writing and during the personal hearing, and to pass an expeditious decision in accordance with the law. No specific finding was made on the limitation issue by the High Court.
The Tribunal held that the demand for duty under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act was unsustainable. It reasoned that Section 11A empowers recovery of duties not levied or paid, but the present case lacked any allegation or finding of clandestine removal in contravention of Rule 8. The Tribunal emphasized that the burden to allege and establish clandestine removal lies with the department, and no such presumption exists under the Act or Rules. Therefore, the demand of duty without such an allegation and establishment could not be accepted. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the rejection of the remission application was contrary to the law laid down in the case of Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd. (supra), as the authorities considered the measurement by State Excise authorities as correct for valuation, ignoring that the remission claim was over a larger period. Consequently, the impugned orders rejecting the remission applications were set aside.
The Tribunal held that the controversy regarding the liability of legal heirs of Late Giri Lal Jain for wealth tax, as per the assessment order, has been settled by the High Court's judgment dated August 11, 2016, in the case of Deepak Kumar Jain. The petitioners are in the same position as Deepak Kumar Jain, and therefore, are entitled to the same relief. The Tribunal found substance in the petitioners' submission that their claim is covered by the prior judgment. Consequently, the competent authority is directed to consider the petitioners' claim strictly in light of the August 11, 2016 judgment and determine the refund amount with interest within four weeks. The petitioners are entitled to the same relief as granted to Deepak Kumar Jain, which included refund of the appropriated amount with 12% interest and setting aside of the order upholding the appropriation.
The Tribunal held that the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were without jurisdiction due to the absence of valid satisfaction recorded by the prescribed authority under Section 151 of the Act at the time of issuance. The Tribunal noted that the satisfaction must be recorded under the signature of the prescribed authority after an application of mind, not mechanically. In the present cases, the satisfaction was either recorded subsequent to the issuance of the Section 148 notice or was mechanically noted as 'yes' without proper application of mind. This failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Sections 147 and 151 rendered the notices invalid. The Tribunal also noted that the issue of whether the Principal Chief Commissioner or Commissioner is a designated authority under Section 282A for recording satisfaction under Section 151 was left open. Consequently, all the writ petitions where there was no valid satisfaction recorded prior to the issuance of the notice were allowed, quashing the notices and consequential proceedings. One petition was dismissed where the satisfaction and notice issuance were simultaneous, with liberty to file an appeal against the reassessment order.
The Tribunal clarified that since the matter was relegated to the first appellate authority solely on the jurisdictional issue and the Tribunal had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the first appellate authority's order dated 19.09.2018, all issues previously raised by the assessee before the first appellate authority, including the issue of jurisdiction raised before the Tribunal as additional grounds, are to be considered afresh by the first appellate authority. The first appellate authority is directed to pass an order strictly in accordance with law, dealing with all issues raised before it after remand. The Tribunal observed that the issue of jurisdiction, being a legal issue, goes to the root of the matter, and therefore, other grounds raised by the assessee on merits were kept open by the ITAT, though not argued. The appeal was disposed of at the admission stage with these observations and directions.
The Hon'ble Court held that the impugned order dated March 31, 2022, passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2018-19, was liable to be quashed. The reasoning was that the Assessing Officer completely failed to consider the reply submitted by the petitioner. The reply had provided specific details regarding bank entries, including dishonored cheques, inter-account transfers, and credited FDR maturities, which were crucial for determining the actual turnover and the genuineness of credits. The rejection of this detailed reply solely on the basis of a report from the Deputy Director of Investigation was found to be unsustainable. The Court quashed the impugned order and remitted the matter back to the concerned respondent/Assessing Officer. The respondent was directed to pass a fresh order after considering the petitioner's reply and affording him a reasonable opportunity of hearing. No specific issue was left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the respondents acted arbitrarily, illegally, without jurisdiction, caused harassment to the petitioner, and abused the powers conferred under the Act, 1961, leading to an illegal demand of Rs. 16,90,61,731. The reassessment proceedings were initiated based on incorrect information from the department's 'insight portal'. The Tribunal found that the department's own counter-affidavit admitted the information was a result of a mistake. The Tribunal quashed the notice dated March 31, 2021, under Section 148, the order dated March 24, 2022, and the reassessment order dated March 31, 2022, for AY 2017-18. The Tribunal also issued directions for developing a mechanism to prevent harassment of assessees due to departmental errors and to fix accountability for officers failing to discharge their duties. The ratio decidendi is that reassessment proceedings initiated on demonstrably incorrect and admitted-to-be-mistaken information, leading to harassment and abuse of power, are liable to be quashed.
The High Court, in view of the submissions made by the parties, found no useful purpose in keeping the writ petition pending. With the consent of the learned counsel for both parties, the writ petition was disposed of. The Court directed the concerned respondent/authority to decide the applications of the petitioner under Section 154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, relating to Assessment Years 2009-2010 to 2015-2016, expeditiously and in accordance with law, after providing the petitioner with a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The specific merits of the Section 154 applications were not decided by the High Court.
The High Court held that the issue of allowability of exemption under Section 11 read with Section 2(15) was concluded by the previous order of the Coordinate Bench in ITA No. 2400/Del/2014, which had restored the registration under Section 12AA after an in-depth examination of the assessee's objects and activities in the context of Section 2(15). The Tribunal had found that the assessee's objects were charitable and that it was entitled to registration. The High Court further noted that the Allahabad High Court had also held that the objects and activities of the Ghaziabad Development Authority were eligible for the benefit of registration under Section 12A, even after considering the proviso to Section 2(15), and that the jurisdictional High Court's judgment has primacy. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, which supported the view that amounts transferred to statutory bodies for public utility purposes are not taxable. The High Court found no substantial question of law involved, as the controversy was concluded by findings of fact and previous judicial pronouncements, including a Supreme Court order dismissing a similar appeal with costs. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order dated March 30, 2022, passed under Section 148A(d), the impugned order dated June 6, 2022, passed under Section 154, and the impugned notice dated March 30, 2022, under Section 148, were all passed arbitrarily and in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. The reasoning was based on the respondents' admission in the short counter-affidavit that the orders were passed without considering the petitioner's reply dated March 29, 2022, which was duly e-filed and acknowledged. The Tribunal expressed concern over Income Tax Authorities frequently disregarding principles of natural justice, often citing system issues. It directed the respondents to remove system shortcomings and develop an accountability mechanism for erring officers. Liberty was granted to the respondents to pass a fresh order under Section 148A(d) after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The writ petition was allowed to the extent indicated, with costs of Rs. 50,000/- imposed on the respondents.
The Allahabad High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court found that respondent no. 2 possessed specific information indicating unverifiable purchases by the petitioner, which led to the escapement of income. This information was received from the Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation). The Court noted that the petitioner had participated in proceedings where information was sought under Section 133(6) and that a show cause notice under Section 148(b) was issued after obtaining prior approval from the specified authority, with the petitioner's reply being found unsatisfactory. Consequently, the Court did not find any good reason to interfere with the impugned orders. The petitioner was left open to appear before the assessing authority pursuant to the notice under Section 148. Any observations made in the order were not to be treated as adverse to the petitioner in the reassessment proceedings under Section 147 for AY 2018-19.
The High Court observed that the respondents' approach in dealing with the petitioner's matter appeared arbitrary and whimsical, causing him to run from pillar to post for a refund of Rs. 38,543/- for Assessment Year 2016-17. The court noted that instead of disposing of his application for treating the return as valid, the respondents were keeping the matter pending. The court expressed hope and trust that the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Gorakhpur, would look into the matter and ensure the petitioner's grievance is redressed by passing an appropriate order in accordance with the law within two weeks from the date of the order. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions.
The Tribunal held that the notice dated March 26, 2022, issued by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2017-18, which granted only a single day for the petitioner to submit a reply, constituted a breach of the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal found that a reasonable opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the petitioner. Consequently, the impugned order dated March 31, 2022, passed by the Principal Commissioner under Section 263, was quashed. The matter was remitted back to the Principal Commissioner to pass a fresh order in accordance with the law, after providing the petitioner with a reasonable opportunity of hearing. No other issues were expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the notice dated March 28, 2022, issued by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 263, which required the petitioner to submit a reply by March 30, 2022, granted an unreasonably short period of one day. This action was found to be a breach of the principles of natural justice and denied the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of hearing. Consequently, the impugned order dated March 31, 2022, passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax for AY 2017-18 under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was quashed. The matter was remitted back to the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax to pass a fresh order in accordance with the law after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The writ petition was allowed to this extent.
The Court held that the substantial questions of law involved in this appeal are concluded by the judgment of this Court in the case of M/S Shri Mehndipur Balaji (supra). Consequently, the appeal is admitted and allowed with the consent of learned counsels for the parties, in terms of the judgment dated 04.07.2022 in Income Tax Appeal No.51 of 2021 (Pr Commissioner Of Income Tax vs. M/S Shri Mehndipur Balaji) and other connected appeals. The impugned order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) is set aside. The appeal before the ITAT is restored to its original number. The ITAT is directed to decide the appeal afresh on merit in accordance with law after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law involved in the present appeal stand concluded by its previous judgment in the case of M/S Shri Mehndipur Balaji (supra). Consequently, the Court admitted and allowed the appeal with the consent of both parties, aligning with the decision in Income Tax Appeal No.51 of 2021. The impugned order of the ITAT was set aside, and the appeal before the ITAT was restored to its original number. The ITAT was directed to decide the appeal afresh on its merits after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to both parties. The principle established is that the Court's prior ruling on the necessity of incriminating material for Section 153A assessments is binding.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law involved in this appeal are concluded by its previous judgment in the case of M/S Shri Mehndipur Balaji (supra). The Court noted that in that precedent, similar questions concerning the framing of assessment or re-assessment under Section 153-A based on incriminating material found during a search under Section 132 were answered in favour of the Revenue. Consequently, the impugned order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) was set aside. The appeal before the ITAT was restored to its original number, and the ITAT was directed to decide the appeal afresh on its merits after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to both parties. The ratio decidendi is that the existence of incriminating material found during a search is not a prerequisite for initiating proceedings under Section 153-A, as established in the cited precedent.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law involved in this appeal are concluded by its prior judgment in the case of M/S Shri Mehndipur Balaji (supra). The Court admitted and allowed the appeal with the consent of learned counsels for the parties, in terms of the judgment dated 04.07.2022 in Income Tax Appeal No. 51 of 2021 and other connected appeals. Consequently, the impugned order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) was set aside. The appeal before the ITAT was restored to its original number, and the ITAT was directed to decide the appeal afresh on merit in accordance with law after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had reason to believe that the petitioner had deposited income through cash, which formed the basis for issuing the impugned order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148. The Tribunal found that the petitioner's contentions regarding the society accounting for the cash deposits and having exemption under the Income Tax Act were matters to be adjudicated during the reassessment proceedings. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that the impugned order could not be interfered with at the present stage. The writ petition was dismissed, with a clarification that any observations made in the order were not to be treated as adverse to the petitioner in the reassessment proceedings. The operative direction was the dismissal of the writ petition.
The Tribunal held that the Income Tax Officer (ITO)-2(1), Moradabad, had the necessary jurisdiction to issue the notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal referred to Section 2(7A) of the Act, which defines 'Assessing Officer' broadly to include officers vested with jurisdiction by orders under Section 120. It also analyzed Section 120, which allows the Board to issue directions for the exercise of powers and performance of functions based on criteria like territorial area, persons, income, and cases. The Tribunal found that the Act does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on a specific Income Tax Authority and acknowledges the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction. The judgment cited the Delhi High Court case of Abhishek Jain Vs. Income Tax Officer, Ward-55 (1), New Delhi, which held that Section 120 allows for concurrent jurisdictions and that the term 'jurisdiction' is used loosely, referring to the 'place of assessment'. The Tribunal concluded that merely because a pecuniary limit is fixed for distribution of work does not imply an inherent lack of jurisdiction for the ITO. Therefore, the ITO did not lack inherent jurisdiction in issuing the notice, and the writ petition was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the entire matter was concluded by concurrent findings of fact recorded by the CIT (Appeal) and the ITAT in its impugned order. Therefore, no substantial question of law was involved. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The reasoning was based on the principle that when lower appellate authorities have concurrently found facts, and no specific legal error is demonstrated, the High Court should not interfere. The operative direction was the dismissal of the Revenue's appeal, upholding the order of the CIT (Appeal) and the ITAT's prior remand directions.
The High Court quashed the impugned order dated 30.3.2022 passed by respondent no. 3 under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act for the assessment year 2015-16. The Court reasoned that the notice was sent to an old email ID, not the current registered one, which meant the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to submit objections as required. To meet the ends of justice, the matter was remitted back to respondent no. 3 to pass a fresh order after providing the petitioner with an opportunity of hearing. The writ petition was disposed of accordingly.
The Tribunal noted that the petitioner was not pressing relief (a) concerning the Office Memoranda, and therefore, that relief was rejected as not pressed. Regarding reliefs (b), (c), and (d) concerning the stay of demand and consequential proceedings, the Tribunal observed that the petitioner had an admitted pending appeal before the CIT(Appeal). The Tribunal held that it was open for the petitioner to file an application for stay in the pending appeal, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Income Tax Officer vs. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi. Consequently, the Tribunal found no good reason to issue directions to stay the demand or consequential proceedings. For relief (e) concerning expeditious disposal, the Tribunal granted liberty to the petitioner to submit an application before the appellate authority. The Tribunal expected that such an application would be disposed of by the appellate authority within two weeks of its submission. The writ petition was disposed of on this basis.
The Tribunal noted that the petitioner was not pressing relief (a) concerning the Office Memorandums, and thus, that relief was rejected as not pressed. Regarding reliefs (b), (c), and (d) concerning the stay of demand and consequential proceedings, the Tribunal observed that the petitioner had an admitted pending appeal before the CIT(Appeal). The Tribunal held that it was open for the petitioner to file an application for stay in the pending appeal, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Income Tax Officer vs. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi. Consequently, the Tribunal found no good reason to issue directions to stay the demand or consequential proceedings. For relief (e) regarding expeditious disposal, the Tribunal granted liberty to the petitioner to submit an application before the appellate authority. The Tribunal expected that such an application would be disposed of by the appellate authority within two weeks of its submission. The writ petition was disposed of accordingly.
The Tribunal noted that the petitioner was not pressing relief (a) concerning the Office Memorandums, and therefore, that relief was rejected as not pressed. Regarding reliefs (b), (c), and (d) concerning the stay of demand and consequential proceedings, the Tribunal observed that the petitioner had an admitted pending appeal before the CIT(Appeal). The Tribunal held that it was open for the petitioner to file an application for stay in the pending appeal, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Income Tax Officer vs. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi. Consequently, the Tribunal found no good reason to issue directions to stay the demand or consequential proceedings. For relief (e) concerning the expeditious disposal of the appeal, the Tribunal granted liberty to the petitioner to submit an application before the appellate authority. The Tribunal expected the appellate authority to dispose of such an application within two weeks of its submission. The writ petition was disposed of in light of these observations.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal of the Revenue. The Tribunal found that the assessee trust was registered under Section 12AA for charitable activity of "Education". While the AO alleged collection of capitation fee, no order from any regulatory authority was produced to substantiate this claim. The Tribunal noted that Supreme Court judgments permit educational institutions to fix their fee structure to generate a reasonable surplus for expansion, provided there is no profiteering or charging of capitation fees. The assessee demonstrated that for the relevant assessment year, no fee was fixed by the competent authority for MBBS and BAMS courses, and for paramedical courses, the fee charged was within the prescribed limits. The Tribunal concluded that the AO's computation of excess fee was based on presumption and lacked documentary evidence. Furthermore, there was no surplus generated, and the assessee was not engaged in profiteering. The Tribunal found no violation of Sections 11, 12, or 13 of the Act, as the income was applied for charitable purposes (education). Therefore, no substantial question of law was involved, and the appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the registration under Section 12AA was granted to the assessee by its earlier order, which was brought to the notice of the CIT(A) but not considered. Since the registration was effective from 30.04.2008, the assessee's claim for exemption under Section 11 for Assessment Years 2012-13 and 2013-14 was valid. Consequently, the appeals of the assessee for both assessment years were allowed. The High Court found that the Tribunal's findings were based on facts and material on record, and no substantial questions of law were involved. Therefore, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
The High Court held that the Assessing Officer had some relevant material before him to assume jurisdiction for initiating reassessment proceedings. While the petitioner provided an explanation with a bank certificate for the cash deposits in the savings bank accounts, they failed to submit credible evidence regarding the unsecured loan of Rs. 28,53,439 to establish the lender's creditworthiness. Therefore, the impugned order under Section 148A(d) of the Act, 1961, could not be deemed to be without jurisdiction or illegal. The Court dismissed the writ petition, allowing the petitioner to participate in the reassessment proceedings. Any observations made in the order were clarified not to be treated as adverse by the Assessing Authority.
The Tribunal held that the penalty imposed under Section 54(1)(14) of the Act, 2008, was just, proper, and reasonable. The Tribunal was not satisfied with the revisionist's explanation for the diversion of the truck to Allahabad, especially since the documents produced did not indicate this diversion and were suspected to be prepared as an afterthought. The fact that the goods, despite being released on security, were not supplied to M/s Pancham Realcon Pvt. Ltd. and the transaction was not recorded in the revisionist's returns further strengthened the apprehension of tax evasion. The Tribunal found that the revisionist failed to prove the transaction with M/s Pancham Realcon Pvt. Ltd. and that the goods were not meant for sale in Allahabad. The Court, in its revisional powers, found no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's findings, noting that the Tribunal, as the last fact-finding authority, had considered all facts and documents and provided cogent reasons for its decision. The Court also referred to a previous decision of the same Court in similar circumstances.
The Tribunal noted that the learned counsel for the respondent nos. 2, 3, and 4 produced a copy of an order dated 1.7.2022 for the Assessment Year 2018-2019 relating to the petitioner. This order recorded that the re-assessment proceedings initiated against the petitioner under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act on 29.3.2022 had been dropped. In light of this submission by the revenue's counsel, the Tribunal found that no cause of action now survived in the present writ petition. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of in terms of the statement made by the learned counsel for the respondents. No specific finding was given on the merits of the petitioner's challenge to the re-opening notice or the alleged misrepresentation of facts, as the proceedings were dropped.
The Tribunal held that for the assessment year under consideration, the revisionist was admittedly not registered for the purchase of railway siding, locomotives, and transmitters against Form C, despite these items being essential for the manufacturing process and subsequently being registered for purchase from March 31, 1995. The Court referred to Section 10(b) of the Act, which allows for penalty if a dealer falsely purchases goods claiming they are covered by a registration certificate when they are not. The revisionist had not applied for registration of these specific items, nor was there any rejection of such an application. The Court distinguished the case of Indian Copper Corporation Ltd. by noting that in the present case, no application was made for inclusion of these items for registration, and the revisionist continued to purchase them using Form C knowing it was unauthorized. Regarding the 'mens rea' argument, the Court found that the revisionist had not applied for registration of railway siding, locomotives, and transmitters, and had not demonstrated any bona fide belief or mistake of fact. The Court concluded that the utilization of Form C for these items was malafide and unauthorized, with the intention to evade tax. Therefore, there was no infirmity in the imposition of penalty under Section 10 of the Act, and no interference was required in the order of the Tribunal. The questions of law were answered against the assessee and in favour of the revenue.
The Tribunal's impugned orders were set aside. The High Court answered the substantial questions of law in favour of the Revenue and against the assessees. The Court held that Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, contains a non-obstante clause that overrides Sections 139, 147, 148, 149, 151, and 153. This means that the Assessing Officer is empowered to assess or reassess the total income for six assessment years preceding the year of search, even if the assessment was already finalized under Section 143(1)(a) or 143(3). The Court relied on its own previous judgments in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Raj Kumar Arora and Kesarwani Zarda Bhandar, which held that the Assessing Officer has the power to reopen concluded assessment proceedings and determine the total income, including undisclosed income found during a search, notwithstanding that the assessee had filed a return before the search which was processed under Section 143(1)(a). Therefore, the ITAT's reasoning that no material was found during the search and that the assessment was concluded was not sustainable. All appeals before the ITAT were restored to their original numbers and directed to be decided afresh on merits.
The Tribunal held that the assessing officer had correctly formed the opinion to issue notice under Section 148 of the Act. The court noted that the assessing officer possessed information from DDIT(Inv.) 7(4), New Delhi, regarding the petitioner's involvement in trading shares of 'Alankit Limited' during FY 2017-18, allegedly showing exempt LTCG under Section 10(38) for AY 2018-19. A chart of transactions was provided to the assessee. The petitioner's Income Tax Return showed LTCG of Rs. 17,12,811/- with STT paid. The petitioner admitted to transactions in 'Alankit Limited' scrip in his reply. The information also indicated that 'Alankit Limited' was a penny stock and the petitioner was a beneficiary of bogus profits. In view of these facts, the Tribunal found no good reason to interfere with the impugned order. The observations were made solely for testing the validity of the order under Section 148A(d).
The High Court disposed of the writ petition without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case. The Court noted that the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Ghaziabad, had initiated suo motu action under Section 264 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, by issuing a notice dated May 30, 2022. This action was taken to afford the petitioner an opportunity of personal hearing and to re-examine the case, including submissions and documentary evidence, in light of the impugned re-assessment order. Given this subsequent development, the Court found no good reason to proceed further with the writ petition. The operative direction was to dispose of the writ petition at this stage, acknowledging the suo motu action taken by the Principal Commissioner.
The Hon'ble Court, in view of the statement made by the respondents in paragraph 10 of their instructions, quashed the impugned reassessment order dated 31.03.2021 for the assessment year 2015-16. The matter was restored. Liberty was granted to the respondent No. 2 (Jurisdictional Assessing Officer) to pass a fresh reassessment order, if required, in accordance with law. This fresh order is to be passed after confronting the petitioner with all relevant adverse material, if any, and after affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The petitioner was also granted liberty to raise all objections available to them under law. The writ petition was disposed of with the consent of learned counsel for the parties. The principle established is that procedural defects in the show cause notice, if admitted by the revenue and if they prejudice the assessee's right to a fair hearing, can lead to the quashing of the assessment order and a remand for fresh proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order dated 31.03.2022 passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2018-19, could not be sustained. The reasoning was that the Assessing Officer had failed to consider the reply submitted by the petitioner, along with the supporting documents, and had not afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing as mandated by Section 148A of the Act. The Tribunal found that the opportunity of hearing had been rendered an empty formality. Consequently, the impugned order was quashed. The matter was remitted back to the Assessing Officer to pass a fresh order after considering the petitioner's reply and providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The writ petition was allowed to this extent.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order dated 31.03.2022 passed under Section 148A(d) and the notice dated 31.03.2022 under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2018-19, were patently erroneous and grossly illegal. The Tribunal noted that the assessing authority had acted arbitrarily and illegally by passing the order despite the petitioner fully explaining the information with documentary evidence. The revenue, through the personal affidavit of the Principal Commissioner, admitted that the proceedings needed to be dropped. The Tribunal also referred to CBDT instructions and an affidavit from the Union of India regarding action against erring officers. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the impugned order and notice, allowing the writ petition. The Tribunal directed the Union of India to initiate appropriate proceedings against the erring officers and to communicate the action taken to the petitioner within four weeks, submitting a compliance report within six weeks.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order dated 30.11.2021, rejecting the petitioner's immunity application under Section 270AA, was unsustainable. The Tribunal found that the AO issued notice on 29.11.2021, requiring a reply by 30.11.2021, and on the very next day, passed the order rejecting the application. The petitioner had specifically requested an opportunity for further substantiation and a personal hearing in his reply dated 30.11.2021. The AO's order merely stated that the reply was 'not found satisfactory' without providing any specific reasons. This action was found to be in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and the statutory mandate of the proviso to Section 270AA(4), which requires an opportunity of being heard before rejecting an application. Consequently, the penalty order dated 18.03.2022, passed subsequent to the rejection of the immunity application, was also quashed. The AO was directed to pass a fresh order on the immunity application within one month, affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing. If the immunity application is allowed, the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 246A will stand withdrawn. If rejected, the AO can pass a penalty order after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was issued on April 1, 2021, for AY 2015-16. The reasons recorded indicated income escaping assessment to the tune of Rs. 48,32,000/-, which is less than Rs. 50,00,000/-. In view of the instructions No. 279/Misc./M-51/2022-ITJ dated May 11, 2022, issued by the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Central Board of Direct Taxes, the limitation for issuing such a notice had expired on March 31, 2021. The Tribunal noted that a similar controversy in Writ Tax No. 347 of 2022 (Ajay Bhandari Versus Union of India and 3 others) was decided on May 17, 2022, relying on the aforesaid Board's Circular dated May 11, 2022. Therefore, the petitioner's case was covered by the judgment in Ajay Bhandari (supra) and the Board's Circular. Consequently, the impugned notice and the order rejecting objections were quashed. The writ petition was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the writ petition was not maintainable. It found that the petitioner's contention that the order under Section 263 was passed without an opportunity of hearing was factually incorrect. The judgment noted that a show cause notice was issued on 02.11.2020, the petitioner sought an adjournment, and subsequently filed a written reply on 22.12.2020. Therefore, it could not be said that the order was passed without affording an opportunity of hearing. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed that the order under Section 263 is appealable under Section 253(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the subsequent assessment order dated 29.03.2022 is appealable under Section 246A of the Act. Given the availability of statutory remedies and the lack of grounds to entertain a writ petition, the Tribunal dismissed the writ petition, leaving it open for the petitioner to avail the statutory remedy of appeal.