M/S BELTEK INDIA LTD vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF TRADE TAX U.P. LUCKNOW
What did the High Court hold?
The Tribunal's decision on the first issue was that the entitlement to exemption flows from the exemption notification, not the Eligibility Certificate. It reasoned that the amendment to the exemption notification, specifically the addition of Part-II effective 16.11.1995, would automatically attach to and amend the Eligibility Certificate. The Tribunal relied on the case of Mentha Oil and Allied Product Vs. State of U.P. (1996)103 STC 316. However, the High Court found this reliance erroneous. The Court held that the exemption notification provided the enabling law, but the actual exemption was granted upon the assessee's application being allowed by the Divisional Level Committee via the Eligibility Certificate. The Court distinguished the Mentha Oil case, stating that in that instance, the recognition certificate holder's eligibility was subject to the prevailing notifications, whereas here, the Eligibility Certificate itself granted the exemption. The Court further held that only the Commissioner, under Section 4-A(3) of the Act, could modify the Eligibility Certificate. Since this power was not exercised, the assessing and appellate authorities were bound to give full effect to the certificate. Therefore, the first question of law was answered in favour of the assessee. Regarding the second issue, the Tribunal affirmed the rejection of the books of account. The High Court found this to be a question of fact based on material and evidence, not requiring interference in revisory jurisdiction. Thus, the second question of law was answered in favour of the revenue. Consequently, both revision applications were partly allowed.
What were the facts?
The assessee, M/s Beltek India Ltd, filed revision petitions against a common order of the Trade Tax Tribunal, Ghaziabad, for Assessment Years (AYs) 1999-2000 (UP and Central). The Tribunal had confirmed the lower authorities' rejection of the assessee's claim for tax exemption based on an Eligibility Certificate dated 05.02.1998, issued under Section 4-A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948. The assessment orders, which declined exemption and resorted to best judgment assessment after rejecting books of account, were also affirmed. The assessee had set up a new unit manufacturing television sets and obtained the Eligibility Certificate for an eight-year period from its first sale on 14.06.1996. The certificate stipulated phased exemption rates. For AY 1999-2000, the assessee claimed 75% exemption, considering it the third/fourth year. The Assessing Authority allowed only 50% exemption, treating it as the fourth/fifth year. The First Appellate Authority further altered the exemption entitlement by reclassifying the assessee's unit under Part-II of the exemption notifications, leading to a different exemption structure and removal of a monetary limit.
What were the issues?
The Tribunal had to decide two questions of law: 1. Whether the Trade Tax Tribunal was legally justified in ignoring the Eligibility Certificate issued to the Revisionist by the competent authority dated 05.02.1998, which provided the rate of tax payable in each Assessment Year during the period of exemption, as per Section 4-A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948? - Assessee's contention: The Eligibility Certificate, once granted by the competent authority (Divisional Level Committee), was binding on the Assessing Officer and First Appellate Authority, who could not sit in judgment over it or deny its benefits. The Assessing Officer had merely misapplied the certificate by incorrectly calculating the exemption year. The First Appellate Authority acted outside its jurisdiction by creating a new objection not present in the assessment order. - Revenue's contention: The Tribunal relied on the decision in Mentha Oil and Allied Product Vs. State of U.P. (1996)103 STC 316, arguing that the entitlement to exemption flows from the exemption notification, not the Eligibility Certificate. Amendments to the notification, particularly the addition of Part-II effective from 16.11.1995, automatically amended the Eligibility Certificate. 2. Whether the Trade Tax Tribunal was legally justified in confirming the orders passed by the Authorities below rejecting the books of account of the revisionist without any incriminating material available to them? - Assessee's contention: Not explicitly recorded, but implied by the framing of the question and the Tribunal's affirmation of the lower authorities' findings. - Revenue's contention: Not explicitly recorded, but implied by the framing of the question and the Tribunal's affirmation of the lower authorities' findings.
Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?
Section 4-A, Section 8(5)
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
A.F.R. Court No. - 1 Case :- SALES/TRADE TAX REVISION No. - 645 of 2004 Revisionist :- M/S Beltek India Ltd Opposite Party :- The Commissioner Of Trade Tax U.P. Lucknow Counsel for Revisionist :- Praveen Kumar Counsel for Opposite Party :- C.S.C. And Case :- SALES/TRADE TAX REVISION No. - 646 of 2004 Revisionist :- M/S Beltek India Ltd Opposite Party :- The Commissioner Of Trade Tax U.P. Lucknow Counsel for Revisionist :- Praveen Kumar Counsel for Opposite Party :- C.S.C. Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal Singh,J. 1. The present revisions have been filed by the assessee against the common order of the Trade Tax Tribunal, Ghaziabad dated 14.01.2004 in Second Appeal Nos. 64 of 2003 and 65 of 2003, for A.Ys. 1999-2000 (UP and Central respectively). By that order, the Tribunal has confirmed the order passed by the First Appellate Authority that had, in turn, confirmed the assessment orders whereby the claim of exemption made by the assessee on strength of the Eligibility Certificate dated 05.02.1998, issued under section 4-A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), had been declined. Also, the finding of rejection of books of account and best judgment assessment have been affirmed. By order dated 15.11.2018, the present revision had been admitted on the following questions of law:- “(i) Whether the Trade Tax Tribunal is legally justified in law in ignoring the Eligibility Certificate issued to Revisionist by competent Authority dated 5.2.1998, which provide rate of tax payable in each Assessment years during the period of exemption? (ii) Whether the Trade Tax Tribunal is legally justified in law in confirming the orders passed by Authorities below rejecting the books of account of revisionist without any incriminating material available to him?” 2. Heard Sri Praveen Kumar, learned counsel for the applicant- assessee and Sri B.K. Pandey, learned counsel for the revenue.
During A.Y. 1999-2000, the assessee manufactured black & white and colour television sets. It set up a "new unit" within the meaning of that term under Section 4-A of the Act, at Ghaziabad. It applied to the Divisional Level Committee to grant exemption in terms of twin exemption notifications nos. 780 and 781 (both issued by the State Government on 31.3.1995) under Section 4-A of the Act, and section 8(5) of the Central Sales Tax Act 1956, respectively. Also admittedly, on 05.02.1998, the Divisional Level Committee, Noida granted the Eligibility Certificate to the assessee in relation to the aforesaid "new unit" set up by it, for a period of eight years from the date of its first sale, being 14.06.1996. According to Clause 10 of the said certificate, the assessee was granted full exemption from tax for the first two years. For the third and fourth years, it was granted exemption to the extent of 75% of the tax liability. For the fifth and the sixth years, it was granted exemption up to 50% of the tax liability and for the seventh and the eighth years, it was granted exemption up to the extent of 25% of the tax liability. 4. It is a fact that the assessment proceeding of the assessee for the A.Y. 1999-2000 (U.P. & Central) came to be completed much thereafter, on 20.02.2003. Therein, the assessee relied on the Eligibility Certificate dated 05.02.1998, and thus claimed exemption up to 75% of the tax liability, treating A.Y. 1999-2000 to be the third/fourth year of exemption. Perusal of the assessment order further reveals, that the Assessing Authority, though acknowledged the entitlement to exemption claimed by the assessee under the Eligibility Certificate dated 05.02.1998, however, strangely, he treated A.Y. 1999-2000 to be the fourth/fifth year of exemption. Accordingly, he only allowed exemption from tax liability up to the extent of 50%. The assessee being aggrieved, preferred first appeals against the assessment orders, being first appeal nos. 93 of 2002 and 94 of 2002. These came to be dismissed by the order dated 16.01.2003 passed by the Joint Commissioner (Appeal), Noida. The First Appellate Authority
made out a new case against the assessee. He reasoned that the exemption claimed by the assessee would fall under Part-II of the exemption notifications nos. 780 and 781, both dated 31.03.1995. Thus, according to the first appellate authority, the assessee was a manufacturer of electronic goods, and therefore, his claim for exemption could arise only under Part- II of those notifications and not under Part I (as had been considered by the Divisional Level Committee). Consequently, the assessee was held entitled to 100% exemption for the first two years; to exemption up to 75% of tax liability for the third year whereas for the next four years being fourth to seventh years, it would be entitled to exemption only up to 50% of it's tax liability while for the last year, it would be entitled to exemption only upto 25% of its tax liability. Another difference that would arise on such reasoning would be, though according to the Divisional Level Committee, the assessee was entitled to exemption up to the monetary limit computed at 175% of the fixed capital investment expended by it to set up the "new unit", yet, according to the first appeal authority, under Part-II of the exemption notification, it would be entitled to exemption from tax without reference to any monetary limit. 5. Thus, the entitlement to exemption was completely altered by the first appellate authority. The assessee being aggrieved, carried the matter in appeal to the Tribunal, that has been dismissed by the impugned order on the reasoning - the entitlement to exemption flows from the exemption notification and not from the Eligibility Certificate. Since, Part-II to the exemption notifications had been added by the amendment made thereto with effect from 16.11.1995, notwithstanding a contrary recital of rights contained in the Eligibility Certificate, the assessee being a manufacturer of electronic goods would remain entitled to exemption under Part-II of Annexure 1 to the exemption notifications. In that regard, the Tribunal has relied on a decision of this Court in Mentha Oil and Allied Product Vs. State of U.P. (1996)103 STC 316. Thus, the Tribunal has further reasoned, the amendment made to the exemption notification would automatically
attach to and have the effect of amending the Eligibility Certificate granted by the Divisional Level Committee. 6. As to the rejection of books of account, the Tribunal has again affirmed the finding of the first appellate authority. Learned counsel for the assessee has first relied on the Annexure No.1 Part-I Clause-3 of the exemption notifications and Clause 3(1) of Part-II of that notification. He would submit while issuing the exemption notifications, the State Government had provided for separate schemes for grant of exemption to "new units" engaged in manufacture of electronic goods and those engaged in manufacture of other goods. However, upon filing its application for grant of exemption, the Divisional Level Committee i.e. the only competent authority granted exemption to the assessee vide Eligibility Certificate dated 05.02.1998. There under, the exemption was made available to the assessee under Part-I Clause 3(1) of of Annexure 1 to the exemption notification as a general “new unit”. Reliance has been placed on the principle - once Eligibility Certificate had been granted, it was not open for the Assessing Authority to deny its benefit in the assessment proceedings, as propounded by the Division Bench decision of this Court in M/S. Kumar Fuels, Pucca Bagh, Puranaganj, Rampur Vs. State of U.P. & Another, 1986 U.P.T.C. 357, followed by other Division Bench in M/S. Paras Furnishers, Deoband, Saharanpur Vs. State of U.P. & Others 1987 (2) U.P.T.C. 1131; M/S Pan Tyres Vs. State of U.P. & Others 1996 (1) U.P.T.C. 569 and Anil Kumar Ramesh Chandra Glass Works, Firozabad & Another Vs. State of U.P. & Another, 2000 U.P.T.C. 383. Thus, it has been submitted, the Assessing Officer as also the first appeal authority could not sit in judgment over the Eligibility Certificate, rather, they were bound to fully comply with it. 7. In any case, it has been submitted, the Assessing Authority did not disturb the terms of the Eligibility Certificate, but had only misapplied the same by treating A.Y. 1999-2000 to be the fourth/fifth year of exemption, whereas on a plain reading of the Eligibility Certificate it
was clear, since exemption had been granted with effect from A.Y. 1996- 1997 (from 14.06.1996), hence A.Y. 1999-2000 would always remain the third/fourth year of exemption. 8. In such circumstances, the First Appellate Authority is claimed to have acted wholly outside its jurisdiction in culling out a completely new, non-existent, objection. The jurisdiction of the first appellate authority being co-extensive with that of the Assessing Authority and nothing more. In an appeal against assessment order, it could not sit in judgment over the Eligibility Certificate granted by the Divisional Level Committee. The principle of law laid down in M/S. Kumar Fuels, Pucca Bagh, Puranaganj, Rampur Vs. State of U.P. & Another (supra) would bind the first appellate authority as well. 9. Next, it has been submitted, owing to the difficulties created by the Assessing Authority and the Appellate Authority, the assessee had been forced to approach the Divisional Level Committee to seek clarification with respect to the exemption granted to it. The Divisional Level Committee, by it's order dated 20.02.2003 made an observation that the assessee was entitled to exemption in terms of Part-II, Clause 3(1) of the exemption notifications i.e. treating the assessee to be a manufacturer of electronic goods. This order passed by the Divisional Level Committee is claimed to be wholly without jurisdiction and a nullity, inasmuch as, neither the assessee had any right to file any application seeking such clarification or modification nor the Divisional Level Committee had any jurisdiction to modify the Eligibility Certificate already granted by it. 10. The power, if any, would have remained with the Commissioner [under Section 4-A(3) of the Act], to cancel or to amend the Eligibility Certificate already granted, if that authority had formed a view, that the assessee was entitled to lesser exemption than that granted by the Divisional Level Committee. However as to its power, the another Division Bench of this Court in M/S Gurunanak Surgical Pvt. Ltd., Meerut & Another Vs. Divisional Level Committee, Sales Tax, Meerut,
1991 U.P.T.C. 620, had specifically held that the Divisional Level Committee had no power to cancel the Eligibility Certificate already granted. That decision of the Division Bench has been followed in M/S Newage Printing Ink Company Meerapur, Allahabad & Another Vs. State of U.P. & Others, 1995 U.P.T.C. 952, wherein a modification made by the Divisional Level Committee to reduce the period of exemption, from five years (originally granted) to three years was quashed following the ratio in the case of M/S Gurunanak Surgical Pvt. Ltd., Meerut & Another Vs. Divisional Level Committee, Sales Tax, Meerut (supra). Similar view has been taken by yet another decision of this Court in M/S Precise Laboratories Ltd. Vs. The Divisional Level Committee And Another, 1997 U.P.T.C. 635. Thus, it has been submitted the Divisional Level Committee had no jurisdiction or competence to modify its order dated 05.02.1998 / Eligibility Certificate, granting exemption for a period of eight years from 14.06.1996 in terms of Clause 3 of Part-I of Annexure No.1 to the exemption notifications dated 31 March, 1995. 11. As to the legal consequence of the above principle being applied, further reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Sarup Singh & Another Vs. Union of India & Another reported in 2011 (11) SCC 198, to submit (consequentially), the order 20.02.2003 being without jurisdiction, would be a nullity and such plea may be raised and examined in the present proceedings as well. Thus, it has been submitted, the fact that an order had been passed by the Divisional Level Committee on 20.02.2003 and the same came to be unsuccessfully challenged in a writ petition which was dismissed, leaving it open to the assessee to pursue his remedies in the present revision, it would have no impact and no legal consequence may flow from the order dated 20.02.2003. 12. Responding to the above, learned Standing Counsel would submit, it is too late in the day for the assessee to turn around and claim entitlement to exemption in terms of Clause 3, Part-I of Annexure 1 to the
exemption notifications, as the assessee had itself made the application to the Divisional Level Committee seeking clarification, as to its entitlement to exemption. Having succumbed to the jurisdiction of the Divisional Level Committee, the assessee cannot escape the consequences of the order dated 20.02.2003 passed on its own application. Further, it has been submitted, no remedy having been availed by the assessee against that order, inasmuch as the assessee did not file any appeal before the Tribunal, it cannot resist the direct legal consequences of the order dated 20.02.2003, which has attained finality. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, under Section 4-A of the Act, Annexure 1, Part-I Clause-3 of the exemption notifications and Clause 3(1) of Part-II of that notification read as under:- ANNEXURE-I S.No. Location of Unit Total period of Exemption from or
Monetary limit upto exemption/reduction reduction in the rate which the benefit of in the rate of tax of tax [denoted as
exemption from or percentage of the rate reduction in the rate of tax payable under of tax under the Act the UP Act to the
together with the goods concerned]
benefit of exemption [Omitted]
from or reduction in Year In case of In case
the rate of tax under units with of other the Central Sales a fixed units
Tax Act, 1956 is capital admissible investment exceeding 50 crores
A B C PART-I CLAUSE-3 ANNEXURE-D 3. The district of Eight years 1st year
75% of the fixed Agra (excluding 2nd year
Taj Trapezium 3rd year 75%
or as the case may Area), Aligarh (excluding Taj Trapezium Area), Allahabad 4th year 75% be, 175 percent of (excluding the area 5th year 50% additional fixed in south of rivers 6th year 50% Jamuna and confluent 7th year 25%
in case of small Ganga but including 8th year 25%
scale units and
the area included
150% of the fixed under Municipal Corporation, Allahabad),
or 150 percent of Bareilly, Bhadohi, additional fixed Bijnor, Firozabad (excluding Taj Trapezium in case of other Area), Ghaziabad (excluding units. the Greater NOIDA Industrial Development Area), Gorakhpur, Haridwar, Kanpur (Nagar), Lakhimpur-kheri, Lucknow, Maharajganj, Meerut, Mirzapur, Muzaffarnagar, Saharanpur, Sonbhadra and Varanasi. Clause 3(1) of Part-II ३.(१) िजिला आगरा (ताजि टरापेजिजियम क्षेजत्र को छोड़कर) अलीगढ (ताजि टरापेजिजियम क्षेजत्र को छोड़कर) इलाहाबाद (िजिसमेज आठ वर्षर पहला वर्षर १०० प्रतितशत कोई सीमा नही यमुना और सगामी गंगा निदयों केज दूसरा वर्षर १०० प्रतितशत दिक्षण का क्षेजत्र शािमल नही है िकन्तु तीसरा वर्षर ७५ प्रतितशत इलाहाबाद नगर िनगम केज अंतगरत चौथा वर्षर ५० प्रतितशत आनेज वर्ाला क्षेजत्र शािमल है) बरेजली, पांचवर्ा वर्षर ५० प्रतितशत भदोही, िबजिनौर, िफ़िरोज़ाबाद, (ताजि छठा वर्षर ५० प्रतितशत टरापेजिजियम क्षेजत्र को छोड़कर) ग़ािज़याबाद सातवर्ां वर्षर ५० प्रतितशत (बृहत्तर नोएडा औद्योिगक िवर्कास आठवर्ां वर्षर २५ प्रतितशत क्षेजत्र को छोड़कर) गोरखपुर, हिरद्वार, कानपूर (नगर), लखीमपुर खीरी, लखनऊ, महराजिगंजि, मेजरठ, िमज़ारपुर, मुज़फ्फरनगर, सहारनपुर, सोनभद्र और वर्ाराणसी केज िजिलेज
Then a "new unit" could claim exemption subject to the terms and conditions of the Act read with the U.P. Trade Tax Rules, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) and the exemption notifications that came to be issued by the State Government. The plain scheme of the Act (as may be culled out from Section 4-A(5) read with Rule 25 of the Rules) unequivocally provides, for a claim of exemption to arise, the application must be made by the "new unit" in the prescribed form before the appropriate committee constituted by the State Government in terms of
Rule 25. Undisputedly, under Rule 25(2) of the Rules that authority in the present case, was the Divisional Level Committee. Then, under section 4- A(2)(d) of the Act read with clause 4(iv) of the exemption notifications dated 31.03.1995, the exemption from tax became available to the assessee only upon his production of the Eligibility Certificate before his assessing authority and not before. The exemption notification/s, by itself only constituted the law whereunder any "new unit" could claim exemption. However, the right to exemption from tax arose only upon issuance of the Eligibility Certificate dated 05.02.1998 by the Divisional Level Committee. 15. Further, upon production of that Eligibility Certificate the assessing authority remained legally bound to give full effect to it in the assessment proceedings. He had no authority or jurisdiction to make any adjudication whether the assessee was or was not entitled to claim exemption from tax. He was similarly bereft of any jurisdiction to enter judgement as to the extent of exemption from tax granted to the assessee. He was only to measure and deliver to the assessee exemption from tax, to the extent the assessee had been held entitled to by the Divisional Level Committee, vide order dated 05.02.1998. Therefore, in absence of any other statutory intent, it does not appeal to reason and consequently it was never open either to the assessing authority or the first appeal authority to either decline or alter or modify the exemption granted to the assessee. Those authorities could not have read a clause in the exemption notifications differently, so as to over ride the specific order passed by the competent authority, when that order had itself been passed after a conscious application of mind to those notifications itself. 16. Then, against an order that may be passed by the Divisional Level Committee either granting or refusing to grant exemption, a remedy had been provided under Section 10(2) of the Act by filing appeal before the Tribunal. Thus, at the relevant time, the revenue had a remedy of appeal against the grant of Eligibility Certificate to the assessee on
05.02.1998. However, admittedly, that order was never assailed in appeal by the revenue. Other than that, in the case of the assessee/applicant, if his application had been rejected, an additional remedy under Rule 25(3)(c) of the Rules would have been available - to file a review application before the same committee. That situation never arose. Third, upon amendment made to the Act, sub-section (3) was introduced where under the Commissioner was given the power to cancel or amend the Eligibility Certificate, if in his opinion, the facility of exemption or reduction from the rate of tax had been obtained upon any legal or factual error or if the assessee was found not entitled to facility of exemption or was found to be entitled to that facility for a lesser period from a different date. Other than the above three contingencies, neither the Act nor the Rules nor the notifications, would allow for any alteration or modification or cancellation in the Eligibility Certificate, once granted. 17. Clearly, in the facts of the case, since the original exemption application filed by the assessee had been allowed (and not rejected), by the Divisional Level Committee, by its order dated 05.02.1998, there never arose any remedy to the assessee to apply for review in terms of Rule 25(3)(c) of the Rules. Therefore, the application that came to be filed by the assessee after grant of Eligibility Certificate was wholly non est. It did not confer jurisdiction on the Divisional Level Committee to review or to re-examine or modify the entitlement to exemption, already granted. In the context of lack of jurisdiction as to the subject matter of proceedings, in Kiran Singh And Others v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 the Supreme Court reasoned "6. The answer to these contentions must depend on what the position in law is when a court entertains a suit or an appeal over which it has no jurisdiction, and what the effect of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is on that position. It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at
the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties". 18. Again, in Vasudev Dhanji Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman And Others, (1970) 1 SCC 670, the Supreme Court held: "7. When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representative on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. Again, when the decree is made by a court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record: where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. In Jnanendra Mohan Bhaduri v. Rabindra Nath Chakravarti [LR 60 IA 71] the Judicial Committee held that where a decree was passed upon an award made under the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, an objection in the course of the execution proceeding that the decree was made without jurisdiction, since under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, there is no provision for making a decree upon an award, was competent. That was a case in which the decree was on the face of the record without jurisdiction". 19. Same position of law inheres in the ratio of the Division Bench pronouncements of this Court in the case of M/S Gurunanak Surgical Pvt. Ltd., Meerut & Another Vs. Divisional Level Committee, Sales Tax,
Meerut (supra) as specifically applied in the case M/S Newage Printing Ink Company Meerapur, Allahabad & Another Vs. State of U.P. & Others (supra). It that case, the Divisional Level Committee had reduced the period of exemption from five years (under the Eligibility Certificate), to three years by subsequent order of the Divisional Level Committee. It was found to have done so without any power to cancel or modify the order granting Eligibility Certificate. The same principle would govern the present case and no different conclusion may be drawn herein. 20. The consequence of the above would be - the order passed by the Divisional Level Committee dated 20.2.2003 would remain a nullity, it being an order passed in proceedings without inherent jurisdiction. Hence, the fact that the assessee did not directly challenge that order or that order had been passed on the application of the assessee cannot be cited as a ground to contend that the assessee is estopped from assailing that order as without jurisdiction or authority. That principle is also well entrenched in our jurisprudence to doubt its applicability - being once the order was found to be without jurisdiction or a nullity, acquiescence may never be found to confer jurisdiction. In United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1951 SC 230, the Supreme Court held: "15. The final contention that the sittings in the interval constituted only an irregularity in the proceedings cannot again be accepted because, in the first place, an objection was raised about the sitting of the two members as the Tribunal. That objection, whether it was raised by the appellants or the other party, is immaterial. The objection having been overruled, no question of acquiescence or estoppel arises. Nor can consent give a court jurisdiction if a condition which goes to the root of the jurisdiction has not been performed or fulfilled. No acquiescence or consent can give a jurisdiction to a court of limited jurisdiction which it does not possess. In our opinion, the position here clearly is that the responsibility to work and decide being the joint responsibility of all the three members, if proceedings are conducted and discussions on several general issues took
place in the presence of only two, followed by an award made by three, the question goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and is not a matter of irregularity in the conduct of those proceedings. The absence of a condition necessary to found the jurisdiction to make the award or give a decision deprives the award or decision of any conclusive effect. The distinction clearly is between the jurisdiction to decide matters and the ambit of the matters to be heard by a Tribunal having jurisdiction to deal with the same. In the second case, the question of acquiescence or irregularity may be considered and overlooked. When however the question is of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to make the award under the circumstances summarized above, no question of acquiescence or consent can affect the decision.” 21. Relying on the aforequoted principal, the Supreme Court in Jagmittar Sain Bhagat And Others v. Director, Health Services, Harayana And Others, (2013) 10 SCC 136, held: 9. Indisputably, it is a settled legal proposition that conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior court, and if the court passes a decree having no jurisdiction over the matter, it would amount to nullity as the matter goes to the root of the cause. Such an issue can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The finding of a court or tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/inexecutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction. Similarly, if a court/tribunal inherently lacks jurisdiction, acquiescence of party equally should not be permitted to perpetrate and perpetuate defeating of the legislative animation. The court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the statute. In such eventuality the doctrine of waiver also does not apply. (Vide United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Workmen [AIR 1951 SC 230] , Nai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan [(1978) 1 SCC 58 : AIR 1978 SC 22] , Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios [(1981) 1 SCC 523] and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar [(1999) 3 SCC 722].”
Insofar as the decision relied upon by learned Standing Counsel in Mentha Oil and Allied Product Vs. State of U.P. (1996)103 STC 316 is concerned, the same is wholly distinguishable. That was a case where a recognition certificate holder under section 4-B of the Act, engaged in the manufacture of notified goods, claimed exemption from tax on purchase of raw materials under an earlier notification issued by the State Government providing for such exemption. The precise argument of the petitioner in that case was, since its recognition certificate under Section 4-B of that Act had been renewed for the period upto 1995-96, the subsequent notification dated 21.05.1994 imposing tax on purchase of raw materials (by persons engaged in manufacture of notified goods), would not apply to the petitioner. That submission had been rejected by the Division Bench on the reasoning, the rate of tax on purchase of raw materials would continue to be governed by the notifications issued by the State Government and the fact that the petitioner may have held a valid recognition certificate, would only imply that it would remain eligible to exemption or concession from tax if such exemption or concession were provided by the State Government. Insofar as the subsequent notification dated 21.05.1994 had imposed tax on the purchase of raw materials, the exemption that was earlier available under a pre-existing notification, would cease to exist. To that extent and in that context the claim of exemption was held to be founded on the notification and not the recognition certificate. 23. The above principle has no application in the facts of the present case, inasmuch as, here, the notification only provided for the enabling law under which an eligibility certificate may be obtained. However, the actual exemption became available to the assessee not by virtue of that declaration of law but upon the claim made by the assessee (in the shape of an application for grant of exemption), being allowed by the Division Level Committee, by its order dated 05.02.1998. Thus, the claims arising under Sections 4-B and 4-A of the Act being based in
entirely different statutory schemes, reliance placed by the Tribunal on the decision of the Division Bench in Mentha Oil (supra), is wholly erroneous. 24. The only power that may have remained with the revenue would have been under Section 4-A(3) of the Act, whereunder the Commissioner may have modified the Eligibility Certificate issued by the Divisional Level Committee vide its order dated 05.02.1998. That power having not been exercised, it was neither for the assessing authority nor for the first appellate authority to sit in judgement over the same or to deprive the assessee of any part of the exemption already granted by the Divisional Level Committee. In that context and regard, the assessing authority as also the first appellate authority, were purely executing authorities, that had to give full effect to the Eligibility Certificate duly granted by the competent authority namely Divisional Level Committee. Consequently, question of law no.1 is answered in the negative i.e. completely in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. 25. Insofar as the second question is concerned, plainly, the books of account had been rejected for varied reasons that have been noted and considered by the Tribunal as well. That being a question of fact and findings recorded thereon being based on material and evidence on record, it does not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of revisory jurisdiction. The question of law no. 2 is answered in the affirmative i.e. in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. 26. Accordingly, both revision applications are partly allowed. Order Date :- 31.7.2019 S.Chaurasia
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