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327 orders · Page 7 of 7
The High Court held that the previous judgment of a Co-ordinate Bench dated December 21, 2017, in M/s. Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-2, Ajmer (D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 298/2016 and other connected matters) squarely covered the present appeals. In that prior judgment, the High Court had found that the assessee-company was covered by the Notification issued by the State Government on January 18, 2002. Consequently, the basis of the ITAT's consideration, treating the assessee under the Companies Act, was deemed to be based on wrong presumptions and required reconsideration. The High Court quashed and set aside the order of the Tribunal and remitted the matters back to the Tribunal. The Tribunal was directed to reconsider the matters after taking into consideration the Notification of 2002, allowing parties to raise all contentions and place all relevant documents. The High Court also directed the Tribunal to decide the present and earlier set of appeals within six months from March 7, 2019.
The High Court held that the previous judgment of a Co-ordinate Bench dated December 21, 2017, in M/s. Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-2, Ajmer (D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 298/2016 and other connected matters) squarely covered the present appeals. In that prior judgment, the High Court had found that the assessee-company was covered by the Notification issued by the State Government on January 18, 2002. Consequently, the basis of the ITAT's consideration, treating the assessee under the Companies Act, was deemed to be based on wrong presumptions and required reconsideration. The High Court quashed and set aside the order of the Tribunal and remitted the matters back to the Tribunal. The Tribunal was directed to reconsider the matters after taking into consideration the Notification of 2002, allowing parties to raise all contentions and place all relevant documents. The High Court also directed the Tribunal to decide the present and earlier set of appeals within six months from March 7, 2019.
The High Court held that the appeals were squarely covered by its previous judgment dated December 21, 2017. Consequently, the order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was set aside. The matters were remanded back to the ITAT with a direction to reconsider them in light of the Notification dated January 18, 2002. Parties were granted liberty to place all supporting documents before the ITAT. The High Court also noted that the earlier set of appeals, remanded in 2017, had not yet been decided despite over a year lapse. Therefore, a specific direction was issued for the ITAT to decide both the present and earlier set of appeals within six months from March 7, 2019. The ratio decidendi is that if a statutory notification impacts the status of an assessee, the tax authorities and the Tribunal must consider it, and failure to do so warrants a remand for reconsideration.
The High Court held that the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. The reasoning provided is that an earlier appeal filed by the Revenue against the identical common order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (dated 21.02.2018) in a related matter (DB Income Tax Appeal No. 148/2018: Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax Central, Jaipur Vs. Daksha Jain) had already been dismissed by this Court on 30.10.2018. Therefore, following its own precedent, the Court dismissed the current appeal. No specific issue was decided on merits; the dismissal was based on the principle of res judicata or consistency with prior judicial pronouncements. No operative directions were issued other than the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court dismissed the appeal. The reasoning was based on a previous judgment of the same Court dated 30.10.2018 in DB Income Tax Appeal No. 148/2018, titled Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax Central, Jaipur Vs. Daksha Jain. In that prior case, the Revenue's appeal against the same common order of the ITAT (dated 21.02.2018 in ITA No. 365/JODH/2017) was dismissed. The Court found that the present appeal was identical in nature and therefore, it should also be dismissed in light of the precedent set by the Daksha Jain judgment. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal. No issues were left undecided.
The High Court held that the present appeal filed by the Revenue should be dismissed. This decision was based on the High Court's own prior judgment dated 30.10.2018 in DB Income Tax Appeal No. 149/2018, wherein a similar appeal filed by the Revenue against the same common order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (dated 21.02.2018) concerning the respondent assessee, Shri Virendra Modi, was dismissed. The reasoning is that the principle of stare decisis dictates that the court should follow its own previous decisions on similar matters. Therefore, in light of the binding precedent established by the court's earlier judgment in the case of Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax Central, Jaipur Vs. Virendra Modi, the present appeal is dismissed. No specific issue was left undecided; the appeal was disposed of on the basis of the prior ruling.
The High Court held that no question of law arises from the ITAT's order. The Tribunal, in its impugned order dated 28.05.2018, had remitted the matter back to the Assessing Officer (AO) for fresh adjudication. This decision was based on previous orders of the Tribunal in RIICO's own cases for Assessment Year 2007-08 and subsequent years (2009-10 to 2012-13). In those prior decisions, the Tribunal had also restored similar issues concerning the valuation of encroached/litigated land to the AO for proper verification and enquiry. The Tribunal directed the assessee to produce all relevant facts regarding each piece of land under litigation/encroachment to determine its actual status and value. The High Court found no reason to interfere with this consistent approach of the Tribunal, which aimed to ensure proper verification by the AO before a final decision on the merits. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that it would not be appropriate to decide the present appeal on merits. This was because a fresh assessment order had been passed on 28.12.2018, in terms of the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Court noted that the assessee had the opportunity to participate in the proceedings before the Assessing Officer and present its case. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed as having become infructuous. The appellant was, however, granted liberty to appeal against the fresh assessment order and challenge it on all available legal grounds.
The High Court held that the appeal was to be disposed of in terms of the Supreme Court's judgment dated 03.08.2018. The Supreme Court had taken note that the ex-parte decision of the ITAT was due to the non-appearance of the appellant-assessee's counsel owing to a general strike by lawyers. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and the ITAT, and restored the appeal to the file of the ITAT for disposal on merits. The High Court directed that the matter be consigned to record as disposed of in light of the Supreme Court's order. No specific finding on the merits of the original dispute was made by the High Court in this proceeding.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the CIT (Appeals), Bikaner, to decide the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the assessment order for Assessment Year 2012-13 within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order. The court also ordered that the interim order previously passed by the High Court, which stayed coercive action for recovery of the demand provided the petitioner furnished a solvent surety, shall continue until the disposal of the appeal. The court did not explicitly rule on the jurisdiction of the CIT (Appeals) to pass interim orders but provided a practical resolution by expediting the appeal process and extending the interim protection.
The High Court held that both writ petitions have become infructuous. The reasoning provided is that the parties are in agreement that a final order of assessment has been passed by the Assessing Authority. Consequently, the Court dismissed both writ petitions. The operative direction is the dismissal of the petitions. No specific issue was decided on merits, as the petitions were disposed of on procedural grounds.
The High Court held that both writ petitions have become infructuous. The reasoning provided is that the parties are in agreement that a final order of assessment has been passed by the Assessing Authority. Consequently, the Court dismissed both writ petitions. The operative direction is the dismissal of the petitions. No specific issue was decided on merits, as the petitions were disposed of on procedural grounds.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. Firstly, the court noted the significant delay of 4 years in challenging the 2004 and 2006 recovery notices. Secondly, it observed that the ITAT had already passed an order on 27.02.2009, reassessing the petitioner's income and allowing deductions, and that the Department had complied by offering a refund, which the petitioner refused. Thirdly, the court found that the petitioner had not challenged the ITAT's order, implying satisfaction with its outcome. Therefore, the court concluded that the petitioner had not pursued available remedies effectively. The petitioner was, however, left free to collect the refund amount if he chose to do so.
The High Court observed that the assessment order dated November 29, 2018, was already under challenge before the Appellate Authority in an appeal filed by the petitioner. Therefore, the Court deemed it just and proper to grant liberty to the petitioner to pursue the pending appeal. The Court directed the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal preferably within a period of two months from the production of a certified copy of the High Court's order. Regarding the petitioner's prayer for staying the demand, the Court noted the respondent's submission that the petitioner could file an appropriate application for staying the recovery before the Appellate Authority, as it also holds jurisdiction for such matters. Consequently, the petitioner was given liberty to file an appropriate application before the Appellate Authority in this regard. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions and observations. No specific finding was given on the merits of the jurisdictional challenge.
The High Court held that it did not find any substantial question of law arising from the present appeal. The Court noted that the Tribunal, in dismissing the revenue's appeal, had considered the specific facts of the discrepancy in the amount shown in Form 26AS compared to the books of account. The Tribunal observed that bills including service tax were raised, and TDS was deducted inclusive of service tax. The revenue had not presented any facts or material to contradict the factual details recorded by the CIT(A). The CIT(A) had found that the assessee's declared receipts were higher than those shown in Form 26AS, and the difference was attributable to the service tax component on which TDS was made. Therefore, the CIT(A) concluded that the AO was not justified in making the addition, and the Tribunal upheld this finding. The High Court, agreeing with the Tribunal's assessment of the lack of a substantial question of law, dismissed the appeal.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. Regarding the first issue, the Court found that the SLSC had erroneously misconstrued the decision of the BIDI and extended the benefit of sub-clause (vii) of the RIPS-2003, which had been deleted. This action was deemed prejudicial to the interest of the State revenue. The Court noted that the petitioner was entitled to only a 50% tax subsidy. The revision by the State Government under Clause 13 was justified because the SLSC's decision was not competent and resulted in money being paid from the State coffers to which the petitioner was not entitled. The Court also addressed the challenge to Clause 13 of the RIPS-2003, stating that the petitioner was aware of this clause when applying for and availing benefits, thus implying a waiver of objections. The Court held that such a revisionary power is necessary for the protection of the public exchequer and is valid. The petitioners failed to demonstrate any violation of fundamental rights, constitutional provisions, or enactments, nor did they prove manifest arbitrariness. The revisionary power was exercised within the stipulated five-year period after the benefits were fully availed, making the argument of unreasonableness or arbitrariness without merit. The Court found no merit in the writ petition.
The High Court allowed the review application and recalled its order dated 02.11.2016. The Court found that the revenue's appeal, which was on the issue of valuation of excess stock, was indeed disposed of as if it related to bogus purchases, a fact not denied by the revenue's counsel. The Court reasoned that this mischaracterization warranted recalling the order. Furthermore, in view of the reassessment and demand created against the assessee following the recalled order, the Court directed status quo with regard to any demand created. Consequently, no amount based on the reassessment order passed subsequent to the recalled order of 02.11.2016 was to be recovered from the assessee until further orders. The Court directed that DB Income Tax Appeal No. 330/2011 be listed for admission.
The High Court held that the findings of the CCIT regarding the alleged financial crunch not being the reason for the delay in filing the return and depositing advance tax, and it not being an unavoidable circumstance for claiming waiver under clause (d) of paragraph (2) of the CBDT Circular dated 26.6.06, were not capricious or perverse. The CCIT had considered the petitioner's financial crisis objectively, noting that the company received substantial subsidies (Rs. 2285.79 lacs) during the year, including arrears. The CCIT observed a continuous increase in turnover and profits, with sufficient cash balances in the relevant and preceding years, and highlighted that the petitioner earned its highest profit in AY 2011-12. Furthermore, the CCIT found the petitioner to be a habitual defaulter in advance tax payments. The Court also noted that paragraph (3) of the CBDT Circular dated 26.6.06 specifies that the class of cases in paragraph (2)(a) and (2)(d) are for waiver of interest under Section 234A only, meaning waiver under Section 234B and 234C could not be claimed on the strength of paragraph 2(d). Therefore, no case for interference under Article 226 was made out.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in allowing the appeal filed by the assessee. This decision was based on the reasoning provided in a detailed order for a connected appeal (DB Income Tax Appeal No.168/2018) which involved an identical question of law. Although the specific reasoning for the ITAT's original decision is not elaborated in this judgment, the High Court affirmed the ITAT's conclusion that the assessee's appeal was rightly allowed. The question of law formulated by the High Court was answered in favor of the assessee, confirming the Tribunal's justification in its decision. No issue was expressly left undecided.