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5,769 tribunal orders from the Indore bench.
Counted from the judgments of this bench on BharatTax. The figure is how many of them cite each decision.
When two equally plausible interpretations of a taxing provision are possible, or when conflicting views exist from non-jurisdictional High Courts, the interpretation that favors the assessee must be adopted.
The fee under Section 234E for late filing of TDS/TCS statements cannot be levied retrospectively by processing an intimation under Section 200A for defaults occurring before the amendment allowing such processing.
Late fees under section 234E are not applicable for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as the amendment to section 200A inserting clause (c) was effective from that date.
Taxing statutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless a clear contrary intention for retrospective application is evident. The law applicable for determining tax liability is that which stands on the first day of the assessment year, following the principle that law looks forward, not backward (lex prospicit non respicit).
A fee under Section 234E cannot be levied or adjusted in an intimation under Section 200A for TDS statements pertaining to periods prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling amendment to Section 200A(1)(c) came into effect only from that date.
Section 234E, levying late fees for delayed filing of TDS statements under section 200(3), is constitutionally valid and constitutes a compensatory fee, not a punitive penalty. Before treating any person as an assessee-in-default, an opportunity of being heard must be provided.
The imposition of fees for late filing of TDS/TCS returns prior to the Finance Act, 2015 amendments was not illegal, and the Rajasthan High Court found no justification to interfere with such compensatory fees.
Delay in filing appeals, when supported by sufficient or justifiable cause, should be condoned with a liberal approach to ensure substantial justice. This principle prioritizes the cause of justice over mere technicalities.
Penalty under Section 272A(1)(d) for non-compliance with a notice issued under Section 142(1) is not leviable when the assessee demonstrates a reasonable cause for such non-compliance. The decision defines what constitutes 'reasonable cause' in this context.
Corroborative evidence is essential to support evidence found on third-party premises, and an assessment cannot be based on suspicion, surmises, or conjecture.
Appellate authorities can consider new claims and additional grounds if the relevant facts are already on record. The purpose of assessment is to correctly determine tax liability, allowing both parties to raise issues.
For revision under Section 263, the Assessing Officer's order must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue; if either condition is not met, the revisionary jurisdiction cannot be invoked. An order is not erroneous merely because the Assessing Officer did not record the details of enquiries conducted, provided due enquiries were made.
Employee contributions to PF and ESIC, deposited beyond the due date under the respective Acts but within the due date for filing the income tax return under Section 139(1), are allowable deductions under Section 36(1)(va). Such disallowance cannot be made during processing under Section 143(1).
An assessee is entitled to be confronted with evidence used against them and to an opportunity for cross-examination, especially when that evidence is from a third party or a retracted statement. Failure to provide such an opportunity violates the principles of natural justice.
A penalty notice issued under section 274 read with section 271(1)(c) is invalid if it fails to specify whether the penalty proceedings are initiated for concealment of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. This non-specification vitiates the penalty proceedings.
An assessee must be given an opportunity to cross-examine third parties whose statements are relied upon for adverse findings. Failure to provide this opportunity is a serious flaw rendering the order a nullity.
Loose sheets of paper, excel sheets, or diaries, often referred to as 'dumb documents,' are wholly irrelevant as evidence and not admissible under Section 34 of the Evidence Act if they lack evidentiary value. Additions to income cannot be made solely based on such documents without corroborating, reliable, and admissible evidence supported by other circumstances.
Employee contributions to provident fund and ESI deposited by an employer beyond the due dates prescribed under the respective special Acts are not allowable as a deduction under section 36(1)(va) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Such disallowance can be made during processing under section 143(1).
Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) for furnishing inaccurate particulars or concealment of income is not automatically leviable if the assessee has made a full disclosure of all particulars and the addition or disallowance arises from a difference of opinion.
Income tax additions cannot be made based on mere suspicion, surmises, or presumptions; the assessing officer must rely on concrete proof and material evidence. Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of legal proof.
Most recent orders on record, from 2026.
The Tribunal held that the findings of the Ld. CIT(A) in paragraph 4.3.4 of the impugned order had become infructuous. This was due to a subsequent order dated 09.03.2026 passed by the Ld. CIT(Exemption), which granted registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(i) for AY 2022-23 to AY 2026-27. The Tribunal reasoned that the assessee's claim for exemption deserved to be considered afresh in light of this new registration order. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the case back to the CPC to consider the assessee's case in view of the new registration order and pass a fresh intimation order under Section 143(1). The ratio decidendi is that a subsequent grant of registration under Section 12A, even if after the period under dispute, can validate prior claims for exemption if the delay in obtaining registration is condoned and the registration covers the period in question.
The Tribunal held that the appeal filed by the Revenue was not maintainable. It noted that CBDT Circular No. 9/2024 dated 17.09.2024 revised the monetary limit for filing appeals before the Tribunal to ₹60 lakh. The tax effect in the present appeal was ₹28,540, which is below the prescribed limit. The Tribunal observed that the case did not fall under any exception clause mentioned in the circular. Therefore, the Revenue was not expected to pursue this appeal. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue on preliminary grounds without delving into the merits of the case. However, it clarified that the Revenue is at liberty to file a miscellaneous application if the case falls under an exception clause.
The Tribunal held that the findings of the Ld. CIT(A) in paragraph 4.3.4 of the impugned order had become infructuous. This was due to a subsequent order dated 09.03.2026 passed by the Ld. CIT(Exemption), which granted registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(i) for AY 2022-23 to AY 2026-27. The Tribunal reasoned that the assessee's claim for exemption deserved to be considered afresh in light of this new registration order. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the case back to the CPC to consider the assessee's case in view of the new registration order and pass a fresh intimation order under Section 143(1). The ratio decidendi is that a subsequent grant of registration under Section 12A, even if after the period under dispute, can validate prior claims for exemption if the delay in obtaining registration is condoned and the registration covers the period in question.
The Tribunal held that the notice dated 28.03.2017 issued under section 148 by the ITO-3(4), Indore, was wholly without jurisdiction. The assessee had raised objections regarding the jurisdiction of the ITO-3(4), Indore, by letters dated 14.04.2017 and 09.05.2017, questioning his authority as the return of income was filed with the ITO, Ward-2, Ratlam, who was the competent jurisdictional officer. These objections were raised within the time frame provided under section 124(3) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that when an assessee questions the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer, the officer is required to refer the matter for determination under section 124(4) and 124(2) before making an assessment. The ITO-3(4), Indore, failed to follow this procedure and instead transferred the case, which was an irregular exercise of jurisdiction. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order, holding that the notice was issued without valid jurisdiction. The appeal was allowed on this limited ground, and the merits of the case were not examined. The Tribunal also affirmed that objections regarding jurisdiction must be made within the time limit prescribed under section 124(3), as per the decision in DIT(Exemption) v/s Kalinga Institute of Industrial Technology.
The Tribunal held that the difficulty faced by the assessee due to Covid-19 and technical glitches in filing Form 10IC was genuine. It noted that the assessee had made a representation dated 31.05.2022 for condonation, which was within the time limit prescribed by CBDT Circular No. 06/2023. The Tribunal expressed surprise at the revenue's contention regarding the non-existence of the PCIT office and the lack of proof of receipt, stating that the assessee should be believed. The Tribunal found that the assessee's actions, including claiming the benefit in the ITR, seeking rectification, and making representations, demonstrated genuineness and bona fide intention. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and directed the CPC to 'open the window' for Assessment Year 2020-21 to enable the assessee to upload Form 10IC and receive the benefit under Section 115BAA. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Wipro Ltd. was distinguished. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal considered the rival submissions and the material on record. The AO made the addition based on the statement of Shri Sharad Darak recorded by the Investigation Wing in other cases. However, apart from this statement, the AO did not produce any independent material to demonstrate that the loan transactions were not genuine or were the assessee's own undisclosed income routed back. The CIT(A) had examined the documents submitted by the assessee, including bank statements, ITRs, and ledger confirmations, and noted the substantial net worth of the two lending companies as of 31.03.2013 (East West Finvest Pvt. Ltd. at Rs. 135.97 crores and Jay Jyoti India Pvt. Ltd. at Rs. 114.96 crores). The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had considered the evidence and deleted the additions. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had also addressed the reopening under section 147 and found it to be valid. The Tribunal ultimately held that the CIT(A) had correctly deleted the additions made by the AO, as the AO had failed to bring on record sufficient material to disprove the genuineness of the loan transactions beyond the statement of Shri Sharad Darak, which was not corroborated by independent evidence in the assessee's case. The CIT(A)'s order was upheld.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was required to consider the effect of the original notice dated 30.06.2021, the subsequent proceedings under Section 148A pursuant to the judgment in Ashish Agarwal (supra), the applicable provisions of TOLA, and the principles laid down in Rajeev Bansal (supra). The validity of the sanction under Section 151 must be determined with reference to the statutory provisions applicable to the reassessment proceedings, read with the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A), by quashing the reassessment proceedings on a preliminary legal ground, did not adjudicate the substantive grounds concerning the addition of Rs.92,71,642/- under Section 68. Since the validity of reassessment proceedings is a threshold jurisdictional issue, it requires determination before merits. Therefore, the matter was restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication of the validity of reassessment proceedings, examining the original notice, subsequent notice, Section 151 sanction, and applicable TOLA provisions in light of the cited judgments. If reassessment is held valid, the CIT(A) shall adjudicate remaining grounds on merits. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the addition.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the exemption of the entire amount of Rs. 22,47,870 received as leave encashment. The Tribunal disagreed with the Chandigarh Bench's reasoning in Arvind Kumar Jolly, finding that the enhanced limit of Rs. 25,00,000, notified on 24.05.2023, was intended to operate retrospectively, as indicated by the Explanatory Memorandum and the pattern of earlier notifications. The Tribunal noted that the notification was deemed to have come into force from 01.04.2023, and the Budget Speech linked the enhanced figure to salary revisions effective from 01.01.2016. Furthermore, the Tribunal highlighted that this Bench and several other Benches of the Tribunal have consistently held that the enhanced limit applies to leave encashment received before 01.04.2023. The Tribunal also clarified that it does not accept the assessee's contention that the monetary limit is null and void; rather, the limit, as now specified by the Central Government, is Rs. 25,00,000, which the assessee's received amount falls within. The orders of the authorities below were set aside, and the AO was directed to allow the exemption as claimed and delete the addition. The Tribunal expressly left undecided the issue of the constitutional validity of the classification between government and non-government employees.
The provided text is an excerpt and does not contain the Tribunal's decision or reasoning. It only states the facts and the issues raised by the appeals. Therefore, the findings on each issue, the reasoning, the ratio decidendi, and any operative directions are not available in this portion of the judgment. No part of the judgment has been expressly left undecided as the decision itself is not present.
The provided text is an excerpt and does not contain the Tribunal's decision or reasoning. It only states the facts and the issues raised by the appeals. Therefore, the findings on each issue, the reasoning, the ratio decidendi, and any operative directions are not available in this portion of the judgment. No part of the judgment has been expressly left undecided as the decision itself is not present.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's contention regarding non-service of notices due to an incorrect email address could not be accepted solely based on a subsequent update of the email address on the income-tax portal. The validity of service must be examined with reference to the email address furnished in Form No. 35 and departmental records at the time of issuance. However, the Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal primarily due to the assessee's failure to respond and furnish evidence, without adequately deciding the grounds of appeal as required by Section 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to cooperate and furnish all relevant documentary evidence, and the CIT(A) was instructed to pass a reasoned and speaking order after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing and examining any additional evidence under Rule 46A. The Tribunal explicitly stated that no finding was recorded on the merits of the addition, leaving all substantive issues open for the CIT(A)'s consideration.
The Tribunal held that the appeal filed by the Revenue is not maintainable. The Tribunal noted that the CBDT Circular No. 9/2024 dated 17.09.2024 revised the monetary limit for filing appeals before the Tribunal to ₹60 lakhs. In the present case, the tax effect in dispute is ₹4,48,050/-, which is less than the prescribed limit of ₹60 lakhs. Therefore, as per the circular, the Revenue is not expected to pursue this appeal. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue without considering the merits of the case. The Tribunal also clarified that the Revenue is at liberty to file a miscellaneous application if the case falls under an exception clause. The appeal was dismissed on the preliminary ground of the monetary limit prescribed by the CBDT.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to satisfactorily explain the nature and source of the cash deposits of Rs. 49,80,000/- made during the demonetization period. The primary contention that the deposits were out of the opening cash balance of Rs. 67,77,918/- as on April 1, 2016, was not substantiated. The Tribunal observed material discrepancies between the cash balances reflected in the cash books and those in the balance sheets for various financial years, including significant differences for March 31, 2013, March 31, 2016, and March 31, 2017. Furthermore, a Chartered Accountant's certificate also showed inconsistencies. The Tribunal found that the assessee failed to furnish satisfactory reconciliation for these discrepancies or provide independent corroborative evidence to establish the actual availability of the claimed cash balance. The Tribunal noted that the judicial precedents relied upon by the assessee were distinguishable on facts. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order sustaining the addition of Rs. 49,80,000/- under section 69A of the Act, dismissing the assessee's grounds of appeal.
The Tribunal, considering the submissions of both parties, allowed the assessee to withdraw the present appeal. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's counsel had requested permission to withdraw the appeal due to the inadvertent filing of two appeals against the same order. The revenue's representative had no objection to this request. Therefore, the Tribunal granted permission to withdraw the appeal and dismissed it as withdrawn. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. No other issues were decided on merits.
The Tribunal held that nothing in Section 12A or 12AB bars a fresh application after an earlier one has been rejected. The ITAT's previous order dated 06.02.2024 did not examine the genuineness of activities but was based on the Assessee not pursuing the earlier application, thus settling the fate of that specific application but not the facts on which it was based. The impugned order, therefore, proceeded on a wrong premise. Regarding genuineness, the CIT(E)'s findings were considered unresolved queries. Deficiencies like missing ledgers, beneficiary details, and bills were capable of being cured. The Tribunal noted that the enquiry was compressed, and neither side had a fair occasion to complete it. Consequently, the impugned orders were set aside, and the applications dated 30.09.2025 (for registration) and 27.11.2025 (for 80G approval) were restored to the file of the learned CIT(E) for a fresh decision after affording the Assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The CIT(E) was given a free hand to examine all aspects, including registration under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959, on which the Tribunal expressed no opinion. The observation regarding cancellation of provisional registration was also set aside. The grounds of appeal were allowed to this extent.
The Tribunal held that both the Assessment Order and the CIT(A)'s order were ex-parte and not decided on merits. The Tribunal observed that the matter had not been adjudicated on merits and desired that the total income be computed and assessed on a real-time basis in accordance with law, following due process. The Tribunal expected the assessee to be compliant and cooperate with the department. In light of the assessee's submission that his authorized representative had died and he was an illiterate farmer, and his son was now digitally literate, the Tribunal decided to set aside the impugned order and remand the matter back to the Assessing Officer (AO) for passing a fresh order on merits. The assessee was directed to provide full and complete details, including updated contact information, and to attend hearings and file replies as sought by the AO. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the appeal filed by the Revenue was devoid of merits and liable to be dismissed. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed his individual return of income and the partnership firm had also filed its return of income with an audited balance sheet. The AO had ignored the conversion of the proprietary concern into a partnership and then back to proprietorship, wrongly adding the entire bank account receipts of the partnership firm to the assessee's individual income. The CIT(A) had deleted the addition after a detailed analysis of the partnership firm's ITR, audited balance sheet, cash book, and bank passbook. The CIT-DR could not produce any contrary documents to prove that the bank account receipts belonged to the assessee in his individual capacity. Therefore, the findings of the CIT(A) were upheld, and the addition was not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) made contradictory findings by first condoning the delay of 25 days in filing the appeal and then, in the concluding part of the same order, declining to condone the delay. This "hot and cold" approach is legally unsustainable. Furthermore, the Ld. CIT(A) reproduced the assessee's written submissions but did not adjudicate on the merits of the case. Consequently, the order passed by the Ld. CIT(A) was set aside. The Tribunal directed the Ld. CIT(A) to provide the assessee with a proper opportunity of hearing and then pass a fresh order on the merits of the case. The Tribunal explicitly stated that it was not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and left it open for the Ld. CIT(A) to adjudicate in accordance with the law. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that nothing in Section 12A or 12AB bars a fresh application after an earlier one has been rejected. The ITAT's previous order dated 06.02.2024 did not examine the genuineness of activities but was based on the Assessee not pursuing the earlier application, thus settling the fate of that specific application but not the facts on which it was based. The impugned order, therefore, proceeded on a wrong premise. Regarding genuineness, the CIT(E)'s findings were considered unresolved queries. Deficiencies like missing ledgers, beneficiary details, and bills were capable of being cured. The Tribunal noted that the enquiry was compressed, and neither side had a fair occasion to complete it. Consequently, the impugned orders were set aside, and the applications dated 30.09.2025 (for registration) and 27.11.2025 (for 80G approval) were restored to the file of the learned CIT(E) for a fresh decision after affording the Assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The CIT(E) was given a free hand to examine all aspects, including registration under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959, on which the Tribunal expressed no opinion. The observation regarding cancellation of provisional registration was also set aside. The grounds of appeal were allowed to this extent.
The provided text is an excerpt and does not contain the Tribunal's decision or reasoning. It only states the facts and the issues raised by the appeals. Therefore, the findings on each issue, the reasoning, the ratio decidendi, and any operative directions are not available in this portion of the judgment. No part of the judgment has been expressly left undecided as the decision itself is not present.
The provided text is an excerpt and does not contain the Tribunal's decision or reasoning. It only states the facts and the issues raised by the appeals. Therefore, the findings on each issue, the reasoning, the ratio decidendi, and any operative directions are not available in this portion of the judgment. No part of the judgment has been expressly left undecided as the decision itself is not present.
The provided text is an excerpt and does not contain the Tribunal's decision or reasoning. It only states the facts and the issues raised by the appeals. Therefore, the findings on each issue, the reasoning, the ratio decidendi, and any operative directions are not available in this portion of the judgment. No part of the judgment has been expressly left undecided as the decision itself is not present.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order of the CIT(A) was bad in law and a violation of the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had issued a notice on 07.10.2025 calling upon the assessee to file a condonation petition, but passed the impugned order on 15.10.2025, which was received by the assessee on 17.10.2025. This provided insufficient time for the assessee to file the application. The Tribunal also observed that the "Impugned Assessment Order" was passed under section 144/147 and had not been adjudicated on merits. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the "Impugned Order" and remanded the matter back to the file of the AO for de novo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal also condoned the delay in filing the first appeal before the CIT(A), considering the small amount of delay and the desire for a meritorious disposal. The assessee was cautioned for its approach in not filing the condonation petition promptly.
The Tribunal held that the "Impugned Order" passed by the CIT(A) was indeed ex-parte and was passed without affording the assessee an opportunity of being heard. This conclusion was based on the fact that the notices issued under section 250 of the Act were sent to incorrect email addresses (dmittalca@yahoo.com and dmittalca077386@gmail.com) instead of the address provided by the assessee in Form 35 (cagoyal0734@gmail.com). Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the "Impugned Order" and remanded the case back to the CIT(A) for a de novo (fresh) adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to pass a speaking and well-reasoned order after affording the assessee a proper opportunity to be heard. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the additions made by the AO or the applicability of sections 69A and 115BBE, as the matter was remitted back.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the assessee's books of account and the subsequent addition were unjustified and bad in law. The Tribunal noted that the assessee maintained regular books of account, which were audited and supported by various documentary evidences, including quantitative details of purchases, sales, and gratuity computations. The primary reason for rejection was the decline in the GP ratio from 30.47% to 3.64%. However, the Tribunal, relying on its own decisions in Arvind Kumar Singhavi and ACIT v/s Anant Commodities, and the Gujarat High Court's decision in CIT v. Symphony Comfort System Ltd., held that a mere decline in GP ratio, without specific defects or discrepancies pointed out in the books of account, is not a sufficient ground to reject the books or make an addition. The Tribunal observed that the AO himself noted the industry standard GP ratio to be between 10% to 15%, and the assessee's GP of 12.62% fell within this range. The Tribunal also considered the reasons provided by the assessee for the GP decline, such as increased raw material prices and rejection of goods by the Electricity Board, which were ignored by the AO. Therefore, the addition of Rs. 17,47,012/- was deleted.