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The High Court held that the appeals filed by the Revenue have become infructuous. This is because the assessee had applied for settlement of disputes before the Settlement Commission, and the competent authority under the Settlement Commission had quantified an amount for settlement. The assessee has subsequently paid this quantified amount to the department, as evidenced by the copies of payments produced. Consequently, the appeals are disposed of as infructuous. The court granted liberty to the Revenue to apply afresh if any difficulty arises in the future. No specific issue regarding the merits of the original assessment or the ITAT's order was decided.
The High Court held that the appeals filed by the Revenue have become infructuous. This is because the assessee had applied for settlement of disputes before the Settlement Commission, and the competent authority under the Settlement Commission had quantified an amount for settlement. The assessee has subsequently paid this quantified amount to the department, as evidenced by the copies of payments produced. Consequently, the appeals are disposed of as infructuous. The court granted liberty to the Revenue to apply afresh if any difficulty arises in the future. No specific issue regarding the merits of the original assessment or the ITAT's order was decided.
The High Court noted that both the appellant and the respondent jointly stated that the appellant had settled the matter under The Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020. They jointly produced Form-5 dated 04.03.2021, issued by the designated authority, as evidence of this settlement. Based on this joint submission, both learned counsels agreed that the appeal had become infructuous. The Court accepted this submission and disposed of the appeal accordingly. The copy of Form-5 was kept on record. No specific finding was made on the merits of the original assessment or appeal, as the appeal was disposed of on procedural grounds due to the settlement.
The High Court held that no error was committed by the Tribunal in its decision. Regarding the disallowance of depreciation, the Court found that the assessee company was formed from the division of the State Electricity Board, and the assets in question were acquired through a financial restructuring plan, with their written-down value reflected in the books of accounts. The Court reasoned that the mere unavailability of physical verification for all widespread assets should not lead to the disallowance of depreciation, especially when the assets were statutorily accounted for. The Court noted that the 5th proviso to Section 32(1) provides restrictions on disallowance. Therefore, no question of law arose on this issue. Concerning prior period expenses, the Court noted that this issue was covered against the department by a previous judgment, and the Revenue had abandoned appeals before the Supreme Court, thus not entertaining this question independently. For the applicability of Section 115JB, the Court referred to judgments of other High Courts, including the Kerala High Court, which held that Section 115JB, prior to its amendment in 2012, did not apply to electricity companies. The Court also noted that Section 211(1) of the Companies Act, 1956, excluded electricity companies from its purview, and consequently from Section 115JB. The Court answered this question in favour of the assessee. Consequently, the correctness of the rectification order became unimportant. All appeals were dismissed.
The High Court enhanced the compensation, considering the nature of injuries, the appellant's profession, and the disability. The court awarded Rs. 5,27,500/- as enhanced compensation with interest.
The High Court held that the appellate court rightly acquitted the accused as the complainant failed to prove the legal notice was sent and also failed to establish the source of funds for the loan. Therefore, no offence under Section 138 of the NI Act was made out.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose on the issue of depreciation. It reasoned that the assessee company was formed from the division of the State Electricity Board, and assets were transferred. The written down value was reflected in the books of accounts, which were statutorily maintained and audited. The Court found that disallowing depreciation merely because assets were not immediately available for physical verification was incorrect, especially considering the nature of the assets and the transfer process. The Court noted that the 5th proviso to Section 32(1) provides restrictions on disallowance. Regarding prior period expenses, the Court noted that the issue was covered by a previous High Court judgment against which the Revenue had abandoned appeals before the Supreme Court, thus not entertaining it independently. On the applicability of Section 115JB, the Court referred to the Kerala High Court judgment in Kerala State Electricity Board vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax, which held that Section 115JB, prior to its amendment in 2012, did not apply to electricity companies. The Court also cited the Companies Act, 1956, which excluded electricity companies from certain provisions related to the form of balance sheets, making Section 115JB unworkable for such entities. Therefore, the Court held that Section 115JB, as it stood prior to the 2012 amendment, was not applicable to the assessee. The Court answered Question No. 2 (referring to Section 115JB) in favour of the assessee. Consequently, the correctness of any rectification order became unimportant. Question No. 1 (depreciation) was not answered as no question of law arose. All appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose on the issue of depreciation. It reasoned that the assessee company was formed from the division of the State Electricity Board, and assets were transferred. The written down value was reflected in the books of accounts, which were statutorily maintained and audited. The Court found that disallowing depreciation merely because assets were not immediately available for physical verification was incorrect, especially considering the nature of the assets and the transfer process. The Court noted that the 5th proviso to Section 32(1) provides restrictions on disallowance. Regarding prior period expenses, the Court noted that the issue was covered by a previous High Court judgment against which the Revenue had abandoned appeals before the Supreme Court, thus not entertaining it independently. On the applicability of Section 115JB, the Court referred to the Kerala High Court judgment in Kerala State Electricity Board vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax, which held that Section 115JB, prior to its amendment in 2012, did not apply to electricity companies. The Court also cited the Companies Act, 1956, which excluded electricity companies from certain provisions related to the form of balance sheets, making Section 115JB unworkable for such entities. Therefore, the Court held that Section 115JB, as it stood prior to the 2012 amendment, was not applicable to the assessee. The Court answered Question No. 2 (referring to Section 115JB) in favour of the assessee. Consequently, the correctness of any rectification order became unimportant. Question No. 1 (depreciation) was not answered as no question of law arose. All appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the tax effect in the present appeal falls below INR 2 Crores. Consequently, in light of the provisions of Circular No. 9/2024 dated 17 September 2024, the appeal is not liable to be continued. The Court dismissed the appeal on the ground of low tax effect. The proposed questions of law were expressly kept open to be urged and addressed in an appropriate case. The date of 26 March 2025, previously fixed, was cancelled.
The High Court held that both parties were ad idem (in agreement) that the tax effect in the appeal was less than Rs. 2 Crore and the matter did not fall under any exceptions to the relevant circulars. In light of this consensus and in accordance with Circular No. 09/2024 dated 17.09.2024 and Circular No. 5/2024 dated 15.03.2024, the Court ordered that the appeal as well as the cross-objections be disposed of as not pressed. No decision on the merits of the case was made. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal and cross-objections as not pressed.
The High Court held that the appeal filed by the Revenue was not maintainable. The reasoning was based on the concession made by the learned counsel for the department, who was unable to dispute the assessee's averments. The assessee had pointed out that the tax effect involved in the appeal was below the minimum threshold prescribed by the CBDT in its circular dated 08/08/2019 for maintaining appeals in the High Court. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal as not maintainable. IA No.1/2021 was also disposed of along with the appeal. The ratio decidendi is that appeals filed before the High Court, where the tax effect falls below the stipulated monetary limit set by the CBDT, are liable to be dismissed as not maintainable, especially when the Revenue concedes this point.
The High Court held that the ITAT was justified in allowing the deduction under Section 80IB of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal had found that the assessee was an integral part of the development and construction activities, not merely a landowner. The ITAT's reasoning was based on the assessee's active participation, evidenced by documents like the NOC for construction bearing her address and her involvement in obtaining clearances and making the land conducive for construction. The ITAT relied on the ratio of decisions in M/s Shravanee Construction and Mr. Abdul Khader, which held that assessees actively participating in joint development projects are entitled to deduction under Section 80IB. The High Court found no substantial question of law requiring adjudication and dismissed the appeal. The relief granted was the affirmation of the ITAT's order allowing the deduction.
The High Court held that the review petition was misconceived as it raised new grounds and failed to demonstrate an error apparent on the face of the record. The court emphasized that review jurisdiction is not for re-arguing decided matters or introducing fresh evidence.
The High Court held that no question of law arises from the impugned order of the Income Tax Tribunal. The Tribunal had deleted the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) on the specific ground that the quantum additions, in respect of which the penalty was levied, had been deleted by the Tribunal and subsequently upheld by the High Court in the assessee's own case. The Tribunal reasoned that if the addition itself is not sustainable, then the penalty levied in respect of such disallowance is also not sustainable. The High Court found this reasoning to be sound and agreed that the penalty would not survive if the underlying addition was deleted. Therefore, all the appeals filed by the revenue were dismissed.
The High Court held that no question of law arises from the order of the ITAT. The Court agreed with the reasoning that the interest earned on Fixed Deposits, which were made from funds received from the Government for the purpose of implementing schemes and projects, did not constitute the income of the assessee. The Court cited the Gujarat High Court's decision in Gujarat Power Corpn. Ltd. Vs. ITO, which held that when funds are placed at the disposal of a corporation by the government with specific stipulations for utilization, any interest accrued on such funds held in trust for the government cannot be treated as the income of the corporation. The Court found that the assessee was holding the funds in trust for the Government, and therefore, the interest earned thereon belonged to the Government. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court found that the permits were granted in haste and without following due process under the Motor Vehicles Act. The tribunal's decision to cancel the permits was upheld, and the original order of the single judge was set aside.
The High Court held that no question of law arises from the impugned order of the Income Tax Tribunal. The Tribunal had deleted the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) on the specific ground that the quantum additions, in respect of which the penalty was levied, had been deleted by the Tribunal and subsequently upheld by the High Court in the assessee's own case. The Tribunal reasoned that if the addition itself is not sustainable, then the penalty levied in respect of such disallowance is also not sustainable. The High Court found this reasoning to be sound and agreed that the penalty would not survive if the underlying addition was deleted. Therefore, all the appeals filed by the revenue were dismissed.
The High Court held that no question of law arises from the impugned order of the Income Tax Tribunal. The Tribunal had deleted the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) on the specific ground that the quantum additions, in respect of which the penalty was levied, had been deleted by the Tribunal and subsequently upheld by the High Court in the assessee's own case. The Tribunal reasoned that if the addition itself is not sustainable, then the penalty levied in respect of such disallowance is also not sustainable. The High Court found this reasoning to be sound and agreed that the penalty would not survive if the underlying addition was deleted. Therefore, all the appeals filed by the revenue were dismissed.
The High Court held that no question of law arises from the impugned order of the Income Tax Tribunal. The Tribunal had deleted the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) on the specific ground that the quantum additions, in respect of which the penalty was levied, had been deleted by the Tribunal and subsequently upheld by the High Court in the assessee's own case. The Tribunal reasoned that if the addition itself is not sustainable, then the penalty levied in respect of such disallowance is also not sustainable. The High Court found this reasoning to be sound and agreed that the penalty would not survive if the underlying addition was deleted. Therefore, all the appeals filed by the revenue were dismissed.
The High Court held that the objection regarding territorial jurisdiction was without merit. It reasoned that the impugned order transferring the O.A. was passed by the Chairman of the CAT on the administrative side, and in such circumstances, the High Court has jurisdiction. The objection regarding maintainability before a Division Bench was also rejected, citing the Supreme Court's decision in L. Chandra Kumar, which mandates that orders of the CAT are to be challenged before the Division Bench of the High Court. On merits, the Court found that the Chairman had not adequately considered the distinctions between the petitioner's case and the cases pending in CAT, Allahabad. The petitioner was a permanent employee removed after a full disciplinary enquiry, whereas the other employees were temporary and removed without enquiry. The Court also noted the inconsistency in transferring only the petitioner's O.A. to Allahabad while an O.A. concerning another involved employee was pending in CAT, Lucknow. Furthermore, the Court emphasized the convenience of the petitioner as per Rule 6 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987, and the hardship he would face due to unemployment and distance. The allegations of prejudicial treatment by CAT, Jodhpur were deemed an afterthought. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the CAT, Jodhpur Bench was directed to hear and decide O.A. No.14/2021 on its merits.
The Court held that the seizure of jewellery, claimed as stock-in-trade, was wholly illegal and contrary to the provisions of Section 132(1)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The proviso to Section 132(1)(iii) explicitly states that bullion, jewellery, or other valuable articles that are stock-in-trade shall not be seized, but an inventory should be made. The Court found that the petitioners had provided sufficient documentation to explain the goods as stock-in-trade, and the non-mention of exact prices in the challans did not invalidate their claim. The Court reasoned that the authorities should have taken a decision at the stage of explanation and production of books of account rather than seizing goods for an extended period. The seizure was deemed unjustified and illegal, especially as over a year and six months had elapsed. Consequently, the petitioners were entitled to receive back the goods. Additionally, the Court awarded interest of Rs. 1 lakh for the gross amount paid towards the retention of the marketable stock-in-trade. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The High Court permitted the appellant to withdraw the appeal. The reasoning provided is that the appellant wished to avail the benefits of the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020. The court ordered accordingly, and the civil miscellaneous application also stands disposed of. The principle established is that an assessee can withdraw an appeal if they intend to utilize a beneficial amnesty scheme offered by the government. No specific amount in dispute or procedural history beyond the filing of the appeal is mentioned. The court did not decide on the merits of the original appeal.
The High Court held that the tax effect forming the subject matter of the appeal falls below INR 2 crores. Consequently, in light of the provisions made in Circular No. 9/2024 dated 17 September 2024, the appeal would not be liable to be continued. The Court dismissed the appeal on the ground of low tax effect. No other issues were decided on merits.
The Court held that the existence of an arbitration agreement was admitted and the objection under Section 69 of the Partnership Act was not tenable as the dispute related to the dissolution of the firm. An arbitrator was appointed.
The High Court agreed with the findings of the Tribunal on questions of fact. The Tribunal had held that the variation in production figures between the DIP file and the stock register was less than 0.5 and was due to estimation methods used for internal purposes, where production was measured in rounded units. The Court also noted that the Assessing Officer's addition was based on electricity consumption during August 2014, when consumption was lowest. Relying on its own decision in CIT Vs. Sulabh Marbles Pvt. Ltd. (165 Taxman 258), the Court found that the Assessing Officer had erred in making additions based on electricity consumption by assuming higher actual production than disclosed. Consequently, the High Court found no justiciable ground to entertain the appeal.
The High Court held that the assessment order dated 23.04.2021 was liable to be quashed and set aside due to a clear violation of the principles of natural justice. The Court found that the Assessing Officer erred significantly by providing only four days for the petitioner to respond to the show cause notice. Furthermore, in light of the sudden surge of Covid-19 and the resulting state-wide lockdown, the petitioner's grievance that he could not file a reply was genuine. The Court also noted that the assessment order was passed even prior to the expiry of the time granted in the notice. The contention of the revenue regarding the alternative remedy of appeal was not accepted, as the violation of natural justice was writ-large. The Court directed the petitioner to file his reply by 16.08.2021, and upon receipt, the competent officer was to pass a fresh order after considering the petitioner's response. Any further information required would necessitate a notice to the petitioner as per law.
The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue. The Court relied on a previous decision of its own Division Bench in Escorts Heart Institute & Research Centre LTD. Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (D.B. Income Tax Appeal Nos.8 and 9 of 2014 decided on 13.09.2017). The operative part of that earlier judgment indicated that the court had considered agreements with doctors, the absence of restrictions on private practice in retainership agreements, and the distinction between contracts of employment and service for honorary or expert services. The earlier judgment concluded that retainer services were professional services and answered the issue in favour of the assessee. The High Court in the present case found that the ITAT's view was consistent with the prevailing legal position and that when two views are possible, the view favouring the assessee should be taken. Therefore, the issues were answered in favour of the assessee and against the Department, leading to the dismissal of the appeals.
The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue. The Court relied on a previous decision of its own Division Bench in Escorts Heart Institute & Research Centre LTD. Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (D.B. Income Tax Appeal Nos.8 and 9 of 2014 decided on 13.09.2017). The operative part of that earlier judgment indicated that the court had considered agreements with doctors, the absence of restrictions on private practice in retainership agreements, and the distinction between contracts of employment and service for honorary or expert services. The earlier judgment concluded that retainer services were professional services and answered the issue in favour of the assessee. The High Court in the present case found that the ITAT's view was consistent with the prevailing legal position and that when two views are possible, the view favouring the assessee should be taken. Therefore, the issues were answered in favour of the assessee and against the Department, leading to the dismissal of the appeals.
The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue. The Court relied on a previous decision of its own Division Bench in Escorts Heart Institute & Research Centre LTD. Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (D.B. Income Tax Appeal Nos.8 and 9 of 2014 decided on 13.09.2017). The operative part of that earlier judgment indicated that the court had considered agreements with doctors, the absence of restrictions on private practice in retainership agreements, and the distinction between contracts of employment and service for honorary or expert services. The earlier judgment concluded that retainer services were professional services and answered the issue in favour of the assessee. The High Court in the present case found that the ITAT's view was consistent with the prevailing legal position and that when two views are possible, the view favouring the assessee should be taken. Therefore, the issues were answered in favour of the assessee and against the Department, leading to the dismissal of the appeals.
The High Court noted the submission by the Income-Tax Department's counsel that the impugned order had been withdrawn. The counsel for the petitioner did not oppose this submission. Consequently, the Court found that the writ petition had been rendered infructuous. The Court dismissed the writ petition accordingly. The interim order dated 17.12.2019, which was previously passed by the Court, was vacated. All interlocutory applications were also disposed of. No specific findings were made on the merits of any tax dispute, as the matter was disposed of on a procedural ground.
The Tribunal decided that the appeal had become infructuous in light of CBDT Circular No. 17/2019. The reasoning was based on the submission made by the appellant's counsel. The Tribunal granted permission to withdraw the appeal. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn and infructuous. No specific issue was left undecided, as the appeal was withdrawn by the appellant.