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153 orders · Page 2 of 4
The High Court, upon hearing both learned counsel for the appellant (Revenue) and the respondent (assessee), noted their joint submission regarding the tax effect. Both parties agreed that the tax effect involved in the appeal was significantly below the monetary limit set by Circular No. 17/2019, dated August 8, 2019, for filing appeals by the income tax department. Consequently, the Court found the appeal to be not maintainable on this ground. The Court dismissed the appeal (ITA/55/2021) solely on the basis that the tax effect was below the prescribed monetary limit. No decision was made on the merits of the substantive tax dispute.
The Tribunal did not decide any substantive issue on merits. The court noted the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents that the proceedings against the petitioner have been dropped as the amount in dispute was less than Rs. 50 lacs. In light of this submission, the court held that the writ petition would not survive. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of as infructuous. No specific finding was made on the merits of the original tax proceedings or the legality of any action taken by the Income Tax Officer. The operative direction was to dispose of the writ petition.
The High Court considered the petitioner's prayer for withdrawal of the writ petition on the grounds that it had become infructuous. The Tribunal accepted this prayer. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of any underlying tax dispute. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as prayed for by the petitioner. Any pending applications related to the writ petition were also disposed of.
The High Court noted the submission by the learned counsel for the respondents that the income submitted by the petitioner had been accepted and an assessment had been made accordingly. In light of this submission, the High Court held that the present writ petition did not survive. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of. The reasoning was based solely on the statement made by the respondents' counsel, which rendered the challenge moot. No specific principle or ratio decidendi for future citation is evident, as the matter was disposed of on a procedural basis due to the respondents' submission. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the levy of interest under Section 8 of the Act was justified. The petitioner failed to comply with the statutory obligations under Section 4 of the Act read with Rule 6 of the Rules of 1998 by not furnishing Form-I within thirty days of commencement of construction. Furthermore, the petitioner also failed to pay the due cess in time as required under Section 3 of the Act read with Rule 4 of the Rules of 1998, resulting in a delay of approximately three and a half years. The court rejected the petitioner's contention that interest is only leviable after the assessment order, stating that the liability to pay interest arises when the cess is 'due' in terms of Sections 3 and 8 of the Act read with Rule 4 of the Rules of 1998. The court emphasized that a purposive and harmonious interpretation of the statute is necessary to give full effect to the welfare objectives of the Act and to prevent Section 8 from becoming inoperable. The court also clarified that interest is compensatory in nature, intended to recover lost revenue due to delayed payment, and not punitive. Therefore, the writ petitions were dismissed.
The High Court held that the levy of interest under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 was justified. The Court reasoned that the petitioners failed to comply with the statutory obligations under Rule 4 and Rule 6 of the Rules of 1998 by not furnishing Form-I and paying the due cess within the prescribed thirty days of commencement of work or within thirty days after the completion of each year of construction. The delay in filing Form-I and depositing cess, which occurred for approximately three and a half years in the lead case, triggered the provision of Section 8. The Court rejected the contention that interest is only leviable after the assessment order, stating that this would render Section 8 ineffective. It emphasized that the Act and Rules have a beneficial purpose and should be interpreted harmoniously and purposively, not strictly literally, if the literal interpretation leads to an absurdity or defeats the law's purpose. The Court also clarified that interest is compensatory, not punitive, and is levied to compensate the government for revenue lost during the interregnum period. Therefore, the interest was rightly levied on the belated payment of cess. The writ petitions were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the interest was rightly levied under Section 8 of the Act of 1996. The court found that the petitioner-company failed to furnish the returns (Form-I) on time as required under Section 4 of the Act of 1996 read with Rule 6 of the Rules of 1998, and also failed to pay the due amount of cess in time as required under Section 3 of the Act of 1996 read with Rule 4 of the Rules of 1998. The petitioner only furnished Form-I and the cess amount in January 2022, approximately three and a half years after the statutory deadline of thirty days. This delay triggered the provision of Section 8. The Tribunal rejected the petitioner's contention that interest cannot be levied prior to the assessment order, stating that this would render Rules 4 and 6 of the Rules of 1998 ineffective. The court also held that a purposive and harmonious interpretation of the statute is necessary, as a strict literal interpretation would make Section 8 inoperable and defeat the Act's welfare purpose. The Tribunal clarified that interest is compensatory in nature, intended to compensate the government for lost revenue due to delayed payment, and not punitive. Therefore, the levy of interest was upheld.
The Tribunal noted that learned counsel for both the petitioner and the respondent were in agreement ('ad idem') that the bullion weighing 4000 grams, which had been taken into possession, has now been handed over to the petitioner. A photocopy of the panchnama dated 09.08.2023, supporting this fact, was placed on record. In light of this development, the counsel for the petitioner submitted that the writ petition had become infructuous. The Court accepted this submission. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of as infructuous. No specific finding was made on the merits of any underlying tax dispute, as the petition was decided on a procedural basis.
The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, held that the writ petition had become infructuous. The court's reasoning was based solely on the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Consequently, the petition was disposed of as having rendered infructuous. No decision was made on the merits of the case, and no specific findings were recorded regarding the underlying tax dispute. The operative direction was to dispose of the petition. No issues were left undecided as the matter was resolved on a procedural basis.
The High Court held that in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India & Another Versus M/S. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. (supra), which remained operative, the writ petition deserved to be disposed of. Consequently, the property in dispute, measuring 0.52 hectares in Village-Khorameena, Tehsil-Amer, District-Jaipur, Rajasthan (Khasra Nos. 1563 and 1564), was directed to be released. The court clarified that this release would be subject to any final order that might be passed by the Supreme Court in the pending review petition. The operative direction was to take necessary steps for the release of the disputed property. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the present case is not one for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the court. The court relied on the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Others, (1998) 8 SCC 1, which states that writ jurisdiction should not be ordinarily invoked when an efficacious and statutory remedy is available. The court found no grounds challenging the jurisdiction of the authority or alleging that the order was passed without any opportunity of hearing. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed. The petitioner was granted liberty to raise all grounds before the appellate authority, and the period during which the writ petition remained pending before the High Court was to be excluded for computing the limitation period for filing the statutory appeal.
The High Court held that the reassessment proceedings were not barred by limitation as the total escaped income for consideration was Rs. 1,84,45,194/-, which is more than Rs. 50,00,000/- as stipulated in Section 149(1)(a). Regarding the contention that the order was based on surmises and conjectures, the Court noted that the AO had considered the petitioner's reply and the details of transactions were available on the tax payer annual summary report. The Court distinguished the present case from Anurag Gupta, Krishna Diagnostic Pvt. Ltd., and Balesh Jain Sons HUF by stating that the AO had duly considered the petitioner's reply and documents, and the information was not ignored. The Court also held that the notice under Section 148 was not in non-compliance with the notification dated 29.03.2023, as the notice under Section 148A(b) was issued on 28.02.2023, prior to the notification. The Court found no reason to interfere with the impugned order and notice, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. regarding the sufficiency of prima facie material to reopen a case. The petitioner was granted liberty to represent before the assessing officer in response to the Section 148 notice.
The High Court held that the ITAT's decision to allow the benefit of Section 10(20) to the assessee was unsustainable in law. This was because the ITAT had relied on a previous High Court judgment which was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court in the case of The Income Tax Officer Vs. Urban Improvement Trust (supra). The Supreme Court held that under the scheme of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959, an Urban Improvement Trust is not a local authority within the meaning of Clause (iii) of the Explanation to Section 10(20) of the Act. Consequently, the ITAT's order was set aside. However, the Court noted that other issues raised in the appeal, including the failure to maintain books of accounts and get them audited as per Section 12A(1)(b), were not decided by the ITAT or the Commissioner of Income Tax due to the focus on the exemption issue. Therefore, the case was remanded to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) for consideration and adjudication on these remaining grounds.
The Tribunal held that the matter was essentially one of appreciation of evidence and no substantial question of law arose for consideration. The Tribunal noted that the AO had rejected the assessee's books of accounts after finding that the assessee was not maintaining requisite records, specifically a stock register and details of material consumption. The AO provided five reasons for rejecting the books. The estimation of GP was done only thereafter. The Tribunal observed that the estimated GP rate was not grossly disproportionate to the GP rate declared by the assessee or the GP rate of the preceding year. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court noted the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants that the present appeals have been rendered infructuous. Consequently, the Court disposed of the appeals accordingly. No decision was made on the merits of any substantive income tax issue. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeals as infructuous. No issues were expressly left undecided as the appeals were disposed of on a procedural ground.
The Tribunal held that in cases of search under Section 132 or requisition under Section 132A, the AO assumes jurisdiction for block assessment under Section 153A. Pending assessments stand abated. Crucially, for completed/unabated assessments, the AO can only assume jurisdiction to assess or reassess if incriminating material is found during the search. In the absence of any such incriminating material unearthed during the search, the AO cannot make any addition or reassessment in respect of completed/unabated assessments. The Tribunal cited the Supreme Court's decision in Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd., which clearly states that in the absence of incriminating material, no addition can be made for completed assessments under Section 153A. The High Court, in the present appeal, agreed with this settled legal position and found no substantial question of law arising for consideration. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court noted the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the present appeals have been rendered infructuous. Based on this submission, the Court disposed of the appeals accordingly. The reasoning is solely based on the appellant's statement that the appeals are no longer relevant or necessary to be adjudicated. The ratio decidendi is that if an appellant states that their appeal has become infructuous, the court will dispose of the appeal on that basis without delving into the merits of the case. No specific relief was granted or denied on the substantive issues, as the appeals were disposed of as infructuous. No issues were left undecided as the appeals were concluded based on the appellant's submission.
The High Court held that the writ petition had become infructuous. This decision was based on the submission made by the petitioner's counsel, who stated that the Hon'ble Supreme Court's order in the case of Union of India & Others Vs. Ashish Agarwal, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 543, had rendered the present writ petition infructuous. The reasoning was purely based on the subsequent development in law as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the High Court disposed of the writ petition as having become infructuous. No other issues were decided, and no operative directions were issued beyond the disposal of the petition.
The High Court, upon the submission of the petitioner's counsel that the return of income had been accepted and the petitioner did not wish to press the petition, dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to approach the Court again in case any eventuality arises. No decision was made on the merits of any substantive issue related to the income tax assessment or the challenge to the revenue's action. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn with liberty to refile.
The High Court held that the petitioner's counsel sought to withdraw the petition. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of any underlying tax dispute was made. The ratio decidendi is that a petitioner has the right to withdraw their petition, and upon such request, the court will typically dismiss the matter accordingly. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn.
The High Court held that the writ petition lacks merit and dismissed it. The Court found that the Income Tax Department's reply, stating that there is no provision for refund to parties other than the assessee, could not be refuted by the petitioners. The petitioners were considered agents who had deposited the amount on behalf of respondent No. 3. Therefore, the refund, if any, could only be claimed by respondent No. 3. The Court noted that it would be open for the petitioners to avail of their remedy in accordance with law, and the period spent during the pendency of the petition might be available to them under Section 14 of the Limitation Act for availing an alternative remedy.
The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, decided to dismiss the writ petition as withdrawn. The court's reasoning was based on the petitioner's explicit prayer for withdrawal. The petitioner sought to withdraw the petition because a final assessment order had been passed by the respondent authority. Consequently, the court granted the prayer and disposed of the petition. No specific findings were made on the merits of the original challenge, as the petition was withdrawn before any substantive adjudication. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's prayer for withdrawal of the writ petition. The court reasoned that since a statutory appeal had been filed and was pending, it was appropriate to permit the withdrawal of the writ petition. The court explicitly stated that all questions of fact and law raised in the writ petition were kept open, meaning the withdrawal would not prejudice the petitioner's rights in the pending statutory appeal. The operative direction was to dispose of the writ petition as withdrawn.
The Tribunal (High Court) allowed the petitioner's prayer for withdrawal of the writ petition. The reasoning was based on the petitioner's submission that a statutory appeal had been preferred and was pending consideration. The court acknowledged this and disposed of the writ petition as withdrawn. Importantly, the court explicitly stated that all questions of fact and law raised in the writ petition were kept open. This means that the merits of the case were not decided, and the petitioner retains the right to pursue her claims through the statutory appeal process. The operative direction was to dispose of the writ petition as withdrawn.
The High Court accepted the application for recall of the order dated 27.01.2017, acknowledging the error in identifying the governing statute. The order was recalled, and the appeal was restored. Subsequently, the High Court, considering the meager tax effect of ₹ 61,591/-, decided not to interfere in the matter. The appeal was dismissed, with the question of law left open for consideration in an appropriate future case. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court accepted the Revenue's application for recall of the order dated 27.01.2017, acknowledging the mistake in assuming the appeal was under the Income Tax Act when it was under the Interest Tax Act, 1974. The order was recalled, and the appeal was restored. Upon considering the appeal, the Court noted that the tax effect was a meager amount of ₹ 61,591/-. Due to this small pecuniary value, the Court was not inclined to interfere in the matter. The appeal was dismissed, with the question of law left open for consideration in an appropriate future case. No specific finding was given on the merits of the appeal itself, other than the decision to dismiss it based on the tax effect.
The High Court held that the writ petition has been rendered infructuous. This decision was based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent that the proceedings against the petitioner had been dropped by the Faceless Assessment Officer by an order dated 31.03.2023. In light of this development, the Court found no further purpose for the writ petition to continue. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of as infructuous. No specific findings were made on the merits of the original grievance, as the proceedings themselves were stated to have been dropped. The operative direction was to dispose of the writ petition.
The Tribunal considered the prayer made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The Tribunal accepted the petitioner's request for withdrawal. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of any underlying tax dispute was made, as the case was disposed of solely based on the petitioner's decision to withdraw the petition. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The Court directed that if the petitioner files an appeal against the order of assessment within a period of two weeks from the date of the order, such an appeal shall be treated as filed within time and shall be decided on its merits. The writ petition was disposed of with these observations. No specific finding was made on the merits of the assessment order itself, as the petition was withdrawn to pursue the appellate remedy.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The Court noted that a statutory remedy of appeal was available against the order of assessment. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The Court clarified that all questions of fact and law were kept open for consideration by the Appellate Authority. Furthermore, the Court directed that if an application to condone any delay in filing the appeal is preferred within one week from the date of the order, it should be considered sympathetically, taking into account the petitioner's approach in filing the writ petition.
The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, upon being informed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner wished to withdraw the instant writ petition, dismissed the petition as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of any potential issues or contentions that might have been raised. The operative direction was solely to dismiss the writ petition due to its withdrawal by the petitioner.
The High Court noted that the petitioner's counsel prayed for the withdrawal of the writ petition, acknowledging that an appeal had been preferred after the passing of the assessment order. The counsel stated the intention to move an appropriate application for exemption/stay/waiver of pre-deposit in the appeal, citing relevant provisions of the Act and reasons. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the assessment order or the grounds for appeal.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court found that the order under Section 148A(d) was passed after giving the petitioner due opportunity of hearing and was a detailed order examining various facts. The Court held that the correctness of the disputed factual aspects could not be gone into in a writ petition. Furthermore, the petition was filed after the petitioner submitted a return pursuant to the notice under Section 148 and during the pendency of assessment proceedings. As no addition had been made and it was a case of reopening of assessment, the assessee would have a full opportunity to satisfy the Assessing Officer against any addition. Therefore, the Court was not inclined to admit the petition.
The High Court held that the order under Section 148A(d) was passed after giving due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, and it was a detailed order examining various facts. The Court noted that the correctness of these disputed factual aspects could not be adjudicated in a writ petition. Furthermore, the petitioner had filed the writ petition after submitting a return in response to the notice under Section 148 and during the pendency of assessment proceedings. The Court found no impropriety in the decision-making process and observed that no addition had yet been made, and the assessee would have a full opportunity to satisfy the Assessing Officer regarding any proposed additions. Therefore, the Court was not inclined to admit the petition.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court found that the order under Section 148A(d) was passed after giving the petitioner due opportunity of hearing and was a detailed order examining various facts. The Court noted that the correctness of these disputed factual aspects could not be adjudicated in a writ petition. Furthermore, the petition was filed after the petitioner had submitted a return pursuant to the notice under Section 148 and during the pendency of assessment proceedings. The Court observed that no addition had yet been made, and the case involved reopening of assessment, where the assessee would have a full opportunity to satisfy the Assessing Officer. Therefore, the Court was not inclined to admit the petition due to the absence of impropriety in the decision-making process.
The High Court held that the petitioner appeared to be not interested in pursuing the matter. This conclusion was based on the petitioner's consistent non-appearance on multiple hearing dates and the failure to deposit process fees and notice, which led to the automatic vacation of the interim order granted in her favour. Consequently, the Court found it appropriate to dismiss the petition for non-prosecution. No decision was made on the merits of the case.
The High Court held that it was not inclined to proceed further with the writ petition, given that the petitioner had already availed of his statutory remedy of appeal, which was pending before the appellate authority. The Court stated that all legal issues, if any, would be left open. The appellate authority was directed to decide the petitioner's appeal within three months from the date of the order. Furthermore, the Court directed that tax recovery pursuant to the impugned assessment order shall not be proceeded with during the pendency of the appeal. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The reasoning provided is that the petitioner sought to withdraw the petition in view of a subsequent event. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the original challenge. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn.
The Tribunal noted that the learned counsel for the petitioner sought to withdraw the petition in view of a subsequent event. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of the case was made.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order dated March 24, 2022, and the demand notice of the same date were rendered ineffective and inoperative in law. The reasoning was that the notice under Section 148 of the Act, issued on March 31, 2021, and served on April 1, 2021, had to be treated as a notice under Section 148A(b) of the Act, in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India Vs. Ashish Agarwal. Consequently, further proceedings were required to comply with Section 148A. The order passed under Section 148A(d) on July 26, 2022, explicitly stated that no scrutiny assessment could be made on the basis of the show cause notice, rendering the earlier scrutiny assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer infructuous. The Tribunal emphasized that the assessment order dated March 24, 2022, was in direct contravention of the Supreme Court's judgment and therefore did not survive in the eye of law. All subsequently issued demand notices were also rendered ineffective. The Tribunal did not interfere with the order dated July 26, 2022, passed under Section 148A(d). The pre-deposit amount, if any, made by the petitioner was ordered to be refunded forthwith.
The High Court noted that the learned counsel for the petitioner sought to withdraw the petition in view of a subsequent event. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the petition as withdrawn. No finding was reached on any substantive issue related to the income tax assessment or any provision of the Income Tax Act. The operative direction was solely to dismiss the writ petition as withdrawn. No issue was left undecided as the petition itself was withdrawn.
The High Court has not yet decided the substantive issues in these petitions. The order indicates that the petitions are listed to be heard on the common issue of whether the re-opening of assessment is barred under applicable laws. The court has directed the learned counsel for the parties to submit a detailed chart categorizing the cases by assessment year, grouping them accordingly, and specifying the amounts involved. This suggests that the court is in the preliminary stage of hearing and is gathering information to facilitate a comprehensive decision on the common issue. No findings or reasoning have been provided in this excerpt, and the matter has been adjourned for further hearing.