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The High Court noted that the petitioner was unrepresented despite two pass-overs. The learned counsel for the respondents informed the Court that a re-assessment order for assessment year 2018-19 was passed during the pendency of the writ petition, and the petitioner had challenged this order in an appeal, which was dismissed on December 28, 2024. In view of this submission, the Court dismissed the writ petition, relegating the petitioner to the alternative remedy in accordance with law. The Court also granted liberty to the petitioner to file an application for recalling the order if there was any factual discrepancy in the statement made by the respondents' counsel. The primary reasoning for dismissal was the availability and exhaustion of the alternative appellate remedy, rendering the writ petition infructuous or inappropriate for adjudication.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petitions. The court held that the writ petitions were dismissed as withdrawn. The court granted the petitioner liberty to raise all the issues that were raised in the writ petitions before the appellate authority. No specific findings were made on the merits of the case as the petitions were withdrawn. The operative direction was the dismissal of the writ petitions as withdrawn with liberty to pursue the appellate remedy.
The Tribunal held that the order passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was liable to be quashed. The primary reasoning was that the assessee was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to file objections as mandated by Section 148A of the Act and the relevant departmental guidelines. The notice dated 19.03.2022 required a reply by 24.03.2022, which is only five days, falling short of the stipulated minimum of seven days. The corrigendum issued later did not rectify the procedural defect as it was a post-facto attempt to correct an error. Consequently, the impugned order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and the statutory requirements. The matter was remitted back to the respondents to decide the proceedings afresh in accordance with law, after providing an adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The petitioner was also granted liberty to file additional objections within two weeks of appearance.
The High Court allowed the writ petition, quashing the impugned notice dated 04.10.2024 issued under Section 271D of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court's decision was based on the principle that for penalty proceedings under Section 271D to be initiated, there must be a satisfaction recorded in the assessment order by the Assessing Officer. The Court found that the assessment order in this case did not contain such a satisfaction. The Court followed its own previous decision in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1102/2025 (Sunil Agrawal vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr.) and the Supreme Court's judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills [(2015) 379 ITR 521 (SC)]. The ratio decidendi is that the absence of recorded satisfaction in the assessment order vitiates the initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 271D. The operative direction was to quash the notice.
The High Court held that the appellant was not pressing the appeal and had requested liberty to file an appeal before the appropriate High Court. The Court granted this liberty and disposed of the appeal as not pressed. No substantive findings on income tax law were made, as the appeal was withdrawn before any adjudication on its merits. The ratio decidendi is that an appellant can withdraw their appeal before the High Court with liberty to approach the correct forum, provided the respondent does not object or the court deems it appropriate.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Tribunal's findings. It found no contributory negligence by the car driver, noting the FIR and charge-sheet were against the bus driver. The Court affirmed that Income Tax Returns are prima facie evidence of income unless rebutted, which was not done here. The finding regarding the vehicle's permit and the right of recovery granted to the Insurance Company was not revisited as the owner had not appealed.
The High Court allowed the writ petition, quashing the impugned orders and notice. The Tribunal found that the reassessment proceedings for assessment year 2015-16 were rendered time-barred. The reasoning was based on the fact that the limitation period for the assessment year 2015-16 expired on 31.03.2022, whereas the notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was issued on 30.07.2022. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India & ors. Vs. Rajeev Bansal (2024) 469 ITR 46, which supported the assessee's contention that the proceedings were beyond the statutory time limit. The Court deemed it unnecessary to address other issues raised in the petition, as the petition deserved acceptance on the sole ground of the reassessment being time-barred. The operative direction was to quash the impugned notices and orders.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order passed under Section 148-A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was not valid. The reasoning was that the objections raised by the petitioner-company had not been dealt with, and the request for supplying the material relied upon by the department was not considered. This failure to address the assessee's objections and provide the necessary material violated the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter back to the Assessing Officer (respondent No.1) to pass a fresh order after properly considering and dealing with all the objections raised by the petitioner. The operative direction was to allow the writ petition and direct the petitioner to appear before the respondent on 05.03.2025.
The High Court held that the appeal filed by the Revenue should be dismissed as withdrawn. The reasoning provided is based on the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant (Revenue) that the tax effect involved in the appeal was under Rs.2 Crores. Consequently, the Revenue had specific instructions to withdraw the appeal in accordance with circular No.9 of 2024 dated 17.09.2024. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. No specific issues from the ITAT order were decided on merits by the High Court, and no part of the ITAT order was upheld or set aside. The principle that can be derived is that appeals with a tax effect below a certain threshold, as stipulated by CBDT circulars, may be withdrawn by the Revenue.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer (AO) failed to follow the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 148A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The reasons annexed with the notice under Section 148A(b) were vague and did not mention the name of the bank, making it impossible for the assessee to respond effectively. The AO issued a notice to the bank and passed the order under Section 148A(d) without waiting for a reasonable time or making sufficient efforts to verify the facts from the bank, brushing aside the petitioner's objections. The Tribunal noted that the revenue did not deny the e-mails received from the bank confirming the closure of the petitioner's account and the non-existence of the mentioned account number. Furthermore, the revenue failed to provide any evidence to prima facie show that the bank account belonged to the petitioner, even before the High Court. The impugned order was quashed because the objections were not decided in accordance with Section 148A and the relevant guidelines. The writ petition was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was bereft of reasons and did not adequately consider the objections raised by the petitioner. The Court noted that the procedure prescribed under Section 148A and the departmental guidelines mandate that the Assessing Officer must consider the assessee's reply and pass a speaking order, thereby incorporating principles of natural justice. The Tribunal found that the impugned order merely stated that the petitioner's reply was not tenable because no income tax return was filed, without addressing the specific objections regarding exemption under Section 10(23C) and receipts below one crore. Consequently, the order was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the respondent to decide afresh in accordance with the law after providing an opportunity of hearing. The writ petition was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer is obligated to deal with the objections raised by the petitioner in accordance with law. The judgment noted that, as per the pleadings, the Assessing Officer was proceeding under Section 148 of the Act while ignoring the objections filed by the petitioner. The Tribunal disposed of the petition with a direction that the Assessing Officer, before proceeding further, must act in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. (supra). It was clarified that if the objections had already been decided, the order should be communicated to the petitioner within one week of receiving the certified copy of the order. The ratio decidendi is that a Section 148 notice requires the Assessing Officer to pass a speaking order disposing of the assessee's objections before proceeding with the assessment, upholding principles of natural justice and established Supreme Court precedent. The operative direction is for the Assessing Officer to comply with the GKN Driveshafts judgment.
The High Court quashed the order passed under Section 148A(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found that despite opportunities, the department failed to produce any document substantiating the validity of the service of the SCN or proving that the petitioner had provided the disputed email address. Consequently, the matter was remitted back to the respondent No.1 (Income Tax Officer, Ward 1, Jhunjhunu) to proceed in accordance with law pursuant to the SCN. The petitioner agreed not to raise the ground of limitation. The Court directed the petitioner's representative to appear before the respondent No.1 on 18.03.2025 at 11:00 A.M. to avoid further delay. The ratio decidendi is that the onus is on the revenue to prove valid service of statutory notices, especially when challenged, and reliance on unverified online general information is insufficient.
The High Court, without commenting on the merits of the case, disposed of the writ petition. It directed that in the event the petitioner deposits Rs. 10 Lakh within four weeks from the date of the order, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) shall decide the appeal on merits within three months thereafter. The Court also directed that no coercive measures shall be taken against the petitioner during the pendency of the appeal before the CIT(A), subject to the deposit of Rs. 10 Lakh within the stipulated four weeks. The Court acknowledged the issue involved and the fact that the appeal has been pending since 2021. No specific finding was given on the validity of the assessment order or the interpretation of Section 133A.
The High Court quashed the assessment order dated 30.05.2023 passed under Section 147 read with Section 144 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found that the petitioner's reliance on the Supreme Court judgments in Seahorse Mercantile Company Private Limited and Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal was persuasive. The revenue could not distinguish the present case from these precedents. Consequently, the matter was remitted back to the Income Tax Officer Ward 1(1), Jaipur (Respondent No.1), to pass a fresh order. This fresh order must address the objections raised by the petitioner. The operative direction was for the petitioner's representative to appear before Respondent No.1 on 17.03.2025 at 11:00 A.M. to avoid further delay. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal decided to dismiss the writ petition as not pressed. The reasoning was based on the petitioner's submission that an appeal was pending against the impugned order and their request to withdraw the current petition with liberty to pursue all issues before the appellate authority. The Tribunal granted the liberty as prayed for by the petitioner. Therefore, the operative direction was the dismissal of the writ petition, allowing the petitioner to pursue their appellate remedies. No issues were expressly left undecided, as the petition was withdrawn on procedural grounds.
The High Court, without commenting on the merits of the case, disposed of the writ petition. It directed the respondent No. 2, the Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax, Jaipur-2, to consider the petitioner's representation dated November 25, 2024, in accordance with the law. The court mandated that this consideration should be done expeditiously, not later than three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order. Furthermore, if the petitioner is found to be entitled to the refund, the same shall be issued within two weeks of such determination. The ratio decidendi is that administrative authorities must act expeditiously on representations concerning tax refunds, especially when linked to schemes like Vivad se Vishwas, and the court will direct them to do so within a stipulated timeframe.
The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, disposed of the writ petitions as infructuous. The Court noted the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Commissioner of Income Tax had accepted the appeals during the pendency of the writ petitions, and the orders had consequently attained finality. Based on this submission, the Court found that no cause of action survived for the petitioner to pursue the writ petitions. Therefore, the petitions were disposed of without delving into the merits of the original dispute, as the subsequent events rendered them moot. No specific issue was left undecided, as the disposal was based on the petitioner's concession regarding the changed circumstances.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with directions to the Assessing Officer to decide the proceedings in accordance with law. The Court specifically directed the Assessing Officer to take into consideration the ratio laid down in the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India & Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondents. The operative direction was for the Assessing Officer to proceed while adhering to the precedent set by the Apex Court and the concession made by the revenue. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided, as the matter was resolved based on the conceded position and the binding precedent.
The High Court held that the writ petition has become infructuous due to the efflux of time, as the period for which the renewal of exemption under Section 80G(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was sought has expired during the pendency of the petition. The Court disposed of the petition on this basis. It was further clarified that if the petitioner applies for fresh exemption or a subsequent renewal, the department shall decide such application in accordance with the law, without being influenced by the observations made in the impugned order dated February 5-6, 2004. No decision was made on the merits of the original rejection order.
The High Court granted the appellant's request to withdraw the appeal. The appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The formulated/proposed substantial question of law was kept open. The department was granted liberty to move an appropriate application for revival if the need arose. The court did not decide the merits of the appeal.
The Tribunal noted the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that a similar appeal, D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 57/2024, was dismissed by the Division Bench of the Court at Jaipur Bench on 27.09.2024 as not maintainable, in view of Circular 9 dated 17.09.2024. Consequently, the appellant sought permission to withdraw the present income tax appeal. The Court permitted the appellant to withdraw the appeal. The operative direction was that the appeal is dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty to the appellant to re-agitate the matter strictly in accordance with law if any occasion arises. No specific finding on the merits of the case was given, as the appeal was withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that the proceedings for reopening of assessment are vitiated in law if the material referred to in the "reasons to believe" was not supplied to the petitioner and the objections demanding such material were not dealt with. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Gkn Driveshafts (India) Ltd. and the Division Bench's decision in Micro Marbles Pvt. Limited. The reasoning was that the Assessing Officer is obligated to supply the reasons for reopening and to decide the objections by passing a reasoned order. Since the order dated 17.02.2017 did not supply the requested material nor dealt with the objection demanding it, the order was set aside. The writ petition was allowed, and the matter was remitted back to the respondent No.2 (Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax) to decide the objections in accordance with law. The petitioner was directed to appear on 12.03.2025.
The Tribunal held that the respondent-Income Tax Officer was obligated to dispose of the objections filed by the petitioner against the issuance of the notice under Section 148 by passing a speaking order. The annexure attached to the notice issued under Section 142(1) was not a speaking order and did not adequately address the objections raised by the petitioner. The Tribunal relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Gkn Driveshafts (India) Ltd., which clearly mandates that the Assessing Officer must dispose of objections by passing a speaking order before proceeding with the assessment. Consequently, the matter was remitted back to the respondent to decide the objections in accordance with the law. The petitioner was directed to appear before the respondent on February 24, 2025, at 11:00 AM to avoid further delay.
The High Court, without commenting on the merits of the case, disposed of the writ petitions. It took into account the interim protection granted to the petitioner since 2020 and the fact that the appeal had not been decided for over four years. The court directed the first Appellate Authority to decide the appeal within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order. The interim protection granted to the petitioner was extended to continue until the appeal is heard. The ratio decidendi is that prolonged delays in appellate proceedings, coupled with existing interim orders, warrant a directive for expeditious disposal of the appeal by the appellate authority.
The High Court dismissed the revision petitions, holding that no substantial question of law arose. The court noted that the petitioner's grievance primarily stemmed from the six-month outer limit prescribed under Rule 12(3) of the Rules of 1999 for goods to be sent out of the local area to qualify for exemption or deduction. The judgment explicitly stated that a revision petition cannot be used to challenge the vires of a rule, especially when the main Act does not prescribe such a limit. The court acknowledged that the vires of Rule 12 had already been challenged in a separate writ petition (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.16922/2015) and that unless that rule was declared ultra vires or contrary to the main Act, no substantial question of law existed in the present revision petitions. The court also noted that the petitioner's admission of facts indicated that the goods were transferred after the six-month period, making the exemption/deduction provision inapplicable. The court denied a blanket permission for revival of the revision petitions, stating that any such request would depend on the outcome of the writ petition and would need to be prayed for subsequently.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition based on joint submissions from both parties for a time-bound disposal of the appeal. The Court directed the respondents to decide the appeal pending before them within a period of three months from the date of receiving a certified copy of the order. The interim order dated January 25, 2024, was ordered to remain in currency for the next three months. The Court did not delve into the merits of the case or the validity of the original return filed by the petitioner. The primary focus was on expediting the appellate process and maintaining the status quo regarding recovery measures until the appeal was decided.
The Tribunal allowed the learned counsel for the appellants to withdraw the appeals. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn. All pending applications associated with these appeals were also dismissed as a result of the withdrawal. The Tribunal did not make any findings on the merits of the case or the underlying tax dispute, as the appeals were disposed of on a procedural basis. The ratio decidendi would be that an appellant has the right to withdraw their appeal, and upon such withdrawal, the appeal is dismissed without prejudice to any other proceedings or rights.
The High Court noted that during the pendency of the writ petition, a re-assessment order had been passed, and the petitioner had filed an appeal against it, which was pending. The petitioner's counsel had no instructions to refute this submission. Consequently, the Court disposed of the writ petition, relegating the petitioner to pursue the remedy of appeal. The petitioner was granted liberty to raise all issues raised in the writ petition before the Appellate Authority at the appropriate stage. The Court did not decide the merits of the original challenge to the Section 148 notice.
The High Court granted the appellant's request to withdraw the appeals. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn. The court also noted that all pending applications associated with these appeals were consequently dismissed. No decision on the merits of the underlying tax dispute was made, as the appeals were disposed of solely on the basis of the withdrawal request.
The High Court held that since a common order was passed under Section 179 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for all three assessment years, and subsequent developments had occurred, including the setting aside of the demand order for assessment year 2015-16 under Section 263 and the disposal of appeals for assessment years 2012-13 and 2013-14 by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, the impugned order under Section 179 was set aside. The matter was remitted back to the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 2, Jaipur, to decide the issue afresh in view of these subsequent developments. The Court clarified that the setting aside of the order does not constitute an opinion on the merits of the case. The petitions were accordingly disposed of.
The High Court held that the application for condonation of delay filed by the respondents sufficiently explained the delay ranging from 50 to 200 days. The Court noted that the respondents had categorically narrated in their application that the delay was caused due to the transfer of the concerned Initiating Officer and the subsequent assumption of charge by a new officer, which prevented timely consultation with the SPP's office. The Court found that the precedent law cited by the appellant, emphasizing strict interpretation of limitation, did not assist them in this case because the initial joint appeal was filed on time in November 2021. This joint appeal was pending until February 15, 2023, when the Appellate Tribunal granted liberty to file separate appeals. The Court reasoned that while compliance with the order for filing separate appeals was required in time, the reasons provided for the delay, specifically the change in the Initiating Officer, were sufficient. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the separate appeals, for which liberty was granted by the Appellate Tribunal, were permitted to be heard on merits by being treated as within the limitation period. The Court found no further interference with the impugned orders to be called for.
The Tribunal held that the issue is squarely covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Court noted that in the present case, the reassessment order was passed on 12.03.2024, and no satisfaction was recorded for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E. The subsequent reference by the DCIT to the ACIT and the satisfaction recorded by the ACIT on 24.09.2024 were deemed insufficient to validate the penalty proceedings. The Tribunal reasoned that the satisfaction must be recorded by the concerned Assessing Officer during the reassessment proceedings. Since no such satisfaction was recorded, the penalty proceedings were quashed. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the DCIT had only recorded satisfaction for proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) and not for Section 271D/271E. The ratio decidendi is that penalty under Section 271D/271E requires prior satisfaction of the AO recorded in the assessment/reassessment proceedings.
The High Court allowed the writ petitions, quashing the notices issued under Section 271E and the proceedings initiated pursuant thereto. The Court found that the reassessment order dated 12.03.2024 did not record any satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E. The Court held that the reference made by the DCIT to the ACIT on 01.08.2024, which was after the conclusion of reassessment proceedings by the DCIT, could not enhance the department's case. Furthermore, the satisfaction recorded by the ACIT on 24.09.2024 could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded in the reassessment proceedings by the concerned AO. The Court reiterated the principle laid down in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra), where the Supreme Court quashed penalty proceedings for want of satisfaction recorded by the AO. The Court noted that in the present case, the DCIT had only recorded satisfaction for proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) and not for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271D or 271E.
The Tribunal held that the writ petitions are squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Supreme Court in that case had quashed penalty proceedings under Section 271E on the ground that in the absence of satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer, the penalty could not be imposed. The Tribunal noted that in the present case, the reassessment order was passed on March 12, 2024, and no satisfaction was recorded for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E. The subsequent reference by the DCIT to the ACIT and the ACIT's satisfaction recorded on September 24, 2024, were deemed insufficient as they occurred after the conclusion of reassessment proceedings and could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded by the concerned Assessing Officer during the reassessment process. Therefore, the notices issued under Section 271E and the proceedings pursuant thereto were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the issue is squarely covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Court noted that the reassessment order was passed on March 12, 2024, and no satisfaction was recorded for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E at that time. The subsequent reference by the Deputy Commissioner to the Additional Commissioner on August 1, 2024, and the satisfaction recorded by the Additional Commissioner on September 24, 2024, were considered insufficient and could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded during the reassessment proceedings by the concerned Assessing Officer. The Supreme Court in Jai Laxmi Rice Mills had quashed penalty proceedings under Section 271D for want of satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer. Therefore, the notices issued under Section 271E and the proceedings pursuant thereto were quashed. The Tribunal expressly left undecided any issue regarding the merits of the penalty itself, focusing solely on the procedural defect.
The Tribunal held that the issue is squarely covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Court noted that the reassessment order was passed on March 12, 2024, and no satisfaction was recorded for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E. The Tribunal found that the reference made by the DCIT to the ACIT on August 1, 2024, was after the conclusion of reassessment proceedings by the DCIT and therefore could not enhance the department's case. Furthermore, the satisfaction recorded by the ACIT on September 24, 2024, could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded in the reassessment proceedings by the concerned AO. The Supreme Court in Jai Laxmi Rice Mills had quashed penalty proceedings for want of satisfaction recorded by the AO. Consequently, the notices issued under Section 271E and the proceedings pursuant thereto were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the writ petitions are allowed and the notices issued under Section 271E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, along with the consequential proceedings, are quashed. The reasoning was based on the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Tribunal noted that the reassessment order dated March 12, 2024, did not record any satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E. The reference made by the DCIT to the ACIT on August 1, 2024, was considered ineffective as it was made after the conclusion of reassessment proceedings by the DCIT. Furthermore, the satisfaction recorded by the ACIT on September 24, 2024, could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded by the AO in the reassessment proceedings. The Tribunal reiterated that in the absence of satisfaction recorded by the AO, penalty cannot be imposed, and the issue in hand was squarely covered by the Supreme Court's judgment.
The Tribunal held that the issue is squarely covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Court noted that the reassessment order was passed on March 12, 2024, and no satisfaction was recorded for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E. The Tribunal found that the reference made by the DCIT to the ACIT on August 1, 2024, after the conclusion of reassessment proceedings, did not improve the department's case. Furthermore, the satisfaction recorded by the ACIT on September 24, 2024, could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded in the reassessment proceedings by the concerned AO. The Supreme Court in Jai Laxmi Rice Mills had quashed penalty proceedings under Section 271D for want of satisfaction recorded by the AO. Therefore, the notices issued under Section 271E and the proceedings pursuant thereto were quashed. The Tribunal also noted that in the case at hand, the DCIT had only recorded satisfaction for proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) and not for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271D.
The Tribunal held that the writ petitions are squarely covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Court noted that the reassessment order dated March 12, 2024, did not record any satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E. The subsequent reference by the DCIT to the ACIT on August 1, 2024, and the ACIT's satisfaction recorded on September 24, 2024, were considered insufficient as they occurred after the conclusion of the reassessment proceedings and could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded by the Assessing Officer during the reassessment process. The Supreme Court in Jai Laxmi Rice Mills had quashed penalty proceedings under Section 271D for want of satisfaction recorded by the AO. Therefore, the notices issued under Section 271E and the proceedings pursuant thereto were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the issue is squarely covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Court noted that the reassessment order was passed on March 12, 2024, and no satisfaction was recorded for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E at that time. The subsequent reference by the Deputy Commissioner to the Additional Commissioner on August 1, 2024, and the satisfaction recorded by the Additional Commissioner on September 24, 2024, were considered insufficient and could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded during the reassessment proceedings by the concerned Assessing Officer. The Supreme Court in Jai Laxmi Rice Mills had quashed penalty proceedings under Section 271D for want of satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer. Therefore, the notices issued under Section 271E and the proceedings pursuant thereto were quashed. The Tribunal expressly left undecided any issue regarding the merits of the penalty itself, focusing solely on the procedural defect.
The Tribunal held that the issue is squarely covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Court noted that the reassessment order was passed on March 12, 2024, and no satisfaction was recorded for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E at that time. The subsequent reference by the Deputy Commissioner to the Additional Commissioner on August 1, 2024, and the satisfaction recorded by the Additional Commissioner on September 24, 2024, were considered insufficient and could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded during the reassessment proceedings by the concerned Assessing Officer. The Supreme Court in Jai Laxmi Rice Mills had quashed penalty proceedings under Section 271D for want of satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer. Therefore, the notices issued under Section 271E and the proceedings pursuant thereto were quashed. The Tribunal expressly left undecided any issue regarding the merits of the penalty itself, focusing solely on the procedural defect.
The Tribunal held that the issue is squarely covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Court noted that the reassessment order was passed on March 12, 2024, and no satisfaction was recorded for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E at that time. The subsequent reference by the Deputy Commissioner to the Additional Commissioner on August 1, 2024, and the satisfaction recorded by the Additional Commissioner on September 24, 2024, were considered insufficient and could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded during the reassessment proceedings by the concerned Assessing Officer. The Supreme Court in Jai Laxmi Rice Mills had quashed penalty proceedings under Section 271D for want of satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer. Therefore, the notices issued under Section 271E and the proceedings pursuant thereto were quashed. The Tribunal expressly left undecided any issue regarding the merits of the penalty itself, focusing solely on the procedural defect.