53 orders · Page 1 of 2
The Tribunal held that the authorization for re-assessment under Section 29(7) of the VAT Act, 2008, was unjustified and unsustainable. The reasoning was that the original assessment order had already considered the quantum of turnover under the Composition Scheme and the goods imported. The tax was levied at 2% based on the imported goods being less than 5% of the total contract money, a fact not disputed by the department in any appeal. The Tribunal further noted that plant and machinery are capital goods used for construction and remain with the assessee after the work is completed; therefore, they cannot be included in the value of the work contract as per the definition of 'sale' under Section 2(ac)(ii) of the Act. This issue had been settled by the Tribunal in a previous assessment year (2009-10) in favour of the assessee, and the department had not appealed that order, making it final. The Tribunal cited *Union Of India & Others Vs. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation* for the principle that a finalized order is binding. Since the authorization for re-assessment was based solely on the inclusion of capital goods, which had already been decided, the assessing authority lacked the necessary 'reason to believe' that income had escaped assessment. Consequently, the order of authorization and the consequential notice for re-assessment were quashed. The writ petition was allowed.
The Tribunal held that Dinesh Kumar, claiming to be the elected Secretary of the assessee society, lacked the locus standi to file the writ petition. This was due to the non-production of bye-laws or resolutions that would authorize him to institute such proceedings, especially in the context of admitted internal disputes within the society. Furthermore, the Tribunal found the writ petition to be not maintainable because the rival factions within the society, who would be directly affected by any order, were not impleaded as parties. The Court reasoned that in the absence of proper authorization and necessary parties, the writ petition could not proceed. The dismissal of the writ petition was without prejudice to the society's right to take recourse to available legal remedies. No specific finding was made on the merits of the Section 148 notice itself.
The Tribunal held that the notice dated March 30, 2017, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, read with the consequential order dated September 5, 2017, could not be sustained in law. The reasoning was that the stated reason for reopening the assessment, which was the non-filing of a return for the assessment year 2010-2011, was demonstrably false as the assessee had indeed filed a return for that year. The Tribunal found that if there was any issue of undisclosed or concealed income, the reasons for reopening ought to have reflected that, rather than relying on an incorrect factual premise. Consequently, the notice and the order were liable to be set aside and were accordingly set aside. The Tribunal clarified that this setting aside would not prevent the Income Tax authorities from proceeding further in accordance with law. No other issues were expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal noted that the grievance of the writ petitioner had been adequately redressed during the pendency of the writ petition. The Income Tax Officer's counter-affidavit confirmed the issuance of a new refund order on April 11, 2019, for a total sum of Rs. 16,517/-, comprising the principal amount of Rs. 9,520/- and interest of Rs. 6,997/- up to date, for assessment year 1999-2000. Consequently, no further orders were deemed necessary, and the writ petition was disposed of on this basis. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The High Court held that there was no plausible or justifiable reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the learned Tribunal dated June 7, 2019. The Tribunal had remanded the matter to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) for fresh consideration after the assessee's representative submitted that an affidavit detailing agricultural income was not considered and a proper opportunity for justification was not given. The High Court found the Tribunal's decision to remand the matter in the interest of justice to be sound. The ratio decidendi is that where an assessee's claim is prejudiced by non-consideration of crucial evidence and denial of a fair hearing, a remand by the appellate tribunal is appropriate. The appeal filed by Ajay Sharma was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the conditions imposed by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax for the release of the assessee's bank account were bereft of any cogent or justifiable reasons. While the Assessing Officer has the right to impose conditions for releasing a bank account, these conditions must conform to applicable CBDT instructions, circulars, and guidelines. The Tribunal found that the impugned letter dated September 12, 2019, failed to meet this requirement. Therefore, the letter could not be sustained in law and was set aside and quashed. The Tribunal directed the concerned Assessing Officer to take a fresh decision after considering the petitioner's letter dated August 22, 2019. This fresh decision must be supported by cogent and justifiable reasons and must conform to applicable CBDT instructions. The entire exercise was to be completed expeditiously, preferably within a fortnight but not later than three weeks from the communication of the order.
The Court allowed the revisions in favour of the assessee. It held that the benefit under Section 4-BB of the U.P. Trade Tax Act should be granted. The reasoning was that while Section 4-BB stipulates 'tax paid', the manner of payment is not restricted to physical tender. When tax is assessed on a dealer who is exempted under Section 4-A, and this assessed tax is adjusted against the eligibility certificate, it amounts to payment of tax by way of adjustment. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Punjab and others Vs. Perfect Synthetics and others (2008 (3) SCC 702), which held that exemption is given to dealers, not goods, and assessment and deduction from eligibility amounts to payment of tax. The Tribunal had found that the dealer was assessed to tax at 2% and this was adjusted from the eligibility amount, thus presumed to be paid. The Court noted that the revenue's counsel did not dispute that the issues were covered by the cited judgment. Therefore, the assessee was granted the same benefit as extended in the previous judgment. The questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee and against the Department.
The Court held that while Section 132(4A) of the Income Tax Act provides that documents found during a search may be presumed to belong to the person in possession and their contents to be true, this presumption is not absolute, as indicated by the word "may". The revenue must corroborate the entries in the seized documents before assuming the transactions were made by the assessee. The presumption is subject to corroborative evidence. In this case, the Tribunal reversed the CIT (Appeals)'s finding regarding the addition of Rs. 5,58,870/- based solely on the presumption under Section 132(4A) without establishing any link or corroboration between the loose sheets recovered and the assessee. Therefore, the Tribunal's order to that extent was unsustainable. The Court set aside the ITAT's order concerning the addition of Rs. 5,58,870/- and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal for a fresh decision on this specific addition within three months.
The Tribunal erred in sustaining the penalty. The Court noted that the assessee was a manufacturer who had paid excise duty and other applicable duties on the imported raw material. It was undisputed that the goods were raw material for manufacturing excisable goods, entitling the assessee to CENVAT credit. The revenue did not allege clandestine import and sale. The Court emphasized that intention to evade tax is a state of mind requiring careful weighing of all available material. Relying on M/s. Rama Pulses Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., the Court held that a finding of intention to evade tax requires proper reasoning and supporting material, not just discrepancies in forms. The order of the Tribunal was set aside, and the matter was remitted back for fresh decision.
The Court held that while a claim for set off may not be rejected solely for not being raised in the return, the assessee must fulfill the conditions for the set off. Section 4-BB of the Act provides for set off of tax paid on raw materials used in manufacturing notified goods, to be deducted from the tax payable on the sale of such goods. This deduction should be made at the stage of sale or filing of returns. Notification No. 2339 dated 22.10.1996, read with Notification No. 1223 dated 22.5.1998, stipulated that claiming set off was an option, not mandatory. By choosing to charge full tax (4%) on the sale of tubular poles instead of making the deduction for tax paid on raw materials, the assessee implicitly opted out of the set off scheme. Therefore, the assessee lost the right to claim set off under Section 4-BB. The timing of the claim during assessment proceedings became inconsequential as the scheme was optional and the assessee had opted out. The Court answered question 1 in the affirmative, implicitly addressing the other questions by dismissing the revisions.
The High Court held that the CIT(A) was legally justified in considering the additions to labour charges and sundry creditors. It was reasoned that the CIT(A) did not travel beyond the books of accounts submitted by the assessee. The additions were made from the profit and loss account and the balance sheet filed by the assessee, and therefore, it was not a case of introducing a new source of income. The Court distinguished the cases relied upon by the assessee, such as CIT vs. Shapoorji Pallonji Mistry and CIT vs. Sardari Lal & Co., stating that those judgments dealt with situations where additions were made from new sources of income, which was not the case here. The Court cited decisions in Nirbheram Deluram and Jute Corporation of India, holding that the power of the CIT(A) is coterminous with that of the Income Tax Officer and he can do what the Income Tax Officer can do. Regarding the second issue, the Court found that the question of issuing a fresh notice of enhancement was irrelevant because the assessee participated in the proceedings after the High Court's remand order and filed documents. The Court also held that questions III and IV were not substantial questions of law but questions of fact that had been dealt with in depth by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal. Therefore, the order of the Tribunal was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed. The questions of law were answered in favour of the Revenue.
The High Court held that the appeal filed by the Revenue was devoid of merit and dismissed it. The Court noted that the ITAT had allowed the assessee's appeal on the ground that the order under Section 263 of the Act had already been set aside. The Assessee had placed on record this Court's order in Income Tax Appeal No. 107 of 2015 dated 20.08.2019, wherein the department's appeal was dismissed and the proceedings under Section 263 were held to be bad. Consequently, the consequential order passed by the Assessing Officer was also deemed bad. Therefore, the questions of law were decided in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The Tribunal held that for question (ii), concerning the sale of bagasse, no interference was warranted. It found that the first appellate authority had concluded against the assessee based on the record, specifically noting that the assessee had disclosed the sale of 'Lugdi' against Form III-B and realized tax. The assessee had not challenged this finding or approach before the Tribunal. Therefore, question (ii) was answered in favor of the revenue. For question (i), regarding lease rent on turbo alternators, the Tribunal found the Tribunal's reasoning that the alternators could be detached from the earth and were thus 'goods' to be contrary to the decision in M/s. Indian Oil Corporation Limited Vs. CTT. The Tribunal held that the right to sever 'goods' attached to the earth refers to the lessee or licensee, not the owner. However, the taxability issue survived to be considered by the Tribunal based on other clauses in the agreement, specifically whether the lessee had the right to sever the alternators. The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to pass a fresh order, without allowing fresh evidence. For question (iii), concerning the sale of boilers, the Tribunal held that the reasoning of the Tribunal below was erroneous. It stated that the test should be whether the purchaser had the right to remove the boiler equipment under the sale deed. If such a right existed, the goods might be treated as movable, subject to further objections. If not, they would remain immovable property. The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to pass a fresh order, and the assessee was permitted to produce the sale deed as additional evidence within one month. For question (iv), regarding works contract under Section 3AAAA, the Tribunal held that it was undisputed that bricks and ballast 'gitti' were taxable at the point of sale by the manufacturer or importer in the relevant year. Therefore, a liability could not arise under Section 3AAAA upon purchase of such commodities from an unregistered dealer. Question (iv) was answered accordingly.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 37,30,710/- on account of the difference in cash balance was not a case falling under Section 68 or Section 69A of the Income Tax Act. It reasoned that the cash in books was more than the actual cash found, and at most, it could be presumed that the assessee spent the difference, but this did not justify an addition under the cited provisions. Regarding the addition of Rs. 23,31,28,321/-, the Tribunal found that the assessee had submitted all necessary documents, including storage and delivery registers, which tallied with the stock. Crucially, the Tribunal noted that the assessee was licensed under the U.P. Regulation of Cold Storage Act, 1976, and had not violated any terms of its license. The Assessing Officer and CIT(A) had failed to produce any evidence of violation or any proceedings initiated by the licensing authority. The Tribunal concluded that the additions were made on presumption and assumption without material evidence of purchase, sales, or unaccounted stock belonging to the assessee. The Revenue failed to establish that the ITAT's order was manifestly illegal or suffered from an error apparent on the face of the record. The Tribunal, being the last fact-finding authority, had categorically recorded that the additions were wrongly made without material evidence.
The Tribunal noted the issuance of Circular No. 19/2015 dated November 27, 2015, by the CBDT, which amended the provisions of Section 194A(3)(v) of the Income Tax Act. Paragraph 42.5 of this circular clarified that the exemption from TDS on interest payments to members by a cooperative society under Section 194A(3)(v) would not apply to payments of interest on time deposits made by cooperative banks to their members. However, this amendment was prospective, effective from June 1, 2015. Consequently, cooperative banks were not required to deduct tax from interest on time deposits paid or credited before June 1, 2015. The Tribunal also referred to the Madras High Court's interpretation of this circular in Coimbatore District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer (2016) 382 ITR 266. In light of Circular No. 19/2015, the Tribunal held that the questions of law were answered in favour of the appellant and against the department. The appeal was allowed.
The Court held that the ITAT was justified in its findings. Regarding the first issue, the Court affirmed that Clause (d) to Section 80-IB(10), inserted with effect from 1.4.2005, operates prospectively and cannot be applied retrospectively to periods prior to 1.4.2005. The Revenue's argument that this clause should be applied retrospectively was found to be without merit and mutually contradictory. The Court noted that the Supreme Court's observations also support the view that Section 80-IB(10)(d) is applicable prospectively. Regarding the second issue, the Court found that since there was no condition requiring a completion certificate within four years from the local authority for projects approved prior to 1.4.2005, the reassessment proceedings initiated against the assessee were bad in law. Therefore, the ITAT rightly set aside the reassessment proceedings and directed the Assessing Officer to grant the benefit of Section 80-IB(10) to the assessee. The questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee.
The High Court held that the rejection of the assessee's books of account by the lower authorities was justified. This was based on findings of fact that a substantial amount was spent in cash with self-made, unverifiable vouchers, and the assessee admitted not maintaining a stock register or performing quantitative tally. The Court found that the net profit fixed at 8% was reasonable. The Court also noted that the assessee had not shown interest derived from FDRs and lease rent from JCB machines in his books. The Court concluded that since the assessee had not voluntarily maintained his books of account as required, their rejection was justified, and the net profit rate of 8% was reasonable. All lower authorities had rejected the assessee's contentions. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose in the appeal. The appeal was dismissed, with the substantial questions of law answered against the assessee and in favour of the revenue.
The High Court allowed the appeal in favour of the appellant. The Court noted the issuance of Circular No. 19/2015 dated November 27, 2015, by the CBDT, which amended Section 194A(3)(v) of the Income Tax Act. Paragraph 42.5 of this circular clarified that the exemption from TDS on interest paid to members by a cooperative society under Section 194A(3)(v) would not apply to payments of interest on time deposits by cooperative banks to their members. However, this amendment was effective prospectively from June 1, 2015. Consequently, cooperative banks were not required to deduct tax on interest paid on time deposits before June 1, 2015. The Court referred to the Madras High Court's interpretation of this circular in Coimbatore District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer (2016) 382 ITR 266 (Mad). Based on this, the Court concluded that the circular had application to the case of the appellant for the assessment year in question, which predates the effective date of the amendment. Therefore, the questions of law were answered in favour of the appellant, and the appeal was allowed.
The High Court held that the assessment order passed under Section 143(3) was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. The Court noted that the AO had issued 28 queries, which were duly replied to by the assessee with documentary evidence, and the AO, being satisfied, passed the assessment order. The CIT, while exercising powers under Section 263, had partially accepted the assessee's reply regarding share capital. However, regarding unsecured loans and creditors, the CIT directed the AO to re-examine the details. The Court found that the CIT's decision to relegate the matter back to the AO concerning unsecured loans and creditors was unsustainable. The Court relied on several High Court decisions, including CIT vs. Krishan Capbox Ltd., CIT vs. Mahendra Kumar Bansal, and CIT vs. Goyal Private Family Specific Trust, which held that a mere non-discussion of queries and replies in the assessment order does not automatically render the order erroneous or indicate a lack of application of mind by the AO. The Court concluded that the CIT failed to bring on record specific instances to show that the AO's order was erroneous or passed without application of mind. Therefore, the ITAT's order and the CIT's revisional order were set aside. The question of law was answered in favour of the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to establish that the saloon business was an integral part of the core activity of the hotel business. The reasoning was that the saloon business, which commenced later, was not the core activity of the hotel, which primarily involved hiring rooms, halls, and providing food and refreshment. The Tribunal noted that the saloon's facilities were not confined to hotel guests but were also extended to outsiders. Furthermore, the business of hair styling and beauty treatment was considered related to cosmetics and could not be equated with the essential parts of hotel operations. The Tribunal also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. Sterling Foods, emphasizing that the term "derived from" requires a direct nexus between the profits and the industrial undertaking. Consequently, the receipts from the saloon section were not considered to be derived from the hotel business, and the benefit of Section 80IB(7)(a) was rightly denied. The questions of law were answered in favour of the department.
The Tribunal's decision on the first issue was that the entitlement to exemption flows from the exemption notification, not the Eligibility Certificate. It reasoned that the amendment to the exemption notification, specifically the addition of Part-II effective 16.11.1995, would automatically attach to and amend the Eligibility Certificate. The Tribunal relied on the case of Mentha Oil and Allied Product Vs. State of U.P. (1996)103 STC 316. However, the High Court found this reliance erroneous. The Court held that the exemption notification provided the enabling law, but the actual exemption was granted upon the assessee's application being allowed by the Divisional Level Committee via the Eligibility Certificate. The Court distinguished the Mentha Oil case, stating that in that instance, the recognition certificate holder's eligibility was subject to the prevailing notifications, whereas here, the Eligibility Certificate itself granted the exemption. The Court further held that only the Commissioner, under Section 4-A(3) of the Act, could modify the Eligibility Certificate. Since this power was not exercised, the assessing and appellate authorities were bound to give full effect to the certificate. Therefore, the first question of law was answered in favour of the assessee. Regarding the second issue, the Tribunal affirmed the rejection of the books of account. The High Court found this to be a question of fact based on material and evidence, not requiring interference in revisory jurisdiction. Thus, the second question of law was answered in favour of the revenue. Consequently, both revision applications were partly allowed.
The Tribunal did not err in affirming the rejection of the books of account. This was based on the discovery of three non-serialled used invoice books during the survey, recording transactions of approximately Rs. 25,00,000/-, which clearly indicated the assessee was maintaining parallel books. Regarding the estimation of turnover, the Tribunal's addition of Rs. 60,00,000/- (combining UP and Central estimations) was considered neither excessive nor arbitrary. It was based on the undisclosed sales of Rs. 25,00,000/- discovered during the survey, representing a little more than two times the material available to the revenue. The estimation of undisclosed purchase of raw material was a natural consequence of finding that the assessee manufactured and sold goods outside its books. The fact that excise authorities did not find the material adverse was relevant only for their proceedings. The Court declined to consider the proportion of raw material to manufactured goods as it was a finding of fact based on relevant material and consideration, and interference was not warranted under revisional jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the cash credit of Rs. 1,80,000 in the name of Smt. Kallu Devi. Consequently, the addition of this amount as unexplained cash credit was rightly confirmed by the authorities. The creditworthiness of Smt. Kallu Devi was disbelieved by all the lower authorities. The Tribunal found no plausible reason to believe her statement, as she failed to provide adequate explanation or evidence before the concerned authorities. The Tribunal, as the last fact-finding authority, found the creditor not creditworthy and disbelieved the evidence presented. Therefore, there was no ground to interfere with the findings of the lower authorities. The substantial question of law was answered in favour of the Department and against the assessee.
The Tribunal held that once the application for additional evidence was allowed by the first appellate authority, the powers of that authority were co-extensive with the assessing officer, and the applicability of Rule 8-A (4) of the Rules could not be restricted. The Court found that the deficiencies noted in the declaration forms, such as missing registration numbers or effective dates, and the submission of the second copy of Form 'C' instead of the first, constituted minor omissions or mistakes. The judgment emphasized that no inquiry at any stage suggested doubt regarding the genuineness or truthfulness of the transactions. Therefore, it would have been in accordance with Rule 8-A (4) to allow the assessee an opportunity to correct these omissions. The submission of the second copy of Form 'C' was also considered a minor mistake, especially since the assessee was willing to produce the original. The Tribunal set aside the order of the Trade Tax Tribunal and remitted the matter to the first appellate authority to grant the assessee one opportunity to make necessary corrections in the specified forms and thereafter pass an appropriate order.
The Tribunal allowed the revision, setting aside the order of the Trade Tax Tribunal. The question of law was answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal held that a penalty under Section 15-A(1)(O) of the Act requires the Assessing Officer to be satisfied that the dealer had an intention to evade tax. This satisfaction must be recorded in the penalty order itself and cannot be inferred. In the present case, the Assessing Officer's order merely noted the default and did not record any satisfaction regarding the assessee's intention to evade tax. Furthermore, the Tribunal found it difficult to accept the presence of such intention, given that the assessee was a 100% EOU with exempt export sales and no allegation of trading in imported goods. The ratio decidendi is that the satisfaction of intent to evade tax must be explicitly recorded by the Assessing Officer, and mere technical defects in documentation, especially in the absence of evidence of evasion or intent, do not warrant penalty.
The Tribunal held that the revision lacked merit and was accordingly dismissed. The questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The Court relied on its earlier decision in Comfort Systems Vs Commissioner, Commercial Tax, U.P., Lucknow (supra), which addressed similar arguments regarding the applicability of Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, in the context of Rule 9(1)(e) of the UP VAT Rules, 2008. The Court reiterated that the phrase 'as a result of sale in the course of inter-state trade or commerce' in Rule 9(1)(e) must be read to include all transactions covered under Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Gannon Dunkerley-II. The Court found that the appellate authorities had concurrently held that the goods imported by the assessee were used for the execution of the civil works contract, and no material was brought forth to doubt these findings. Therefore, the revenue's contention that the goods were not applied to the contract was not accepted. The Court also clarified that the concept of subsequent sale was not relevant as the assessee's case clearly fell under Rule 9(1)(b) of the UP VAT Rules, 2008, based on the import of goods for execution of the works contract.
The Tribunal held that the applicant had filed a revised return showing the sale of mustard oil and had deposited the tax along with interest before the assessment order was passed. Section 15-A(1)(c) of the Act is attracted only if a person has concealed particulars of their turnover or deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars. Since the applicant filed a revised return which was accepted by the Assessing Authority, and the sale of mustard oil was duly shown in the books of account, it could not be said that the applicant had violated the provisions of Section 15-A(1)(c). Therefore, the levy of penalty was not justified. The questions of law were answered in favour of the revisionist and against the Revenue. The revision was allowed, and the penalty was set aside.
The High Court was of the opinion that the matter required fresh consideration by the Tribunal. The Court noted that the Tribunal had deleted the penalty by giving the assessee the benefit of Section 273-B, which allows for waiver of penalty in case of reasonable cause. The Tribunal had concluded that no TDS was required prior to the survey on February 24, 2014, and that a Delhi High Court judgment on February 16, 2017, and a Supreme Court judgment in the case of NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NO.2) VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (APPEALS) AND OTHERS (2018) 406 ITR 209 (SC) clarified the position regarding lease rent. Due to these developments and the need for a fresh examination of the facts in light of the judicial pronouncements, the High Court remanded the matter back to the Tribunal for reconsideration within three months. The appeals were disposed of finally.
The Tribunal held that while reassessment proceedings may not be permissible for an unspecified reason to believe, the notice impugned in the writ petition did not appear to be proposing to initiate reassessment proceedings for assessment year 2015-16, despite being titled under Section 29 of the Act. A perusal of the notice indicated that the Assessing Officer had merely called for certain information from the petitioner in response to audit objections received. Therefore, the Tribunal disposed of the writ petition with a direction for the petitioner to furnish a reply to the notice. It further directed that if the Assessing Officer proposed to initiate reassessment proceedings, he must do so strictly in accordance with the law and by following the conditions under Section 29 of the Act. The Tribunal did not decide on the validity of reassessment proceedings per se, but rather on the nature of the notice at that stage.
The Tribunal held that while the company deals in both branded and unbranded software, the latter, developed according to client specifications, becomes the property of the client, and the assessee has no further rights over it. However, the Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to produce the crucial work contracts/agreements before the assessing authority, first appellate authority, or the Tribunal to substantiate its claim that the unbranded software development was a service and not 'goods'. The Tribunal distinguished the case of Sasken Communication Technologies, where agreements were placed before the assessing authority. The Tribunal also observed that the Tribunal, being the last fact-finding court, should have recorded a specific finding on the additional grounds raised regarding computer hardware sales, which were not done. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Trade Tax Tribunal and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal to record specific findings after examining the agreements/contracts submitted by the assessee. The assessee was directed to place all relevant agreements before the Tribunal for consideration. The revision was partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the Divisional Level Committee (DLC) did not have the power of review. However, in the present case, there was no pre-existing order granting exemption for the period after the date of starting production that was subsequently reviewed. Therefore, the DLC's order dated 22.01.2011, which deprived the assessee of exemption from the withdrawal date, was not an order passed upon a review of the earlier Eligibility Certificate. Regarding the second and third questions, the Tribunal found that the promise of exemption was conditional, and the State Government had reserved the right to withdraw it under clause 3(त)/3(i)(d) of the notification. The withdrawal was effected through valid delegated legislation. The assessee failed to establish how it had altered its position to its prejudice regarding the further Fixed Capital Investment made subsequent to the withdrawal notification. Consequently, the principle of promissory estoppel was inapplicable. The Tribunal noted that the withdrawal was a piece of delegated legislation, not an administrative or quasi-judicial action, thus not requiring a show cause notice.
The High Court held that there was no legal infirmity in the order passed by the ITAT. The Court noted that the assessee had filed its return declaring Rs. 24 Crores and provided evidence for its claims. The addition of Rs. 7 Crores was made by the AO solely on the basis of the statement given during the survey, without any incriminating materials or documents to support it. The assessee's statement on 6.10.2005 clarified that Rs. 18 Crores were for investment in jewellery/precious stones and Rs. 6 Crores were cash shown in books, with details for the remaining Rs. 7 Crores to be provided later. The Court found that assets to the magnitude of Rs. 7 Crores were neither found nor identified, leading to the inference that no such assets existed. The Court reiterated that additions can only be made if there is incriminating material or surrounding circumstances justifying it. It distinguished the cited case laws, noting that in the present case, the addition was made mechanically on the statement alone, unlike in M/S Vertex Chemical Industries where the AO applied his mind and examined documents. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the questions of law were answered in favour of the respondent.
The High Court, with the consent of the parties, disposed of the writ petition. It directed the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal expeditiously, preferably within three months from the date of communication of the order. The Court explicitly stated that it had not expressed any view on the merits of the case, and the Appellate Authority would decide the appeal in accordance with the law. The learned counsel for the petitioner assured the Court that no unnecessary adjournments would be sought. The Court also granted interim protection, stating that no coercive action would be taken against the petitioners until the appeal is decided. The issue regarding the validity of the assessment proceedings and the time bar under Section 245HA(2) read with Section 153B was implicitly left to be decided by the Appellate Authority.
The Tribunal was justified in setting aside the order passed under Section 263. The Court noted that proceedings under Section 263 were initiated because the assessment order was allegedly passed without requisite inquiries, making it prejudicial to the revenue. However, the notice under Section 263 pointed out four specific issues. While passing the order under Section 263, the CIT directed the Assessing Authority to inquire not only into these four points but also to enlarge the scope to cover entire sundry creditors and estimate net profit at 5% of gross turnover, which were not mentioned in the notice. The Tribunal found that the revision under Section 263 can only be passed on grounds for which the assessee was given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the notice. It is not permissible for the CIT to set out one reason in the notice but revise the assessment on other grounds. Furthermore, the AO did not make any addition on any of the four issues raised in the notice. Therefore, the Tribunal quashed the order under Section 263 and all subsequent proceedings. The substantial question of law was answered in favour of the assessee.
The High Court held that the provision contained in Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act is mandatory. It is obligatory for the Assessing Officer to apply their mind to the contents of the return filed in response to a notice under Section 148, record reasons, and thereafter issue a notice under Section 143(2) before proceeding to decide the controversy with regard to escaped assessment. The Tribunal's finding that the notice under Section 143(2) was validly served within limitation and that the proviso to Section 143 did not apply to a return filed in response to a notice under Section 148 was found to be contrary to the established legal position as laid down in the cited judgments. The Court noted that in the present case, after the notice under Section 148 and the subsequent filing of the return, no notice as prescribed under the Act was issued to the appellant, and the assessing officer did not apply their mind to the contents of the fresh return before issuing a notice under Section 143(2). Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the question of law was answered in favour of the appellant and against the Revenue.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's Memorandum of Association, at serial no. 7, included an object to "let out on lease or on hire the whole or any part of the property of the company on such terms as the company shall determine." This indicated that earning business income from letting out property was an object of the company. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had claimed depreciation on the building which was let out and simultaneously sought deduction under Section 24 as income from house property. Citing Raj Dadarkar & Associates, the Tribunal clarified that if letting out of premises is the business of the assessee, it can be treated as business income. In this case, the assessee's Memorandum of Association included this object, and the assessee's income in the disputed year was solely from renting out the property, with no other income. Therefore, claiming deduction under Section 24 for the same property was not permissible as only one treatment (either business income or income from house property) is allowed. The authorities below were justified in rejecting the second claim under Section 24. The appeal was dismissed, and the questions of law were answered in favour of the Revenue.
The Court held that once the assessee filed an application to withdraw its appeal, the first appellate authority had no jurisdiction to proceed with deciding the appeal on merits or to issue directions for a fresh assessment. The proviso to Section 55(5) of the Act grants the assessee the right to withdraw the appeal, thereby interjecting the appellate authority's inquiry. The appeal authority's only course of action should have been to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. The Court distinguished the case of R.R. Brick Factory, stating that the appeal authority could not decide the appeal against the wishes of the appellant. Furthermore, the Court found that the direction for fresh assessment for A.Y. 2012-13 (Central) was beyond the appellate authority's jurisdiction as that assessment order was not under appeal. Consequently, both questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee. The order of the Tribunal and the first appellate authority were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the first appellate authority to pass a fresh order in accordance with law.
The High Court held that the ITAT did not err in confirming the penalty. The Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd. was emphasized, stating that penalty under Section 271(1)(c) arises when particulars furnished in the return are found to be inaccurate. The Court noted that the assessee admitted that the amounts of Rs. 12.24 lacs and Rs. 52.24 lacs were liable to be assessed for tax. The assessee had paid advance tax of Rs. 12.24 lacs and debited it as 'other expenditure', and Rs. 52.24 lacs was debited as loss from non-banking business, which was an appropriation of profit, not an expense. Crucially, the assessee did not file a revised return even after notice. The Court found that the assessee's explanation regarding the amendment to Section 80P was unacceptable, as the return filed did not claim deductions under Chapter VI-A, including Section 80P. The Court concluded that the assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars and concealed income deliberately and intentionally. The contention regarding lack of professional advice was also rejected, as the assessee was required under Section 44AB to get its accounts audited by a chartered accountant. The appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that no substantial question of law arose in the present appeal. It noted that Shri Har Narayan Gupta, during cross-examination, clearly and categorically denied indulging in any malpractice or making any statement that he was only receiving commission for issuing bills without actual sales. The Tribunal affirmed the findings of fact recorded by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal itself, which were in favour of the assessee. It was observed that M/s Annapurna Trading Company had produced its books of account, which were verified by the Assessing Authority, and the details furnished by the assessee regarding quantities and payments were neither disturbed nor rejected. Furthermore, the assessee had shown purchases from 13 parties, and none of these parties were found to have made bogus sales by the Assessing Authority. All payments were made by cheques and duly recorded in the books of account. Consequently, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
The High Court held that the Tribunal, being the last court of fact, was not justified in brushing aside the certificate, survey report, and the assessment order passed by the Commercial Tax Department of U.P. The Court found that the assessment order and survey report dated 14.01.2008 filed by the assessee showed that production commenced in March 2008, and sales were also made. Therefore, the view taken by the Tribunal in disregarding the assessment order relevant for the year under consideration was incorrect. The Court set aside the impugned order of the Tribunal and remanded the matter back to the Tribunal for reconsideration in accordance with law. The substantial questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee-appellant and against the Revenue. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The Tribunal held that the assessment year 1997-98 was clearly mentioned in the notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The court found that the records, which were summoned and perused, supported this finding recorded by the Tribunal in paragraph 3.2 of its order. Consequently, the court concluded that the notice issued to the assessee under Section 148 was not defective. The order of the Tribunal was upheld, and the questions of law were answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The appeal was dismissed. No costs were awarded.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings initiated under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1944, were bad in law and liable to be set aside. The Court noted that the original assessment order dated May 5, 2009, had considered the explanation regarding the creditors' account and was satisfied with the petitioner's submitted documents. The reassessment proceedings were initiated on the same set of facts concerning the genuineness and verifiability of sundry creditors, which had also been the subject of the dropped Section 154 proceedings. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Aryaverth Chawal Udyog and others, the Tribunal emphasized that a mere change of opinion, without fresh material, cannot constitute a valid 'reason to believe' for reopening assessment proceedings. The impugned notice was deemed to be a change of opinion on facts already available during the original assessment. Therefore, the reassessment proceedings were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the appeals filed by the Revenue lacked merit and were accordingly dismissed. Regarding the addition of Rs. 2,70,77,374/- towards undisclosed stock, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(Appeals) had made a finding of fact that the assessee's physical stock was valued at Rs. 4,39,94,860/-, and after accounting for stock with weavers and local sales, the total stock inventorized was Rs. 4,49,31,695/-. The assessee's contention that the computer data was not updated and their annual accounts showed a higher closing stock was considered. The CIT(A) found that the assessee had shown more stock, thus no addition for undisclosed stock was warranted. The Tribunal confirmed this finding of fact. Similarly, the deletions of Rs. 4,70,282/- (unexplained cash) and Rs. 7,80,200/- (unexplained stock investment) were upheld, as these were consequential to the acceptance of the assessee's books of account under Section 145(3) by the CIT(Appeals) and the Tribunal. The Tribunal emphasized that once the CIT(Appeals) and the Tribunal recorded a concurrent finding of fact in favour of the assessee regarding the correctness of the books of account, no adverse inference could be drawn. The questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
The High Court held that the very basis for referring the matter to the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) in the disputed years, where proceedings were initiated under Section 153C, had been held to be without jurisdiction by this Court in a previous inter-parties judgment (CIT Vs. M/s Gopi Apartment, Income Tax Appeal No. 60 of 2014). Once the foundation for referring the matter to the DVO vanished, the entire proceedings could not be justified. Furthermore, at the time of the reference to the DVO, neither returns had been filed, nor the assessee's books of account were rejected, nor were any assessment or reassessment proceedings pending. Relying on the judgment in Sargam Cinema (supra) and the inter-parties judgment of this Court, the basis for referring the matter to the DVO itself was vitiated and liable to be quashed. Consequently, no substantial question of law arose, and the appeal was dismissed. The questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of deduction under Rule 9(1)(e) of the U.P. VAT Rules, 2008. The Court reasoned that the phrase 'as a result of sale in the course of inter-state trade or commerce' in Rule 9(1)(e) must be interpreted to include all transactions covered under Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Gannon Dunkerley-II. The Court found that the Tribunal had recorded specific findings that pre-existing works contracts existed and that the assessee had purchased goods from outside U.P. solely to execute these contracts. In the absence of any further findings to the contrary, the assessee was clearly entitled to the deduction. The question of law was answered in favour of the assessee. The revisions were allowed, and the Tribunal's order was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the benefit granted under Section 80IC of the Income Tax Act, 1961, could not extend beyond a period of ten years. While discussing the matter, the Tribunal examined the provisions and concluded that although the 'initial assessment year' within the ten-year period could occur once, twice, or thrice, the deduction itself would not extend beyond the overall statutory limit of ten years. The High Court, while hearing the appeal, found that the law had been correctly applied by the Tribunal. Consequently, the question of law was answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. The appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated on the ground that broken rice (kana) amounting to Rs. 25,10,730/- was given to rice millers free of cost in lieu of hulling charges, on which tax had escaped assessment. The Tribunal noted that a similar controversy regarding broken rice given free of cost in lieu of hulling charges was squarely covered in favour of the petitioner by the first appellate order and the Tribunal's order for a previous year. The Tribunal also noted that the Revenue had not filed any revision against those favourable orders for previous and subsequent years. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Aryaverth Chawal Udyog and others, the Tribunal stated that a mere change of opinion based on the same material cannot be a "reason to believe" for initiating reassessment proceedings. Therefore, the order granting permission to reopen the assessment and the consequential reassessment notice were set aside as they were tantamount to a change of opinion, which is not permissible under the law. The writ petition was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings initiated for Assessment Year 2012-13, including the order dated 14.11.2017 granting permission to reopen and the consequential notice dated 26.12.2017, were liable to be set aside. The reasoning was that the initiation of reassessment amounted to a mere change of opinion, which is not permissible under the law. The Tribunal noted that the issue concerning broken rice (kana) given free of cost to millers in lieu of hulling charges was squarely covered in favor of the petitioner by previous orders of the first appellate authority and the Tribunal for Assessment Year 2010-11. Furthermore, the Revenue had not filed any revision against those favorable orders for previous and subsequent years. The Supreme Court's decision in State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Aryaverth Chawal Udyog and others was cited to support the principle that a change of opinion on the same material cannot justify reopening assessment. The operative direction was to set aside the impugned order and notice. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the assessee failed to discharge the burden as stipulated under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Both the Tribunal and lower authorities noted the assessee's failure to prove the creditworthiness of creditors and the genuineness of the transactions. The assessee had not discharged this burden before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) or the Tribunal. The Court found that the Tribunal had considered all relevant facts and its conclusions were neither perverse nor unreasonable in confirming the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The case was squarely covered by the High Court's earlier judgment in Ram Baboo Agrawal (supra). Therefore, the appeal lacked merit and was dismissed. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal, decided in favor of the Revenue and against the Assessee.
The High Court, in light of the Apex Court's decision in the case of the respondent authority itself (reported in 2018 (406) ITR 178 (SC)), which concluded that the respondent-authority is not a local authority due to the amendment in the explanation to Section 10(20) of the Income Tax Act, found it necessary to reconsider the matter. Consequently, the High Court remanded the case back to the Tribunal for a fresh decision. The Court also directed that the decision in Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS) and another Vs. Canara Bank, 2018 (406) ITR 161 (SC), may also be looked into and the matter decided accordingly. The appeal was disposed of on this basis, without a decision on the merits of the ITAT's original order.