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1,247 orders · Page 25 of 25
The Tribunal held that the issue is squarely covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Court noted that the reassessment order was passed on March 12, 2024, and no satisfaction was recorded for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E. The Tribunal found that the reference made by the DCIT to the ACIT on August 1, 2024, after the conclusion of reassessment proceedings, did not improve the department's case. Furthermore, the satisfaction recorded by the ACIT on September 24, 2024, could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded in the reassessment proceedings by the concerned AO. The Supreme Court in Jai Laxmi Rice Mills had quashed penalty proceedings under Section 271D for want of satisfaction recorded by the AO. Therefore, the notices issued under Section 271E and the proceedings pursuant thereto were quashed. The Tribunal also noted that in the case at hand, the DCIT had only recorded satisfaction for proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) and not for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271D.
The Tribunal held that the issue is squarely covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Court noted that the reassessment order was passed on March 12, 2024, and no satisfaction was recorded for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E. The Tribunal found that the reference made by the DCIT to the ACIT on August 1, 2024, was after the conclusion of reassessment proceedings by the DCIT and therefore could not enhance the department's case. Furthermore, the satisfaction recorded by the ACIT on September 24, 2024, could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded in the reassessment proceedings by the concerned AO. The Supreme Court in Jai Laxmi Rice Mills had quashed penalty proceedings for want of satisfaction recorded by the AO. Consequently, the notices issued under Section 271E and the proceedings pursuant thereto were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the order under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was not in compliance with the law. The Court found that although reasons were supplied with the notice under Section 148A(b), the summary of the material and the relevant portion were not provided. This contravened the guidelines issued by the Department. The Tribunal relied on its previous decision in DBCWP No.14414/2022 (R.K. Buildcreations Private Limited Vs. The Income Tax Officer) dated 08.02.2024, which also dealt with the provisions of Section 148A and departmental guidelines. Consequently, the order under Section 148A(d) was quashed, and the matter was remitted back to the respondent to proceed in accordance with law after supplying the requisite information as contemplated in the departmental guidelines. The writ petition was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the issue is squarely covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Supreme Court in that case had quashed penalty proceedings under Section 271D on the ground that in the absence of satisfaction recorded by the AO, the penalty could not be imposed. The Tribunal noted that in the present case, the reassessment order was passed on 12.03.2024, and no satisfaction was recorded for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E. The Tribunal further observed that the reference made by the DCIT to the ACIT on 01.08.2024, which was after the conclusion of reassessment proceedings, did not aid the department's case. Similarly, the satisfaction dated 24.09.2024 recorded by the ACIT could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded in the reassessment proceedings by the concerned AO. The Tribunal also noted that in the case of the petitioners, the DCIT had only recorded satisfaction for proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) and not for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271D. Consequently, the notices issued under Section 271E and the proceedings pursuant thereto were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the issue is squarely covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Tribunal noted that the reassessment order dated March 12, 2024, did not record any satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E. The subsequent reference by the DCIT to the ACIT on August 1, 2024, and the satisfaction recorded by the ACIT on September 24, 2024, were deemed insufficient as they occurred after the conclusion of reassessment proceedings and could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded by the concerned Assessing Officer during the reassessment process. The Supreme Court in Jai Laxmi Rice Mills had quashed penalty proceedings under Section 271D in the absence of recorded satisfaction by the AO. Therefore, the notices issued under Section 271E and the proceedings pursuant thereto were quashed. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The Tribunal held that the writ petitions are squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Supreme Court in that case had quashed penalty proceedings under Section 271E on the ground that in the absence of satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer, the penalty could not be imposed. The Tribunal noted that in the present case, the reassessment order was passed on March 12, 2024, and no satisfaction was recorded for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E. The subsequent reference by the DCIT to the ACIT and the ACIT's satisfaction recorded on September 24, 2024, were deemed insufficient as they occurred after the conclusion of reassessment proceedings and could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded by the concerned Assessing Officer during the reassessment process. Therefore, the notices issued under Section 271E and the proceedings pursuant thereto were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the writ petitions are allowed and the notices issued under Section 271E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, along with the consequential proceedings, are quashed. The reasoning was based on the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Tribunal noted that the reassessment order dated March 12, 2024, did not record any satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E. The reference made by the DCIT to the ACIT on August 1, 2024, was considered ineffective as it was made after the conclusion of reassessment proceedings by the DCIT. Furthermore, the satisfaction recorded by the ACIT on September 24, 2024, could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded by the AO in the reassessment proceedings. The Tribunal reiterated that in the absence of satisfaction recorded by the AO, penalty cannot be imposed, and the issue in hand was squarely covered by the Supreme Court's judgment.
The Tribunal held that the writ petitions are allowed and the notices issued under Section 271E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, along with the consequential proceedings, are quashed. The reasoning was based on the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Tribunal noted that the reassessment order was passed on March 12, 2024, and no satisfaction was recorded for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E. The Tribunal found that the reference made by the DCIT to the ACIT on August 1, 2024, was after the conclusion of reassessment proceedings by the DCIT and therefore could not enhance the department's case. Furthermore, the satisfaction recorded by the ACIT on September 24, 2024, could not be equated with the satisfaction to be recorded in the reassessment proceedings by the concerned AO. The Tribunal reiterated that in the absence of satisfaction recorded by the AO, the penalty cannot be imposed, and the issue in hand was squarely covered by the Supreme Court's judgment.
The Tribunal held that the writ petitions are allowed and the notices issued under Section 271E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, along with the proceedings pursuant thereto, are quashed. The reasoning was based on the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra), which held that penalty proceedings under Section 271D (analogous to Section 271E) cannot be imposed in the absence of satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer for initiating such proceedings. The Tribunal noted that the reassessment order dated March 12, 2024, did not record any satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E. The reference made by the DCIT to the ACIT on August 1, 2024, was considered irrelevant as it was made after the conclusion of reassessment proceedings by the DCIT. Furthermore, the satisfaction recorded by the ACIT on September 24, 2024, was not equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded in the reassessment proceedings by the concerned Assessing Officer. The Tribunal found that the DCIT had only recorded satisfaction for proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) and not for Section 271D/271E. Therefore, the issue was squarely covered by the Supreme Court's judgment, leading to the quashing of the penalty notices and proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the writ petitions are squarely covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Court noted that the reassessment order dated March 12, 2024, did not record any satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E. The subsequent reference by the DCIT to the ACIT on August 1, 2024, and the ACIT's satisfaction recorded on September 24, 2024, were considered insufficient as they occurred after the conclusion of the reassessment proceedings and could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded by the Assessing Officer during the reassessment process. The Supreme Court in Jai Laxmi Rice Mills had quashed penalty proceedings under Section 271D for want of satisfaction recorded by the AO. Therefore, the notices issued under Section 271E and the proceedings pursuant thereto were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the writ petitions are squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills (supra). The Court found that the reassessment order dated March 12, 2024, did not record any satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings under Section 271E. The Tribunal reasoned that the reference made by the Deputy Commissioner to the Additional Commissioner on August 1, 2024, was after the conclusion of the reassessment proceedings by the Deputy Commissioner, and therefore, it could not validate the penalty proceedings. Furthermore, the satisfaction recorded by the Additional Commissioner on September 24, 2024, could not be equated with the satisfaction required to be recorded by the Assessing Officer during the reassessment proceedings. The Supreme Court in Jai Laxmi Rice Mills had quashed penalty proceedings under Section 271D in the absence of satisfaction recorded by the AO. Consequently, the notices issued under Section 271E and the proceedings pursuant thereto were quashed. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The High Court held that the amount retained by the Government Department as performance security deducted from the running bills of the assessee has to be considered for the purpose of taxation at that time. The Court found the reasoning of the ITAT justified and in consonance with the precedent law laid down in Girdharilal & Co. (supra). The Court answered the questions of law against the assessee and in favour of the revenue, stating that whenever security deposits are deducted from running bills, they shall be treated as part of the assessee's income for taxation purposes. Consequently, the High Court found no cause for interference with the ITAT's judgment dated 25.02.2013. The operative direction was to dismiss the cross objections. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that it is lawful for the income retained or deducted from the assessee's running bills as security deposits to be considered for taxation at that time. The Court found the reasoning of the ITAT justified and in consonance with the precedent law laid down in Girdharilal & Co. (supra). Consequently, the questions of law were answered against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. The principle established is that whenever security deposits are deducted from the running bills of an assessee, such deducted amounts shall be treated as part of the assessee's income for taxation purposes. The Court found no cause for interference with the ITAT's judgment dated 25.02.2013, and the cross objections were dismissed. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court granted the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The Court's decision was to dismiss the writ petition as withdrawn. No findings on the substantive issues that might have been raised in the writ petition were made, as the case was disposed of on the procedural ground of withdrawal. The operative direction was the dismissal of the writ petition as withdrawn. No issues were left undecided; the entire petition was withdrawn.
The Tribunal held that there was no factual or legal mistake in the order rejecting the request for waiver of interest. The petitioner's claim that seized documents were returned in December 1997 was contradicted by their own communication dated November 11, 1997, which stated documents were returned in the first week of September 1997. No valid explanation was provided for the delay in filing the return until August 18, 1998, which was significantly beyond the fifteen-day period stipulated in the notice. Regarding the non-returning of seized documents, the petition was disposed of with a direction for the legal heirs of the petitioner to file an application for the return of documents, substantiating the seized and returned items. The Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Jaipur, was directed to consider this application expeditiously, within two months of receiving the order's certified copy, and decide on the return of documents within four weeks thereafter if the petitioner was found entitled.
The High Court clarified that the Tribunal had disposed of the cross-objections as infructuous. The appeal was disposed of with this clarification. The High Court did not delve into the merits of the Tribunal's decision to allow the cross-objections for statistical purposes, but rather focused on the fact that the underlying issue leading to the cross-objections had already been decided in favour of the assessee by the CIT, and this decision was upheld. Therefore, the operative direction was to clarify the Tribunal's disposal of the cross-objections as infructuous, effectively accepting the procedural outcome without a detailed examination of the statistical allowance.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was in violation of the procedure prescribed by Section 148A. It was further held that the order was passed without affording a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to put forth their objections, as the request for adjournment was not considered. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside. The matter was remanded back to the assessing officer (respondent No.2) to proceed in accordance with the law. The writ petition was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the petitioner's claim of ownership based on an agreement to sell, which was not registered, could not override the bank's prior mortgage rights. The arbitration award was binding only on the parties to the arbitration and persons claiming under them; the bank, as a mortgagee, was not a party to the arbitration and its rights were not derived from the borrowers in a manner that would make it claim under them. The Tribunal found that the petitioner's objections regarding the non-holding of an inquiry under Rule 11 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act were rejected because there was no challenge to the recovery certificate or the mortgaging of the plots. Reliance on Rules 60 and 61 of the Second Schedule (analogous to Order 21 Rules 89 and 90 of CPC) was rejected as the petitioner failed to comply with the conditions for setting aside the sale, such as depositing the required amounts. The Tribunal also noted that the petitioner had not substantiated claims of material irregularity in the sale proceedings. The discrepancy in the area of plots was found to be unsubstantiated. The execution of the sale deed by the borrowers in favour of the petitioner after the auction was considered a deliberate withholding of facts from the arbitration proceedings. The writ petitions were dismissed.
The High Court held that there was a factual error in the impugned order dated 05.08.2021, as it was passed without considering the reply filed by the petitioner on 31.07.2021. The Court found that the order erroneously stated that no reply was filed. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside. The matter was remitted back to the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Jaipur (Respondent No.1) to decide the issue of transfer afresh in accordance with law. The petitioners were directed to appear before the Principal Commissioner on 24.02.2025 at 11:00 A.M. to avoid further delay.
The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, disposed of the petition in the same terms as its earlier decision in the case of Shyam Sundar Khandelwal & Ors. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax reported in (2024) 471 ITR 45. The judgment does not elaborate on the specific findings or reasoning of the Shyam Sundar Khandelwal case, nor does it detail the operative directions given in this particular instance. However, by disposing of the petition in the same terms, it implies that the outcome for M/s Shiv Vegpro Private Limited would mirror that of Shyam Sundar Khandelwal. The specific relief granted or denied, or any issue left undecided, is not recorded in this judgment.
The High Court held that the appeals are dismissed as there is no substantial question of law for consideration. The Court reasoned that the legal position settled by the Supreme Court in ACIT vs. Rajesh Zaveri (supra) clearly states that an intimation under Section 143(1) is not an assessment. The admitted facts show that the assessee filed a revised return on 18.10.2016, after a notice under Section 143(1) was issued on 12.10.2016. The Court found that the submission of the revised return was not beyond the period of limitation as provided under Section 139(5) of the Income Tax Act. In the absence of any other provision in Section 80IA or any other part of the Act prohibiting such a claim, the CIT(A) and the Tribunal were correct in concluding that there was no legal impediment to accepting the claim of deduction made in the revised return. The ratio of the decision is that a deduction under Section 80IA can be allowed if claimed in a revised return filed within the statutory time limit, even if not claimed in the original return, especially when the intimation under Section 143(1) is not considered an assessment.
The High Court, referencing its own prior decision in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.11787/2024 (Sharda Devi Chhajer & Anr. Vs The Income Tax Officer & Anr.) and the Punjab and Haryana High Court's decision in Jasjit Singh vs. Union of India & Ors., held that notices issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer under Section 148 of the Act, 1961, are contrary to the provisions of the Act and the faceless assessment regime envisaged under Section 144B. The mandate of Section 151A of the Act, 1961, requires strict adherence to the algorithm-based random assessing system. Therefore, such notices and subsequent proceedings initiated by the JAO are liable to be quashed for want of jurisdiction. However, in this specific case, since an appeal against the final assessment order was already preferred and was pending, the Court deemed it inappropriate to pass an order that would render the appeal redundant. Instead, the petitioner was directed to file an application before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), who was directed to consider it and pass appropriate orders within 15 days, taking into account the judgments quashing proceedings based on notices issued by the JAO. The time spent during the litigation was to be excluded for computing limitation for fresh notices, if needed.
The High Court, acknowledging the prolonged pendency of the rectification application, was inclined to finally dispose of the writ petition. The Court directed that the rectification application, filed on 29.01.2022/31.06.2024, be decided one way or the other by the concerned authorities as expeditiously as possible. The preferred timeline for disposal was within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. The Court did not delve into the merits of the rectification application itself, focusing solely on ensuring its timely adjudication. No specific issue was left undecided, as the Court's direction was to decide the pending application.
The Tribunal held that the writ petition deserved acceptance on the single issue of the re-assessment for assessment year 2015-16 being time-barred. The reasoning was that the limitation for the assessment year 2015-16 expired on 31.03.2022, and the notice under Section 148 of the Act was issued on 28.07.2022. This date falls after the expiry of the limitation period. The Tribunal found the case indistinguishable from the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India & ors. Vs. Rajeev Bansal, which supported the assessee's contention regarding the expiry of limitation. Consequently, the impugned notices were liable to be quashed on this ground alone. The Tribunal did not address other issues raised in the petition. The operative direction was to allow the writ petition.
The High Court allowed the writ petitions, quashing the notice dated March 27, 2018, and the order dated September 24, 2018. The Court held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated based on a mere change of opinion, which is not a valid ground for reopening an assessment under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court emphasized that the "reason to believe" required for reopening must be based on objective determination and tangible information, not mere suspicion or conjecture. The Long Term Capital Gains were already disclosed and dealt with in the original assessment order dated March 24, 2014. The Court found no failure on the part of the assessee to fully and truly disclose all material facts necessary for the assessment, which would attract the extended limitation period under the proviso to Section 147. Therefore, reopening the assessment after four years without fresh tangible material indicating non-disclosure was contrary to the law.
The Court held that the reassessment proceedings initiated by the respondent were invalid and quashed the impugned notice and order. The primary reasoning was that the Long Term Capital Gains (LTCG) were fully disclosed by the assessee and dealt with by the Assessing Officer in the original assessment order dated March 24, 2014. The Court noted that the original assessment order explicitly mentioned the sale of immovable property and the calculation of LTCG, including an addition of Rs. 14,850 under Section 50C. Therefore, the material in question was available to the Assessing Officer from the beginning and could not be termed a non-disclosure by the assessee. The Court found that the reasons for reassessment did not demonstrate that income had escaped assessment due to the assessee's failure to make a return, respond to notices, or disclose material facts. The initiation of reassessment after four years, based on a mere change of opinion regarding material already on record, was contrary to the proviso to Section 147. The Court emphasized that a mere change of opinion does not satisfy the "reason to believe" requirement, which necessitates objective determination based on tangible information. The petitions were allowed, and the notice and order were quashed.
The High Court disposed of the petition. The court noted that the petition had been pending since 2022 without any stay. The petitioner's counsel argued that the limitation period for reassessment for assessment year 2015-2016 had expired on 31.03.2023, and no order had been communicated. The respondent's counsel stated that if a reassessment order was passed, it would be communicated within four weeks, and if not, the department would proceed as per law. In light of these submissions, the court disposed of the petition, stating that the petitioner was at liberty to avail remedies in accordance with law for any surviving grievance. The court did not decide on the merits of the reassessment proceedings or the limitation issue.
The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, acknowledging the submissions of both parties, disposed of the writ petition. The Court directed Respondent No. 1, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Jodhpur, to decide the petitioner's appeal within an outer limit of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. No specific findings on the merits of the appeal were made, as the petition was solely for expeditious disposal. The ratio of the decision is that courts can direct quasi-judicial authorities to decide pending matters within a stipulated time, especially when there are grounds like the age of the appellant and prolonged pendency.
The High Court admitted the appeal on two substantial questions of law. The first question concerns whether the ITAT was justified in quashing reassessment proceedings as a change of opinion, when the Revenue argued that the deduction under Section 80IA on interest income was not examined in the original assessment under Section 143(3) and an excessive deduction was allowed. The second question relates to whether the ITAT was justified in allowing deduction under Section 80IA on interest income, including penal interest and other income, despite the Revenue's contention that these lacked a direct nexus with the business profits. The Court has not yet rendered a decision on these issues; it has only admitted the appeal for further hearing. The operative directions are to list the appeal for hearing in the first week of April, 2025. No specific findings or reasoning on the merits of the case have been provided in this excerpt.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose from the grounds raised by the petitioner. The court observed that the issue was primarily one of applicability of law to given facts, and the petitioner failed to substantiate their claim for exemption with supporting material. The concurrent findings of fact by the Tax Assessing Authority, the appellate authority, and the Rajasthan Tax Board were consistent. The court noted that the judgments relied upon by the petitioner (Prem Nath Motors and Geo Motors) were overruled by the Supreme Court in M/s M. Ekaram Khan and Sons Vs. CTT. The High Court further clarified, by referring to the Tata Motors judgment which followed M/s M. Ekaram Khan, that a credit note issued by a manufacturer to a dealer for replacement parts under warranty is considered valuable consideration and exigible to sales tax, unless the dealer simply received the spare part from the manufacturer to replace a defective part under a warranty collateral to the sale of the automobile. The court found that the petitioner failed to prove their case fell under the exemption category. Therefore, the revision petitions were dismissed as devoid of merits.
The High Court, exercising its discretion, declined to entertain the writ petitions. The court noted that notices under Section 143(2) and 142(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were issued in June 2023, and the writ petitions were filed in January 2024, indicating a significant delay. The court found that in these circumstances, it was not inclined to entertain the petitions. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed. However, the court granted liberty to the petitioners to challenge the order by taking recourse to appropriate remedies available under the law. Specifically, if an individual appeal is filed within a period of two months from the date of this order, it shall be decided on its own merits without considering the issue of limitation. The court did not decide on the merits of the grounds raised in the writ petitions.
The High Court, in view of the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Others vs. Rajeev Bansal-2024 SCC Online 2693, was not inclined to grant any relief to the petitioner concerning the issue of limitation. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner had taken recourse to various other remedies, including applying for settlement under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2024, on December 30, 2024. Given the Supreme Court's order and the subsequent proceedings initiated by the petitioner, the High Court was not inclined to proceed further with the writ petition. The petition was disposed of, reserving liberty to the petitioner to pursue the alternative remedies already taken. The Court explicitly stated that it was not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, except for the issue of limitation.
The High Court dismissed the writ petitions. The court noted that notices under Section 143(2) and 142(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were issued in June 2023, and the writ petitions were filed in January 2024, indicating a delay. In exercise of its discretion, the court was not inclined to entertain the petitions due to this delay. However, the court granted liberty to the petitioners to challenge the order by taking recourse to appropriate remedies available under the law. Specifically, if individual appeals were filed within a period of two months from the date of the order, such appeals would be decided on their own merits without considering the issue of limitation. The court did not decide on the merits of the grounds raised in the writ petitions.
The High Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable in light of the fact that the petitioner had already filed an appeal against the impugned assessment order before the department. The court noted that the petitioner's counsel did not dispute this fact. Therefore, the petition was disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to pursue the appeal before the department. The court did not decide on the merits of the assessment order or any specific grounds raised by the petitioner. The ratio decidendi is that a writ petition is generally not entertained when an effective alternative remedy, such as an appeal, is available and has been pursued by the assessee.
The Tribunal granted the appellant's request to withdraw the appeal. The reasoning provided is that the tax effect in the appeal was below Rupees Two Crores, and in view of the CBDT circular dated 17.09.2024, the learned counsel for the appellant sought permission to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The Tribunal also noted that the formulated substantial question of law was kept open and granted the Department liberty to move an application for revival if the matter is not covered under the circular. No specific finding on the merits of the case was made.
The High Court, in light of the limited submission made by the petitioners' counsel, directed that the petitioners shall file a representation/application before respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (Deputy Director of Income Tax and Principal Director of Income Tax) within 10 days from the date of the order. The court further directed that the representation of the petitioners shall be decided by the said respondents by passing a speaking order, strictly in accordance with law, within one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order. The principle established is that administrative authorities should consider and decide representations in a timely and lawful manner, especially when supported by directions from other relevant authorities. The instant writ petition was disposed of with these directions.
The High Court held that substantial questions of law No. 1 and 2 are covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax-1. The Supreme Court held that employees' share of provident fund, deducted by the employer, must be deposited by the due date fixed by the EPF Act and ESI Act, not as per Section 43B of the Income Tax Act. There is no leeway for late deposit of employees' contribution for deduction purposes; it is an essential condition for deduction that such amounts are deposited on or before the due date. Therefore, questions 1 and 2 are answered in favour of the appellant-Department. Regarding substantial question No. 3, the High Court noted that the respondent relies on the Punjab & Haryana High Court decision in CIT, Faridabad vs. NHPC Ltd., which was accepted by the department. The High Court found that the appellant-Department was not in a position to distinguish this decision or refute the fact that it was accepted by the department. Therefore, substantial question No. 3 is answered against the appellant-Department. The appeal is disposed of in terms of these findings.
The Tribunal granted the appellant's request to withdraw the appeal. The reasoning was based on the tax effect being below Rupees Two Crores, which, according to the Circular of the Central Board of Direct Taxes dated 17.09.2024, permitted withdrawal. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The substantial question of law formulated in the appeal was kept open. The Department was granted liberty to move an application for revival if the matter was not covered under the circular. The principle established is that appeals with a tax effect below a certain threshold, as defined by CBDT circulars, can be withdrawn by the revenue.
The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur held that the civil writ petition had become infructuous. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition on this ground. No other issues were decided, and no reasoning beyond the petition becoming infructuous was provided. The operative direction was to dismiss the writ petition.
The High Court allowed the petitioners to withdraw the writ petition. The court accepted the statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petition had become infructuous with the passage of time. Consequently, the petition was disposed of as having rendered infructuous. Any pending applications related to the petition were also disposed of. The court did not decide on the merits of any underlying tax dispute, as the petition was withdrawn.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises for consideration in these revision petitions. The Court noted that the dispute pertains to exemptions and claims under RIPS-2003, which were considered by the lower authorities. The petitioner's argument regarding the Uma Polymers judgment was addressed, with the Court observing that the judgment still holds good and its operation has not been stayed. Therefore, the request to adjourn sine die was rejected. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's definition of a substantial question of law and concluded that the petitioner failed to demonstrate perversity or an issue requiring adjudication. The judgment in M/s Uma Polymers (supra) on an identical issue was considered decisive. Consequently, the revision petitions were dismissed.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the instant petition with liberty to file a fresh one. The Court accordingly dismissed the petition as withdrawn, granting the liberty as prayed for. Any pending applications related to the petition were also dismissed. The reasoning for granting this liberty is not explicitly stated, but it implies the Court accepted the petitioner's request without delving into the merits of the original petition. No specific findings were made on the substantive issues that might have been raised in the writ petition.