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572 orders · Page 2 of 12
The High Court held that since the petitioner had already availed the statutory remedy of appeal against the order of assessment, it was not inclined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain the writ petition. The Court noted that the petitioner was at liberty to raise all the grounds before the appellate authority in the pending appeal. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed on the ground of availability of an alternative efficacious remedy. No decision was made on the merits of the grounds raised by the petitioner.
The High Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned order of the ITAT. The Court condoned the delay of 178 days in filing the appeal. The reasoning was that there was confusion regarding the introduction of faceless hearing, leading the appellant to file an appeal with CIT(A) Jaipur but receive notices from CIT(A) Delhi. The issue of jurisdiction was raised, along with a prayer for transfer to Jaipur, which was not considered. The appellant's subsequent approach to the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Jaipur, for recalling the order and transfer was based on mistaken advice and a bonafide ground of wrong advice in pursuing the appropriate remedy. The Court found the delay sufficiently explained. The matter was remitted back to the Tribunal to decide the appeal on merits. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court partly allowed the appeal, modifying the compensation by increasing amounts for loss of consortium and adding loss of estate, while rejecting the Insurance Company's plea for income tax deduction. The Court held that compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is not eligible for income tax and that taxability is for the Income Tax Department to consider, not for the Insurance Company's benefit.
The High Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned order of the ITAT. The Court condoned the delay of 178 days in filing the appeal. The reasoning was that there was confusion regarding the introduction of faceless hearing, leading the appellant to file an appeal with CIT(A) Jaipur but receive notices from CIT(A) Delhi. The issue of jurisdiction was raised, along with a prayer for transfer to Jaipur, which was not considered. The appellant's subsequent approach to the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Jaipur, for recalling the order and transfer was based on mistaken advice and a bonafide ground of wrong advice in pursuing the appropriate remedy. The Court found the delay sufficiently explained. The matter was remitted back to the Tribunal to decide the appeal on merits. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal dismissed the present appeal as withdrawn. This decision was based on a submission by the learned counsel for the appellant (revenue) that, in light of the Central Board of Direct Taxes circular dated 17.09.2024, the appeal need not be pressed because the tax effect was below Rs. 2 crores and the case lacked exceptional factors. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the formulated substantial question of law is kept open for consideration in an appropriate case if the need arises. The Department was granted liberty to move an appropriate application for revival. No finding was reached on the merits of the appeal.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the competent authority, as on the date of the order, to decide the application dated February 22, 2016, for the release of the seized documents. The decision on this application is to be taken within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order. The Court also noted that the petitioner would be at liberty to avail further remedies in accordance with law if they are aggrieved by the decision on their application. The judgment does not provide findings on the merits of the additions made in the block assessment or the specific reasons for the delay in deciding the application.
The Tribunal held that Section 179 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is specifically applicable to the recovery of tax dues from the Directors of a Private Limited Company. The latter part of Section 179(1) places a negative onus on the Director to prove that non-recovery was not due to their gross neglect, misfeasance, or breach of duty. However, the provision does not extend to Public Limited Companies. The Tribunal noted that the Revenue Authorities failed to dispute the fact that the Company was a Public Limited Company and did not lay down any factual foundation to the contrary in their notices or orders. Relying on pronouncements from the Supreme Court in M. Rajamoni Amma vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and the Gujarat High Court in Radhey Mohan Sharma vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, as well as the Madras High Court in R. Rajagopalan vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, the Tribunal concluded that proceedings under Section 179 cannot be initiated against the Director of a Public Limited Company. Consequently, the impugned notices and orders were quashed, and the Revenue was granted liberty to proceed against the Company for recovery of dues.
The Tribunal held that Section 179 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is specifically designed to recover tax dues from directors of private limited companies. The latter part of Section 179(1) places a negative onus on the director to prove that non-recovery was not due to their gross neglect, misfeasance, or breach of duty. The Tribunal noted that the company in question was incorporated as a Public Limited Company since 1997 and was registered as such. The Revenue Authorities failed to dispute this fact in their notice or the order passed under Section 179. Citing the Supreme Court in M. Rajamoni Amma Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and the Gujarat High Court in Radhey Mohan Sharma Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, the Tribunal concluded that Section 179 does not apply to public limited companies. Therefore, the proceedings initiated against the petitioner under Section 179 were held to be bad. The writ petitions were allowed, and the impugned notices and orders were quashed. The Revenue was granted liberty to proceed against the company for recovery of dues.
The Tribunal held that Section 179 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, empowers the Income Tax Authorities to recover dues of a private company from its director. The latter part of Section 179(1) places a negative onus on the director to prove that non-recovery was not due to their gross neglect, misfeasance, or breach of duty. However, the Tribunal found that the Revenue Authorities failed to lay down a factual foundation to dispute the Company's status as a public limited company. The Company was incorporated as a Public Limited Company since 1997, and this fact was not refuted by the Revenue. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that proceedings under Section 179 cannot be initiated against a Director of a Public Limited Company was accepted. The Tribunal relied on Supreme Court and Gujarat and Madras High Court judgments stating that Section 179 does not apply to public limited companies. The impugned notices and orders were quashed, with liberty to the Revenue to proceed against the Company for recovery.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) to decide the pending appeal within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order. The Court noted that interim protection had been in favour of the petitioner since 2019 and that the appeal had remained undecided for over five years. Without commenting on the merits of the case, the Court emphasized the need for timely resolution of appeals. The interim protection granted to the petitioner was extended to continue until the appeal is heard and decided. No specific issue was left undecided; the primary direction was for the expeditious disposal of the appeal.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition as withdrawn with liberty granted to the petitioner. Specifically, the court allowed the petitioner to file an application for revival of the appeal that was previously withdrawn. Furthermore, the court directed that if the petitioner files the application for revival within one week, the Appellate Authority shall decide this application within two weeks thereafter. The court also granted liberty to the petitioner to file an application for stay along with the revival application. The court did not decide on the merits of the original dispute, as the petition was disposed of based on the petitioner's request to pursue the appellate remedy.
The Tribunal held that the impugned assessment order dated 08.09.2022 is set aside. The reasoning was that despite the revenue's claim of multiple opportunities, the petitioner was unable to upload their reply due to persistent technical glitches in the portal, even after extensions were granted. This resulted in a violation of the principles of natural justice, as the petitioner was denied a fair opportunity to present their case. The Tribunal acknowledged the petitioner's undertaking not to raise the objection of the assessment being time-barred if granted one opportunity to file a response. The assessing officer is directed to proceed with the show-cause notice dated 29.06.2021 in accordance with law and provide an opportunity to file the reply. The assessment order is set aside subject to the petitioner's undertaking. The Tribunal also expressed a desirability for the assessing officer to complete the proceedings expeditiously.
The Tribunal permitted the appellant (CIT) to withdraw the appeals based on the tax effect being below Rupees Two Crores, citing a CBDT circular dated 17.09.2024. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the formulated substantial question of law, though not detailed in the judgment, was kept open. The department was granted liberty to move an appropriate application for revival if the need arose. No decision on the merits of the case was made.
The Tribunal granted permission to the appellant (Revenue) to withdraw the appeals. The appeals were dismissed as withdrawn. The Tribunal noted that the tax effect in the appeals was below Rupees Two Crores, and this was in line with the CBDT circular dated 17.09.2024. The formulated substantial question of law was kept open. The department was granted liberty to move an appropriate application for revival if the need arose. The specific findings on the merits of the original assessment or the grounds of appeal were not addressed as the appeals were withdrawn.
The High Court held that for the demand created against the petitioner for non-deposit of TDS by the employer, the petitioner has a statutory remedy of appeal. The Court noted that there were no pleadings indicating that the demands for AY 2011-12 and 2012-13 had been challenged or that such proceedings were pending. Regarding the notice under Section 245 of the Act, the Court stated that the petitioner must respond to the notice, and the respondent authority will proceed in accordance with law after considering the reply. If the petitioner is aggrieved by the subsequent order, they will have a statutory remedy. Consequently, the Court found no reason to interfere in its writ jurisdiction. The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to avail remedies in accordance with law against the demands and to file a response to the Section 245 notice within two weeks.
The Tribunal granted the Revenue's request to withdraw the appeals. The reasoning was based on the Central Board of Direct Taxes circular dated 17.09.2024, and the fact that the tax effect in the appeals was below Rupees Two Crores. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the formulated substantial question of law was kept open, implying that the merits of the case were not decided.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were not based on a mere change of opinion. The court observed that while the original assessment was framed under Section 143(3), there was no specific question raised or detailed discussion regarding the deduction claimed under Section 54B. The assessment order noted income from Long Term Capital Gain (LTCG), but this did not necessarily imply that the specific issue of deduction under Section 54B for land sold by the petitioner's brothers was considered or decided. The court cited Supreme Court decisions in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax versus Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Broker Pvt. Ltd. and Phool Chand Bajrang Lal & Anr. versus Income Tax Officer & Anr. to emphasize that for initiating reassessment proceedings under Section 147, the AO needs 'reason to believe' that income has escaped assessment, and this belief can be based on material already on record, provided it is not merely a change of opinion. The court found that the reasons for reopening indicated an escaped assessment, and the AO had the right to initiate proceedings under Section 147 even if the material was available during the original assessment. Therefore, the petition was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the objects of the assessee, aimed at benefiting pharma dealers and promoting trade, fall under the advancement of any other object of general public utility as defined in Section 2(15). Therefore, the ITAT was justified in granting registration.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the order rejecting the objections were invalid. The reasoning was that the issue regarding the deduction under Section 54B was explicitly raised by the Assessing Officer (AO) during the original assessment proceedings for AY 2009-10. The petitioner had provided an explanation and material, which led the AO to drop this issue and finalize the assessment with additions on other grounds. This indicated that the AO had applied his mind to the issue and formed an opinion, even if not explicitly recorded in the assessment order. Therefore, initiating reassessment proceedings on the same issue constituted a change of opinion, which is impermissible under Section 147 of the Act, as established by Supreme Court and High Court precedents. The Tribunal quashed the notice and the order rejecting objections. The writ petition was allowed.
The Tribunal permitted the appellant's counsel to withdraw the appeals. The appeals were accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the formulated substantial question of law is kept open. This implies that the merits of the case were not adjudicated upon, and the decision to dismiss the appeals was solely based on the appellant's request to withdraw them due to the tax effect falling below the threshold stipulated in the CBDT circular. No finding was reached on the substantive issues of the appeals.
The Tribunal held that the first ground regarding unsigned notices was not pressed as the petitioner's reply indicated they were digitally signed. Regarding the second issue, the Tribunal noted that the escaped assessment was prima facie stated to be Rs. 1,28,98,518/-, which is more than fifty lakhs, thus the contention that the notice was time-barred could not be accepted at this stage. On the third issue, the Tribunal found that the notices were issued based on material collected during a search on the ARC group, which provided accommodation entries of bogus unsecured loans. The AO had reasons to believe income had escaped assessment, and the sufficiency of these reasons could not be examined at this stage. The Tribunal distinguished the cited Delhi High Court cases, stating that in the present case, information was supplied, an opportunity was granted, and the order was passed after considering the reply. The Tribunal concluded that interference in writ jurisdiction was not warranted as the petitioner had an effective opportunity to raise all pleas during proceedings under Section 148 and subsequent appeals. The petition was dismissed.
The High Court found that the ITAT relied on two pieces of evidence to conclude that the respondent-assessee did not actually receive the additional amount of Rs.96,06,279/-. Firstly, the ITAT relied on the affidavit of the respondent-assessee. Secondly, it accepted the assessee's contention that this amount was not actually received by the assessee through bank transactions. The Court considered the revenue's submission that this was a mode to avoid direct evidence of receipt, but viewed this as a matter within the realm of assessment of evidence. The Court concluded that no substantial question of law was involved. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal granted the appellant's request to withdraw the appeal. The reasoning was based on the CBDT circular dated 17.09.2024, which indicated that the tax effect in the appeal was below the threshold for pursuing it. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. However, the substantial questions of law that were proposed in the appeal were expressly kept open for consideration in an appropriate future case. No decision was made on the merits of the substantive issues.
The Tribunal dismissed both appeals as withdrawn. This decision was based on the Circular of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) dated 17.09.2024, which directs the withdrawal of appeals where the tax effect is less than two crores. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the substantial question of law is kept open. The appellant (revenue) was granted liberty to file an application for revival of the appeals if they fall within the exceptions mentioned in the circular. No specific findings were made on the merits of the original dispute.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with directions to the Income Tax Department to decide the application filed by the petitioner under Section 132(10) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, expeditiously. The Court emphasized that the decision should be made as early as possible, preferably within a period of three months, strictly in accordance with law, and after affording due opportunity of hearing to all the respective parties. The Court explicitly clarified that it had not issued any order or direction to the respondents to decide the application in a particular way, and the Department remained at liberty to decide it strictly in accordance with law. The ratio decidendi is that administrative authorities must act diligently and decide pending applications within a reasonable time, subject to legal provisions and principles of natural justice.
The High Court held that no case was made out for interference in writ jurisdiction at this stage. The Court directed that if the petitioner files a preliminary reply to the notice within two weeks, the respondent (Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax) shall consider it in accordance with law expeditiously. The petitioner was also granted liberty to avail further remedies if aggrieved by the decision. The writ petition was dismissed. The Court did not decide the merits of the time-bar contention but allowed the petitioner to pursue it through a preliminary reply.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271(B) was not leviable. The Court found that the complete dissolution of the firm on March 31, 2005, coupled with the intimation of dissolution and filing of the return with the appropriate authority in Mumbai, constituted a reasonable cause under Section 273B. The Court reasoned that the bona fides of the assessee should be considered, and since the appellant had filed the return and audit report with all required documents within the permissible time to one of the authorities, they could not be said to lack a reasonable cause. The Court also referred to the judgment in Bajrang Oil Mills V/s Income Tax Officer, which emphasized that penalty should not be levied for venial or technical breaches arising from a bona fide belief. The penalty imposed by the AO and affirmed by the CIT(A) and ITAT was set aside.
The Tribunal granted the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The court's decision was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn. No findings were made on the merits of the case, as the petition was disposed of on the procedural ground of withdrawal. The ratio decidendi is that a party has the right to withdraw their petition, and the court will typically grant such a request unless there are compelling reasons otherwise, which were not present here. No issues were left undecided as the matter was concluded by the withdrawal.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition without commenting on the merits of the case. The court directed the competent authority to expeditiously conclude the pending proceedings within a period of six months. The ratio of this decision is that in cases where proceedings are pending before a statutory authority, a writ petition can be disposed of with a direction for speedy completion of those proceedings, provided there is no opposition from the respondent and the court does not delve into the merits of the underlying case. No specific issue was left undecided as the petition was disposed of on the petitioner's request.
The Tribunal decided to dismiss the appeals as withdrawn. The reasoning provided is that the appellant, in view of the circular of the Central Board of Direct Taxes dated 17.09.2024, and noting that the tax effect in the appeals was below Rupees Two Crores, sought permission to withdraw the appeals. The Tribunal granted this permission and accordingly dismissed the appeals. The ratio decidendi is that appeals can be withdrawn by the revenue if the conditions stipulated in the relevant CBDT circular are met, and the tax effect falls below the prescribed monetary limit. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeals as withdrawn. The substantial question of law was expressly left undecided.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition, considering the nature of the prayer. It directed the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) to decide the petitioner's appeal within three months from the date of receiving a certified copy of the order. The interim order, which prevented coercive action against the petitioner, was extended to continue until the appeal was decided. The Court did not delve into the merits of the rejection of the stay by the Assistant Commissioner but focused on ensuring a timely resolution of the appeal. The ratio decidendi is that when an appeal is pending and a stay has been sought, the appellate authority should be directed to decide the appeal expeditiously, and interim protection should continue till then.
The Tribunal (High Court) granted the appellant's (Revenue's) request to withdraw the appeals. The appeals were accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. The judgment explicitly states that the formulated substantial question of law is kept open. No decision on the merits of the case was made. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeals as withdrawn.