Rajasthan High Court Judgments — 2025

The High Court held that the controversy in the present batch of writ petitions concerns the issue of jurisdiction between Faceless and Jurisdictional Assessing Authorities, which has been settled by this Court in the case of Sharda Devi Chhajer (supra). Consequently, the Court quashed the notices issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officers, treating them as illegal. The respondents were granted liberty to proceed via the mode of Faceless Assessment in terms of the judgment in Sharda Devi Chhajer (supra). The period during which the petitions remained pending before the Court was to be excluded for the Faceless Assessing Officer proceedings. Any issues of limitation were to be decided by the Assessing Officer in terms of Rajeev Bansal (supra). The Court also clarified that any further proceedings under the Faceless Assessment Scheme must be strictly in accordance with law, and any other unadjudicated issues could be agitated again.

The High Court held that the controversy in the present batch of writ petitions concerning the jurisdiction of Faceless and Jurisdictional Assessing Authorities had already been settled by this Court in the case of Sharda Devi Chhajer (supra). Based on the joint prayers and consensus between the parties, all petitions were allowed. The notices issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officers were declared illegal and quashed. The respondents were granted liberty to proceed via the mode of Faceless Assessment in terms of the judgment in Sharda Devi Chhajer (supra). The period during which the petitions remained pending before the Court was to be excluded for the Faceless Assessing Officer proceedings. Any issues of limitation were to be decided by the Assessing Officer in terms of Rajeev Bansal (supra). Any other unadjudicated issues were left open for parties to agitate again. Proceedings under the Faceless Assessment Scheme were to be conducted strictly in accordance with law.

The High Court held that the notices issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officers for reopening of assessment were illegal and liable to be quashed. This decision was based on the settled proposition of law by the same Court in the case of Sharda Devi Chhajer (supra), which dealt with the dispute concerning the jurisdiction of Faceless versus Jurisdictional Assessing Authorities. The Court quashed the impugned notices and proceedings, with a liberty to the respondents (Revenue) to proceed via the mode of Faceless Assessment. The period during which the petitions remained pending before the Court was to be excluded for the purpose of any fresh proceedings under the Faceless Assessment Scheme. Any issues of limitation were to be decided by the Assessing Officer in terms of Rajeev Bansal (supra). The Court also clarified that any other unadjudicated issues could be agitated later, and all future proceedings under the Faceless Assessment Scheme must strictly adhere to the law.

The High Court held that the controversy in the present batch of writ petitions concerning the jurisdiction of Faceless Assessing Officers versus Jurisdictional Assessing Officers is settled by this Court's previous decision in the case of Sharda Devi Chhajer (supra). Consequently, the Court quashed the notices issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officers, treating them as illegal. The respondents were granted liberty to proceed via the mode of Faceless Assessment in terms of the judgment in Sharda Devi Chhajer (supra). The period during which the petitions remained pending before the Court was to be excluded for the Faceless Assessing Officer proceedings. Any issue of limitation was to be decided by the Assessing Officer in terms of Rajeev Bansal (supra). The Court also clarified that any other unadjudicated issues could be agitated again before this Court, and any further proceedings under the Faceless Assessment Scheme must be strictly in accordance with law. The specific assessment year mentioned in the prayer clause was 2013-14.

The Tribunal (High Court) allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The court granted liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh petition with better particulars. The reasoning behind this decision is not elaborated upon, but it implies that the court accepted the petitioner's submission for withdrawal and the need for amended details in a subsequent filing. The operative direction is the dismissal of the current petition as withdrawn with the liberty granted. No issues were decided on merits.

The Tribunal held that the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to avail remedies in accordance with law should be granted. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The court explicitly granted the liberty as prayed for by the petitioner. This means the petitioner can pursue other legal avenues available to them without prejudice from this withdrawn petition. The specific remedies available or the merits of the original challenge were not adjudicated upon.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed. It ruled that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as doing so weakens Section 151A and may lead to its diminished activation. The Court emphasized that for assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, adherence to the algorithm-based random assessing system is mandatory. Consequently, the impugned notices were quashed and set aside due to jurisdictional error. The Court directed that fresh notices, if required, must be issued in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022, with the FAO as the assessing officer. The time spent during the litigation was excluded for computing the limitation period for issuing fresh notices.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed. It ruled that the "Jurisdictional Assessing Officer" (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as doing so weakens Section 151A and may lead to its diminished activation. The Court emphasized that for assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, with sanction under Section 151A, adherence to the algorithm-based random assessing system is mandatory. The Court reasoned that the faceless assessment scheme, including automated allocation, is intended to enhance efficiency, transparency, and impartiality, and allowing local control to prejudice this would undermine legislative wisdom. Consequently, the impugned notices were quashed and set aside concerning the jurisdiction of JAOs to issue them. The Court granted liberty to the respondents to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated March 29, 2022, by keeping the "Faceless Assessing Officer" (FAO) as the assessing officer. The time spent during the litigation was excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed, and there is no way to circumvent it. The Court ruled that the Joint Assessing Officer (JAO) shall not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as doing so weakens Section 151A and may lead to its diminished activation. For assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, in light of the sanction under Section 151A, adherence to the algorithm-based random assessing system is mandatory. Consequently, the impugned notices issued by JAOs were quashed and set aside. The Court clarified that fresh notices, if required, must be issued in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated March 29, 2022, with the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) as the assessing officer. The time spent during the litigation was excluded for computing the limitation period for issuing fresh notices.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed. It ruled that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as doing so weakens Section 151A and may lead to its diminished activation. For assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, in light of the sanction under Section 151A, adherence must be made to the algorithm-based random assessing system. Consequently, the impugned notices issued by JAOs were quashed and set aside. The Court clarified that for issuing such notices, the FAO should be the assessing officer, and the respondents have the liberty to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022. The time spent during the pendency of the litigation was excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices, if needed.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed. It ruled that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as doing so weakens Section 151A and may lead to its diminished activation. The Court emphasized that for assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, in light of the sanction under Section 151A, adherence must be made to the algorithm-based random assessing system. Consequently, the impugned notices issued by JAOs were quashed and set aside concerning their jurisdiction. The Court allowed the respondents to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022, with the FAO as the assessing officer. The time spent during the litigation was excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices, if needed. The ratio decidendi is that the faceless regime and automated allocation for issuing reassessment notices under Section 148 are mandatory and exclusive.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed. The Court found that the automated allocation system, as envisaged by the CBDT Scheme, is crucial for ensuring a faceless and transparent assessment process. Consequently, the Court ruled that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as doing so weakens Section 151A and diminishes its activation. For assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, adherence to the algorithm-based random assessing system is mandatory. Therefore, the impugned notices issued by the JAOs were quashed and set aside. The Court granted liberty to the respondents to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022, with the FAO as the assessing officer. The time spent during the litigation was excluded for computing the limitation period for issuing fresh notices. The Court expressly left undecided any issue not directly related to the jurisdictional error in the issuance of notices.

The Tribunal held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed. The Court found that the faceless assessment scheme, including the automated allocation based on algorithms, is intended to enhance efficiency, transparency, and impartiality. It observed that allowing JAOs to issue notices under Section 148 would weaken Section 151A, create concurrent jurisdictions, and defeat the legislative purpose of the faceless regime. The Court ruled that for assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, adherence to the algorithm-based random assessing system is mandatory. Consequently, the impugned notices issued by JAOs were quashed and set aside. The respondents were granted liberty to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated March 29, 2022, with the FAO as the assessing officer. The time spent during the litigation was excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed, and there cannot be a way out of doing so. The Court ruled that Jurisdictional Assessing Officers (JAOs) shall not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as this would weaken Section 151A and potentially lead to its diminished activation. For assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, in light of the sanction under Section 151A, adherence must be made to the algorithm-based random assessing system. Consequently, the impugned notices issued by JAOs were quashed and set aside concerning their jurisdiction. The Court clarified that the time spent during the pendency of the litigation would be excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices, if needed, in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated March 29, 2022, by keeping the FAO as the assessing officer. The ratio decidendi is that the faceless assessment regime, mandated by Section 151A and the CBDT Scheme, requires automated allocation and prohibits issuance of Section 148 notices by JAOs.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed, and there is no way to circumvent it. It further held that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as doing so weakens Section 151A and may lead to its diminished activation. For assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, in light of the sanction under Section 151A, adherence to the algorithm-based random assessing system is mandatory. Consequently, the impugned notices issued by JAOs were quashed and set aside. The Court allowed the respondents to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated March 29, 2022, by keeping the FAO as the assessing officer. The time spent during the litigation was excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices, if needed.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed. It ruled that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as doing so weakens Section 151A and may lead to its diminished activation. The Court found that for assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, with the sanction under Section 151A, adherence to the algorithm-based random assessing system is mandatory. Consequently, the impugned notices were quashed and set aside concerning the jurisdiction of JAOs for issuing them. The Court clarified that fresh notices could be issued in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022, with the FAO as the assessing officer. The time spent during the litigation was excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices.

The High Court held that the Settlement Commission's approach in dismissing the application was flawed. It noted that no communication was sent to the applicants requesting reconstruction of the record or supplying copies of the application and relied documents. The attempt to reconstruct the file was made by the department without involving the petitioners, leaving them without a remedy and without fault on their part. The Court found that the mode adopted by the Commission was improper and contrary to its own earlier directions. Therefore, the impugned order of the Settlement Commission was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the Commission for a fresh decision on the application. The applicants were directed to appear before the concerned authority on April 21, 2025. The ratio decidendi is that a Settlement Commission cannot dismiss an application for non-cooperation in reconstructing records without affording the applicant a proper opportunity and clear communication, especially when prior court orders mandate a decision on merits after assessing the cause of delay.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed. It ruled that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) shall not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as doing so weakens Section 151A and may lead to its diminished activation. The Court emphasized that for assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, in light of the sanction under Section 151A, adherence must be made to the algorithm-based random assessing system. The Court reasoned that the faceless assessment scheme, including the automated allocation mechanism, was introduced to enhance efficiency, transparency, and impartiality, and allowing JAOs to issue such notices would defeat this legislative purpose and create parallel jurisdictions. Consequently, the impugned notices were quashed and set aside concerning the jurisdiction of JAOs to issue them. The Court granted liberty to the respondents to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022, with the FAO as the assessing officer. The time spent during the litigation was excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed, and there is no way to circumvent it. The Court ruled that the Joint Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as doing so would weaken Section 151A and potentially lead to its diminished activation. For assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, in light of the sanction under Section 151A, adherence to the algorithm-based random assessing system is mandatory. Consequently, the impugned notices issued by JAOs were quashed and set aside. The Court clarified that for issuing fresh notices, if required, the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) should be the assessing officer, and the time spent during the litigation would be excluded for computing the limitation period. The Court emphasized that the legislative intention behind the faceless regime and technological integration for automated allocation must be upheld.

The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer (AO) failed to apply his mind to the information suggesting escaped assessment, as required by Section 148A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The initial notice incorrectly stated purchases instead of sales, and the AO's subsequent change in stance indicated a lack of independent application of mind. The Tribunal emphasized that the AO must have a prima facie ground for reopening and cannot conduct a fishing or roving inquiry. Furthermore, the AO's failure to supply the material relied upon to the petitioner, despite a specific request, denied the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to object, violating the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal noted that the AO brushed aside the petitioner's documentary evidence supporting sales transactions, including transportation documents and GST-compliant invoices. The non-compliance with the mandatory procedure under Section 148A vitiated the proceedings. The writ petition was allowed, and the impugned order and consequent proceedings were quashed.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed, and there is no alternative to adhering to it. The Court ruled that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) shall not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as doing so would weaken Section 151A and potentially diminish its activation. For assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, in light of the sanction under Section 151A, strict adherence to the algorithm-based random assessing system is required. Consequently, the impugned notices issued by JAOs were quashed and set aside concerning their jurisdiction to issue such notices. The Court granted liberty to the respondents to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022, with the FAO as the assessing officer. The time spent during the pendency of the litigation was excluded for computing the limitation period for issuing fresh notices.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed. It ruled that the Joint Assessing Officer (JAO) shall not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as this would weaken Section 151A and potentially lead to its diminished activation. The Court emphasized that for assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, in light of the sanction under Section 151A, adherence to an algorithm-based random assessing system is mandatory. Consequently, the impugned notices issued by JAOs were quashed and set aside concerning their jurisdiction. The Court clarified that the time spent during the litigation would be excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices, if necessary, and that such fresh notices should be issued by the FAO in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022. The ratio decidendi is that the faceless assessment scheme, particularly the automated allocation mechanism mandated by Section 151A, is crucial for transparency and efficiency, and any deviation by local authorities undermines legislative intent.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed, and there is no way to circumvent it. The Court ruled that a Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) shall not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as doing so would weaken Section 151A and potentially lead to its diminished activation. For assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, in light of the sanction under Section 151A, adherence must be made to the algorithm-based random assessing system. Consequently, the impugned notices issued by JAOs were quashed and set aside. The Court clarified that for issuing fresh notices, if needed, the respondents must comply with the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022, keeping the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) as the assessing officer. The time spent during the pendency of the litigation was excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed. It ruled that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as this would weaken Section 151A and potentially lead to its diminished activation. The Court reasoned that for assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, in light of the sanction under Section 151A, adherence to the algorithm-based random assessing system is mandatory. Consequently, the impugned notices issued by JAOs were quashed and set aside concerning their jurisdiction. The Court clarified that the time spent during the litigation would be excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices, if necessary, in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated March 29, 2022, with the FAO as the assessing officer. The Court explicitly left undecided the broader implications of Section 144B for notices under Sections 147 & 148, stating it was not relevant for the purpose of issuing notices under Sections 147 & 148.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed, and there is no way to circumvent it. The Court ruled that the Joint Assessing Officer (JAO) shall not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as doing so would weaken Section 151A and potentially diminish its activation. For assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, in light of the sanction under Section 151A, adherence to the algorithm-based random assessing system is mandatory. The Court found that the impugned notices, issued by JAOs, did not withstand the broader scheme of law requiring automated allocation based on algorithms and random assignment of the assessing officer. Consequently, the impugned notices were quashed and set aside concerning the jurisdiction of JAOs. The Court granted liberty to the respondents to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022, by keeping the FAO as the assessing officer. The time spent during the pendency of the litigation was excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed, and there is no way to circumvent it. The Court found that the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act, as doing so weakens Section 151A and may lead to its diminished activation. For assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, in light of the sanction under Section 151A, adherence to the algorithm-based random assessing system is mandatory. Consequently, the impugned notices were quashed and set aside concerning the jurisdiction of JAOs to issue them. The Court granted liberty to the respondents to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated March 29, 2022, by keeping the FAO as the assessing officer. The time spent during the pendency of the litigation was excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices, if needed.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed. It ruled that the Joint Assessing Officer (JAO) does not have the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Act. The Court reasoned that allowing JAOs to issue such notices would weaken Section 151A and diminish its activation. For assessment and reassessment under Sections 147, 148, and 148A, with sanction under Section 151A, adherence to the algorithm-based random assessing system is mandatory. Consequently, the impugned notices issued by JAOs were quashed and set aside. The Court directed that fresh notices, if required, must be issued in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated 29.03.2022, with the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) as the assessing officer. The time spent during the litigation was excluded for computing the limitation period for issuing fresh notices.

The High Court held that the mandate of Section 151A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, must be strictly followed. The Court found that the notices issued under Section 148 of the Act by the Joint Assessing Officer (JAO) were invalid due to a jurisdictional error. The Court reasoned that the legislative intent behind Section 151A, coupled with the CBDT Scheme, was to strengthen the revenue assessment system through faceless proceedings and automated allocation via algorithms. Allowing JAOs to issue such notices would create concurrent and parallel jurisdictions, leading to confusion and defeating the purpose of the faceless regime and the provisions of Sections 144B, 147, and 148 of the Act. The Court emphasized that the scheme clearly demarcates the role of the FAO as the jurisdictional authority for such matters. Therefore, the impugned notices were quashed and set aside concerning the jurisdiction of JAOs. The Court granted liberty to the respondents to issue fresh notices in compliance with the CBDT Notification dated March 29, 2022, by keeping the FAO as the assessing officer. The time spent during the litigation was excluded for computing the limitation for issuing fresh notices.

The High Court held that Section 127 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, empowers the transfer of cases and mandates a procedure, including providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee and passing a reasoned order, unless the transfer is within the same city. In this case, the transfer was between different districts (Jaipur to Bikaner), and it was undisputed that no opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner. The impugned order was also found to be bereft of reasons. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Ajantha Industries, the Court found that the principles of natural justice were not complied with. Consequently, the impugned order dated 17.11.2017 and all consequent proceedings were quashed. The department was granted liberty to proceed in accordance with law. The present writ petition was disposed of in the same terms.

The Tribunal noted that the tax effect in the appeals was below Rupees Two Crores. In view of the circular of the Central Board of Direct Taxes dated 17.09.2024, the learned counsel for the appellant (CIT) sought permission to withdraw the appeals. The Tribunal accordingly dismissed the appeals as withdrawn. The substantial question of law, if any formulated, was kept open. The department was granted liberty to move an appropriate application for revival if the need arises.

The High Court held that penal proceedings cannot be initiated merely because it is lawful to do so, unless the conduct of the assessee is malicious or contumacious, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Hindustan Steel Ltd. versus State of Orissa. The Court noted that the explanation provided by the petitioners for the delay in TDS deposit, attributing it to e-commerce transactions and delays in bill submissions by companies like Amazon, Naaptol, and Ebay, was neither doubted nor rejected. It was undisputed that the TDS was deposited voluntarily along with interest before the show cause notice was issued. The Court found that delayed compliance with the provisions of deducting and depositing TDS, standing alone, is not sufficient grounds for granting prosecution sanction. Given that the writ petition has been pending since 2018 with interim protection and no prosecution launched, and considering the explanation provided by the petitioners, the Court concluded that no case was made out for prosecution. Consequently, the impugned order granting sanction for prosecution was set aside. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided.

The Tribunal granted the appellant's (CIT) request to withdraw the appeals. The reason for withdrawal was the tax effect being below Rupees Two Crores, as per a CBDT circular dated 17.09.2024. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the formulated substantial question of law, though not detailed in the judgment, was kept open. The department was granted liberty to move an appropriate application for revival if the need arose. No findings on the merits of the case were made.

The High Court decided to dispose of the appeal as withdrawn. The reasoning provided was that the assessee had already availed of the Vivad Se Vishwas Act/Scheme. Consequently, the Revenue's counsel informed the Court that they had instructions not to pursue the instant appeal. The High Court accepted this submission and disposed of the appeal accordingly. No specific findings on the merits of the original tax dispute were made, as the appeal was withdrawn before any substantive adjudication. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal as withdrawn.

The tribunal erred in directing the notional interest to be taxed as income under Section 56(2)(vii)(b). The section does not create a fiction to tax notional interest on delayed payments, and the addition was made without any specific charging provision or finding of actual income earned.

The High Court disposed of the appeal as not pressed. The appellant was granted liberty to approach the Tribunal and raise the grievance concerning the production of documents substantiating purchases before it. The court did not decide the merits of the case. No specific finding was given on any substantive issue, and no ratio decidendi can be extracted for future citation. The operative direction was to allow the appellant to approach the Tribunal with the stated liberty.

The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The Court noted that the petitioner sought to withdraw the petition in view of subsequent events and with liberty to pursue remedies available under the law against the assessment order. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as withdrawn. Any pending applications were also disposed of as dismissed. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to take such remedies as may be available to him under the law against the assessment order. No specific findings were made on the merits of the assessment order itself.

The High Court condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It reasoned that there was uncertainty regarding the applicable exemption notification and the university acted on legal advice, justifying the delay.

The High Court did not decide the merits of any substantive issue. The learned counsel for the respondent revenue, on instructions, submitted that prosecution had not been initiated till date. In light of this submission, the learned counsel for the petitioners stated that they were not pressing the petitions. The Court, therefore, dismissed the petitions as not pressed, granting liberty to the petitioners to avail remedies in accordance with law if the need arises in the future. No specific finding was given on the legality of any action by the revenue, nor was any amount in dispute quantified or decided. The principle that can be derived is that a High Court may permit withdrawal of a writ petition if the respondent states that the action complained of has not yet been initiated, and the petitioner seeks to withdraw with liberty to approach the court again if the situation so warrants.

The High Court held that the Assessing Officer had considered the petitioner's reply, but found the explanation regarding the source of funds for the property purchase, specifically the mother's contribution, to be doubtful due to the absence of supporting documentary evidence like the mother's bank statement. The Court emphasized that the purpose of proceedings under Section 148A is to determine if an assessment can be reopened, not to conduct a full assessment. It reiterated that in writ jurisdiction under Article 226, the Court scrutinizes the decision-making process, not the decision itself, unless there is a violation of law, principles of natural justice, or patent arbitrariness. The Court found no such violations. It concluded that a deeper examination of facts would be required by the Assessing Officer during the assessment proceedings. Therefore, the Court declined to interfere in writ jurisdiction and dismissed the petition, leaving the petitioner to submit all explanations to the Assessing Officer.

The High Court, without commenting on the merits of the case, acknowledged the significant delay in deciding the appeal, which had been pending for over five years. The Court noted that interim protection had been in place since 2019. Consequently, the petition was disposed of with a direction to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) to decide the appeal within three months from the date of receiving a certified copy of the order. The interim protection granted to the petitioner was extended to continue until the appeal was heard and decided. The Court's reasoning was primarily based on the need for timely resolution of appeals and the prolonged period of pendency.

The High Court, without commenting on the merits of the case, disposed of the writ petitions. The court took into account the fact that interim protection had been in favour of the petitioners since 2020 and that their appeals had not been decided for over four years. Consequently, the Court directed the first Appellate Authority to decide the appeals within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order. The interim protection granted to the petitioners was extended to continue until the appeals are heard and decided. The court's reasoning was primarily based on the inordinate delay in the disposal of appeals and the need for expeditious resolution, rather than a determination on the validity of the 20% deposit demand itself.

The High Court held that the writ petition is devoid of merit and dismissed it. The Court found that the WhatsApp chats were not vague but were corroborated by specific transactions related to the petitioner, Giriraj Pugalia, who is the proprietor of M/s. Ratan Industries. The judgment noted that the petitioner had purchased plots No. SP 818-(II)-3 & 818-(II)-4 from Om Metal Infotech Private Limited, and this sale and purchase was established with specific information for a particular year. The Court observed that the WhatsApp chats clearly reflected details of cash payments amounting to Rs. 48,00,000 on February 8, 2019, Rs. 52,00,000, and other substantial cash transactions totaling Rs. 4,52,62,000, as detailed in the satisfaction note. The Court reasoned that these specific inputs, including the details of cash transactions and the purchase of plots, could not be considered vague and therefore did not violate the strict parameters of Section 153C. The Court distinguished the cited judgments, stating they did not assist the petitioner's case. The ratio decidendi is that specific, corroborated digital evidence like WhatsApp chats detailing cash transactions for identified assets can form the basis for initiating proceedings under Section 153C, even if no physical documents were seized from the searched entity, provided the satisfaction note is specific and supported by such evidence.

The Tribunal held that the contention of the petitioner that it is a case of change of opinion and that the entire material was before the assessing authority is rejected. The assessment order passed under Section 143(3) was found to be cryptic, lacking discussion on any issue or deductions claimed. The proviso to Section 147 of the Act, as it existed at the relevant time, allows for reassessment after four years if income has escaped assessment due to the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The Tribunal noted that the assessing officer concluded that there was an escapement of assessment due to the petitioner's failure to disclose necessary material. Specifically, the escapement related to Minimum Alternative Tax (MAT) on book profits, arising from the petitioner availing a deduction of Rs. 1,64,51,540/- for 'Profit of Sick Industrial Company till net worth is equal to or exceeds accumulated losses' without the necessary sanction from the CBDT for exemption from Section 115JB(2)(ii) of the Act. The contention that the notice was time-barred was considered a mixed question of fact and law, not determinable in writ jurisdiction. The writ petition was dismissed, with liberty to the petitioner to raise all issues at an appropriate stage.

The High Court held that Section 127 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, empowers the transfer of cases and prescribes a procedure that includes providing the assessee with a reasonable opportunity of being heard and passing a reasoned order. An exception exists under sub-section (3) where transfer is within the same city, which is not applicable here as the transfer was between Jaipur and Bikaner, different districts. It was undisputed that no opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner before passing the impugned order. Furthermore, the impugned order was found to be bereft of reasons. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Ajantha Industries (supra), which set aside transfer orders where reasons were not communicated. In this case, not only were reasons not communicated, but no opportunity of hearing was granted. Consequently, the impugned order dated 17.11.2017 and the proceedings consequent thereto were quashed. The department was granted liberty to proceed in accordance with law.

The High Court held that the petitioner cannot be allowed to pursue two concurrent remedies. The Court observed that the petitioner had already filed an appeal, which is an alternative remedy. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed. The Court explicitly stated that the issue remains open for consideration in the appeal. No specific amount in dispute or assessment year was mentioned in the judgment. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition, leaving the issue open for appellate consideration.

The tribunal found that the postal seal on the acknowledgment card was dated long after the complaint was filed and the sworn statement recorded, indicating the statutory notice was not received. Additionally, material alterations were visible on the cheque.

The Tribunal allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The court granted liberty to the petitioner to raise all their pleas before the assessing officer at an appropriate stage. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the case, as the petition was disposed of based on the petitioner's request for withdrawal. The ratio decidendi is that a party can withdraw a writ petition with liberty to pursue remedies before the original authority, provided such liberty is granted by the court.

The High Court held that transfer is a matter of administrative exigency and the court generally exercises restraint in intervening unless there is a flagrant legal violation, malafide, or extreme hardship. The prerogative to transfer an official rests solely with the employer, dictated by administrative necessity. The court found no indication that the petitioner had endured any exceptional hardship warranting judicial interference. Consequently, the court found no grounds for intervention. The challenge to the transfer order was rendered infructuous due to the petitioner having already assumed charge at the transferred location in the absence of any stay order. The court dismissed the writ petition.