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The High Court set aside the impugned order dated 07.07.2026. The Court found that the Appellate Authority had rejected the petitioner's application for stay without considering the question of hardship. The Court observed that the Appellate Authority had straightaway rejected the application for not depositing the 20% pre-deposit and had not considered the hardships raised by the petitioner. Consequently, the matter was remitted back to the Appellate Authority. The petitioner was directed to file a fresh application highlighting his hardships in depositing the 20% amount, along with an affidavit and other documents. The Appellate Authority was directed to consider this fresh application in accordance with law within 30 days of its filing, and to consider the application for stay before proceeding with recovery. The writ petition was disposed of with these observations.
The Tribunal decided that the petitioner was permitted to withdraw the Civil Writ Petition. The reasoning was based on the explicit request made by the petitioner's counsel after some initial arguments. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn. The Tribunal made it clear that the withdrawal would not cause any prejudice to the petitioner. No specific issue was left undecided as the matter was disposed of on the petitioner's request. The ratio decidendi is that a petitioner has the right to withdraw their petition, and such withdrawal, when granted by the court, does not preclude them from pursuing other remedies or create prejudice, unless specifically ordered otherwise.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition, deeming it just and proper to direct the Appellate Authority to provide an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner. The Court further directed that the Appellate Authority shall decide all objections raised by the petitioner, including those pertaining to the special audit. The principle established is that procedural fairness, including the right to a personal hearing, should be ensured, and appellate authorities are empowered to adjudicate all objections raised by the assessee. The Court did not decide the merits of the special audit order itself but ensured the petitioner's right to be heard on this issue was preserved before the appellate forum.
The High Court, with the consent of both parties, heard all the petitions together. The Court noted the submission from the Revenue that no demand had been raised against the petitioners pursuant to the order dated September 30, 2021, and that assessment orders had already been passed. Considering these facts, the Court deemed it just and proper to dismiss all the petitions. The Court granted liberty to the petitioners to avail appropriate legal remedies if the special audit report under challenge is used against them for any other assessment year. The ratio decidendi is that a writ petition challenging a procedural order like a special audit direction may not be maintainable when the substantive assessment has been completed without raising a demand based on that specific order, and the petitioners are adequately protected by liberty to challenge any future adverse use of the report.
The High Court held that the interest income earned by the assessee from fixed deposits of surplus funds with banks is to be treated as income from other sources and not as profits and gains of business or profession. The Court agreed with the ITAT's reasoning, which relied on the Delhi High Court's decision in CIT v. Shri Ram Honda Power Equipments & Ors. (though that case pertained to Section 80HHC, the Court found the language of Section 80HHD to be substantially similar). The Court noted that Section 80HHD mandates the utilization of amounts credited to a reserve account for specific business purposes within five years, but it does not stipulate that funds must be parked in bank deposits. The interest earned was from voluntarily depositing surplus funds, which were not utilized for the immediate business operations of running the hotel. The Court distinguished the present case from precedents where fixed deposits were imperatively required for business operations. Therefore, the questions of law were answered against the appellant. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the interest income earned by the assessee on fixed deposits of surplus funds should be treated as income from other sources and not as profits derived from the hotel business for the purpose of deduction under Section 80HHD. The Court agreed with the ITAT's view, which relied on the Delhi High Court's decision in CIT v. Shri Ram Honda Power Equipments & Ors. The reasoning was that the provisions of Section 80HHD stipulate the retention of amounts imperative for conducting business operations, not surplus funds voluntarily placed in fixed deposits. The Court found that the interest was earned by depositing surplus funds, which were not utilized for business purposes. The Court distinguished the present case from precedents where fixed deposits were imperatively required for business operations. Therefore, the questions of law were answered against the appellant and in favour of the revenue.
The Tribunal decided that the appeal was non-maintainable. This decision was based on the joint submission of both the appellant (revenue) and the respondent (assessee) that the issue was covered by the judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax-I Vs. Satish Kumar Agarwal, decided on 27.09.2024. Furthermore, the dismissal was explicitly stated to be in view of Circular 9 of 2024. The reasoning is that if the tax effect is below a certain threshold (implied by the submission regarding Rs. 2 Crores) and the issue is covered by precedent and administrative instructions, the appeal should not proceed. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal. The proposed substantial questions of law were expressly left undecided.
The High Court noted the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the writ petition had become infructuous. Consequently, the Court dismissed the writ petition on this ground. The reasoning is solely based on the petitioner's counsel's statement that the matter no longer requires adjudication. The Court also disposed of all pending applications, if any. No other issues were decided, and no specific relief was granted or denied on merits.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 2006-07 was barred by limitation. The assessment year ended on March 31, 2007, meaning the four-year period expired on March 31, 2011. The notice was issued on March 26, 2013, which is beyond this period. Since the original assessment was completed under Section 143(3), the first proviso to Section 147 applies, requiring the Revenue to demonstrate a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The Tribunal found no such failure, as the very issue of the difference in receipts was raised by the AO during the original assessment, and the petitioner provided a specific explanation which was accepted. The Tribunal further held that the reopening was based on a mere change of opinion, not on any fresh material. The reasons recorded for reopening relied on the same discrepancy that was already before the AO during the original assessment. The Tribunal cited the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kelvinator of India Ltd. and other High Court judgments to emphasize that reassessment cannot be a second innings for the AO to reconsider previously examined facts. The principle that reopening on the same material amounts to a change of opinion, which is not a valid ground for invoking Section 147, was applied. Consequently, the notice and the proceedings initiated pursuant to it were set aside.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-I, Jodhpur, to decide the representation submitted by the petitioner-assessee. The decision is to be made by passing a reasoned and speaking order, in accordance with law. This direction is to be complied with within a period of three weeks from the date of production of a certified copy of the order. The Court did not delve into the merits of the seized amount or the refund claim, but focused on ensuring the pending representation is addressed. The ratio decidendi is that administrative authorities must decide representations filed by assessees within a reasonable time, especially when such representations pertain to significant financial matters and are supported by procedural notices.
The High Court held that the writ petition was maintainable. It reasoned that the petitioner was not questioning a finding of fact on merits but the very assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 and a breach of natural justice in the disposal of objections. An appeal would lie only after reassessment, by which time the petitioner would have suffered the allegedly invalid proceedings, rendering the appeal not an efficacious remedy. The Court agreed with the petitioner that the objections were rejected without affording an opportunity of personal hearing, as the respondents evaded addressing this specific contention in their reply. The Court noted that the AO merely observed that the petitioner's assertions could not be corroborated by the material on record. Consequently, the impugned notice dated March 26, 2013, and the order dated January 15, 2014, were set aside. The Competent Authority was granted liberty to proceed afresh, but only after granting the petitioner an opportunity of being heard in person, and thereafter, if deemed appropriate, issue a fresh notice and proceed in accordance with law. The ratio is that reassessment proceedings initiated without proper adherence to natural justice, particularly regarding the disposal of objections, can be quashed, and the availability of an appeal does not preclude writ jurisdiction when the very assumption of jurisdiction is challenged.
The High Court held that the notice issued under Section 148 was barred by limitation. For assessment year 2006-07, the four-year period expired on March 31, 2011. The notice dated March 26, 2013, was issued beyond this period. Since the original assessment was completed under Section 143(3), the first proviso to Section 147 applies, allowing reopening beyond four years only if there was a failure to disclose material facts. The Court found no such failure, as the discrepancy in receipts was specifically queried and explained by the petitioner during the original assessment. Therefore, the extended period was not available. The Court also held that the reopening was based on a mere change of opinion, not fresh material. The Assessing Officer had examined the same discrepancy during the original assessment and accepted the petitioner's explanation. Reopening on the same facts after forming an opinion constitutes a change of opinion, which is not a valid ground for invoking Section 147. The Court relied on Supreme Court and other High Court judgments to support this principle. Consequently, the notice and proceedings were set aside due to lack of jurisdiction.
The High Court noted the concession made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appeal had become infructuous due to the passage of time and subsequent developments. Consequently, the counsel was under instructions not to press the appeal. In light of this, the High Court disposed of the instant Income Tax Appeal. No specific findings on the merits of the original dispute were made, as the appeal was not pressed. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal as not pressed.
The Tribunal noted the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant (Revenue) that in view of the Circular dated 17.09.2024 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, the tax effect involved in the present appeal is less than Rs. 2 Crores. Consequently, the Revenue had instructions to withdraw the appeal. In light of this submission, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. All pending applications were also disposed of. No decision was made on the merits of the original appeal filed by the Revenue before the Tribunal.
The High Court held that the ITAT was not justified in setting aside the order of the CIT. The Court found that the CIT's findings were recorded without proper appreciation of the material evidence and the activities carried out by the Trust, which fell foul of Section 13(1)(c)(ii) read with Section 13 of the Act. The Court noted that the Trust was paying salary and rent to family members controlling it, indicating complete family control. Furthermore, the Court expressed concern over the ITAT's complete disregard for factual evidence, such as misutilisation of Trust funds on liquor, hotel payments, personal telephone bills, electricity expenses of a family member's residence, and other personal expenses for individuals specified under Section 13(3). The Court concluded that the CIT's order did not warrant interference by the ITAT, which committed material irregularity by misappreciating the record and ignoring facts. The appeal was allowed, and the question of law was answered in favour of the Revenue. The respondent was not precluded from applying for registration afresh if statutory parameters were met.
The High Court held that the controversy primarily concerned the inference drawn by the ITAT from the satisfaction note and supporting material for the search authorisation. The scope of interference under Section 260A is limited to substantial questions of law. A finding based on appreciation of material does not warrant interference merely because another inference is possible or the Revenue prefers its own appreciation. Interference is warranted only if the finding is perverse, rests on no evidence, misreads or excludes material evidence, or applies an erroneous legal test. The Court distinguished between the existence and relevance of information for forming the belief under Section 132(1) and the sufficiency or adequacy of such information. While sufficiency cannot be reassessed, the existence of a rational connection between the information and the statutory belief is open to examination. The ITAT examined the satisfaction note, circumstances, and supporting material, finding that the material did not establish the requisite nexus with the events contemplated by Section 132(1) and that independent application of mind by the competent authority was not disclosed. The Revenue failed to demonstrate any perversity, erroneous legal standard, or substantial error of law. The Court clarified that the validity of an authorisation is examined based on information available at the time of issuance, not the eventual outcome of the search. The ITAT's finding concerning the absence of the requisite statutory nexus was decisive. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the assessee is entitled to additional depreciation under Section 32(1)(iia) of the Income Tax Act. The Court noted that the ITAT had relied on various High Court decisions, including CIT Vs. Sesa Goa Ltd., CIT Vs. Mysore Minerals Ltd., and Arihant Tiles and Marbles P. Ltd. Vs. ITO, which held that power generation amounts to 'production'. Furthermore, the Court referred to its own decision in CIT Vs. Ankit Metal and Power Ltd. and other High Court judgments, including CIT Vs. Hi Tech Arai Ltd. (where SLP was dismissed by the Supreme Court), which confirmed that an assessee engaged in manufacturing and production of an article or thing is entitled to additional depreciation on new plant and machinery for power generation, provided the conditions of Section 32(1)(iia) are fulfilled. The Court found that the ITAT had rightly concluded that the assessee met all statutory conditions for claiming additional depreciation and that the CIT's invocation of Section 263 was unjustified as the Assessing Officer's order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the revenue. Consequently, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur held that the substantial question of law in the present appeal stands answered by virtue of the judgment separately passed in D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 183/2014. Consequently, this appeal also stands dismissed. The reasoning is that the present appeal's outcome is intrinsically linked to the decision in the other appeal. No specific findings on the merits of the present appeal are recorded, as the dismissal is based on the precedent set by the related case. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeal. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the order dated 29.06.2026 passed under Section 148A(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is not tenable and is set aside. The reasoning was that Section 148A(1) of the Act statutorily requires the Assessing Officer to provide an opportunity of being heard to the assessee before passing an order. The Tribunal found that mere issuance of a notice and filing of a reply by the assessee does not fulfill the requirement of affording an opportunity of personal hearing. Therefore, the impugned order was in violation of the principles of natural justice and the mandate envisaged under Section 148A. The Tribunal clarified that setting aside the order does not preclude the Assessing Officer from proceeding afresh after affording an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner. The petition was disposed of with this liberty.
The High Court held that the writ petition questioning the Assessment Order dated 19.03.2024 is not maintainable because an appeal invoking the appellate remedy against the said order is already pending consideration before the Commissioner of Income Tax. The Court dismissed the writ petition summarily. However, the petitioner was granted liberty to raise all points before the Appellate Authority. The Court explicitly stated that no opinion was expressed on the merits of the matter. The ratio decidendi is that statutory appellate remedies must be exhausted before approaching the High Court under its writ jurisdiction, especially when the appellate process is already underway and the assessment order itself is under challenge.
The High Court noted the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant (petitioner) that due to subsequent events, the present income tax appeal has become infructuous. The Court observed that in view of this submission, there was nothing remaining to be adjudicated in the appeal. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal as having become infructuous. No specific findings on any substantive tax issues were made as the appeal was disposed of on a procedural ground.
The High Court held that it did not find any substantial question of law involved in the appeal. The Court noted that the ITAT had remanded the matter to the CIT (Exemption) for reconsideration of the assessee's application for registration under Section 12AB of the Act, in light of the Supreme Court's judgment in M/s. Dawoodi Bohara Jamat. The Court observed that the remand provided an opportunity for the Revenue to contest the application and for the CIT (Exemption) to consider it after hearing the assessee. Therefore, the High Court was not inclined to entertain the appeal and dismissed it. The Court explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and directed the CIT (Exemption) to consider the application strictly in accordance with law.
The Tribunal held that the present appeal is squarely covered by the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the High Court at Jaipur Bench in D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 8/2021, Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Jaipur vs. Satish Kumar Agarwal & Ors., decided on 27.09.2024. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed in terms of the aforementioned judgment. The reasoning is based on the principle of precedent, where a decision of a higher bench or a coordinate bench on identical issues binds the current bench. The ratio decidendi is that if a controversy is squarely covered by a binding precedent, the appeal must follow that precedent. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeal. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that while the case technically falls within the exception recognized under the CBDT Circulars (specifically relating to organized tax evasion), the insignificant tax effect of Rs. 8,96,687/- and the overall policy of reducing unnecessary litigation warrant closing the present appeal. The Court decided to dismiss the appeal without entering into the merits of the controversy. The substantial question of law proposed by the appellant was kept open for consideration in a more appropriate case where the factual matrix or tax effect justifies judicial examination. The dismissal is based solely on the aforementioned circular and the policy of reducing litigation, not on the merits of the case.
The High Court dismissed the appeal without entering into the merits of the controversy. While acknowledging that the case technically fell within the exception recognized under CBDT Circular No. 05/2024, the Court considered the insignificant tax effect of Rs. 7,35,657/- and the overall policy of reducing unnecessary litigation. The Court deemed it appropriate to close the present appeal. The substantial question of law proposed by the appellant was kept open for consideration in a more appropriate case where the factual matrix or tax effect justifies judicial examination. The dismissal was based solely on the aforementioned circular and the policy of reducing litigation, not on the merits of the case.
The High Court directed the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Jaipur (Respondent No. 1) to decide the application filed by the petitioners under Section 132B of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in accordance with the law, within a period of two weeks from the date of receiving a certified copy of the order. The Court also directed that the petitioners' further application seeking details of adjustments of the auction amount, cash seized, and other related information should also be considered and disposed of by Respondent No. 1 within the same timeframe, in accordance with the law. The Court explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. The ratio decidendi is that authorities must decide pending applications within a reasonable time, especially when related to the release of assets or provision of information, and that the court's intervention is warranted to ensure timely disposal.
The Court held that while the case technically falls within the exception recognized under the CBDT Circulars, the insignificant tax effect of Rs. 29,71,594/- and the overall policy of reducing unnecessary litigation make it appropriate to close the present appeal. The Court decided to dismiss the appeal without entering into the merits of the controversy. The substantial question of law proposed by the appellant is kept open and the dismissal of this appeal shall not preclude the appellant from raising the same in an appropriate matter where the factual matrix or tax effect justifies judicial examination, as the merits of the case have not been considered. The dismissal is based solely on the aforementioned circulars.
The High Court held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act for re-assessment was indeed barred by limitation. The Court referred to Section 149 of the Act, which stipulates that no notice under Section 148 shall be issued if four years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless the case falls under clause (b) of Section 149. The Court found that the petitioner's case did not fall within the ambit of clause (b). Therefore, as the period of four years had elapsed from the assessment year 1994-95, the notice issued to the petitioner was barred by limitation. The Court quashed the impugned notice dated 12.03.2001 and made the interim order absolute. The writ petition was allowed to the extent indicated.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. Regarding the first issue, the Court held that the Explanation to the amended Section 147 clearly indicates the legislature's intent to empower the Assessing Officer to reassess income in respect of any issue relating to escaped income that subsequently comes to his notice during reassessment proceedings. The Court found that the amended Explanation, by allowing reassessment irrespective of Section 148A compliance for subsequent information, widens the scope of original reassessment proceedings. The Court rejected the contention that the Explanation is ultra vires, stating that legislative intent must be given effect to, even if an Explanation broadens the scope of a substantive provision. The Court also rejected the argument that the use of "any issue" in the Explanation restricts it to information already available, holding that it can include material from outside the original reassessment proceedings. The Court further held that the existence of an independent mechanism for search-related assessments does not preclude widening pending reassessment proceedings based on search material. The Court found the petitioner's contentions unsustainable.
The High Court held that while the failure to serve mandatory notices or afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing can vitiate proceedings, the record indicated the petitioner had knowledge of the reassessment proceedings before their culmination. Specifically, the petitioner's application dated 14.12.2022 demonstrated awareness of the notices and initiated proceedings. Consequently, the Court found no violation of the principles of natural justice warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Income-tax Act was deemed a self-contained code with an effective statutory remedy of appeal. The petitioner was granted liberty to avail the appellate remedy against the assessment order dated 24.03.2023, with the time spent in pursuing the writ petition to be excluded for limitation purposes. The appellate authority was directed to entertain and decide the appeal on merits without raising objections as to limitation if filed within 30 days of the order's upload. All issues and contentions were left open for the appellate authority to decide.
The High Court held that the first substantial question of law is answered against the assessee. The provisions of Section 40(a)(i) were not rendered inapplicable simply because the foreign currency payment to DML was released through Crown Agents. The Court found that the intervention of Crown Agents as administrators of the UK grant did not divest the appellant of its character as the contracting person on whose behalf and towards whose contractual liability the payment was made. The contractual obligation was undertaken for the appellant's Indian project, and the payment discharged this obligation. The second substantial question of law was also answered against the assessee. The payment made to DML through Crown Agents under the grant arrangement represented the discharge of consideration incurred by the appellant for technical know-how for its Indian business. It could not be treated as having its source outside India merely by reference to the location from which Crown Agents released the funds. The Court found no legal infirmity in the ITAT's conclusion. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the ITAT's order.
The Tribunal decided both issues. On the first issue, it held that the deduction under Sections 80-IA/80-IB must be reduced while computing deduction under Section 80HHC(3), relying on the decision in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Rogini Garments. On the second issue, the Tribunal held that the additional sales tax and interest related to the purchase of assets and formed part of their actual cost, directing depreciation to be allowed. The High Court, however, answered the first substantial question of law in the negative, in favour of the assessee, holding that deductions under Sections 80-IA/80-IB should be reduced at the stage of actual allowance, not computation, and referred to Shital Fibers Ltd. For the second issue, the High Court held that the Tribunal was not justified in conclusively directing the entire amount of Rs.7,77,607/- to be treated as actual cost and allowing depreciation without examining the statutory mechanism for adjusting the written-down value. The issue was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh determination, considering the nature of the components, the year of crystallisation, and the applicable statutory provisions for revenue expenditure or adjustment to actual cost.
The High Court held that the petitioner's case fell under 'under-reporting due to misreporting,' which is specifically excluded from immunity under Section 270A(9) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found that while the show-cause notice did not explicitly mention the specific subcategory of Section 270A(9), it referred to the petitioner's case as falling under "under-reporting consequences of misreporting." The petitioner was aware of this classification from the assessment order, which noted the failure to produce accounting records for income derived from its solar plant unit, thus bringing it within the scope of "under-reporting in consequence of misreporting." The Court ruled that the absence of explicit mention of the sub-category in the notice did not constitute arbitrariness or a violation of natural justice. Regarding the timeline, the Court held that statutory provisions do not mandate that immunity applications in cases of income misreporting be decided within the one-month period specified in Section 270AA(4). Therefore, the department was not obligated to decide the petitioner's application within that timeframe, and the petitioner's application seeking exemption was outside the statutory framework for misreporting cases. Consequently, the Court found no illegality in the show-cause notice or the impugned order and dismissed the writ petition.
The High Court declined to interfere with the impugned notices under Section 148 and remitted the matter to the competent authority. The Court observed that the writ petition, filed in 2001, had remained pending for approximately 25 years. It found itself unable to effectively adjudicate the factual disputes pleaded, as these required examination and corroboration against documentary evidence and potentially recording of witness statements, which cannot be done solely on affidavits. The Court noted that mere delay in disposal does not empower it to bypass the adjudicatory process envisaged under the Income Tax Act. Furthermore, allegations of bias and prejudice against revenue officials were deemed unlikely to survive consideration due to the efflux of time. The Court concluded that no prejudice would be caused to the petitioner if the disputed facts were adjudicated under the machinery of the Income Tax Act by the competent authority. The petitioner was granted liberty to respond to the notices with supporting material. All issues and contentions raised in the writ petition were left open for adjudication by the Assessing Officer. The petitioner was advised that if his defence is accepted, nothing further would survive, and if an adverse view is taken, he would have adequate appellate remedies.
The High Court held that the matter requires to be remitted back to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) for fresh consideration. This decision is based on the joint submission of the learned counsel for the parties, who agreed that the controversy is similar to that decided in D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 59/2009. In that prior case, the High Court had found that the Tribunal had wrongly relied on a previous judgment of the High Court which did not address the provisions of Section 145(3). Therefore, the appeals were disposed of by remanding the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration in accordance with law and in terms of the directions contained in the aforesaid order. The Tribunal was also directed to expedite the hearing. No specific finding on the entitlement to deduct interest or commission was made by the High Court in this judgment; the operative direction is a remand.
The High Court, in view of the joint submission made by the learned counsel for both the parties, disposed of the present appeal. The matter was remanded to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), Jodhpur, for fresh consideration and decision in accordance with law. The ITAT was directed to keep in view the judgments cited by the parties: Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. (2010) 322 ITR 478 (Raj), C.I.T. Udaipur vs. M/s Hindustan Zinc Ltd.; Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.28563/2009, decided on 18.07.2011 (Supreme Court of India), and Sharp Business System vs. Commissioner of Income Tax-III (2026) 484 ITR 509 (SC). The High Court did not decide the merits of the case but facilitated a re-adjudication by the ITAT based on the specified precedents.
The High Court allowed the application for restoration of the appeal. The Court noted the Revenue's candid admission in the restoration application that the appeal did not survive on merits due to the low monetary limit prescribed by the CBDT. Consequently, despite restoring the appeal to its original status for hearing, the Court proceeded to dismiss the appeal itself on the ground that it did not survive due to the low monetary limit prescribed under the CBDT norms. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the order dated 10.04.2026 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Income Tax Officer, Ward 2(1), Chandigarh & Ors. vs. Tej Pratap Singh, which remitted matters to respective High Courts for fresh adjudication, could not be a justified ground for recalling the High Court's earlier order. The Court reasoned that the Supreme Court's directions were confined to the specific matters in relation to which the SLPs were disposed of and did not constitute an order in rem that would automatically revive all decided writ petitions for fresh adjudication. The Court observed that if the Department wished for a similar outcome, they could move an appropriate SLP before the Supreme Court. If a similar order was passed by the Supreme Court, the writ petitions would automatically stand revived or revival could be sought from the Court. The application for recalling the order was dismissed. However, the prayer to allow the filing of photocopies of certified copies and their return to the applicant for future filing was allowed.
The High Court allowed the prayer for restoration of the appeal. The Court noted the applicant-Revenue's submission that the appeal did not survive on merits due to the low monetary limit prescribed by the CBDT, but that the department desired the matter to be restored for a clean withdrawal. In light of this submission, the Court dismissed the appeal, stating that it did not survive due to the low monetary limit prescribed under the CBDT norms. The application for restoration was disposed of, and the appeal was restored to its original status for hearing, only to be subsequently dismissed on the stated ground.
The High Court held that the appeals have become infructuous. Consequently, the Court dismissed all the instant appeals. The reasoning provided is solely based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appeals have become infructuous. No other grounds or arguments were considered or decided. The ratio decidendi is that if an appeal is rendered infructuous by the parties, it should be dismissed. The operative direction was the dismissal of all pending appeals and disposal of all pending applications.
The High Court held that the appeals had become infructuous. The reasoning provided is solely based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals as having become infructuous. No decision was made on the substantive issues that might have been raised in the original appeals. All pending applications were also disposed of. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeals.
The High Court held that the instant appeals have become infructuous. This decision was based solely on the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Consequently, the Court ordered that the appeals be dismissed as having become infructuous. All pending applications associated with these appeals were also disposed of. The reasoning is that if the counsel for the appellant states the appeals are infructuous, the court accepts this and proceeds to dismiss them without delving into the merits of the original dispute. No specific IT Act sections were discussed in relation to the merits of the case, as the appeals were dismissed on a procedural ground.
The High Court held that the appeals had become infructuous. The reasoning provided is solely based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant. No other reasoning or analysis was presented by the court. The ratio decidendi is that if an appeal is rendered infructuous by the appellant's submission, it will be dismissed on that ground. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeals as having become infructuous. All pending applications were also disposed of.
The High Court held that the appeals had become infructuous. The reasoning provided is a direct submission from the learned counsel for the petitioner stating that the appeals have become infructuous. Based on this submission, the Court concluded that the appeals could no longer be pursued on their merits. The ratio decidendi is that if all parties agree or if a party representing the appeal submits that the appeal is infructuous, the court will dismiss the appeal on that basis without delving into the substantive issues. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed as having become infructuous, and all pending applications were disposed of.