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572 orders · Page 7 of 12
The High Court held that the present writ petitions should be disposed of in terms of the decision of this Court dated April 18, 2024, in the case of Siddharth Totuka vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (DBCWP No.13424/2021). This decision, in turn, followed the Court's earlier ruling in Shyam Sunder Khandelwal vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.18363/2019) and connected petitions. The Court's reasoning, as indicated by the agreement of the parties and the reference to prior judgments, was that the identical facts warranted the same outcome. The ratio decidendi is that where facts are identical to those in a precedent-setting judgment of the same court, the same relief should be granted. The operative direction was to allow the writ petitions, quashing the notices under Section 148 and the assessment orders. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the issues raised were factual and involved disputed questions. Considering these factual complexities, the court found no grounds for interference under its writ jurisdiction. The petitioner was therefore relegated to the statutory remedy of appeal. The Tribunal directed that if an appeal is filed along with a condonation of delay application, the appellate authority should consider the pendency of the writ petition. Furthermore, the appellate authority was urged to decide the appeal expeditiously, preferably within six months, given that the issue pertains to assessment year 2016-17. No specific issue was left undecided; the court declined to decide on merits due to the nature of the dispute.
The High Court considered the request made by the learned counsel for the petitioners to withdraw the petitions with liberty to file fresh. The court granted this request. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed as withdrawn. The liberty to file fresh petitions was explicitly granted as prayed for by the petitioners. No decision was made on the substantive issues that might have been raised in the writ petitions, as they were withdrawn before adjudication on merits. The operative direction is the dismissal of the petitions with liberty to refile.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition as not pressed. The court granted the petitioner the liberty to raise all the issues that were intended to be raised in the writ petition before the appellate authority in the pending appeal. The reasoning is based on the petitioner's submission that an appeal has already been filed against the order under challenge, and they wish to pursue that remedy instead of the writ petition. Therefore, the operative direction is the dismissal of the petition with liberty granted as prayed for. No specific issue was decided on merits.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with a specific direction to the respondents. It held that the respondents, while proceeding under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must consider the reply already filed by the petitioner. Furthermore, the respondents are also directed to consider any other reply that the petitioner may file within fifteen days from the date of the order. The court did not delve into the merits of the case or the validity of the Section 148-A(d) order, but rather focused on ensuring the petitioner's response is considered in the ongoing proceedings. The ratio is that procedural fairness requires the tax authorities to consider submissions made by the assessee in response to notices issued during reassessment proceedings.
The High Court granted the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The court's decision was based solely on the petitioner's expressed desire to withdraw the case. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn. No findings were made on the merits of any substantive issue that might have been raised in the writ petition, as the proceedings were terminated at the petitioner's instance. The ratio decidendi for this judgment is that a party has the right to withdraw their case, and the court will generally permit such withdrawal unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, which were not present or argued in this instance. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn.
The High Court held that while the proposition that the Court cannot modify the cut-off date of the Scheme is correct, the issue needs to be viewed from the perspective of when the limitation to file an appeal begins. The Court noted that the impugned order rejected the application solely on the ground that no appeal was pending on 31.01.2020, despite the undisputed fact that an appeal along with a condonation of delay application filed on 07.01.2021 was pending. The Court found that the Commissioner, while dealing with the Vivad Se Vishwas application, had not considered the crucial aspect of the date of service of the re-assessment order, which has ramifications for the petitioner's eligibility under the Scheme. Determining the date of service is necessary to ascertain if the 'Vivad' was pending on the cut-off date. Consequently, the petition was disposed of by remitting the matter back to the concerned authority to decide the application filed under the Scheme afresh by passing a speaking order, without commenting on the petitioner's eligibility. The Department was advised to take steps for expeditious disposal of the appeal pending before the CIT(A), and the petitioner was granted liberty to request the Chief Commissioner for expeditious disposal of their condonation application.
The High Court held that the petitioner's circumstances, including his age (around 72 years), depression, the long pendency of the issue (writ petition pending for 7 years), and his status as a small-scale surveyor with no adverse findings from revenue authorities, constituted genuine hardship. The Court quashed the impugned order dated 27.02.2017, setting aside the rejection of the delay condonation application. The authority was directed to accept the returns and decide the refund claim strictly adhering to the six-year limit from the date of the petitioner's application, as prescribed in CBDT Circular No. 09/2015, treating it as a case of genuine hardship. The Court found that the respondents had not filed a reply controverting the petitioner's averments. The reasoning was based on a purposive interpretation of Section 119(2)(b) and the CBDT circular, considering the peculiar facts and the precedent set by the Apex Court in B.M. Malani's case. No issue was left undecided.
The Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petitions. The primary reason for the withdrawal was the passing of an order under Section 147/148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, during the pendency of the petitions. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to pursue alternative remedies as available under the law, including the option to file fresh petitions if deemed maintainable. The Court did not delve into the merits of the original challenge in the writ petitions. The operative direction was to dismiss the petitions as withdrawn with the liberty granted.
The Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petitions. The primary reason for this decision was the passing of an order under Section 147/148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, during the pendency of the writ petitions. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to avail remedies in accordance with law, including the option to file fresh petitions if they were maintainable. The petitions were accordingly dismissed as withdrawn with the liberty granted. No decision was made on the merits of the original challenges raised in the writ petitions.
The High Court held that the impugned order dated 13.04.2023 was flawed because the specific objection raised by the petitioner regarding the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer at Alwar was not dealt with. The Court referred to Section 148A(c) of the Act, which mandates that the reply furnished by the assessee must be considered while passing an order under Section 148A(d). Since this procedural requirement was not met, the Court set aside the impugned order. The matter was remitted back to the respondent (Assessing Officer at Alwar) to decide the objection afresh in accordance with the law. The Court also clarified that the stay operating during the pendency of the writ petition would continue until the objections are decided and that the petitioner would be at liberty to avail further remedies if aggrieved by the decision on the objection.
The High Court granted the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The court's reasoning was based solely on the petitioner's expressed desire to withdraw due to subsequent developments. No decision was made on the merits of the case, as the petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The operative direction was the dismissal of the petition. No issues were expressly left undecided, as the matter was disposed of on procedural grounds.
The High Court, in its Jaipur Bench, allowed the writ petitions. The Court noted that learned counsel for the parties jointly submitted that the issue raised was squarely covered by a previous order of the same Court dated March 19, 2024, in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.18363/2019 (Shyam Sunder Khandelwal Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax) and other connected petitions. In light of this submission, the Court quashed the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the impugned orders. The Court, however, clarified that the respondents (revenue) are at liberty to proceed against the petitioners under Section 153C of the Act in accordance with law. The ratio decidendi is that if a matter is covered by a binding precedent, the court should follow it, while also preserving the revenue's right to pursue alternative legal avenues.
The High Court declined to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court noted that the petitioner did not challenge the notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, issued on March 28, 2023, and instead participated in the reassessment proceedings. The Court found it inappropriate to entertain the challenge to the validity of the notice under Article 226 in these circumstances. The petition was dismissed, but the petitioner was granted liberty to raise all available grounds under the law in challenging the reassessment order, including the reassessment notices, before the appropriate appellate authority.
The High Court allowed the writ petitions. The court noted that the issue raised was covered by its previous order dated March 19, 2024, in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18363/2019 and connected petitions. Consequently, the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the impugned orders were quashed. However, the court granted liberty to the respondents (revenue) to proceed against the petitioners in accordance with law, specifically under Section 153C of the Act. The ratio decidendi is that if a prior judgment of the same court covers the issue, subsequent similar petitions should be decided based on that precedent, with liberty granted to the revenue to pursue alternative legal avenues if applicable.
The High Court held that the issue raised in the writ petition is squarely covered by its previous order dated 19.03.2024 in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.18363/2019 (Shyam Sunder Khandelwal Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and other connected petitions). Consequently, the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the impugned orders were quashed. The Court clarified that the respondents (revenue) are at liberty to proceed against the petitioner under Section 153C of the Act of 1961 in accordance with law. The ratio decidendi is that if a matter is covered by a binding precedent of the same court, the same principle will apply. The operative direction is to quash the Section 148 notices and consequential orders, with liberty to proceed under Section 153C.
The Tribunal held that the petitioner's original return for assessment year 1996-97 was filed belatedly on 08.08.1997, which was processed under Section 143(1)(a). The petitioner himself had not claimed the deduction under Section 80RRA in his original return. The Tribunal found that a revised return filed under Section 139(5) is not permissible when the original return was filed belatedly under Section 139(4). This position was supported by the Supreme Court in Kumar Jagdish Chandra Sinha and the Bombay High Court in Menezes Fernandes Enterprises. Therefore, the revised return filed by the petitioner was not considered valid. The rejection of the application under Section 154 and the order rejecting the revision under Section 264 were found to be well-reasoned and based on settled legal principles. The Tribunal concluded that the petitioner was not entitled to any relief on the basis of equity as the statutory provisions were plain and unambiguous. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed.
The High Court noted that the petitioner had already filed a statutory appeal against the assessment order. It was observed that the allegation of anti-dating, which formed the basis of the writ petition, could be examined in the appeal proceedings. The Court found no impediment to these grounds being taken up in the appeal. Consequently, the High Court disposed of the writ petition, granting the petitioner liberty to raise all the grounds already raised in the petition before the appellate authority. The petitioner was also granted liberty to pursue further remedies if an adverse order was suffered in the appeal. The Court did not decide the merits of the assessment order or the allegations of anti-dating.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition in light of the changed circumstances and the submissions made by both parties. The Court directed the petitioner to approach the assessing authority by filing an application seeking a review of its earlier order dated November 12, 2021. The assessing authority was instructed to consider this review application and pass appropriate orders on the petitioner's application under Section 220(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, within a period of two months from the date of receiving a copy of the Court's order. The Court did not decide the merits of the additions but provided a procedural path for reconsideration.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the Appellate Authority (National Faceless Appeal Centre) to decide the petitioner's pending appeals efficaciously. The Court specified that the decision should preferably be made within a period of three months from the date of receiving a certified copy of the order. The reasoning was based on the petitioner's prayer for expeditious disposal and the non-opposition from the Revenue. The ratio decidendi is that courts can direct quasi-judicial authorities to decide pending matters within a reasonable timeframe, especially when there is no opposition from the respondent. The operative direction is for the NFAC to decide the appeals within three months.
The High Court allowed the writ petitions, setting aside the notices of reopening and reassessment orders. The Court held that the basis for reopening the assessment in this case was incriminating material collected during the search and statements recorded post-search. It reasoned that these post-search statements were in relation to the material collected during the search. Therefore, the petitions were squarely covered by the Court's prior decision in Shyam Sunder Khandelwal vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. The ratio decidendi is that if the basis for reopening under Section 147/148 is incriminating material and documents seized during a search, and statements recorded during proceedings, the Assessing Officer must proceed under Section 153-A, and if the material belongs to a person other than the one searched, Section 153-C must be invoked. The department was granted liberty to proceed in accordance with law under Section 153-C and other applicable provisions.
The High Court held that the issue raised in all the present writ petitions is squarely covered by the common order dated 19.03.2024 passed by a Division Bench of the same court in the case of Shyam Sunder Khandelwal Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. Consequently, the petitions were allowed in similar terms as the aforementioned precedent. The judgment also grants liberty to the parties as stated in the Shyam Sunder Khandelwal case. The specific relief granted or the findings on the merits of the individual cases are not detailed, as the decision is based on the binding precedent. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The High Court, acknowledging the joint submission of the parties that the issue is squarely covered by a prior Division Bench order in Shyam Sunder Khandelwal Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, allowed these petitions in similar terms. The court's decision is based on the principle of following precedent, specifically the order dated 19.03.2024. The operative direction is that the petitions are allowed, and the liberty granted in the Shyam Sunder Khandelwal case is extended to the petitioners in these matters. The judgment does not specify the exact nature of the liberty granted in the precedent case, nor does it detail the specific relief granted to each petitioner. No issues were expressly left undecided; the decision was based on the applicability of the prior judgment.
The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court held that the issue raised in the present writ petitions was squarely covered by its common order dated March 19, 2024, in the case of Shyam Sunder Khandelwal Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and other connected writ petitions. Consequently, the court allowed these petitions in similar terms as the precedent case. The judgment also grants liberty to the parties as stated in the Shyam Sunder Khandelwal order. The specific relief granted or the exact reasoning from the Shyam Sunder Khandelwal case is not detailed in this excerpt, but the operative direction is to allow the petitions based on the prior ruling. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the issue raised in all the connected writ petitions is squarely covered by a prior common order dated 19.03.2024 passed by a Division Bench of the same Court in the case of Shyam Sunder Khandelwal Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. Consequently, the Court allowed these petitions in similar terms as the Shyam Sunder Khandelwal case. The judgment also grants liberty to the parties as stated in the precedent order. The specific findings or reasoning from the Shyam Sunder Khandelwal case are not elaborated upon in this excerpt, nor are any specific issues left undecided. The operative direction is to allow the petitions and grant liberty as per the precedent.
The Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, held that the issue raised in these writ petitions is squarely covered by a common order dated 19.03.2024 previously passed by a Division Bench of the same Court in the case of Shyam Sunder Khandelwal Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and other connected writ petitions. Consequently, the Court allowed these petitions in similar terms as the aforementioned case. The judgment also states that liberty was granted as provided in that case. The specific findings or reasoning from the Shyam Sunder Khandelwal case that are applicable here are not detailed, nor are the operative directions beyond allowing the petitions and granting liberty. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the issue raised in all the present writ petitions is squarely covered by the common order dated 19.03.2024 passed by a Division Bench of the same court in the case of Shyam Sunder Khandelwal Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. Consequently, the petitions were allowed in similar terms as the aforementioned precedent. The judgment also grants liberty to the parties as stated in the Shyam Sunder Khandelwal case. The specific relief granted or the findings on the merits of the individual cases are not detailed, as the decision is based on the binding precedent. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the dispute centered on whether the property sold was agricultural land or a capital asset. If it was agricultural land, no capital gains tax was payable; if it was a capital asset, tax was payable. The Court noted that a notice under Section 133(6) was issued to the petitioner, to which no reply was given. Subsequently, upon issuance of the Section 148 notice, the petitioner filed objections, which were properly dealt with by the Assessing Officer. The Court found that the Department had reasons to believe income had escaped assessment and had proceeded in accordance with the law by issuing notices under Section 133(6) and then Section 148. Therefore, no error was found in the order disposing of the objections or in the issuance of the Section 148 notice. The Court dismissed the writ petition, but clarified that the petitioner could raise all objections before the Assessing Authority, and the observations made would not impede the petitioner.
The High Court noted that the petitioner had filed an appeal against the order passed under Section 148(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which was pending. The Court observed that the petitioner had simultaneously challenged the correctness and validity of the same order in the writ petition. Consequently, the Court decided to leave the issue of the validity of the order open for future consideration in an appropriate case. The writ petition was disposed of with liberty granted to the petitioner to pursue their pending appeal before the appellate authority. The Court also stated that if the petitioner felt aggrieved by any order passed in the appeal, they could pursue available legal remedies.
The High Court partly allowed the writ petition, quashing the impugned order dated 21.02.2024 and consequential proceedings. The Court found that while the sanctioning authority considered the defense of the COVID-19 pandemic, it did not adequately deal with the critical waves and restrictions that impacted the hotel industry in 2020-21. The Court held that the restrictions imposed due to the pandemic could have constituted reasonable causes that warranted more specific deliberation. The Court was convinced that in the peculiar factual matrix, where the petitioners had paid the full TDS amount with interest and late fees within three months of default and suffered the intense wave of the pandemic, exposing them to prosecution with potential imprisonment up to seven years was ill-considered. The Court reiterated that the validity of sanction depends on the sanctioning authority's application of mind to relevant facts and evidence. It concluded that the sanctioning authority failed to apply its mind for genuine satisfaction regarding the prosecution sanction, giving an impression of mechanical application. The matter was remanded back to the sanctioning authority to reconsider the reasonable cause after hearing the petitioners, and then proceed under Section 278AA if warranted.
The High Court held that all proceedings initiated against a dead person are a nullity and therefore void. The Court found it undisputed that notices, proceedings, and orders were issued against a deceased individual. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, and the notices and proceedings initiated against the deceased were declared nullities. However, recognizing that the initial notice was issued within the period of limitation, the Court granted liberty to the Income Tax Department to initiate fresh proceedings against the legal representative in accordance with the law, specifically referencing Section 159 of the Income Tax Act. The Court also noted that if fresh notices are issued, the petitioner would be free to raise all available legal objections.
The Court allowed the writ petition in the same terms as the decision in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18363/2019. While the specific reasoning from the cited case is not detailed in this judgment, the operative direction is the quashing of the impugned notice. The principle derived is that if an issue is squarely covered by a prior binding precedent of the same court, the subsequent petition will be decided in line with that precedent. The relief granted is the quashing of the Section 147/148 notice.
The Tribunal held that the order dated 01.03.2019 clearly decided the objections filed by the petitioner against the initiation of proceedings under Section 148 of the IT Act. The petitioner chose not to challenge this order rejecting objections and instead participated in the proceedings that culminated in the reassessment order. Therefore, any grievance against the order dated 01.03.2019 can be addressed by the Appellate Authority in an appeal against the reassessment order. The Tribunal noted that adjudicating whether the reassessment order is barred by limitation would require reconsideration of factual aspects, including the effect of stay orders and the pendency of earlier writ proceedings. Finding no case for interference in writ jurisdiction, the petition was dismissed, relegating the petitioner to the remedy of an appeal. No specific issue was left undecided, as the dismissal was based on the availability of an alternative remedy.
The High Court held that the writ petition had become infructuous. This decision was based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The court reasoned that if the cause of action no longer survives due to subsequent events, the petition cannot be pursued. Consequently, the court dismissed the writ petition as rendered infructuous. No specific findings were made on the merits of the original dispute, as the petition was disposed of on a procedural ground.
The High Court of Delhi held that the appeal is not liable to be continued due to the low tax effect. The court explicitly referred to Circular No. 9/2024 dated 17 September 2024, which mandates the dismissal of appeals where the tax effect falls below INR 2 crores. The judgment states that the tax effect in this particular appeal is below this threshold. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal on the ground of low tax effect. No other issues were decided on merits, and the reasoning is solely based on the administrative instructions contained in the circular regarding monetary limits for appeals.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition for non-prosecution. The reasoning was based on the submission of the petitioner's counsel that they were not receiving instructions from their clients to enable them to pursue the petition. The Court held that in the absence of instructions, the petition could not be prosecuted. The petitioners were granted liberty to move an application for revival of the writ petition if the cause of action still survived. No decision was made on the merits of the underlying tax dispute.
The High Court held that the writ petition had become infructuous. The reasoning was based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, who stated that due to subsequent developments during the pendency of the writ petition, no cause of action survived for its continuation. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the writ petition as rendered infructuous. No specific findings were made on any substantive income tax issues, and no operative directions for relief were issued beyond the dismissal of the petition. The ratio decidendi is that a writ petition will be dismissed if the petitioner demonstrates that the original cause of action no longer exists.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with a specific direction. The respondent authority (Income Tax Officer) was directed to consider the reply filed by the petitioner while proceeding in pursuance to the notice dated 28.05.2019. The Court clarified that the petitioner would be at liberty to avail further remedies in accordance with law if they remained aggrieved by the order passed pursuant to the Section 142(1) notice. The principle established is that statutory notices requiring a response necessitate the consideration of that response by the issuing authority before finalizing any decision. The judgment did not decide on the merits of the assessment itself, only on the procedural aspect of considering the petitioner's submission.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with liberty granted to the petitioner to approach the Settlement Commission for pursuing their application filed for AY 2011-12. The Court noted that the Settlement Commission had already decided matters for AY 2012-2013 to 2018-2019, but the application for AY 2011-12 was not dealt with due to a prior stay order. The Court explicitly stated that the petitioner would be at liberty to avail remedies in accordance with law for redressal of any surviving grievance. The core of the decision is procedural, allowing the petitioner to pursue the settlement route for the remaining assessment year. No finding was given on the merits of the reassessment proceedings themselves.