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572 orders · Page 12 of 12
The Tribunal held that the impugned order passed under Section 148A(d) was unsustainable and not in consonance with the procedure prescribed under Section 148A of the Act. The Court found that the Assessing Officer (AO) was mandated to pass a speaking order, taking into consideration not only the material on record but also the reply filed by the assessee. The judgment noted that the AO reproduced the petitioner's reply dated 11.06.2022 and concluded that the petitioner had not made arguments on merits, thus having nothing to explain regarding the cash loan and interest received. However, the additional reply dated 14.06.2022 was not considered, and consequently, the objections raised therein were not dealt with. This failure to consider the assessee's objections and pass a speaking order that addresses all points raised rendered the impugned order procedurally flawed. The Court also addressed the contention of alternative remedy, stating that the issue went to the root of the jurisdiction for initiating reassessment proceedings, falling within exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, specifically violation of principles of natural justice and proceedings without jurisdiction. Therefore, the impugned order dated 26.07.2022 was quashed, and the matter was remitted back to the respondent to proceed with a notice under Section 148-A(b) in accordance with the law.
The Tribunal's decision to uphold the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was sustained. The High Court found that the assessee had not filed income tax returns for preceding years. Significant cash deposits of Rs. 12,75,000/- were made between June 11, 2009, and June 19, 2009, with no withdrawals during that period. Further cash deposits were made during the assessment year. This information, along with interest on the savings bank account, was not declared in the returns. The assessee failed to explain the source of these cash deposits, and the additions made were upheld up to the ITAT, having attained finality. The court rejected the contention that additions were based on presumption, stating they were made after deducting withdrawals, relying on departmental material, and considering the assessee's explanation. Regarding the penalty, no explanation for the cash deposits was provided, and the assessee's reply stated no concealment or unexplained income. The court concluded that no substantial question of law was involved and dismissed the appeal.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax (Circle), Gurugram. The reasoning for this dismissal is not detailed in the provided text but is stated to be contained in a separate order of even date concerning ITA No. 41 of 2021. Therefore, the specific findings on any issues, the ratio decidendi, or operative directions are not available in this judgment. No issue was expressly left undecided, as the appeal itself was dismissed.
The High Court held that the writ petitions had become infructuous. This decision was based on the fact that the appeals, which were the subject of the stay applications, had subsequently been decided by the Commissioner Income Tax. The respondents' counsel presented the orders of disposal, and the petitioner's counsel could not controvert this information due to a lack of instructions. Consequently, the original challenge to the dismissal of the stay applications was rendered moot. The court dismissed the writ petitions as infructuous. The petitioner was granted liberty to move an application for recalling the order if there was any factual discrepancy in the statement made by the respondents' counsel. No specific finding was made on the merits of the stay applications or the appeals themselves.
The Tribunal noted that the Department, during the pendency of the writ petition, had passed an order under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dropping the reassessment proceedings. Based on this submission by the petitioner's counsel, the High Court found that no cause of action survived for the petition. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed as infructuous. The principle derived is that if the underlying action challenged in a writ petition is withdrawn or dropped by the authority, the petition becomes infructuous and liable for dismissal.
The High Court held that the writ petition had become infructuous. The reasoning was based on the statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petition had become infructuous by the efflux of time. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the writ petition as having become infructuous. No decision was made on the merits of any underlying dispute. The ratio decidendi is that a writ petition, if rendered infructuous by the passage of time or change in circumstances, will be dismissed on that ground.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. It held that a writ petition should not ordinarily be entertained at the stage of a show-cause notice, especially when alternative statutory remedies are available. The Court relied on several Supreme Court judgments, including Union of India Vs. Coastal Container Transporters Association & Ors., Commissioner of Central Excise, Haldia Vs. Krishna Wax (P) Ltd., and State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Greatship (India) Limited. The Court found that the notice under Section 148 was a show-cause notice, and the petitioner had the remedy to file a reply and raise all objections before the Assessing Authority. The interim order cited by the petitioner was considered non-binding as it was an interim measure and the present matter was being decided finally. The Assessing Authority was expected to consider the petitioner's objections during the assessment proceedings. The principle established is that interference by a writ court at the show-cause notice stage is rare and should not be routine, unless there is a clear lack of jurisdiction or abuse of process, which must be prima facie established.
The High Court disposed of the writ petitions based on the statement made by the learned counsel for the respondents. The respondents assured that the refund for both assessment years (2015-16 and 2017-18) was being processed, the discrepancy with the bank account had been resolved, and the matter would be decided in accordance with law within six weeks from the date of the order. The Court noted that the petitioner would be at liberty to avail further remedies if their grievance persisted after the respondents' decision. No specific finding on the legality of the delay was made, as the petitions were disposed of on the assurance of prompt action by the revenue. The ratio decidendi is that when the revenue assures prompt action and resolution of pending matters within a stipulated timeframe, the High Court may dispose of writ petitions on such assurances, reserving the petitioner's right to pursue further remedies.
The High Court disposed of the petitions based on the statement made by the learned counsel for the respondents. The respondents assured the Court that the refund for both Assessment Years 2015-16 and 2017-18 was being processed and that the issue with the bank account discrepancies had been resolved. They committed to deciding the matter pertaining to the refund within six weeks from the date of the order. The Court noted that the petitioner would be at liberty to pursue further remedies if their grievance persisted after the respondents' decision. No specific finding was given on the justification of the delay, as the matter was resolved by the departmental assurance.
The Tribunal, in this case, is bound by the previous decision of the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-I Versus Ritu Agarwal. The Court noted that the substantial question of law concerning the eligibility of exemption under Section 10(38) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, has already been decided and is no longer res integra. The Court also referred to another Division Bench decision in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-I Versus Smt. Seema Agarwal, where appeals were dismissed in light of the Ritu Agarwal judgment. Therefore, following these precedents, the present appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Bhansali and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Yogendra Kumar Purohit, held that the writ petition had become infructuous. This decision was based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The court noted that subsequent to the filing of the writ petition, an assessment order had been passed, and the petitioner had filed an appeal against this order. Consequently, the original purpose of the writ petition was rendered moot. The court's reasoning was solely based on the petitioner's counsel's statement that the petition was no longer necessary. No decision was made on the merits of any underlying tax dispute. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition.
The High Court allowed the writ petition, directing the release of the disputed property, which is agricultural land comprising Khasra Nos. 895 and 1054/895 situated at Village-Harwar, Tehsil - Amer, District – Jaipur. The Court reasoned that the issue had been decided by the Supreme Court in Union of India & Another Versus M/s. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd., and the respondent could not dispute that this order remained operative. The release of the property was made subject to the final order that may be passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the pending review petition. The ratio decidendi is that a High Court should follow an operative Supreme Court judgment even if a review petition is pending, unless the Supreme Court has stayed its own order or granted specific relief pending the review.
The High Court held that it would not exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the order passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The reasoning was that the petitioner had failed to challenge the order dated July 22, 2022, when it was passed and subsequently an assessment order was also issued. The Court found that the petitioner has an alternative and efficacious statutory remedy. Therefore, all issues raised in the petition were left open to be considered in an appeal that the petitioner may file. The writ petition was dismissed with liberty to pursue the available legal remedies.
The High Court held that Respondent No. 2 lacked territorial jurisdiction to issue the notice under Section 148A(b) and pass the order under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court noted that the material on record, including a screenshot of the Income Tax Department's portal (Annexure-6), clearly indicated that the petitioner's jurisdiction lay with the Assessing Officer at Kolkata, as per Section 124 of the Act. The Court found the respondents' plea regarding the non-availability of the PAN number to be without substance, as the petitioner's PAN was reflected on the notice itself (Annexure-2), and the authority was obligated to ascertain territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, the further proceedings by Respondent No. 2 were unsustainable. The Court did not delve into the issue of limitation as submissions were confined to jurisdiction. The writ petition was allowed, and the order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148, both dated 06.04.2023, were quashed and set aside. Respondent No. 2 was permitted to take appropriate proceedings in accordance with law, implying a potential transfer under Section 127.
The High Court allowed the writ petition, directing the release of the disputed property. The Court reasoned that the issue raised by the petitioner had been decided by the Supreme Court in Union of India & Another Versus M/S. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. While the revenue pointed to a pending review petition, they could not dispute that the Supreme Court's order was still operative. The Court found that the petition deserved to be allowed based on the existing Supreme Court judgment. The release of the property was made subject to the final order that might be passed by the Supreme Court in the pending review petition. The ratio decidendi is that a High Court should follow a binding Supreme Court judgment even if a review petition is pending, unless the Supreme Court has stayed its earlier order or directed otherwise.
The Tribunal held that the writ petition filed by the petitioner is allowed and the impugned notices and order are quashed and set aside. On the first issue, the Tribunal, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Pioneer Motors (Private) Ltd. vs. The Municipal Council, Nagrecoil, held that the requirement of 'not less than seven days' necessitates the exclusion of both the date of issue/posting and the last date for response. Since the notice dated March 16, 2022, posted on March 17, 2022, with a response date of March 23, 2022, did not provide a clear seven days, it violated the mandatory provisions of Section 148A(b). Regarding the limitation issue, the Tribunal noted that the petitioner's bank account statement for Assessment Year 2015-16 showed cash deposits totaling Rs. 42,15,000, which is less than Rs. 50,00,000. As the notice was issued on March 16, 2022, beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, it was ex-facie barred by limitation under Section 149(1)(a) and consequently without jurisdiction. The Tribunal also found the revenue's action of passing the order under Section 148A(d) on March 27, 2022, while the notice was returned undelivered on March 28, 2022, to be a mechanical exercise of power, further vitiating the proceedings. The operative direction was to quash and set aside the notice dated March 16, 2022, the order dated March 27, 2022, and the notice dated March 27, 2022.
The Tribunal held that the action of the respondent was barred by limitation and could not be sustained. The Court noted that the notice under Section 148A of the Act was issued on the premise of cash deposits amounting to Rs. 59,75,000/-, purportedly invoking the extended period of limitation. However, it was subsequently found that the actual cash deposits were only Rs. 33,62,000/-. Once this fact became clear to the authority, it lost its jurisdiction to continue with the proceedings, as the limitation under Section 149(1)(a) of three years would trigger, and the amount being less than Rs. 50,00,000/-, the authority would lose jurisdiction on account of limitation. The Court found that the order under Section 148A(d) was passed in a mechanical manner, rejecting the petitioner's plea and proceeding to issue notice under Section 148. The subsequent attempt to convert proceedings into a notice under Section 69A read with Section 115BBE was also deemed impermissible. Following the dictum in Abdul Majeed (supra), the Court quashed the show cause notice and all consequential proceedings and the assessment order. The ratio is that if the actual amount of escaped income or cash deposit is found to be below the threshold for invoking the extended period of limitation under Section 149(1)(b), and the original period of limitation under Section 149(1)(a) has expired, then the proceedings initiated under Section 148A are without jurisdiction.
The High Court held that the revision petitions under Section 25 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, against an intimation issued under Section 16(1) of the Act are maintainable. The Court reasoned that the intimation, being a decision of the Assessing Officer accepting self-assessment, is in the nature of an order passed by the concerned authority. This interpretation is supported by the analogy drawn from the Income Tax Act, where an intimation under Section 143(1) has been held to have the force of an order and is amenable to revision under Section 263. The Court noted that the Commissioner had not examined the matter on merits and that the analogy from the Bombay High Court's judgment in Anderson Marine & Sons Pvt. Ltd., upheld by the Supreme Court, provided sufficient ambit within the law to invoke revisionary jurisdiction. Therefore, the special appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.
The Court held that the writ petition was maintainable. It found that the Assessing Officer (AO) had failed to specify which part of Section 270A(9) was attracted in the case of the petitioner, rendering the initiation of penalty proceedings 'nonest'. The Court also noted that the petitioner had withdrawn its claim for deduction of education cess and accepted the addition, making it eligible for immunity under Section 270AA. The AO's conclusion that the petitioner did not fulfill the conditions of Section 270AA(3) was deemed illegal. Furthermore, the AO failed to decide the petitioner's application for immunity under Section 270AA within the prescribed time limit as per Section 270AA(4). Consequently, the penalty order and demand notice were set aside, and the AO was directed to grant immunity under Section 270AA to the petitioner.
The High Court held that the provisions of Section 148A(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, require an opportunity of being heard via a show-cause notice, which must contain information persuading the Assessing Officer that income has escaped assessment. However, the statute does not compel the Assessing Officer to supply all documentary or oral evidence on which the opinion is formed, provided the show-cause notice contains sufficient information and the foundational material behind the opinion. The Court found that the show-cause notice in this case, along with its annexures, provided sufficient information. The Court respectfully disagreed with the Delhi High Court's decision in Charu Chains and Jewels Pvt. Ltd. and distinguished the Micro Marbles Private Limited case as it dealt with unamended provisions. The Court found the petitioner's case covered by Explanation 1(i) of Section 148. Consequently, the writ petitions were dismissed, with liberty to the petitioners to raise all defenses before the Jurisdictional Authority.