52 orders · Page 1 of 2
The Tribunal held that the penalty under section 271AAB was wrongly imposed as the additional income was voluntarily declared by the assessee in response to a notice under section 153A, and there was no incriminating material found during the search to suggest concealment.
For AYs 2009-10 and 2012-13, the Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings were invalid due to defective show-cause notices. The notices issued by the AO failed to specify the exact charge of default, either concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income, thereby violating the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal relied on the decisions in Pr. CIT-I vs. Kulwant Singh Bhatia and CIT vs. S.S.A. Emerald Meadows, which held that such vague notices render the penalty proceedings void ab initio. Consequently, the penalty orders for these AYs were quashed on legal grounds without examining the merits. For AY 2010-11, the Tribunal rejected the assessee's request for condonation of delay. The Tribunal found that the assessee's custodial period (21.03.2021 to 29.11.2021) expired long before the CIT(A)'s order (20.05.2023) and the filing of the appeal (31.01.2025), making the custody argument for the delay unmeritorious. Furthermore, the revenue demonstrated that multiple hearing notices were sent to the assessee's email IDs, including one of the AR. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee failed to establish a sufficient cause for the inordinate delay of 562 days and dismissed the appeal as time-barred. The ratio decidendi for AYs 2009-10 and 2012-13 is that a penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be sustained if the show-cause notice is vague and does not specify the exact charge, violating natural justice. For AY 2010-11, the ratio is that an inordinate delay in filing an appeal will not be condoned without a proven sufficient cause, especially when the stated reasons are found to be unsubstantiated.
The Tribunal decided to condone the delay in filing the appeal. It reasoned that Section 253(5) of the Act empowers the ITAT to admit an appeal after the prescribed time. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition Vs Mst. Katiji and others, the Tribunal emphasized preferring substantial justice over technical considerations and adopting a justice-oriented approach. Regarding the penalty, the Tribunal held that where successive notices are issued by the AO seeking the same information, it does not multiply the default but constitutes a single default. This view is supported by various decisions, including a recent one by the ITAT, Pune Bench. Therefore, the Tribunal confirmed the penalty for the first non-compliance and deleted the penalty for subsequent non-compliances. The penalty levied under Section 271(1)(b) was restricted to one default, confirming a penalty of Rs. 10,000/- and deleting the remaining Rs. 40,000/-. The appeal was partly allowed.
For AYs 2009-10 and 2012-13, the Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings were invalid due to defective show-cause notices. The notices issued by the AO failed to specify the exact charge of default, either concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income, thereby violating the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal relied on the decisions in Pr. CIT-I vs. Kulwant Singh Bhatia and CIT vs. S.S.A. Emerald Meadows, which held that such vague notices render the penalty proceedings void ab initio. Consequently, the penalty orders for these AYs were quashed on legal grounds without examining the merits. For AY 2010-11, the Tribunal rejected the assessee's request for condonation of delay. The Tribunal found that the assessee's custodial period (21.03.2021 to 29.11.2021) expired long before the CIT(A)'s order (20.05.2023) and the filing of the appeal (31.01.2025), making the custody argument for the delay unmeritorious. Furthermore, the revenue demonstrated that multiple hearing notices were sent to the assessee's email IDs, including one of the AR. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee failed to establish a sufficient cause for the inordinate delay of 562 days and dismissed the appeal as time-barred. The ratio decidendi for AYs 2009-10 and 2012-13 is that a penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be sustained if the show-cause notice is vague and does not specify the exact charge, violating natural justice. For AY 2010-11, the ratio is that an inordinate delay in filing an appeal will not be condoned without a proven sufficient cause, especially when the stated reasons are found to be unsubstantiated.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal was condoned. The Tribunal found 'sufficient cause' for the delay based on the assessee's explanation and in the absence of contrary material. It relied on Section 253(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which empowers the ITAT to admit an appeal after the prescribed time if there is a sufficient cause. The Tribunal also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition Vs Mst. Katiji and others, emphasizing a justice-oriented approach when substantial justice and technical considerations conflict. The Tribunal decided to remand the matter back to the Assessing Officer (AO) for fresh adjudication. This decision was based on the principle of natural justice and the understanding that no prejudice would be caused to the revenue. The AO was directed to provide a necessary opportunity of hearing to the assessee and pass an appropriate order, uninfluenced by the earlier order. The assessee was directed to remain vigilant and ensure participation in hearings, failing which the AO would be at liberty to pass an order in accordance with law. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the levy and calculation of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) are intrinsically linked to the additions made in the assessment order. If the additions themselves do not subsist, then neither the levy of penalty nor its calculation has any basis. The Tribunal found no merit in the Revenue's submission that the penalties should survive pending the Revenue's quantum appeals before the Hon'ble High Court. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A)'s order deleting the penalties, finding no infirmity or fallacy. Therefore, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s orders and dismissed the Revenue's appeals. However, the Tribunal clarified that if the Revenue succeeds in its pending appeals before the Hon'ble High Court, the Assessing Officer would be at liberty to re-initiate penalty proceedings as per the relevant provisions of the Act, in accordance with the outcome of the High Court's judgment.
The Tribunal acknowledged the principle of natural justice and the potential for prejudice to the revenue. Considering the submissions, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication, providing the assessee with a necessary opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal, finding that the AR and DR were 'Ad idem' (in agreement), set aside the impugned order. The matter was remanded back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication on a de novo basis, directing the assessee to cooperate fully.
For AYs 2009-10 and 2012-13, the Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings were invalid due to defective show-cause notices. The notices issued by the AO failed to specify the exact charge of default, either concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income, thereby violating the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal relied on the decisions in Pr. CIT-I vs. Kulwant Singh Bhatia and CIT vs. S.S.A. Emerald Meadows, which held that such vague notices render the penalty proceedings void ab initio. Consequently, the penalty orders for these AYs were quashed on legal grounds without examining the merits. For AY 2010-11, the Tribunal rejected the assessee's request for condonation of delay. The Tribunal found that the assessee's custodial period (21.03.2021 to 29.11.2021) expired long before the CIT(A)'s order (20.05.2023) and the filing of the appeal (31.01.2025), making the custody argument for the delay unmeritorious. Furthermore, the revenue demonstrated that multiple hearing notices were sent to the assessee's email IDs, including one of the AR. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee failed to establish a sufficient cause for the inordinate delay of 562 days and dismissed the appeal as time-barred. The ratio decidendi for AYs 2009-10 and 2012-13 is that a penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be sustained if the show-cause notice is vague and does not specify the exact charge, violating natural justice. For AY 2010-11, the ratio is that an inordinate delay in filing an appeal will not be condoned without a proven sufficient cause, especially when the stated reasons are found to be unsubstantiated.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of deductions claimed under Section 80C and 80TTA by the AO did not fall within the definition of 'undisclosed income' as defined in Section 271AAB. Therefore, the penalty imposed under Section 271AAB was not sustainable.
The Tribunal, finding that the AR and DR were 'Ad idem' (in agreement), set aside the impugned order. The matter was remanded back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication on a de novo basis, directing the assessee to cooperate fully.
The Tribunal held that the levy and calculation of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) are intrinsically linked to the additions made in the assessment order. If the additions are deleted, the penalty cannot sustain. Therefore, the appeals of the revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the case back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh assessment on a de novo basis. The assessee was directed to file all supporting documents before the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal remanded the matter back to the CIT(E). It directed the CIT(E) to consider the resolution passed by the assessee regarding dissolution and to re-evaluate the time-bar issue based on ITAT precedents.
The Tribunal, finding that the AR and DR were 'Ad idem' (in agreement), set aside the impugned order. The matter was remanded back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication on a de novo basis, directing the assessee to cooperate fully.
The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee on both appeals. For ITA No. 387/Ind/2025, concerning the penalty under Section 271(1)(b), the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submission that the non-compliance with the notices was due to the death of her counsel and the subsequent negligence of the persons handling his office. Citing Section 273B, which allows for waiver of penalty if a reasonable cause is proven, the Tribunal concluded that there was a reasonable cause for the non-compliance. Consequently, the penalty of Rs. 30,000 was deleted. For ITA No. 388/Ind/2025, regarding the penalty under Section 271F for non-filing of the return, the Tribunal accepted the assessee's argument that her total income did not exceed the maximum amount not chargeable to tax. As there was no compulsory obligation to file a return under Section 139(1), the penalty under Section 271F was not attracted. The penalty of Rs. 5,000 was accordingly deleted. The ratio decidendi is that genuine reasons stemming from circumstances beyond the assessee's direct control, such as the death of a legal representative and subsequent administrative lapses, can constitute a reasonable cause for non-compliance, and that penalty for non-filing of return is not applicable if no statutory obligation exists.
The Tribunal held in favour of the assessee on both appeals. For ITA No. 387/Ind/2025, concerning the penalty under Section 271(1)(b), the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submission that the non-compliance with the notices was due to the death of her counsel and the subsequent negligence of the persons handling his office. Citing Section 273B, which allows for waiver of penalty if a reasonable cause is proven, the Tribunal concluded that there was a reasonable cause for the non-compliance. Consequently, the penalty of Rs. 30,000 was deleted. For ITA No. 388/Ind/2025, regarding the penalty under Section 271F for non-filing of the return, the Tribunal accepted the assessee's argument that her total income did not exceed the maximum amount not chargeable to tax. As there was no compulsory obligation to file a return under Section 139(1), the penalty under Section 271F was not attracted. The penalty of Rs. 5,000 was accordingly deleted. The ratio decidendi is that genuine reasons stemming from circumstances beyond the assessee's direct control, such as the death of a legal representative and subsequent administrative lapses, can constitute a reasonable cause for non-compliance, and that penalty for non-filing of return is not applicable if no statutory obligation exists.
The Tribunal held that the levy and calculation of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) are intrinsically linked to the additions made in the assessment order. If the additions are deleted, the penalty cannot sustain. Therefore, the appeals of the revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had a 'sufficient cause' for the delay in filing the appeal due to the medical complications of their counsel. The Tribunal condoned the delay and admitted the appeal.
The Tribunal, considering the submissions of both parties, the principle of natural justice, and the fact that no prejudice would be caused to the revenue, decided to remand the matter back to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal held that the assessee's appeal is allowed for statistical purposes. The remand is subject to the assessee paying a cost of Rs. 5,000/- to the "Prime Minister National Relief Fund" and producing the receipt to the AO. The AO is directed to provide the assessee with an opportunity of hearing and pass an appropriate order uninfluenced by the previous order. The assessee is also directed to be vigilant and ensure participation in hearings, avoiding unnecessary adjournments. The AO is at liberty to pass an appropriate order in accordance with law if the assessee fails to comply.
The Tribunal, after hearing both parties, decided to remand the matter back to the Assessing Officer (AO) for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal acknowledged the principle of natural justice and noted that no prejudice would be caused to the revenue by restoring the matter to the AO. The AO was directed to provide the assessee with an opportunity of hearing, consider the submissions made in the Written Synopsis, and any other submissions the assessee might present. The assessee was also directed to be vigilant and ensure participation in hearings without seeking unnecessary adjournments. The Tribunal stated that the AO would be at liberty to pass an appropriate order in accordance with the law if the assessee failed to comply. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal restored the appeals to the Commissioner (Appeals) for fresh adjudication. This was because the protective additions were linked to substantive additions in the son's case, and the CIT(A) had dismissed the assessee's appeals for non-prosecution without proper adjudication.
The Tribunal allowed the appeals to be withdrawn as the assessee is not willing to pursue them, having opted for the 'Vivad se Vishwas' Scheme. The assessee was granted liberty to seek recall of the order if their scheme application is rejected.
The Tribunal allowed the appeals to be withdrawn as the assessee is not willing to pursue them, having opted for the 'Vivad se Vishwas' Scheme. The assessee was granted liberty to seek recall of the order if their scheme application is rejected.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee failed to provide all necessary documents, it was important to provide one last opportunity to fulfill the requirements. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the case back to the CIT(E) for de novo consideration.
The Tribunal held that the late fee of Rs. 40,231 levied under Section 234E cannot be imposed for the delay in filing the TDS statement for the Assessment Year 2013-14, as the default period was prior to 01.06.2015. The Tribunal noted that the amendment to Section 200A of the Act, which inserted clause (c) allowing the creation of a demand for late fee, was effective from 01.06.2015. Prior to this date, there was no specific provision in law empowering the revenue to create such a demand for late fee under Section 200A. The Tribunal relied on its own previous decisions in ITA No. 914&917/Ind/2024 (Assessment Year 2013-14) in the case of M/s Supreme Transport Co. V/s ITO TDS-II, Indore, and the ITAT Delhi's decision in Prakash Industries Ltd. v. DCIT. The Tribunal acknowledged conflicting decisions from various High Courts on the issue but, following the principle of favouring the assessee in case of judicial controversy in the absence of a jurisdictional High Court decision, held that the CIT(A) was not justified in confirming the late fee. Consequently, the late fee of Rs. 40,231 levied under Section 234E was directed to be deleted. As the late fee was deleted, the consequential interest of Rs. 24,186 levied under Section 220(2) was upheld as the ground for interest was not pressed and the primary demand was confirmed. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) in part.
The Tribunal noted that the protective additions were intrinsically linked to the substantive additions in the son's case. Since the appeals of the son were still pending, the Tribunal restored the assessee's appeals to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication along with the son's appeals.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee failed to provide all necessary documents, it was important to provide one last opportunity to fulfill the requirements. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the case back to the CIT(E) for de novo consideration.
The Tribunal held that the ITAT, Indore Bench does not have jurisdiction over Raipur, where the original assessment order was passed. Therefore, the appeal and cross-objection are not maintainable before this bench.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order should be set aside and the matter remanded back to the CIT(A) for a fresh adjudication. The assessee was directed to pay a cost of Rs. 5000/- to the PM Relief Fund.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had filed a reply, which was acknowledged by the CIT(E), but deemed incomplete. Considering the assessee's willingness to provide further submissions, the Tribunal restored the case to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed a reply and that the CIT(E) had acknowledged it. Considering the interest of justice, the Tribunal restored the case to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication, directing that the CIT(E) should provide a necessary opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal after considering the submissions of the assessee and noting that the revenue did not object. On merits, the Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's submission that the CIT(A) had decided the first appeal ex-parte because the assessee failed to make submissions despite opportunities. The assessee contended that the grounds raised required adjudication on merit as per Section 250(6) of the Act, which mandates that the CIT(A)'s order must state the points for determination, the decision, and the reasons. The assessee expressed willingness to make a proper representation before the CIT(A) if given an opportunity and prayed for a remand. The revenue agreed with this prayer, requesting the assessee to represent its case diligently. The Tribunal, considering the principle of natural justice and that no prejudice would be caused to the revenue, remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to provide an opportunity of hearing to the assessee and pass an order uninfluenced by the earlier order. The assessee was directed to be vigilant and ensure participation in hearings, failing which the CIT(A) could pass an order in accordance with law. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT's second revision order was based on an earlier revision order that had already been quashed by the ITAT. Therefore, the PCIT could not have passed the impugned order. The delay in filing the appeal was condoned.
The Tribunal noted that both the assessee's AR and the revenue's DR were in agreement that the impugned order of the CIT(A) should be set aside and the matter remanded back to the CIT(A) for a de novo consideration. The Tribunal observed that the Ld. DR fairly conceded that there was no mention of a remand report in the impugned order and that the matter should, in fairness, be remanded to the Ld. CIT(A) for the assessee to appear and cooperate. The Ld. AR also concurred with this course of action, requesting an opportunity for the assessee to produce all information and documents. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the case back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) on a de novo basis. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that both the assessee's Authorized Representative (AR) and the Revenue's Departmental Representative (DR) were in agreement that the impugned order should be set aside and the matter remanded back to the Assessing Officer (AO) for a fresh assessment on merits. The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's contentions regarding the ex-parte nature of the assessment, short notices, and potential procedural infirmities. The Revenue did not object to a remand. Therefore, the Tribunal found it appropriate to set aside the impugned order passed by the CIT(A) and the assessment order passed by the AO. The case was remanded back to the file of the AO for a denovo assessment. The assessee was directed to cooperate with the department and provide all necessary information and documents to the AO to enable a correct computation and assessment of total income. The AO was directed to pass a reasoned and speaking order. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal upheld the reopening of assessment and the addition of unexplained investments. It found that the assessee failed to provide satisfactory explanations for the source of these investments, placing the burden of proof on the assessee.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to dismiss the assessee's appeal. The assessee failed to provide satisfactory explanations for the nature and source of investments, leading to the addition of these amounts to their total income.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) should not have dismissed the appeal solely on the grounds of delay without considering the merits. Both parties agreed that the matter should be remanded to the AO for a fresh assessment.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) should not have dismissed the appeal solely on the grounds of delay without considering the merits. Both parties agreed that the matter should be remanded to the AO for a fresh assessment.
The Tribunal noted the possibility of communication gaps and the lack of effective compliance with Section 250(6) of the Act in the lower appellate order. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the appeal was set aside and restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal considered the rival submissions and perused the impugned order and the paper book. It noted that the CIT(E) had given two opportunities, and the assessee had admittedly filed a reply, which was acknowledged by the CIT(E). However, the CIT(E) deemed the information incomplete and rejected the applications. The Tribunal found that the assessee had filed a comprehensive paper book and was ready to make further submissions. To grant substantial justice, the Tribunal agreed with the assessee's request to restore the cases to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(E) was directed to provide necessary opportunities, which the assessee was expected to avail, and to pass a judicious order without being influenced by the earlier decision. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Exemption) erred in rejecting the application and cancelling the provisional registration without proper reasoning and adherence to principles of natural justice. The sale of incidental items was not considered a commercial activity disentitling the assessee from registration.
The Tribunal considered the rival submissions and perused the impugned order and the paper book. It noted that the CIT(E) had given two opportunities, and the assessee had admittedly filed a reply, which was acknowledged by the CIT(E). However, the CIT(E) deemed the information incomplete and rejected the applications. The Tribunal found that the assessee had filed a comprehensive paper book and was ready to make further submissions. To grant substantial justice, the Tribunal agreed with the assessee's request to restore the cases to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication. The CIT(E) was directed to provide necessary opportunities, which the assessee was expected to avail, and to pass a judicious order without being influenced by the earlier decision. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the Notice of Demand issued under Section 156 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in the name of the assessee/appellant, Harish Kumar Chandnani, instead of the Society, is invalid and unsustainable in law. The reasoning was based on a careful consideration of Section 156, which mandates that when any sum is payable in consequence of an order passed under the Act, the AO shall serve a notice of demand upon the assessee. The Tribunal found that the identity of the assessee in the assessment order and the corresponding Notice of Demand must be identical. There is no provision in Section 156 that allows the AO to issue a Notice of Demand in the name of a person other than the one against whom the assessment order was made. The learned Departmental Representative for the revenue could not demonstrate any other provision in the Income Tax Act, 1961, to justify the AO's action. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the impugned Notice of Demand. The Tribunal clarified that it was not expressing any opinion on the assessment order passed in the name of the Society, and the AO may, if permissible, issue a fresh Notice of Demand in the name of the Society. The delay in filing the appeal was condoned.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's objections regarding the cost of acquisition and the nature of agricultural land, remanding these issues to the AO. The issue of cash deposit was also remanded for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the appeal was filed beyond the limitation period and the grounds for condonation of delay were not convincing. The assessee's claim of health issues affecting the delay was contradicted by the timeline.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, subject to payment of cost, considering the assessee's meritorious case and the established practice in a subsequent year. The appeal was remanded to the AO for fresh adjudication after providing due opportunity to the assessee.
The Tribunal decided to remand the issue of the addition of Rs. 10,34,615/- on account of credit card payments to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO) for fresh adjudication. The reasoning was based on the assessee's submission that these payments were for the employer's business and were reimbursed, and that the assessee possessed documentary evidence. The Revenue did not object to this course of action. The Tribunal directed the AO to verify the assessee's evidences judiciously. The ratio decidendi is that where an assessee claims expenses were incurred for an employer and subsequently reimbursed, and the revenue does not object to verification, a remand for fresh adjudication with verification of evidence is appropriate. The Tribunal allowed the appeal for statistical purposes.
On the issue of delay, the Tribunal held that the assessee had demonstrated a 'sufficient cause' for the 23-day delay, citing the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition Vs Mst. Katiji and others, which emphasizes a justice-oriented approach. The Tribunal condoned the delay and admitted the appeal. Regarding Ground No. 5, concerning the Rs. 10,00,000/- bonus expenditure, the Tribunal agreed in principle that disallowance under Section 43B is not attracted if payment is made by the due date. However, since the assessee presented additional evidence (statement of bonus working, date-wise payments, payment vouchers, and auditor's affidavit) requiring verification by the AO, the Tribunal remanded this ground to the AO for the limited purpose of verifying these evidences. The AO was directed to delete the disallowance after verification. Thus, Ground No. 5 was allowed for statistical purposes. For Grounds No. 6 & 7, relating to the addition of Rs. 86,682/- on account of other incomes, the Tribunal found that the assessee had successfully demonstrated that these incomes were already offered in the ITR and tax paid thereon. As the Revenue could not object to this submission, the Tribunal directed the AO to delete the addition. Accordingly, Grounds No. 6 & 7 were allowed.