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153 orders · Page 3 of 4
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The Court held that the petition could be dismissed as withdrawn with liberty granted to the petitioner to file a fresh petition. This liberty was granted in view of a subsequent event that had occurred. The Court did not decide any substantive issues related to income tax law or the merits of the case. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh petition.
The High Court held that the impugned assessment order was unsustainable. The Court found that there was no order passed by the competent authority specifically denying the petitioner the right to a personal hearing as contemplated under Section 144B(7)(viii). Consequently, the assessment order passed without affording the petitioner a personal hearing was deemed invalid. The Court set aside the assessment order dated March 30, 2022. The matter was remanded back to the National Faceless Assessment Centre, Delhi (Respondent No. 2) to grant the petitioner a personal hearing before proceeding further on the notice served upon him. The writ petition was disposed of with a direction to Respondent No. 2 to fix a date for personal hearing and then proceed in accordance with law.
The High Court held that the petitioner's counsel does not wish to press the writ petition and seeks liberty to revive it in case an eventuality so arises. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn with the liberty as sought by the petitioner. The principle established is that a petitioner can withdraw a writ petition and seek liberty to revive it, subject to the court's discretion.
The Tribunal decided that the petitioner did not wish to press the writ petition. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The reasoning provided is solely based on the submission made by the petitioner's counsel. No decision on the merits of the case was made. The ratio decidendi is that if a petitioner withdraws their petition, it will be dismissed as withdrawn. The operative direction was to dismiss the writ petition as withdrawn. No issues were left undecided as the matter was disposed of on the petitioner's request.
The High Court held that the PCIT's rejection of the revision application on the ground of delay was per se illegal. The Court found that Section 264(3) of the Income Tax Act clearly indicates that for reckoning the period of limitation for a revision application, the relevant date is either the date of communication of the order or the date on which the assessee otherwise comes to know of the order. By considering the date of passing of the order, the PCIT had incorrectly applied the limitation period. Consequently, the High Court set aside the order dated 31.03.2023 passed by the PCIT, Jaipur-2. The Court directed the PCIT to decide the application under Section 264 of the Income Tax Act on its own merits. No other issues were expressly left undecided.
The High Court permitted the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition. The court noted the petitioner's prayer to approach the Appellate Authority and the statement that an application for waiver of pre-deposit due to hardship had been moved. The court directed that if such an application is moved before the Appellate Authority, it shall be considered, and appropriate orders will be passed in accordance with the law. No decision was made on the merits of the case.
The High Court, in consideration of the limited submission made by the petitioner's counsel, disposed of the writ petition. The Court directed the respondents, the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (Benami Prohibition) and the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (Initiating Officer, Benami Prohibition), to decide the petitioner's representation dated 16.02.2023. This decision is to be made by passing a speaking order within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the Court's order. The decision must be strictly in accordance with the law. The stay petition filed along with the writ petition was also disposed of accordingly. No specific findings on the merits of the representation were made, as the Court only directed its consideration and decision.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition, taking into account the subsequent development of a substantial refund being processed. The Court directed the respondents to examine the petitioner's claim for the balance amount as a refund, rather than an adjustment, and to also consider the claim for interest under Section 244A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This decision was to be made within three months through a speaking order. The Court did not decide on the merits of the balance refund or interest claim but mandated a reasoned decision by the revenue. The petitioner was granted liberty to revive the petition if their grievance remained unredressed. No issue was expressly left undecided, but the core claims were remanded for decision.
The High Court held that the networking products, including CAT-5/CAT-6 cables, Routers, Switches, Hubs, and LAN Cards, are classifiable as computer peripherals. The Court found that the Tax Board had erroneously taken a hyper-technical view and failed to apply the correct ratio of previous judgments. The burden to prove that a product falls within a particular tariff is on the revenue, and in this case, the revenue failed to adduce any evidence to substantiate its claim that these items were not covered under Part-A of Schedule IV of the RVAT Act. The Court also noted that subsequent amendments to the RVAT Act, which specifically included "networking items" and "networking cables" in Part-A of Schedule IV, acted as a clarification and should be given retrospective effect. The Court further observed that the Tax Board had restricted its findings to cables and imposed tax on the entire turnover despite other networking items being undisputedly covered by earlier judgments. The argument based on HSN was rejected as it was not raised before the lower authorities and lacks statutory force under the RVAT Act. Consequently, the questions of law were answered in favour of the petitioner-assessee, and the impugned orders were quashed and set aside. The appeals were allowed.
The High Court allowed the writ petition, directing the release of the disputed property. The Court reasoned that the issue had been decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Another Versus M/S. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd., and this order remained operative. The High Court found that the property in dispute, comprising specific hectares of land across various Khasra numbers in Village Kukas, Amer, Jaipur, deserved to be released. The operative direction was for necessary steps to be taken for the release of the property. However, the Court made it clear that this release would be subject to the final order that may ultimately be passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the pending review petition. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The Tribunal held that the writ petition deserved to be allowed. The reasoning was based on the petitioner's submission that the issue had been decided by the Supreme Court in Union of India & Another Versus M/S. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. (supra). Although the revenue pointed to a pending review petition, they could not dispute that the Supreme Court's order was still operative. Consequently, the property in dispute was ordered to be released. The Tribunal clarified that this release would be subject to the final outcome of the review petition pending before the Supreme Court. The ratio decidendi is that a High Court should follow a binding Supreme Court judgment unless it has been stayed or set aside, even if a review petition is pending, but the relief granted can be made subject to the final decision in the review.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court held that the respondents had no legal authority to withhold the refund amount payable to the petitioner in compliance with the order dated 02.11.2021 passed by the Appellate Authority. The reasoning was that the respondents could not point to any provision in the Income Tax Act, 1961, that empowered them to withhold such a refund. The Court acknowledged that other proceedings for subsequent assessment years might be pending, but this did not justify withholding the refund for the assessment year in question. The ratio decidendi is that a refund due as per an appellate order must be released unless there is a specific legal provision or a stay order preventing its release. The operative direction was for the respondents to forthwith refund the amount payable to the petitioner. The Court clarified that this refund would not impede the respondents' authority to recover tax for other assessment years.
The Tribunal held that vocational education is a form of education necessary for earning a living and falls within the scope of Section 12A/12AA. The society's activities were found to be systematic, approved, and aimed at employment generation.
The High Court held that the questions of law were answered in favour of the petitioner-assessee and against the respondent-revenue. The Court found that both the lower authorities (Assistant Commissioner and Tax Board) relied on extraneous, unsound, specious, and ill-founded factors, leading to perverse conclusions. The burden to prove that a specific product falls within a particular tariff is on the revenue, especially when classifying it under a residual entry against a specific one. The revenue failed to adduce any evidence, technical or otherwise, to substantiate its claim that 'pizza' and 'sandwich' are not 'cooked food'. Reliance on Wikipedia definitions was deemed erroneous. The reasoning of the Tax Board, based on common parlance and the idea that these items are not substitutions for regular meals, was also found erroneous as it lacked evidence and did not consider the evolution of eating habits and technology. The Court noted that the Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment in Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. Shri Ballabhdas Ishwardas, relied upon by the Tax Board, had been distinguished by a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer vs. Azad Bakery. Crucially, the Court observed that subsequent notifications issued by the State Government (dated July 14, 2014, and March 9, 2015) explicitly included 'pizza' and 'sandwich' under the broad category of 'cooked food'. Applying the principle that subsequent legislation can be used to interpret earlier ambiguous legislation, the Court concluded that 'pizza' and 'sandwiches' are indeed 'cooked foods' under the notification dated March 9, 2010. The consequential relief was to be awarded within 90 days. All Sales Tax Revisions were allowed.
The High Court held that the impugned order dated March 3, 2023, passed by the PCIT, Jaipur, was not liable to be sustained as it was a non-speaking and non-reasoned order. The Court observed that the PCIT had merely quoted certain portions of the stay application and submissions without addressing the petitioner's contentions regarding undue hardship, financial condition, and the downfall in export industries. The Court noted that while the PCIT followed the administrative instructions, it failed to give any finding on the hardships pointed out by the petitioner and did not consider factors like the prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. LG Electronics India (P) Ltd., the Court reiterated that administrative circulars do not fetter a quasi-judicial authority, which can order a deposit of a lesser amount than 20% of the demand. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, the impugned order was quashed and set aside, and the matter was remanded to the PCIT to pass a fresh order after considering the facts, circumstances, and the petitioner's hardships, and providing an opportunity of hearing. The PCIT was directed to pass the fresh order expeditiously, preferably within six weeks.
The High Court declined to entertain the writ petition. It reasoned that the authority passing the order under Section 148A(d) did not act without jurisdiction, as a show cause notice was issued and an order was passed thereafter. While the petitioner alleged that certain documents were not supplied and that the opportunity of hearing was not proper, the Court found that the order under Section 148A(d) was passed based on subsequent information regarding alleged fake supply claims without actual movement of goods. Given these circumstances and the subsequent passing of the final assessment order on 03.03.2023, the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner was advised to avail the statutory remedy of appeal against the final assessment order. The period during which the writ petition remained pending was directed to be excluded for filing the appeal.
The High Court noted the statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The counsel submitted that during the pendency of the writ petition, the assessment proceedings have been dropped as a consequence of faceless assessment. This development has rendered the writ petition infructuous. Based on this submission, the Court found no necessity to adjudicate the merits of the case. The petition was accordingly disposed of as having become infructuous. No specific finding on the merits of the original challenge, if any, was made, nor was any issue left undecided as the petition was disposed of on a procedural ground.
The High Court acknowledged the Revenue's submission that the questions of law in the dismissed appeal were governed by the Court's subsequent orders dated July 18, 2017, in D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 39/2017 and D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 40/2017. The Assessee did not dispute this factual assertion. Consequently, the Court disposed of the review petition by modifying the earlier order of dismissal dated March 2, 2022. The modification stipulated that the disposal of D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 69/2019 would now have specific reference to the Court's order dated July 18, 2017, passed in the aforementioned appeals. The principle established is that where subsequent judicial pronouncements clarify or govern the issues in a pending or previously decided appeal, the earlier decision can be modified to reflect these developments, especially when there is no dispute on the factual premise.
The High Court held that it was not inclined to interfere with the order of the Assessing Authority. The court noted that the petitioner had already filed an appeal and that the application under Section 220(6) was rejected on the grounds of no hardship. The court considered the amount ultimately required to be paid upon rejection of the stay, which was stated to be only 20% of the demand. As the impugned order indicated that the petitioner was advised to deposit 20% of Rs.12,20,43,200/-, the court found no undue hardship warranting interference. The court also reiterated that it remains open for the petitioner to apply for a stay of demand before the Appellate Authority invoking its inherent jurisdiction, as suggested by the revenue based on the Gujarat High Court's judgment. The writ petition was dismissed.
The Tribunal's finding that the sale consideration for the agriculture land was Rs. 6.75 lacs, and not Rs. 20,80,000 as claimed by the assessee, was upheld. The Tribunal considered both oral and documentary evidence. It placed significant reliance on the recital in the registered sale deed, which clearly stated the sale consideration as Rs. 6.75 lacs. While the valuation for stamp duty was considered, the Assessing Authority, Appellate Authority, and ITAT reached a concurrent finding based mainly on the sale deed. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee did not claim the entire sale consideration was transferred via cheque, but rather involved cash deposits, thus placing the burden on the assessee to prove the higher consideration. The Court found that the case primarily involved appreciation of evidence and did not raise a substantial question of law. Therefore, the Court declined to re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the concurrent findings of fact. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that since the final assessment order passed during the pendency of the writ petition was in favour of the petitioner, the issue raised in the writ petition had become academic. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of. The Court explicitly kept open the legal issue involved in the matter, indicating that the decision to dispose of the petition was based on the changed circumstances rather than a determination of the underlying legal question. No specific relief was granted or denied on merits, as the petition was rendered infructuous.
The High Court noted the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent that the proceedings against the petitioner have been dropped. Based on this statement, the Court held that the writ petition had become infructuous. Consequently, the Court disposed of the writ petition. No specific findings on the merits of any tax dispute were made, as the proceedings were dropped by the revenue. The operative direction was to dispose of the petition as having become infructuous.
The Tribunal decided that the petitioner was entitled to withdraw the writ petition. The reasoning was based on the explicit request made by the petitioner's counsel. The ratio decidendi is that a petitioner has the right to withdraw their case. The operative direction was to dismiss the writ petition as withdrawn. No issues were left undecided.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The Court granted the petitioner liberty to file an appeal. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn with the liberty granted. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn and grant liberty to file an appeal. No other issues were decided on merits.
The High Court held that it would not exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the orders. The reasoning was based on the petitioner's failure to challenge the order under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act when it was passed on March 26, 2022, and the subsequent passing of the assessment order on March 9, 2023. The court found that the petitioner had an alternative and efficacious statutory remedy available. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed. All issues raised in the petition were left open to be considered in an appeal that may be filed by the petitioner. No specific issue was left undecided by the Tribunal; rather, the entire petition was dismissed on procedural grounds.
The High Court, on prima facie consideration, found merit in the petitioner's submissions. The court noted that the petitioner had provided information regarding the assessment of the education society, which had disclosed the entire fee collected from various schools, including the petitioner. This fee was declared in the society's books and returns and was assessed to income tax. The court also observed that despite the disclosure of these facts and documents, the Assessing Authority had not considered them. Furthermore, it was noted that in previous years, it had been consistently held that the petitioner was not amenable to assessment nor liable to pay income tax. Consequently, the court directed that no coercive steps would be taken against the petitioner by the respondents until the next date of hearing. The court issued notice to the respondents and granted them six weeks to file a reply.
The High Court, on prima facie consideration, found merit in the petitioner's submissions. The court noted that the petitioner had provided information regarding the assessment of the education society, which had disclosed the entire fee collected from different schools, including the petitioner. This fee was declared in the society's books and returns, and the society was assessed to income tax on this basis. The court also observed that despite the disclosure of these facts and documents, the Assessing Authority had not considered them. Furthermore, the court took into account that in previous years, it had been consistently held that the petitioner was not amenable to assessment nor liable to pay income tax. Consequently, the court directed that no coercive steps would be taken against the petitioner until the next date of hearing. The court issued notice to the respondents and directed them to file a reply within six weeks.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn. The court granted liberty to the petitioner to challenge the subsequent order of assessment dated 30.07.2022. The reasoning was based on the petitioner's submission that they wished to challenge the assessment order on grounds of subsequent law, implying that a new proceeding or challenge would be more appropriate for addressing these grounds. The court did not decide on the merits of the assessment order or the grounds of subsequent law. No specific issues were decided on their merits.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn. The court granted liberty to the petitioner to challenge the subsequent order of assessment. The reasoning was based on the petitioner's counsel indicating a desire to challenge the assessment order, implying that the current writ petition was being withdrawn to pursue a different course of action, likely an appeal or revision against the assessment order. No decision was made on the merits of the assessment order itself. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh challenge.
The High Court granted the petitioner's request for permission to withdraw the writ petition. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the case, as the withdrawal obviated the need for adjudication. The ratio decidendi is that a petitioner has the right to withdraw their petition, and upon granting such permission, the court will dismiss the matter as withdrawn. No specific operative directions were issued beyond the dismissal of the petition.
The High Court dismissed the writ petitions. The Court noted that the counsel for the petitioners was not appearing, which was considered illegal and in breach of a Supreme Court order. The Court accepted the submission of the respondent's counsel that the petitions were filed against the rejection of preliminary objections and that the petitioners would have the opportunity to challenge the final assessment order. The Court found that re-assessment proceedings were initiated based on undisclosed income. Therefore, the Court was inclined to dismiss the petitions. No specific issue was left undecided, as the petitions were dismissed on procedural grounds.
The High Court held that the proceedings initiated under Section 148A(d) of the Act of 1961 were not without material basis. The seized electronic data, indicating cash transactions of Rs. 55,99,999/- which were not disclosed in the petitioner's return of income for AY 2018-19, constituted material. The Court found that the petitioner was given an opportunity of hearing, his reply was obtained, and the order was passed thereafter, indicating no violation of statutory provisions or principles of natural justice. The petitioner's claims that he had not carried out the transactions and his intention to cross-examine were deemed matters to be raised during reassessment proceedings before the Assessing Authority, not before the High Court in a writ petition. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
The High Court held that it should not interfere at this premature stage of proceedings. The court noted that the petitioner had not alleged procedural impropriety or lack of opportunity. The department had received information suggesting escaped income, and the reliability of this information would be examined in subsequent stages. The writ court would not delve into disputed questions of fact regarding the valuation or nature of the land. Citing various High Court and Supreme Court judgments, including Anshul Jain, Lachhman Das Nayar, Rasulji Buxji Kathawala, Sumit Passi, CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, Gulmuhar Silk Pvt. Ltd., and Raymond Woollen Mills Limited, the court reiterated that the Income Tax Act provides a complete machinery for assessment/reassessment and obtaining relief. Interference by the writ court is generally not warranted when statutory remedies are available and proceedings are at an initial stage. The court found no jurisdictional error apparent from the notice itself. Therefore, the petitioner was left to pursue remedies in subsequent proceedings. The petition was dismissed.
The High Court held that the notice under Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, issued to the petitioner before the expiry of the limitation period, at the address of his office as per the available PAN database, fulfilled the legal requirement of service. The Court found that the petitioner had admitted that the addresses mentioned in the order dated 13.08.2012 were addresses intimated by him, but claimed they were old PAN database addresses as he no longer resided there. Crucially, there was no averment that the petitioner had intimated any change of address to the department. The Court noted that while the report of refusal to take notice might be factually incorrect, the communication from the Department of Post India indicated that the petitioner was not residing at the given address when the notice was attempted to be served. Applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court in M/s. I-Ven Interactive Limited, the Court concluded that sending the notice to the address available in the PAN database, in the absence of any intimation of change of address by the assessee, is justified. The Court found no merit in the writ petition and dismissed it.
The High Court held that appeals against every decision of the ITAT shall lie only before the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Assessing Officer who passed the assessment order is situated. This principle remains applicable even if the case has been transferred under Section 127 of the Act. The Court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Chandigarh vs. M/s ABC Papers Ltd. In the present case, the assessment order was passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Vijayawada. Therefore, the appeal would be maintainable only before the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Consequently, the memo of appeal was ordered to be returned to the appellant. The appeal before the High Court was disposed of for statistical purposes.
The High Court held that an appeal to it must involve a substantial question of law. The rejection of a recall/restoration application by the ITAT, particularly when filed beyond the limitation period, does not, in itself, raise a substantial question of law that would warrant the High Court's entertainment of the appeal. The Court noted that whether the application was rejected under Section 254(2) of the Act or Rule 24 of the ITAT Rules, the limitation for filing a rectification or recall application is four years. Since the assessee's application was filed beyond five years, it was liable to be rejected. Regarding the date discrepancy, the Court observed that such an issue might be a clerical error and could be sought for correction or review of the original order, but it did not constitute a substantial question of law for the present appeal. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as bereft of merit.
The High Court held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, had lost its relevance as a final assessment order had already been passed based on it. The Court noted that the final assessment order could be challenged through the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 246-A of the Act. The Court found that the petitioner could raise both the issue of limitation concerning the Section 148 notice and the issue of non-furnishing of the draft assessment order before the Appellate Authority. Consequently, the High Court declined to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction due to the availability of an alternative statutory remedy. The writ petition was dismissed, granting the petitioner liberty to approach the Appellate Authority within two weeks. The Court also suggested sympathetic consideration for condonation of delay by the appellate authority, given the petitioner's initial recourse to a writ petition.
The Tribunal considered the submission made by the petitioner's counsel that he had availed of the alternative remedy available in law and wished to withdraw the writ petition. In view of this statement, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of the case was made. The operative direction was to dismiss the writ petition as withdrawn.
The High Court clarified its previous order dated 27.05.2022. It held that the reference to the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India & Others Vs. Ashish Agarwal was made to remind the authorities that, with effect from 01.04.2021, the amended scheme of the Income Tax Act, 1961, requires proceedings under Section 148-A to be drawn before issuing a notice under Section 148. The Court explicitly clarified that it did not intend for notices issued in the name of a dead person to be treated as notices under Section 148-A against the legal representative. The Court's intention was solely to emphasize the procedural requirement of Section 148-A before Section 148, in light of the amended statutory scheme. The review petition was disposed of with this clarification.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment notice dated March 30, 2021, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act for Assessment Year 2013-14, is time-barred. It found that the proviso to Section 147 allows reassessment after four years only if there is tangible material showing the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The Court observed that the reasons provided by the Income Tax Officer for reopening, stating a failure to disclose material facts, were unfounded and self-contradictory. The Court noted that the information cited as reasons for reopening was already considered during the original assessment. Therefore, the reassessment was based on a 'change of opinion' without any fresh tangible evidence. The Court concluded that the reassessment notice was unsustainable and liable to be struck down. Consequently, the impugned notice and all proceedings pursuant thereto were quashed and set aside.
The High Court held that the writ petition does not survive because the reassessment proceedings, which were the subject of the challenge, have been directed to be dropped by the respondents. The Court observed that the purpose for which the writ petition was filed has been achieved. Therefore, the writ petition was disposed of as having served its purpose. No specific finding was made on the merits of the original reassessment notice, as the proceedings were dropped by the revenue itself. The operative direction was to dispose of the writ petition.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court noted that the Revenue had candidly admitted that the issue was no longer res integra and had been decided against the Revenue by a Division Bench of the same Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. ([2009] 221 CTR 631 (Rajasthan)). The Special Leave Petition filed by the Department against that judgment was also dismissed. The Division Bench in the cited case had held that the expenditure incurred by the assessee for commercial expediency, relating to carrying on of business, falls within the category of expenditure a prudent businessman may incur. Specifically, regarding the water pipeline from Gosunda Dam, the Court found that the assessee's expenditure was to ensure sharing of water for its super smelter plant, which was essential for its operation. The Court concluded that operational expenses solely intended for the furtherance of the enterprise cannot be treated as capital expenditure. Therefore, the present appeal was dismissed in view of the ratio laid down in the previously decided case.
The High Court held that while a statutory remedy of appeal exists against a reassessment order, the writ petition is maintainable because the primary challenge is to the validity of the Section 148 notice and the order disposing of objections, for which no specific statutory remedy is available. The Court noted that if the notice or objection order is quashed, the reassessment order would automatically become invalid. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Calcutta Discount Company Limited, which held that the passing of assessment orders does not preclude relief under Article 226 if the notices are bad in law. The key issue was the non-supply of documents referred to in the 'reasons to believe' for reopening the assessment. The Court found that the reasons provided to the assessee were incomplete as they referred to information from the Deputy Director of Income Tax, Investigation, and a statement of Deepak Jain recorded under Section 132(4), but these documents were not supplied. Citing decisions of the Delhi and Bombay High Courts, the Court held that the non-supply of such material violates principles of natural justice and renders the reassessment proceedings void. The ratio decidendi is that the failure to supply documents referenced in the 'reasons to believe' vitiates the reassessment proceedings, even if the material for forming the opinion may have been sufficient. The Court quashed the Section 148 notice and the objection disposal order, declaring the reassessment order illegal and void, with liberty to the respondents to initiate fresh proceedings if necessary.