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24 orders · Page 1 of 1
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a co-operative society (which is not a co-operative bank) from investments in co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). The Tribunal relied on various High Court and ITAT decisions.
The Tribunal noted that both the assessee's counsel and the revenue's representative agreed that the CIT(A)'s order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice due to a lack of proper hearing opportunities. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal by the assessee due to valid reasons like family health issues. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)'s order was dismissed for non-prosecution without adjudication on merits. The Tribunal held that to ensure natural justice, the case should be remanded to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that both the assessee's counsel and the revenue's representative agreed that the CIT(A)'s order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice due to a lack of proper hearing opportunities. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, agreeing that the assessee had discharged the initial onus regarding the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the loans. The Tribunal followed its previous decisions which held that the lender companies were not bogus entities.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, agreeing that the assessee had discharged the initial onus regarding the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the loans. The Tribunal followed its previous decisions which held that the lender companies were not bogus entities.
The Tribunal held that the AO provided a very short and inadequate opportunity for the assessee to explain the cash deposit, violating principles of natural justice. The CIT(A) also failed to properly investigate the assessee's claim regarding prior cash withdrawal.
The Tribunal noted that the AO disallowed the second component of Section 36(1)(viia) deduction due to lack of details regarding rural branches and advances. While the CIT(A) granted relief based on assessee's submissions, these details were not verified by the AO. Therefore, the Tribunal remanded the issue to the AO for fresh verification and adjudication.
The tribunal held that while interest on the delayed re-deposit is justified as it compensates for the loss to revenue, the late fee under section 234E is not leviable. This is because the initial deposit and filing were within the due date, and the second filing was due to a mistake without causing loss to the revenue.
The Tribunal held that the filing of the audit report in Form 10CCB after the due date but before the assessment order is a procedural requirement and not mandatory. Therefore, the deduction under Section 80IA cannot be denied solely on this ground.
The Tribunal held that the purchase of shares occurred on 02.07.2010, which falls in AY 2011-12, not the assessment year under consideration (AY 2012-13). Therefore, the addition made in AY 2012-13 was not justified.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, noting that the lender company was found to be genuine in other cases and that the assessee had provided documentary evidence of loan repayment and interest payment. The Tribunal also noted a denial of natural justice as the AO relied on a statement without providing an opportunity for cross-examination.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the deduction under Section 35AD. The Tribunal found that the AO's approach of disallowing the deduction solely on the ground of not furnishing Form 10CCB within the due date of filing the return of income was unsustainable. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. G.M. Knitting Industries and the jurisdictional High Court's decision in CIT vs. Panama Chemical Works, which held that if the prescribed audit report is filed before the completion of assessment, the deduction cannot be denied merely because it was not filed along with the return of income. The Tribunal rejected the revenue's contention that these precedents were not applicable to fresh assessment proceedings initiated under Section 263, stating that once an assessment is set aside, the subsequent proceedings assume the character of a fresh assessment. Since the assessee furnished Form 10CCB before the completion of the fresh assessment, it constituted sufficient compliance. The Tribunal also noted that the claim was disclosed in the return and Form 3CD, and depreciation was foregone, demonstrating the bona fide nature of the claim. Therefore, the grounds raised by the revenue were dismissed, and the order of the CIT(A) granting relief was upheld.
The Tribunal held that the matter should be remanded to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication. The reasoning was based on the principle of natural justice and the fact that no prejudice would be caused to the revenue. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had passed an ex-parte order due to the assessee not appearing, which was attributed to notices being sent to an incorrect email address. The assessee also argued that the original assessment order by the AO was ex-parte for similar reasons. The Tribunal directed the AO to provide the assessee with an opportunity of hearing and pass an appropriate order, uninfluenced by the earlier order. The assessee was also directed to be vigilant and participate in hearings without seeking unnecessary adjournments. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 382 days in filing the appeal. The Tribunal found that the assessee had a "sufficient cause" for the delay, as explained by the learned AR. The Tribunal noted that notices from the CIT(A) were sent to various email IDs, with some notices (S.No. 4 to 8) being sent to the assessee's provided email ID "shailendrasolanki123@gmail.com", while other notices and the impugned order were sent to "client_rsbco@yahoo.com". This discrepancy prevented the assessee from making timely submissions and filing the appeal. The Tribunal relied on Section 253(5) of the Act, which empowers ITAT to admit an appeal after the prescribed time if there is a "sufficient cause", and the Supreme Court's decision in Collector, Land Acquisition Vs Mst. Katiji and others, emphasizing a justice-oriented approach. The Tribunal admitted the appeal and proceeded with the hearing. The Tribunal also noted that crucial aspects of the transaction, specifically the seller's holding of shares on the date of purchase consideration payment and the mode of payment (cash vs. cheque), required fresh factual verification by the AO. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside on these issues, and the matter was restored to the AO for fresh adjudication.
Both the learned Authorized Representative (AR) for the assessee and the learned Senior Departmental Representative (Sr. DR) for the revenue were ad idem that the impugned orders should be set aside and the matters remanded back to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO). The Tribunal agreed with this consensus. The reasoning was that a fresh adjudication on a denovo basis would allow the AO to consider the entire gamut of the case from all angles. The Tribunal set aside the impugned orders and remanded the cases back to the AO. The assessee was directed to fully cooperate with the department and not seek adjournments on flimsy grounds. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal concerning section 80G(5), finding sufficient cause. Both appeals were remanded to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication, directing the assessee to present its case properly.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the second appeal, finding a sufficient cause and no negligence or mala fide intention. The matters were remanded back to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication, directing the CIT(E) to provide an opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that both parties agreed for a remand of the matters to the AO for fresh adjudication. This was in line with a previous order of the Tribunal concerning other assessment years of the same assessee.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the first appeal after reviewing the material and hearing both parties, finding sufficient cause. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the case back to the CIT(A) to decide the delay aspect and thereafter the merits.
The Tribunal held that the penalty order was time-barred under Section 275(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Rajasthan High Court, which was upheld by the Supreme Court, stating that penalty proceedings under Section 271D are independent of assessment proceedings for limitation purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the first appeal after reviewing the material and hearing both parties, finding sufficient cause. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the case back to the CIT(A) to decide the delay aspect and thereafter the merits.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 79 days in filing the appeal, finding the reasons to be bonafide. On the substantive issues, the Tribunal observed that the impugned assessment order was passed under section 144 of the Act. The assessee's counsel submitted that the ROI, replies, and other submissions made before the AO, as placed in the paper book, should be considered afresh. The Tribunal noted that the Ld. DR for the revenue agreed that these materials could be considered afresh in de novo proceedings. In light of these facts and circumstances, the Tribunal deemed it fit to set aside the impugned order and remand the case back to the file of the AO on a de novo basis. The AO was directed to pass a fresh order in accordance with law after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing and considering all relevant information, material, and documents in a time-bound manner. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee wished to withdraw the appeal against the order rejecting the application for registration under Section 80G of the Income Tax Act, 1961. With the consent of both parties, the appeal was allowed to be withdrawn.