PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX vs. M/S AJMER VIDYUT VITRAN NIGAM LIMITED

THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL

Special Appeal No. 153 of 2019 With Delay Condonation Application No. 2607 of 2019 Application For Leave to Appeal No. 2606 of 2019

Sandeep Kumar

.....Appellant

Vs.

State of Uttarakhand & Others ...Respondents

With Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1039 of 2009

Seema Garg & Others

.....Petitioners

Vs.

State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Others

...Respondents

With Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1120 of 2009

Dheeraj Kaushal

.....Petitioner

Vs.

State of Uttarakhand & Others ...Respondents

With Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1127 of 2009

Preeti Gupta

.....Petitioner

Vs.

State of Uttarakhand & Others ...Respondents

With Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1156 of 2009

Pawan Kumar & another

.....Petitioners

Vs.

State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Others

...Respondents

With Special Appeal No. 152 of 2019 With Delay Condonation Application No. 2611 of 2019 Application For Leave to Appeal No. 2609 of 2019

Sandeep Kumar

.....Appellants

Vs.

State of Uttarakhand

...Respondent

Present: Mr. A.S. Rawat, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Siddhartha Sah, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. C.S. Rawat, Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand. Mr. Amar Murti Shukla, Advocate for respondent nos. 4 & 5.

Dated: 19th March, 2019

Coram: Hon’ble Ramesh Ranganathan, C.J. Hon’ble N.S. Dhanik, J.

Ramesh Ranganathan, C.J. (Oral)

The delay, in preferring the appeals, is not opposed by the learned counsel for the respondents, and the delay is, therefore, condoned. Since the appellants are either persons in whose favor permits were granted by the Regional Transport Authority, or in whose favor the permits were transferred later, they are undoubtedly aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge. We see no reason, therefore, to deny them leave to prefer an appeal against the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The applications, seeking leave to appeal, are allowed.

The appellants, in Special Appeal Nos. 152 and 153 of 2019, are the respondents in WPMS Nos. 96 and 103 of 2009, wherein the legality of Agenda No. 13 of the meeting of the Regional Transport Authority dated 27.12.2008, granting permits to several persons without survey of the route, was put in issue. By the common order dated 14.08.2018, the validity of which is now under challenge before us, the learned Single Judge took note of the submissions of Sri Amar Murti Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioners, that these 90 permits were granted without obtaining a report from the Joint Survey Committee; they were granted against the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; all the applications, based on which permits were granted, were incomplete; the Regional Transport Authority had granted permits in haste, and without application of mind; and Sri Gurubaksh Singh had invoked the

3 jurisdiction of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal which had cancelled the permits of 85 persons, but had made such cancellation subject to the decision in Writ Petition Nos. 96 and 103 of 2009.

In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge noted that the Regional Transport Authority had, in its meeting dated 24.02.1999, passed a resolution that permits, on the city bus routes, should be granted on the recommendation of the Joint Survey Committee; the Joint Survey Committee comprised of one officer nominated by each District Magistrate, the Senior Superintendent of Police and the Regional Transport Officer; in compliance with the Joint Survey Committee’s report, in its meeting held in the year 2004, 09 buses were plied in the Dehradun- Kalsi route; in its meeting held on 27.12.2008, the Regional Transport Authority had considered various applications for the Dehradun-Kalsi route, and had granted 91 permits; no survey was conducted before granting 91 permits on the said route; the applications, on which permits were granted, were incomplete; and they were granted without application of mind, and without following the provisions of Motor Vehicle Act. The writ petitions were allowed, Agenda No. 13 of the meeting of the Regional Transport Authority dated 27.12.2008 was set-aside, the Regional Transport Authority was directed to have a survey undertaken for the Dehradun-Kalsi route, if not already undertaken, so that the public may not suffer; thereafter, invite applications for granting permit of the said route, and grant permit strictly in accordance with law. Aggrieved thereby the present appeal.

When we took up these appeals for admission and hearing, it was brought to our notice that other writ petitions had been filed seeking a Writ of certiorari to quash the order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal dated 27.06.2009. Since the issues, which arose for consideration in the

4 Special Appeals, were the same as those which arose for consideration in the writ petitions preferred against the order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, we directed all the matters to be listed together. All the matters have now been listed before us for hearing. Elaborate submissions were put forth, on behalf of the appellants, by Sri A.S. Rawat, learned Senior Counsel; on behalf of the official respondents by Sri C.S. Rawat, learned Additional C.S.C. for the State; and by Sri Amar Murti Shukla, learned counsel for the unofficial respondents in this appeal.

Sri A.S. Rawat, learned Senior Counsel, would rely on the judgment of the Supreme Court, in Mithilesh Garg & others vs. Union of India & others: (1992) 1 SCC 168, to submit that the respondents in these appeals, as well as the applicants before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, were are all existing operators plying buses on the very same route; they lacked locus standi to question the grant of permits to the appellants; most of those who were granted permits by the Regional Transport Authority were illiterate; they had merely filled up the application forms furnished to them across the counter; the important document was not the application form, but the affidavit submitted thereafter; a check list was also furnished to the applicants calling upon them to furnish information; while the appellants may have left the column, relating to the time-table, in the application forms blank, they had furnished details of their buses which were plying in the previous year; the appellants have invested huge sums of money in procuring buses; and interference at this stage would cause them irreparable hardship and injury.

As reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court, in Mithilesh Garg & others vs. Union of India & others, to contend that the private respondents lack locus standi, it is necessary to take note of the law declared therein. In

5 Mithilesh Garg & others vs. Union of India & others, the liberalized policy for private sector operators in the road transport field, under Section 80 and the other provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, were subjected to challenge in a batch of petitions filed before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. These writ petitions were filed by existing operators primarily on the ground that they had been adversely affected in the exercise of their rights under Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. A three judge Bench of the Supreme Court, relying on the earlier judgments in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar: (1976) 1 SCC 671 and Nagar Rice and Flour Mills vs. N.T. Gowda: (1970) 1 SCC 575, held that the existing tour operators lacked locus standi to question grant of permits, to the new permit holders, under the liberalized regime.

While the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in Mithilesh Garg & others vs. Union of India & others, was invoked under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar, the certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court was invoked, and in Nagar Rice and Flour Mills vs. N.T. Gowda the locus standi of an existing rice mill owner, to challenge the setting up of a new rice mill by another, was subjected to challenge in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the light of the law declared in the aforesaid judgments, the existing permit holders lack locus standi to question the grant of permits, to new transport operators, on the ground of violation of their fundamental rights under Article 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India.

The private respondents herein, who had invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court by filing WPMS Nos. 96 and 103 of 2009 questioning the decision of the Regional Transport Authority, in its meeting held on 27.12.2008, on the ground of

6 violation of their fundamental rights, must be held to lack locus standi to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As the writ petitions ought not to have been entertained at their behest, the order of the learned Single Judge, in WPMS Nos. 96 and 103 of 2009 dated 14.08.2018, is liable to be, and is accordingly, set-aside on this short ground.

That, however, is not the end of this dispute, since some of the existing permit holders had approached the State Transport Appellate Tribunal invoking its revisional jurisdiction under Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the STAT had passed an order setting aside the grant of permits to 85 of the 90 applicants in whose favor permits were granted by the Regional Transport Authority in its meeting held on 27.12.2008. Some of these permit holders, who suffered an adverse order from the STAT, have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by filing WPMS Nos. 1039 of 2009, 1120 of 2009, 1127 of 2009 & 1156 of 2009.

While Mr. A.S. Rawat, learned Senior Counsel, would submit that what applies to the petitioners in WPMS Nos. 96 and 103 of 2009 would apply also to those existing permit holders who invoked the jurisdiction of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Sri Amar Murti Shukla, learned counsel for the respondents, would contend that, while the judgment of the Supreme Court, in Mithilesh Garg & others vs. Union of India & others, may have disabled existing permit holders from directly invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, contending that the grant of license/permits to others had violated their fundamental rights under Article 14 & 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India, that did not mean that the existing licensees were disabled even from invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the STAT under Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles

7 Act; a bare perusal of the order of the STAT would reveal the casual manner in which the Regional Transport Authority had granted permits, even though the applicants had failed to furnish the required information in the application forms submitted by them; and, since the order of the STAT is a well considered and reasoned order, interference by this Court, in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would not be justified.

Before examining whether the STAT was justified in setting aside the permits granted to the petitioners by the Regional Transport Authority, in its meeting held on 27.12.2008, it is necessary to examine the contention of Sri A.S. Rawat, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, that the existing permit holders lacked locus standi even to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 90 of the Act.

Section 89 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 relates to appeals and, under Sub-Section 1 (a) thereof, any person, aggrieved by the refusal of the Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him, may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the State Transport Tribunal constituted under Sub-Section (2) which shall, after giving such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard, give a decision thereon which shall be final. A right of appeal is provided under Section 89 (1) of the Act only to a person aggrieved, among others, by the refusal of the Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit. No right of appeal is provided therein for any person aggrieved by the grant of a permit, by the Regional Transport Authority, to another.

Section 90 of the 1988 Act relates to revision and, thereunder, the STAT may, on an application made to it, call for

8 the record of any case in which the order has been made by a Regional Transport Authority against which no appeal lies; and if it appears to the STAT that the order, made by the Regional Transport Authority, is improper or illegal, it may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit, and every such order shall be final. Under the first proviso thereto, the STAT shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by the order of the Regional Transport Authority, unless the application is made within thirty days from the date of the order. While the second proviso permits extension of time to prefer an application, the third proviso obligates the STAT not to pass an order prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

As noted hereinabove, the revisional jurisdiction of the STAT can only be invoked, by a person aggrieved, by way of an application, that too only if it relates to an order made by the Regional Transport Authority against which no appeal lies. Since an appeal, under Section 89 (1) (a) of the Act, lies against the refusal of the Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, the remedy of a revision under Section 90 of the Act is not available to a person aggrieved by the refusal of the Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit.

If the submission of Sri A.S. Rawat, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, that the existing permit holder lacks locus standi even to avail the remedy of a revision under Section 90 of the Act, were to merit acceptance it would render the remedy of a revision, under Section 90 of the Act, redundant and otiose, for a person, who has been refused a permit by the Regional Transport Authority can only avail the appellate remedy under Section 89 (1) of the Act, and a person who has been granted a permit would have no reason to question such a order by way of a revision. The remedy of a revision, under Section 90 of the Act, can be exercised by the

9 STAT only on an application made to it, and not suo-motu. It is evident, therefore, that the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal, under Section 90 of the Act, can only be invoked by a person aggrieved, other than a person in whose favor a permit has either been granted or has been refused by the Regional Transport Authority. It is difficult for us, on a plain reading of Section 90, to hold that a person aggrieved, and entitled to make an application seeking revision, would exclude the existing permit holder. We are satisfied, therefore, that, while the existing permit holders would be entitled to avail the remedy of a revision under Section 90, the STAT can exercise its revisional jurisdiction, under Section 90 of the Act, only if it is satisfied that the order made by the Regional Transport Authority is either improper or is illegal, and not on the ground that any of the existing rights, of an existing permit holder, is violated.

Illegality, in the context of Section 90 of the Act, would arise only if there is a contravention of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Motor Vehicles Rules. It is in this context that the order of the STAT necessitates examination, albeit within the limited parameters of judicial review in certiorari proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The certiorari jurisdiction of this Court is invoked only when the order of the Tribunal suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction such as in cases where the order is passed without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction or where, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is supervisory and not appellate. An error of law which is apparent on the facts of the record can be

10 corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence, and the inference to be drawn therefrom, cannot be agitated in certiorari proceedings (Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan: AIR 1964 SC 477) as it is in the province of a court of appeal.

If the tribunal has erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or has erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence, or if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, it would be an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Where the conclusion of law by the Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions, or in ignorance of it or even in disregard of it or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Whether or not an error is an error of law, and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and upon the nature and scope of the legal provisions which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened. (Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan: AIR 1964 SC 477).

Unlike an appellate authority which can re- appreciate the evidence on record, the High Court, in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, would not substitute its views for that of the Tribunal, nor would it re-appreciate the evidence on record to arrive at a conclusion different from that of the Tribunal whose order is impugned before it. Even if two views are possible, and the Tribunal has taken one of the possible views, the High Court would not interfere, in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, even if it were to be satisfied that the other possible view, canvassed before it, is more attractive. A finding of fact, reached on the appreciation of evidence, cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings, save a finding of fact which is either perverse or is

11 based on no evidence. If a provision is reasonably capable of two constructions, and one construction has been adopted by the authority, its conclusion may not always be open to correction in writ proceedings. (Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan: AIR 1964 SC 477).

A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior tribunals. A writ can similarly be issued where, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it, the Tribunal acts illegally or improperly. (Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot vs. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd: (2008) 14 SCC 171 and Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan: AIR 1964 SC 477). A writ of certiorari can be issued in the case of illegal exercise of jurisdiction, and also to correct errors of law apparent on the face of the record, even though they do not go to jurisdiction. It is only errors of law apparent on the face of the record, and not errors of fact though they may be apparent on the face of the record, which can be corrected, (Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd vs. S.B. Bhatt & another: AIR 1961 SC 970, Regina vs. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal (1952) 1 KB 338 ; and Nagendra Nath Bora & another vs. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam & others: AIR 1958 SC 398), and not every error either of law or fact which can be corrected by a Court of appeal or revision. (T. Prem Sagar vs. M/s Standard Vaccum Oil Company, Madras & others: AIR 1965 SC 111; Bachan Singh & others vs. Gauri Shankar Agarwal & others: (1972) 4 SCC 257; Nagendra Nath Bora & another vs. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam & others).

Further an error of law, which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari, must be self-evident. It should not need an elaborate examination of the record (Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. vs. S.B. Bhatt & another), or require a detailed

12 examination or an elaborate argument to establish it (Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot vs. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd; Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque & others: AIR 1955 SC 233; Batuk K. Vyas vs. Surat Borough Municipality & others: AIR 1953 Bom 133). An error cannot be said to be apparent if one has to travel beyond the record to see whether the judgment is correct or not. It is an error which strikes on the mere looking, and does not need a long-drawn out process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. Such an error would not require any extraneous matter to show its incorrectness. To put it differently, it should be so manifest and clear that no court would permit it to remain on record. (Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot vs. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd; Sant Lal Gupta & others vs. Modern Cooperative Group Housing Society Limited & others: (2010) 13 SCC 336).

In its order dated 27.06.2009, the STAT has examined the grant of permits by the Regional Transport Authority, to the 90 applicants, in its meeting held on 27.12.2008. The STAT called for the file, and on perusal thereof, recorded the factual position as under:

“1. Applications having empty columns: Columns were not completely filled by opposite party nos. 5, 8, 13, 24, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 43, 44, 45, 53, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 70, 71, 75, 76, 85.

13 4. Such applications in which there is no date and signatures of the applicant are mentioned:- Opposite party nos. 18, 13, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 43, 44, 45, 50, 60, 63, 64, 65, 70, 71, 76, 78, 79, 93.

In this way, only applications 16, 17, 18, 19 & 20 complies with all the conditions. “

The STAT, thereafter, observed that the Regional Transport Authority had, in its meeting dated 27.12.2008, ignored the provisions of Section 70, 71, 72 and Rule 68 of the Rules which required the time-table to be enclosed along with each permanent passenger vehicle application; the Regional Transport Authority had not scrutinized the applications, before granting a permit, to ascertain how many of the 90 applications, received by the authority, had enclosed therewith the time-table. The STAT further observed that, on a perusal of the 90 applications, it was evident that the time-table was not annexed with 85 of such applications; and the Regional Transport Authority had, at the time of sanctioning the permits, overlooked all these principles. The STAT concluded by holding that the Regional Transport Authority had granted permits on the basis of incomplete applications; applications submitted without enclosing the time-table; such consideration, of a permanent vehicle permit application, was contrary to law; opposite party Nos. 16, 17, 18, 19 & 20 had fulfilled all the conditions; and the applications of all the other opposite parties were not as per the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules made thereunder. The revision was partly allowed, and the permits granted in favour of opposite party 1 to 15 and 21 to 91 were cancelled, except the permits granted in favour of opposite party no. 16 to 20. Since WPMS Nos. 96 and 103 of 2009 was

14 pending on the file of this Court, the STAT observed that its decision was subject to the result of the Writ Petitions.

Section 70 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 relates to an application for a stage carriage permit and, under Sub- Section (1) thereof, the application for a permit, in respect of the stage carriage, shall, as far as may be, contain the following particulars, namely, (a) the route or routes or the area or areas to which the application relates; (b) the type and seating capacity of each such vehicle; (c) the minimum and maximum number of daily trips proposed to be provided and the time- table of the normal trips; (d) the number of vehicles intended to be kept in reserve to maintain the service and to provide for special occasions; (e) the arrangements intended to be made for the housing, maintenance and repair of the vehicles, for the comfort and convenience of passengers, and for the storage and safe custody of luggage; and (f) such other matters as may be prescribed.

As noted hereinabove, Section 70 (1) (c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 requires the application to contain particulars of the time-table of the normal trips to be undertaken by a stage carriage permanent vehicle. Section 71 (1) of the Act requires a Regional Transport Authority, while considering an application for a stage carriage permit, to have regard to the objects of the Act. Section 71 (2) of the Act requires a Regional Transport Authority to refuse grant of a stage carriage permit if it appears, from any time-table furnished, that the provisions of this Act, relating to the speed at which the vehicles may be driven, are likely to be contravened.

It is only if a time-table is furnished, along with the applications in terms of Section 70 (1) (c) of the Act, would the Regional Transport Authority be in a position to exercise his

15 powers, under Section 71 (2) of the Act, to examine whether it appeared, from the time-table, that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, relating to the speed at which the vehicles may be driven, are likely to be contravened.

Section 72 of the Act relates to the grant of stage carriage permits and under Sub-Section (1) thereof, subject to the provisions of Section 71, a Regional Transport Authority may, on an application made to it under Section 70, grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deems fit, or refuse to grant such a permit. The power conferred on a Regional Transport Authority, under Section 72 of the Act, to grant a stage carriage permit is subject to the provisions of Section 71 and, as noted hereinabove, Section 71 (2) confers power on a Regional Transport Authority to refuse to grant a stage carriage permit if it appears, from the time-table, that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, relating to the speed at which the vehicles may be driven, would be contravened.

Rule 64 of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules 1998, which were adopted by the State of Uttarakhand, relate to an application for permit and, thereunder, every application, for a permit in respect of a stage carriage, shall be in Form SR- 20. Section 65 (1) of the Rules requires every permit, in respect of a stage carriage, to be in Form SR-26. Form SR-20 requires the application to contain, in column 7 thereof, the particulars of the time-table proposed, and for the time-table to be appended. While several other particulars are also required to be furnished which, as is evident from the order of the STAT, have not been filled up, the importance of the requirement to furnish a time-table is evident from a reading of Section 70 (1) (c) and Section 71 (2) of the 1988 Act. Form SR-26 relates to the permit in respect of a stage carriage, and column 9 thereof requires the permit to contain particulars of the approved time-

16 table. This requirement could only have been complied with, if the applicant had furnished particulars of the time-table in his application form, and had enclosed therewith a copy thereof.

The finding of fact recorded by the STAT, in its order dated 27.06.2009, are based on the material placed before it, and cannot be characterized as either perverse or as based on no evidence. The certiorari jurisdiction of this Court would be exercised only if the order of the STAT suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. In the exercise of such jurisdiction, this Court would neither substitute its views for that of the STAT nor would it record its independent findings on the material on record. Even if two views are possible, this Court would refrain from interference, if the view taken by the STAT is held to be a possible view. We see no error in the order of the STAT warranting interference in certiorari proceedings.

While Sri A.S. Rawat, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, would request this Court to set-aside the order of the Tribunal on sympathetic grounds, we must express our inability to do so, since the order of the STAT discloses the haste with which the Regional Transport Authority had granted permits, and the casual manner in which the applications were received and dealt with. The submission that these particulars, though not reflected in the application form were later furnished in the form of an affidavit, needs only to be noted to be rejected. No provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 or the Uttar Pradesh, Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998, which enables the applicant to give a go- by to the application form, and instead furnish an affidavit, has been brought to our notice. Our attention has also not been drawn to any statutory provision which requires such an affidavit to be filed by the applicant, instead of filling up the prescribed application form.

17 Viewed from any angle, we see no reason to interfere with the order of the STAT. All the four writ petitions, wherein the order of the STAT have been subjected to challenge, are, accordingly, dismissed. Special Appeal Nos. 152 and 153 of 2019 are allowed, and the order passed by the learned Single Judge, in WPMS No. 96 and 103 of 2009 dated 14.08.2018 are set-aside. Needless to state that this order shall not disable the authorities concerned from examining the matter afresh and, if it comes to the conclusion that fresh permits should be issued, to invite applications afresh, and grant permits in accordance with law. No costs.

(N.S. Dhanik, J.) (Ramesh Ranganathan, C.J.) 19.03.2019

A.kaur