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The High Court held that the application for waiver of interest under Sections 234B and 234C of the Act of 1961 was decided in a mechanical manner without convincing reasons. The respondents' counsel also admitted that the reasons provided were not convincing. Consequently, the Court set aside the order dated 31.3.2014 passed by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Jodhpur. The matter was remanded back to the Chief Commissioner for reconsideration of the assessee's application. The authority was directed to provide a sufficient opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and to pass a fresh, reasoned, and speaking order within three months from the date the petitioners appear before it. The petitioners were directed to appear on 22.1.2024. The Court did not go into the merits of the case.
The High Court held that the writ petitions were not maintainable. Regarding the procedural irregularities alleged by the petitioners, the Court relied on established precedents from the Madras High Court (Dinesh Chand Surana) and the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Abhay Nigam & Ors.). These judgments emphasize that proceedings under Section 24 of the PBPT Act require only a prima facie opinion and the recording of reasons. The opportunity to furnish documents, particulars, evidence, and be heard is primarily at the stage of adjudication proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority under Section 26. The Court found that the provisional attachment order is tentative and subject to judicial review by the Adjudicating Authority. The petitioners were advised to raise all their grounds, including those related to the Benami nature of the property, before the Adjudicating Authority, which is statutorily obliged to consider all relevant aspects. Therefore, the Court declined to interfere at this stage, holding that no case was made out for intervention in the writ petitions.
The High Court held that since an assessment order has already been passed, the writ petition filed by the petitioner has become infructuous. The Court's reasoning was based on the joint submission made by the learned counsel for both the parties. The operative direction was to dismiss the writ petition as having become infructuous. No specific issue regarding the assessment order itself or its validity was decided on merits. The principle derived is that a writ petition seeking to challenge an action or order of the revenue may be dismissed as infructuous if a subsequent event, such as the passing of an assessment order, renders the original challenge moot.
The High Court held that the writ petitions were not maintainable and dismissed them. Regarding the arguments on natural justice and premature issuance of orders, the Court referred to the judgments in Dinesh Chand Surana (Madras High Court) and Abhay Nigam & Ors. (M.P. High Court). These judgments held that proceedings under Section 24 of the PBPT Act only require a recording of a prima facie opinion, and the opportunity of being heard and furnishing documents is primarily at the stage of adjudication proceedings under Section 26. The Court emphasized that provisional attachment orders are tentative and subject to judicial review by the Adjudicating Authority. The petitioners could raise all grounds before the Adjudicating Authority, which is best suited and statutorily obliged to consider all relevant aspects. Therefore, interference at the provisional stage was not warranted. The Court also noted that the judgment in M/s Shri Kalyan Building’s case was not applicable as the petitioners had alternative remedies available and the situation was not analogous. The Court found no reason to interfere, dismissing the writ petitions.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition. It acknowledged that the issue raised was covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India and Anr. Vs. M/s Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. (supra), which held that the amended provisions are not retrospective. Consequently, the Court directed the release of the disputed property, described as 0.1506 hectare comprising specific portions of land in Khasra Nos. 832, 833/2361, 848, 849, and 846 in Village Kukar, Amer, Jaipur. However, the Court clarified that this order was solely at the instance of petitioner No. 1. The release of the property was made subject to the final outcome of the review petition pending before the Supreme Court concerning the M/s Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. judgment. Petitioner No. 2, while impleaded, was not claiming any relief in its capacity as a petitioner.
The High Court dismissed the writ petitions. Regarding the premature issuance of the provisional attachment order, the Court, citing the Madras High Court in Dinesh Chand Surana and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Abhay Nigam & Ors., held that proceedings under Section 24 of the PBPT Act only require a recording of a prima facie opinion. The furnishing of documents, particulars, or evidence, and the opportunity of being heard, are primarily at the stage of adjudication proceedings under Section 26. The Court found that the Adjudicating Authority is best suited and statutorily obliged to consider all relevant aspects, including the validity of the provisional attachment order and the grounds raised by the petitioners. Therefore, interference at the stage of provisional attachment was not warranted. The arguments regarding the lack of reasons, DIN, limitation, and denial of personal hearing were implicitly rejected by the Court's decision not to interfere with the provisional attachment, as these issues could be raised before the Adjudicating Authority. The Court also rejected the petitioners' reliance on Section 2(9) of the PBPT Act, stating their submissions were without basis. The judgment in M/s Shri Kalyan Building’s case was distinguished as the petitioners there approached the court after the Adjudicating Authority's order and when the appellate tribunal was not functional, unlike the present situation.
The High Court, in its order dated 12/12/2023, considered the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner. The Court noted that the counsel for the petitioner sought withdrawal of the writ petitions. In view of these submissions, the High Court ordered that the writ petitions are dismissed as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of the underlying dispute was made. The operative direction was the dismissal of the petitions as withdrawn.
The High Court, in its order dated 12/12/2023, considered the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner. The Court noted that the counsel for the petitioner sought withdrawal of the writ petitions. In view of these submissions, the High Court ordered that the writ petitions are dismissed as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of the underlying dispute was made. The operative direction was the dismissal of the petitions as withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the petitioner is entitled to interest on the refund amount for the delayed payment. The issuance of Form No. 5 on 8/3/2021 clearly indicated the petitioner's entitlement to a refund of Rs. 3,47,03,505/-. The refund was admittedly paid/adjusted in installments between October 2021 and May 2022, with no valid reason provided for the delay. The Tribunal rejected the revenue's plea based on the Explanation to Section 7 of the VSV Act, 2020, finding that the Explanation pertains to amounts paid before filing the declaration and not to interest for delayed refunds after the issuance of Form No. 5. Relying on the Delhi High Court's decision in Ms. Anjul and the Bombay High Court's decision in UPS Freight Services, the Tribunal ruled that the State, having retained money without right, is obligated to make good the loss, which includes interest. Consequently, the petitioner is entitled to interest at 6% per annum on the delayed refund amount from 8/6/2021 (90 days after 8/3/2021) until the date of actual/last payment. The respondents were directed to make the payment within 8 weeks.
The High Court dismissed the petition on the grounds of delay in approaching the Court. The Court observed that the notices impugned were issued on March 25, 2023, and March 26, 2023. The petitioner did not challenge these notices at that time but instead participated in the subsequent proceedings. Notices under Section 143(2) of the Act were issued on June 22, 2023, followed by a notice under Section 142(1) of the Act on July 21, 2023, wherein materials relied upon and the petitioners were disclosed. Given these circumstances and the delay in challenging the notices, the Court was not inclined to interfere with the ongoing proceedings. Therefore, the petition was dismissed without delving into the merits of the alleged non-compliance with the circular.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the Appellate Authority to decide the petitioner's pending appeal on its merits within a period of four months from the date of production of a certified copy of the order. The Court also extended the interim stay order, which prohibited coercive action against the petitioner, until the final disposal of the appeal. The Court's reasoning was based on the pendency of the appeal and the need for its expeditious resolution to provide finality to the matter. The judgment did not decide the merits of the assessment order itself, but rather focused on the procedural aspect of ensuring the appeal is heard and decided promptly while maintaining the interim protection for the petitioner.
The Court dismissed the writ petition in limine. It found that the petitioner's claim of not being served with the notice under Section 148A(b) dated 21.03.2023 and the subsequent order under Section 148A(d) dated 30.03.2023 was an afterthought, as evidenced by his own rectification application filed on 08.06.2023, which mentioned receiving the show cause notice and did not dispute service. The rectification application itself stated that the petitioner did not avail sufficient time to file explanations or documentary evidence. The order rejecting the rectification application noted that the case was pending before the Faceless Assessment Unit. The Court also noted that the petitioner's income declared for AY 2016-17 was Rs.3,36,670/-, while he claimed to have paid Rs.42,27,554/- for property purchase, indicating a potential discrepancy. The Court distinguished the present case from the cited judgment in Rajhans Processors Union of India & Others, finding the facts to be different. The Court clarified that the petitioner could raise all available grounds in the reassessment proceedings.
The Court dismissed the petition in limine. It found that the petitioner's claim of non-service of the notice under Section 148A(b) and the subsequent order under Section 148A(d) was an afterthought, as her rectification application filed on 08.06.2023 acknowledged receipt of the Section 148A(b) notice dated 30.03.2023 and attempted to justify her investment. The Court noted that the rectification application was rejected because the assessee did not avail sufficient time or provide documentary evidence regarding the information communicated. The Court also observed that the case was pending before the Faceless Assessment Unit (NaFAC) for finalization. The Court distinguished the present case from the cited judgment in Rajhans Processors Union of India & Others, where there was an admission of no material to form a bonafide belief of escaped assessment. The Court held that no case was made out for issuance of notice. However, it clarified that the petitioner could raise all available grounds in the re-assessment proceedings against any proposed additions.
The High Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable. The Court noted that the petitioner had failed to disclose the crucial fact that an assessment order had been passed prior to the filing of the writ petition. Furthermore, the order under Section 148A(d) was passed much earlier, and the petitioner had participated in the assessment proceedings without challenging it. The Court found that the petitioner had an alternative remedy of appeal available under the law. Citing its own decision in Bhag Chand Jangid, the Court declined to entertain the writ petition. The petitioner was granted liberty to raise all grounds in an appeal before the appellate authority, which was directed to consider all points raised by the petitioner. The writ petition was disposed of with this liberty.
The High Court held that the appeal could not be admitted as a substantial question of law would arise only on a factual foundation, which was absent. The Court noted that the assessee's argument on limitation was not supported by a factual assertion that the notice under Section 148, though dated 31.03.2017, was not issued on that date but dispatched thereafter. The Court acknowledged that the ITAT had not recorded any finding on the issue of limitation. However, in the absence of any factual foundation to support the claim of limitation, the argument was considered to lack substance. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed on the grounds that no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The High Court noted that the learned counsel for the petitioner wished to withdraw the instant writ petition. Consequently, the Court ordered that the writ petition be dismissed as withdrawn. No findings were made on the merits of any underlying tax dispute, as the appeal was disposed of on the procedural ground of withdrawal. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn.
The High Court held that the entire outstanding demand created against the petitioner pursuant to the reassessment orders for Assessment Years 2008-09, 2009-10, and 2010-11 is liable to be stayed. This decision is based on the fact that the order cancelling the petitioner's Section 12AA registration was quashed by the ITAT, and although the revenue has filed an appeal against the ITAT's order before the High Court, no stay has been granted. Therefore, the basis for initiating reassessment proceedings is questionable. The Court also directed the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) to decide the appeals filed by the petitioner against the reassessment orders expeditiously, preferably within six months. The writ petition was disposed of by restraining the respondents from initiating coercive recovery measures until the disposal of the petitioner's appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals).
The High Court allowed the application for withdrawal of the writ petition. The Court granted the reasons indicated in the application for withdrawal. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the underlying dispute that led to the filing of the writ petition. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn.
The High Court acknowledged that the adjudicating authority was obliged under the law to send official communication to the revenue authority regarding the revocation of attachment once such an order was passed. While noting that the petitioner took eight months to inform the respondent of the issue, the Court directed the respondent to positively send a communication to the concerned revenue authority within six weeks from the date of the order. The Court also advised the petitioner to directly approach the revenue authority with the revocation order for necessary corrections in revenue entries. The Court placed on record the respondent's submission regarding a pending review petition before the Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India & Another Versus M/S. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions.
The High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur held that the writ petition had become infructuous. This decision was based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent. The respondent stated that a final assessment order had been passed by the income tax authority. Consequently, the Court found no reason to proceed with the writ petition as the underlying issue it sought to address was superseded by the subsequent assessment order. The Court did not delve into the merits of the original challenge or the validity of the assessment order itself. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the impugned show cause notice/order was not barred by limitation. The Court reasoned that Notification No. 10 of 2021 extended the period for completion of reassessment to September 30, 2021. The stay granted on February 24, 2021, remained operative until the dismissal of the writ petition on March 13, 2023. This period of stay was to be excluded from the computation of limitation. Consequently, after the dismissal on March 13, 2023, the department had 219 days available to complete the reassessment proceedings, extending the deadline to October 18, 2023. Therefore, the Revenue's action in passing the impugned notice was found to be in accordance with the law. The Court also found no substance in the petitioner's claim of parity with ASG Hospital Pvt. Ltd., as the calculation of available time was consistent. The petitioner was advised that they still had sufficient opportunity to defend their case during the assessment proceedings. The Court found no illegality or perversity in the impugned notice.
The Tribunal decided both issues against the petitioners. Regarding jurisdiction, the Tribunal found that the petitioners did not dispute residing in the house where the search was conducted in 1995, that they owned the residence, were present during the search, and did not dispute claiming the seized items. Therefore, the Tribunal held that the ACIT, Bikaner, had jurisdiction as per the notification dated July 9, 1993, which authorized the ACIT for all search and seizure cases. Consequently, the rejection of the petitioners' objections regarding jurisdiction was also deemed not illegal. On the issue of reason to believe, the Tribunal noted that the reasons recorded by the ACIT were placed on record and provided to the petitioners, who did not file any response. Citing the Supreme Court in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. and the Division Bench in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Banswara Syntex Ltd., the Tribunal held that the proper course for the noticee is to file a return and objections, which the assessing officer must dispose of by a speaking order. The writ petitions were dismissed, but the petitioners were granted liberty to file their returns and objections, and to appeal any adverse assessment order.
The Tribunal held that the ACIT, Bikaner, had the jurisdiction to issue the impugned notices under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court noted that while the petitioners claimed no search and seizure was conducted against them, they did not deny residing in the house where the search took place in 1995, nor did they dispute ownership of the residence or the seizure of items. Considering these circumstances, the Court found that the ACIT, Bikaner, had jurisdiction as per the notification dated July 9, 1993, which authorized the ACIT for all search and seizure cases. Consequently, the rejection of the petitioners' objections regarding jurisdiction was also deemed not illegal. Regarding the 'reason to believe' issue, the Court noted that the reasons recorded by the ACIT were placed on record and provided to the petitioners, who filed no response. Citing the Supreme Court in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. and this Court in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Banswara Syntex Ltd., the Tribunal stated that the proper course for the noticee is to file a return, seek reasons, file objections, and if dissatisfied with the reassessment order, file an appeal. Therefore, the writ petitions were dismissed, with liberty granted to the petitioners to file their returns and objections, and pursue appeals if necessary.
The Tribunal held that if a demand has already been created after a completed assessment against the deceased, the department is entitled to carry out necessary adjustments in view of Section 159 of the Income Tax Act. However, the factual aspect of whether a demand was indeed created against Sh. Murari Lal Gupta needs verification. The respondent authority is directed to verify if a demand was created against Sh. Murari Lal Gupta. If no demand was created, then the provisions of Section 159 would not be applicable, and the balance refund amount of Rs. 6,54,650/- along with applicable interest shall be paid to the petitioner. This verification and subsequent order are to be completed within 45 days of receiving the order.
The High Court allowed the withdrawal of the writ petition. The Court noted that the petitioner's counsel informed them about the passing of the order by the Commissioner on September 30, 2023, and the petitioner's intention to avail of the alternative remedy. In light of this submission, the Court disposed of the writ petition as withdrawn. The liberty to avail of the alternative remedy was granted. Any pending applications were also disposed of.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the respondents to conclude the process for the refund of the amount within a period of three weeks from the date of the order. This decision was made in light of the fact that the matter had been pending for a long time and the refund process had been initiated earlier. The Court's reasoning was based on reducing the period initially stated by the respondents (four weeks) to three weeks, considering the delay. The operative direction was to expedite the refund process. The principle derived is that the High Court, exercising its writ jurisdiction, can direct the revenue to conclude refund processes within a reasonable and expedited timeframe when undue delays occur. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court dismissed the Income Tax Appeal filed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Jaipur-2. The Court relied on its previous decisions in D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 54/2021 (Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax-I Vs. Ritu Agarwal) and D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 60/2021 (Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax-I Vs. Ajay Agarwal), which were decided on May 10, 2022. In those cases, the Court had observed that the ITAT had logically dealt with the questions of fact and law involved through a reasoned order, and therefore, no substantial question of law arose. The Court reiterated the principle from the Supreme Court's judgment in Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. Designated Authority, that if the Tribunal, on consideration of material and relevant facts, arrives at a conclusion which is a possible conclusion, it must be allowed to rest. The Court found no gross violation of principles of natural justice or failure of justice in the ITAT's order. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed in the same terms as the cited precedents, in favor of the assessee.
The High Court held that the assessee's contention that the entire proceedings under Section 263 should be set aside was not tenable. The Court reasoned that proceedings were initiated within the statutory time limit, and the assessee was afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing, despite the short notice period. The adjournment application filed on the day of the hearing was also noted. The Court distinguished the case of *Ashutosh Bhargava* by stating that it involved different factual circumstances and the ITAT's order in that case was not binding on the High Court. The Court found that the ITAT's decision to remand the matter back to the PCIT for fresh consideration, due to the assessee not being accorded sufficient opportunity, was a valid exercise of discretion and not perverse. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in *Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. Designated Authority* regarding the admission of appeals on substantial questions of law, concluding that no substantial question of law arose as substantial relief had already been granted by the ITAT's remand order.
The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, considered the prayer made by the learned counsel for the petitioner seeking withdrawal of the writ petition. The Court found no impediment to granting this request. Accordingly, the Tribunal decided to dispose of the present petition as withdrawn, as prayed for by the petitioner. Any pending applications associated with the writ petition were also disposed of as a consequence. The judgment does not delve into the merits of the original dispute or any substantive legal questions that might have been raised had the petition proceeded.
The High Court held that the petitioner's argument was misconceived in law and fact. The court found that the PCIT had applied its mind to the case and granted approval, which is the essential requirement under Section 151 of the Income Tax Act. The presence of remarks from the Joint Commissioner in the file, while the file was routed through the JCIT, did not invalidate the PCIT's approval. The court reasoned that the JCIT's remarks were merely to facilitate the PCIT's decision-making process and did not usurp the PCIT's jurisdiction. Since the competent authority (PCIT) applied its mind and granted approval based on the available material, no case was made out for interference. The writ petition was dismissed.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court noted that learned counsel for both parties were in agreement ('ad idem') that the issue involved in the present case was covered by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Bar Council of Maharashtra and the judgment of the High Court in Bar Council of Rajasthan Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax. Based on this consensus and the precedent set by these judgments, the Court quashed the impugned order dated 08.03.2001 for the assessment years 1971-72 to 1976-77. The ratio decidendi is that if an issue is squarely covered by a binding precedent from the Supreme Court or a High Court in favour of the assessee, and both parties acknowledge this, the impugned order should be set aside. No issues were left undecided.
The High Court permitted the petitioner to withdraw the present petition. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action, provided it includes particular details. The petition was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn with the aforesaid liberty. The judgment does not delve into any substantive legal issues or merits of the case, as it was disposed of on a procedural request.
The High Court held that since the petitioner had brought to its notice a Supreme Court judgment in the case of Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur Vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (Assessment) and Anr. (Civil Appeal No.8590/2010), which dealt with identical questions of fact and law including assessment years, and the respondents' counsel could not dispute this fact, the present writ petition should be disposed of in the same terms as the Supreme Court judgment. The reasoning is based on the binding precedent set by the Supreme Court. The operative direction is to dispose of the writ petition in terms of the Supreme Court judgment.
The High Court held that the grievance raised by the petitioner, who is serving in the Income Tax Department, is required to be agitated before the Central Administrative Tribunal. Consequently, the High Court did not entertain the present writ petition. The petitioner was granted liberty to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal in accordance with the law. The writ petition and the stay application were disposed of on this basis. No decision on the merits of the petitioner's grievance was made by the High Court.
The High Court decided the three questions of law as follows. For Questions 1 and 3, the appeals were answered against the appellant-Revenue and in favour of the assessee, relying on this Court's judgment in CIT Central Jaipur Vs. Unique Builders and Developers and connected matters [2017 (5) TMI 1505 (Rajasthan High Court)], noting that the SLP against this judgment was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Consequently, D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 11/2019 was dismissed. For Question 2, concerning the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia), the question was answered in favour of the appellant-Revenue and against the assessee, citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Shree Choudahry Transport Company Vs. Income Tax Officer [2020 (8) TMI 23 (Supreme Court)]. Accordingly, D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 12/2019 was partly allowed.
The Tribunal disposed of the writ petition as withdrawn. The petitioner was granted liberty to amend the earlier writ petition (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3598/2023) to incorporate the challenge to the penalty order dated August 10, 2023. This penalty order was stated to be a consequence and in continuation of the assessment order that was already under challenge in the previous writ petition. The court did not decide on the merits of the penalty order itself, but allowed the procedural step of withdrawal to facilitate a consolidated challenge in the pending earlier writ petition.
The High Court held that the questions of law proposed by the Revenue were factually incorrect. The ITAT had thoroughly examined the material on record and reappreciated it while deleting the additions. For the addition on account of rejected goods, the Tribunal found that the AO lacked a basis to infer that the stock shown as rejected was actually finished goods. The Tribunal considered the assessee's status as an exporter, the importance of quality, and the possibility of genuine rejections. It noted that the AO accepted the goods were rejected and the assessee had no right to sell them, but then demanded proof of destruction, which was not universally required by all agreements. The Tribunal found no proof of the assessee selling rejected goods in the grey market. Similarly, for stock with job units, the Tribunal found that the assessee outsourced certain manufacturing processes, which is a trade practice. The assessee provided detailed quantitative records of fabrics sent to job units and received back. The stock with job units was valued at the cost of fabric only, as no further cost was incurred. The Tribunal found that the assessee had produced complete quantitative details which were wrongly rejected by the AO. The extensive details filed before the lower authorities left no doubt about the units with job units. The Tribunal concluded that the addition was improper and could not be made merely due to the absence of separate disclosure in the notes to accounts. The Court found no perversity, violation of law, or non-consideration of material aspects by the ITAT. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose.
The High Court held that the writ petition had become infructuous. This decision was based on the statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, who informed the Court that a final assessment order had been passed. Consequently, the Court found no further purpose in continuing the writ proceedings. The principle derived is that if the subject matter of a writ petition is resolved by subsequent events, such as the passing of a final order, the petition can be disposed of as infructuous. The operative direction was to dispose of the writ petition.
The Tribunal held that the petitioner was not entitled to the certificate of declaration under the PMGKY Scheme. The primary reasoning was that the petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory statutory requirement of submitting the declaration in the prescribed Form-1, which included specific verification and solemn statutory declarations. The Tribunal emphasized that these requirements, particularly those under clauses (b), (c), (d), and (e) of the verification clause in Form-1, were not directory but mandatory. The object of these declarations was to ensure the applicant had an unblemished record. Therefore, non-submission of the solemn statutory declaration in the prescribed proforma was considered fatal to the petitioner's claim. The Tribunal also noted that the petition was not maintainable as it did not challenge the subsequent order dated May 13/14, 2019, rejecting the petitioner's representation, although this was a secondary reason. The Tribunal dismissed the petition, finding no merit.
The Tribunal (High Court) decided that the petitioner was entitled to withdraw the writ petition. The reasoning was based on the petitioner's counsel explicitly praying for the withdrawal of the petition. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn. No other issues were decided on merits as the petition was withdrawn. The ratio decidendi is that a petitioner has the right to withdraw their petition, leading to its dismissal as withdrawn without prejudice to the merits of the case.
The Tribunal (High Court) noted the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The counsel stated that the writ petition had become infructuous and consequently, the petitioner did not wish to press the petition. Based on this submission, the High Court disposed of the writ petition as not pressed. No decision on the merits of the original dispute was made. The operative direction was to dispose of the writ petition.
The High Court, upon hearing both learned counsel for the appellant (Revenue) and the respondent (assessee), noted their joint submission regarding the tax effect. Both parties agreed that the tax effect involved in the appeal was significantly below the monetary limit set by Circular No. 17/2019, dated August 8, 2019, for filing appeals by the income tax department. Consequently, the Court found the appeal to be not maintainable on this ground. The Court dismissed the appeal (ITA/55/2021) solely on the basis that the tax effect was below the prescribed monetary limit. No decision was made on the merits of the substantive tax dispute.
The tribunal held that the APL, through its nominees, can exercise voting rights in the tier-one companies and influence decisions in lower-tier companies as shareholders. However, the APL cannot directly interfere with the internal affairs of companies or lift the corporate veil.