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71 orders · Page 1 of 2
The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of telescoping the surrendered income with the cash deposits in the bank account, as the cash deposits were from the maturity proceeds of hundis. The addition made by the AO for unexplained cash credit was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of telescoping the surrendered income with the cash deposits in the bank account, as the cash deposits were from the maturity proceeds of hundis. The addition made by the AO for unexplained cash credit was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of telescoping the surrendered income with the cash deposits in the bank account, as the cash deposits were from the maturity proceeds of hundis. The addition made by the AO for unexplained cash credit was deleted.
The Tribunal held that the Commissioner was justified in invoking Section 263 as the AO's inquiry was perfunctory and the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. The AO had not conducted proper investigations into the revised claims.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act, which enabled the levy of fees under Section 234E during processing, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, fees could not be levied for statements processed before this date.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act, which enabled the levy of fees under Section 234E during processing, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, fees could not be levied for statements processed before this date.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act, which enabled the levy of fees under Section 234E during processing, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, fees could not be levied for statements processed before this date.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act, which enabled the levy of fees under Section 234E during processing, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, fees could not be levied for statements processed before this date.
The Tribunal held that before the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act effective from June 1, 2015, the revenue authorities did not have the power to levy late fees under Section 234E while processing TDS statements. Therefore, such levies for periods prior to the amendment are invalid.
The Tribunal held that prior to the amendment of Section 200A effective from June 1, 2015, the revenue authorities did not have the power to levy late fees under Section 234E while processing TDS statements. Therefore, the levy of such fees for statements processed before this date was not justified.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act, which enabled the levy of fees under Section 234E during the processing of TDS statements, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, fees could not be levied for statements processed before this date.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act, which enabled the levy of fees under Section 234E during processing, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, fees could not be levied for statements processed before this date.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act, which enabled the levy of late fees under Section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, fees could not be levied for statements processed before this date.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Act, which enabled the levy of fees under Section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, such fees could not be levied for statements processed before this date.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Act, which enabled the levy of fees under Section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, late fees could not be levied for statements processed before this date.
The tribunal held that the appeals were defective due to the incorrect filing of a single appeal for multiple quarters. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed as unadmitted.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act, which enabled the levy of late fees under Section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, fees could not be levied for statements processed before this date.
The Tribunal held that before the amendment to Section 200A effective from June 1, 2015, the revenue authorities did not have the power to levy late fees under Section 234E during the processing of TDS statements under Section 200A. Therefore, the levy of such fees for statements processed prior to this amendment was not justified.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Act, which enabled the levy of fees under Section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, late fees could not be levied for statements processed before this date.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act, which enabled the levy of late fees under Section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, fees could not be levied for statements processed before this date.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income Tax Act, which enabled the levy of late fees under Section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, fees could not be levied for statements processed before this date.
The tribunal held that the appeals were defective due to the incorrect filing of a single appeal for multiple quarters. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed as unadmitted.
The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Act, which enabled the levy of fees under Section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, late fees could not be levied for statements processed before this date.
The Tribunal found that the assessee did not appear before the AO and the CIT(A) did not obtain a remand report. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the issues were set aside to the AO for a fresh examination and denovo assessment.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the application for approval under Section 10(23C)(vi) solely on the ground that the assessee already possessed registration under Section 12AA was incorrect. The Tribunal referred to CBDT Circular No. 14 of 2015, which clarifies that Section 10(23C)(vi) does not prescribe registration under Section 12AA as a mandatory pre or post-condition. The circular states that Sections 11 and 10(23C) are parallel regimes that operate independently. The Tribunal also cited the jurisdictional High Court's decision in CIT V. Franciscan Clarist Society, which held that exemption cannot be denied merely relying on bye-laws without considering actual activities. The Tribunal reasoned that both provisions work independently, and having registration under Section 12AA does not preclude an assessee from obtaining approval under Section 10(23C)(vi), provided the conditions for the latter are met. The CIT(Exemption) should have focused on examining the activities undertaken by the assessee. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(Exemption) and restored the issue for fresh examination after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal noted that the registration under Section 12AA should not be a bar for granting approval under Section 10(23C)(vi).
The Tribunal held that there was no concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income as the expenses were debited to the Profit & Loss account. The disallowance under Section 14A was on an estimated basis, and no bonafide intention to conceal was evident.
The Tribunal noted a divergent view taken by the lower appellate authorities regarding protective and substantive assessments. To ensure justice and fair play, the ITAT set aside the impugned orders and remitted the appeals back to the CIT(A) for de novo decision.
The Tribunal noted a divergent view taken by the lower appellate authorities regarding protective and substantive assessments. To ensure justice and fair play, the ITAT set aside the impugned orders and remitted the appeals back to the CIT(A) for de novo decision.
The Tribunal noted a divergent view taken by the lower appellate authorities regarding protective and substantive assessments. To ensure justice and fair play, the ITAT set aside the impugned orders and remitted the appeals back to the CIT(A) for de novo decision.
The Tribunal noted a divergent view taken by the lower appellate authorities regarding protective and substantive assessments. To ensure justice and fair play, the ITAT set aside the impugned orders and remitted the appeals back to the CIT(A) for de novo decision.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was not given a proper and effective opportunity of hearing and the CIT(A) passed a one-sided order without considering the merits. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal set aside the orders of the lower authorities and restored the issue to the Assessing Officer. The AO was directed to verify if the interest was paid to the company and if the company had disclosed the income in its return.
The Tribunal held that although the surrendered income was business income, since the assessee could not offer any explanation for its source, it was rightly taxed under Section 115BBE at the higher rate as income falling under Sections 68 to 69D.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's persistent absence indicated a lack of interest in pursuing the appeal. Therefore, the appeal could not be kept pending indefinitely and was liable to be dismissed.
The CIT(A) deleted the addition, holding that since the remuneration was not paid and the partnership deed was amended to withdraw such provisions, the addition on a notional basis was unjustified. The Tribunal affirmed the CIT(A)'s finding.
The Tribunal found the assessees' reasons for non-appearance and non-filing of evidence to be bona fide. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside, and the assessment was restored to the AO for a de novo assessment.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was not given a proper and effective opportunity of hearing. The CIT(A) did not pass a reasoned order on merits, which is not just. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the AO erred in not referring the valuation of the property to the Departmental Valuation Officer (DVO) as requested by the assessee. The addition made under Section 56(2)(vii)(b) was therefore confirmed without proper valuation.
The ITAT found that the assessee was not given a proper opportunity of hearing and the CIT(A) did not pass a reasoned order on merits. The ITAT quashed the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back for a fresh decision after providing a proper opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal found the assessees' reasons for non-appearance and non-filing of evidence to be bona fide. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside, and the assessment was restored to the AO for a de novo assessment.
The CIT(A) deleted the addition, holding that since the remuneration was not paid and the partnership deed was amended to withdraw such provisions, the addition on a notional basis was unjustified. The Tribunal affirmed the CIT(A)'s finding.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was not given a proper opportunity of hearing and the CIT(A) did not pass a reasoned order. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside.
The ITAT found that the assessee was not given a proper and effective opportunity of hearing and the CIT(A) passed a non-speaking order. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was not given a proper opportunity of being heard and the CIT(A) had not passed a reasoned order. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was not given a proper and effective opportunity of hearing and the CIT(A) did not pass a reasoned order on merits. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) was set aside.