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327 orders · Page 6 of 7
The High Court directed the respondents to reconsider the TDS deduction on the compensation awarded to the petitioners, taking into account the amendment made in Section 194LA of the Income Tax Act, 1961, by the Finance Act, 2017, effective from April 1, 2017. The Court held that if, after this re-computation, TDS is found not to be leviable, it shall not be levied. Furthermore, if TDS has already been unlawfully levied, it shall be refunded. The respondents were given a period of three months to take the necessary decision. The principle established is that TDS under Section 194LA is not to be deducted on compensation for acquired agricultural land if such award or agreement is exempted under Section 96 of the Act of 2013, especially after the amendment to Section 194LA.
The High Court held that the Benami Amendment Act, 2016, amending the Principal Benami Act, 1988, which was enacted and enforced w.e.f. November 1, 2016, cannot have retrospective effect. The Court reasoned that the amendments introduced by the legislature affect substantive rights of the parties and must be applied prospectively. It relied on the Supreme Court's decision in R. Rajagopal Reddy v. Padmini Chandrasekharan, which held that the Benami Act, as a whole, creates substantive rights and liabilities and is not merely procedural or declaratory. The Court distinguished the present case from others cited by the petitioners (Mohar Singh, Zile Singh, Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd., Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd., Harbanslal Sahnia) as those dealt with different legal principles or factual matrices. The Court explicitly stated that it had neither examined nor commented upon the merits of the individual writ applications but had focused solely on the larger question of retrospective applicability. The authority concerned is directed to examine each case on its own merits, keeping in view that the amended provisions are prospective.
The High Court held that the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016, which amended the Principal Benami Act, 1988, and was enforced from November 1, 2016, cannot have retrospective effect. The Court reasoned that the amendments introduced by the legislature affect substantive rights of the parties and must be applied prospectively. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in R. Rajagopal Reddy v. Padmini Chandrasekharan, the Court emphasized that the Benami Act, as a whole, creates substantive rights and liabilities, and therefore, its provisions, including amendments, should not be applied retrospectively unless the law expressly or by clear intention indicates otherwise. The Court clarified that it had not examined the merits of the individual writ applications but had focused solely on the larger question of the retrospective applicability of the 2016 Amendment Act. The authority concerned would examine each case on its own merits, keeping in mind that the amended provisions are prospective. The batch of writ applications was disposed of accordingly.
The High Court held that the Benami Amendment Act, 2016, which amended the Principal Benami Act, 1988, and was enforced from November 1, 2016, cannot have retrospective effect. The Court reasoned that the amendments introduced by the legislature affect substantive rights of the parties and, therefore, must be applied prospectively. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in R. Rajagopal Reddy v. Padmini Chandrasekharan, which established that the Benami Act, in its entirety, creates substantive rights and liabilities and thus cannot have retrospective operation. The Court noted that the Supreme Court had also declined to grant special leave to appeal against an opinion on this matter. The Court clarified that it had not examined the merits of the individual writ applications but had focused solely on the question of the retrospective applicability of the Benami Amendment Act, 2016. The authorities are directed to examine each case on its own merits, keeping in mind that the amended provisions are prospective.
The High Court held that the CAT's finding regarding the lack of proper authorization was justified. The Court observed that the documents filed by the petitioner did not comply with Rule 7 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Rules of Practice, 1993. Furthermore, Annexure-6, relied upon by the petitioner, was deemed to be on plain paper without sufficient details about the union's office or office bearers, thus not inspiring confidence in its veracity. The Court also noted that a writ petition challenging a common order in two OAs, including the one under consideration, had been dismissed as withdrawn, meaning the Tribunal's findings had attained finality. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as devoid of merit.
The High Court held that the directions issued by the Commissioner under Section 263 were warranted, considering the reasons specifically recorded by the PCIT. The Court noted that the AO did not expressly deal with the claim of loss amounting to Rs. 6.61 Crores, which was sought to be set off against profits. Furthermore, the Commissioner observed that the issue of shortage in the MTP account, involving a significant quantity and value (4775 Qtl. worth Rs. 1,74,37,481/-), was not even raised by the AO or explained by the assessee during the assessment, constituting a serious mistake. The Court opined that the lack of significant discussion of every argument by the ITAT did not constitute a substantial question of law. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court admitted the appeal and framed specific questions of law for determination. The judgment indicates that the ITAT had previously dismissed the department's appeal, confirming the decision of the CIT(A) in deleting certain additions and disallowances. Specifically, the ITAT had allowed a deduction under Section 80-IA, deleted an addition made by the AO for apportioning expenses and depreciation between HO and CPP, and deleted a disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) for non-deduction of tax at source on payments to a subsidiary. The High Court has not yet ruled on the merits of these issues; it has only admitted the appeal and framed the questions of law. The operative directions are to issue notice and list the matter for hearing along with other related appeals. No specific finding or ratio decidendi has been established by the High Court in this order, as it is an admission order.
The Tribunal held that the approach of setting aside the search assessment on the ground that no fresh materials were seized or discerned during the search was correct. This reasoning conforms to the view taken by the Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-III vs. Kabul Chawla (380 ITR 573), a judgment that has been followed by various High Courts, including the Rajasthan High Court. Consequently, the Tribunal found that no substantial question of law arose for consideration. The appeal filed by the Revenue was accordingly dismissed. The judgment does not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The High Court held that the learned Single Judge was justified in quashing the reassessment notice. The original assessment order was framed under Section 143(3), indicating a scrutiny of all claims. The Court relied on *Commissioner of Income – Tax, Delhi Vs. Kelvinator of India Ltd.* (2010) 187 Taxman 312 (SC), which held that for a valid reopening of an assessment completed under Section 143(3), the Revenue must possess tangible material outside the existing record. A mere second opinion or review of existing material is impermissible. The Court found no allegation of suppression or mis-declaration by the assessee, and the Assessing Officer had considered all claims during the original assessment. The mere fact that the AO might have overlooked some provisions, in the absence of tangible material, did not afford an opportunity for reassessment. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the reasons provided by the assessee to explain the delay of 998 days were vague and could not constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The court found the explanation of the clerk's mistake and subsequent family problems to be insufficient to justify such a significant delay. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was dismissed. As the appeal was filed with an inordinate and unexplained delay, the court dismissed the appeal itself. No decision was made on the merits of the original ITAT judgment.
The High Court held that the Tribunal was justified in setting aside the order passed by the PCIT under Section 263. The Court found that the Tribunal had analytically examined all arguments and noted that the AO had indeed made inquiries. The AO had issued a query letter requesting details of fixed asset additions and supporting documents, including the valuation report. The assessee had provided a valuation report dated May 14, 2013, and also submitted documents related to the term loan from the bank, including the project report. The Tribunal concluded that the project report submitted with the bank was an estimated future cost, not the actual cost incurred. The Court agreed with the Tribunal's finding that the AO was satisfied with the cost of fixed assets as recorded in the books of accounts, which was supported by a valuation report. The Court emphasized that the project report could not constitute the actual cost of construction once the assessee had recorded the actual cost, which was verified by the AO. The Court further noted that the PCIT was not sure about the correctness of the cost of construction and had set aside the AO's order solely for the purpose of referring the matter to the DVO. The Court reiterated the principle that if the AO has taken one of the possible views permissible in law, the PCIT cannot invoke Section 263 simply because he disagrees with the AO's view. The Court cited the Supreme Court judgment in Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala State, to clarify that not every loss of revenue is prejudicial to the interest of the revenue, especially when the AO has taken a view that is sustainable in law. Therefore, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
The High Court directed the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions), Jaipur, to adjudicate the petitioner's application under Section 12AA and 10(23)(C) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court acknowledged the delay in adjudication beyond the six-month period but emphasized that the adjudication should proceed irrespective of this delay. The decision was guided by the opinions of the Division Benches in Commissioner of Income Vs. Vijay Vargiya Vani Charitable Trust and Chief Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Geetanjali University Trust, which dealt with the criteria for granting registration and approval to educational institutions. The Court instructed the Commissioner to consider the law declared in these precedents. The adjudication should be done expeditiously, preferably within two months of presenting a certified copy of the order. No specific issue was left undecided, as the core grievance was the lack of adjudication.
The High Court held that the present appeals should be dismissed, following its own previous decision in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Rajasthan Housing Board (D.B.Income Tax Appeal No.193/2017 and connected cases decided on 27.11.2017). The Court clarified that the parties would be finally bound by the ultimate decision on the question of law to be rendered by the Supreme Court in the appeals pending before it. The reasoning for dismissal was based on the pendency of the SLP before the Supreme Court and the prior Division Bench judgment of the High Court. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeals with a clarification regarding the finality of the Supreme Court's decision. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the order rejecting the appeal had a material bearing on the case and its omission to consider the VDI Scheme declaration by the petitioner's wife appeared to be an error on the face of the record. Consequently, the review petitions were allowed, and the appeals were restored to their original numbers. The High Court directed that the income-tax appeals be listed for further hearing. The principle established is that if a material fact, which was declared and accepted under a scheme like the VDI Scheme, is omitted from consideration by the appellate court, it can constitute an error apparent on the face of the record, warranting a review. No specific issue was left undecided.
The High Court held that no question of law arose for consideration on the first issue concerning the arm's length price (ALP). The court noted that the TPO's adjustment was at a margin of 4.06%, while the assessee had offered an adjustment of 1.63%. Since this difference was within the tolerance zone of less than 5%, it could not have resulted in any addition, rendering the first question of law non-existent. Regarding the second issue of deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e), the court observed that the ITAT had relied on its previous decisions in identical circumstances concerning the assessee. Furthermore, the Tribunal's order on this point had been affirmed by a Division Bench of the High Court in a prior appeal (The Commissioner of Income Tax, Alwar. Vs. M/s Vijay Solvex Limited). Consequently, the court concluded that no question of law arose on this issue either. As there was no merit in the appeal, it was dismissed.
The High Court held that the question of law was covered by a Division Bench ruling of the same court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. M/S. State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur [(2014) 363 ITR 70 (Raj.)]. This ruling stated that a conjoint reading of the proviso to Section 43-B (as amended) and the explanation to Section 36(1)(va) indicated that employer's contribution, if paid prior to the due date of filing the return, could be claimed as a deduction. The court found the revenue's contention not tenable, as deductions for payments under Section 139 are permissible only if statutory liabilities are paid within the due dates under respective enactments, not under the due date of filing the return. However, the court noted that the aforementioned judgment was subject to an appeal before the Supreme Court. Therefore, the present order was made subject to the final decision of the Supreme Court in the pending Special Leave Petition or any appeal arising from it. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, subject to the final decision.
The High Court held that the first question concerning the disallowance of an expense claimed under Section 37(1) was set aside by the ITAT. The court noted that for previous years, a common judgment upheld similar expenditure, making the ITAT's order reasonable. Regarding the contribution to the State Renewal Fund, the court followed its previous decision in Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax v. M/s. Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation Ltd., which in turn relied on Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Rajasthan State Seed Corporation Ltd. The court reiterated that expenditure for the welfare and benefit of employees, even if a legal obligation, is an allowable deduction under Section 37(1) as it is for business expediency. For the third and fourth questions concerning provident fund contributions, the court acknowledged that its decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v. M/s. State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur binds the issue against the revenue. However, it noted that a special leave petition is pending before the Supreme Court, and thus, these questions, though answered against the appellant, are subject to the final order of the Supreme Court.
The High Court held that there was no merit in the revenue's appeal. Regarding the first issue, the court found the reduction of the ALP determination on interest, by applying LIBOR rates, to be reasonable. This was because the amounts were used by the Associated Enterprise (AE) abroad, and LIBOR rates were considered the appropriate yardstick. Concerning the second issue, the court held that a mere reduction in the ALP determination of the corporate guarantee fee, per se, does not result in a question of law, as urged by the revenue. The court noted that the ALP determination leading to adjustments on both counts had been subject to previous appeals, including one to the High Court, which were decided in favour of the assessee. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order dated September 27, 2018, was in infraction of the mandatory requirements of recording reasons for the conclusion. Citing the Apex Court's decision in Ajantha Industries & Ors. Vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes & Ors., the Tribunal emphasized that the requirement of recording reasons under Section 127(1) is a mandatory direction and non-communication thereof is not saved by merely showing that the reasons exist in the file. The Tribunal found that the authority did not apply its mind to the reasons detailed by the petitioner or the reasons resisting the prayer. Consequently, the writ application was allowed, the impugned order was quashed, and the matter was remanded back to the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-2, Jaipur, for adjudication afresh in accordance with the law. The ratio decidendi is that the reasons for an order of transfer under Section 127(1) must be recorded and communicated to the assessee to enable them to challenge the order if it is malafide, arbitrary, or based on irrelevant considerations.
The High Court held that the appeal is dismissed as withdrawn in light of the appellant's submission and CBDT Circular No. 3/2018. The court noted that the tax effect was Rs. 27,61,577/-, which is below the threshold of Rs. 50,00,000/- stipulated in the circular for maintaining appeals. Consequently, the application for withdrawal was also disposed of. The appellant was granted liberty to apply for revival of the appeal if its case falls within the conditions stipulated in Clause 10 of the aforesaid circular. No specific finding on the merits of the original dispute was made as the appeal was withdrawn.
The High Court granted the petitioners' request for liberty to withdraw the writ petition. The court permitted Mr. Jagdish Solanki to pursue his grievance by filing a separate petition. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The court did not delve into the substantive merits of the case or any underlying tax disputes. The ratio decidendi is that a party can be granted liberty to withdraw a writ petition to pursue their remedies through a different legal avenue, provided such a request is made and granted by the court.
The High Court granted the liberty sought by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The court did not delve into the merits of the case or the underlying grievance that led to the filing of the writ petition. The decision is purely procedural, allowing the petitioners to withdraw their action and pursue alternative remedies. No specific legal principles were established or applied beyond the court's discretion to grant withdrawal.
The High Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds of maintainability, citing CBDT Circular No. 3/2018. The court noted that the tax effect of the appeal was Rs. 27,61,577/-, which is below the monetary limit of Rs. 50,00,000/- prescribed by the circular for filing appeals. The reasoning is that the appeal does not meet the threshold for maintainability as per the CBDT's instructions. The appellant was granted liberty to apply for revival of the appeal if its case falls within any of the conditions stipulated in Clause 10 of the aforesaid circular. No specific issue was decided on merits.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the ITAT's order. The Court reasoned that if the primary activity of the assessee is education, then the mere inclusion of incidental or supporting activities cannot, per se, exclude the grant of benefit under Section 10(23C) of the Act. The Court referred to the predominant objective test articulated in the Supreme Court judgment of Additional Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth (1980 121 ITR 1) and the Delhi High Court's decision in Director of Income Tax (Exemption) Vs. Delhi Public School Society (2018 (15) G.S.T.L. 502). The appeal filed by the Revenue was accordingly dismissed.
The High Court reiterated its earlier conclusion from its order dated January 16, 2018, that substantial questions of law 1, 2, and 4 were not made out. Regarding the third substantial question of law, the Court accepted the assessee's submission that this issue was decided by the High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Versus Rajasthan State Ganganagar Sugar Mills Ltd. & Ors. The Court noted that in that case, it was held that the liability to excise duty arises when goods are removed from the factory/bonded warehouse, and the taxable event is manufacture/production, but the liability to pay duty is postponed until removal under Rule 9A. Consequently, unpaid excise duty on goods in stock that have not left the premises could not be added to the value of closing stock under Section 145A. The Court found that the judgment in Wallace Flour Mills Co. Ltd. Versus Collector of Central Excise, relied upon by both parties, supported the assessee's contention. Since the revenue's counsel could not offer any contrary argument, the Court held that none of the four substantial questions of law framed in the appeal were made out. The appeal was consequently dismissed.
The High Court held that the appeal is dismissed in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner Vs. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. (2018 SCC OnLine SC 534). The Supreme Court, in its judgment, clarified that Section 41(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, applies when a deduction or allowance for a loss, expenditure, or trading liability has been claimed by the assessee, and subsequently, the creditor remits or waives such liability. The objective is to prevent the assessee from obtaining a double benefit. In the Mahindra and Mahindra case, it was noted that the assessee had not claimed any deduction for the interest paid under Section 36(1)(iii) of the Act. Furthermore, the waiver of loan amounts to the cessation of a liability other than a trading liability, and Section 41(1) specifically deals with the remission of trading liabilities. Therefore, the waiver of interest in this case did not fall under the purview of Section 41(1).
The High Court disposed of the writ application by maintaining the interim order dated February 13, 2019. The Court directed the Appellate Authority to adjudicate upon the pending appeal of the petitioner as expeditiously as possible, preferably within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. The parties were directed to appear before the Appellate Authority on May 2, 2019, and the Appellate Authority was to decide the pending appeal within one month thereafter. The Court did not explicitly rule on the merits of the case or the applicability of the Supreme Court's decision to the petitioner's specific claim under Sections 11 and 15, but rather focused on expediting the appellate process.
The High Court held that the ITAT had erred in law by not passing a specific order on the second part of the additional grounds raised by the assessee. This second ground concerned the genuineness of an agreement dated 02.06.2011, which the assessee contended was never an issue before the lower authorities or argued by the revenue. The Court found that the ITAT had taken note of this ground but failed to provide any specific finding. Consequently, the High Court set aside the ITAT's order dated 08.03.2017 to the extent of the second part of the additional grounds. The Court directed that the assessee's application under Section 254(2) should be treated as allowed in toto with respect to both parts of the additional grounds. The Court further directed that the appeal, which was restored for hearing on the first part of the additional grounds, should now be heard and decided on both grounds. The appeal was disposed of with these directions.
The High Court concurred with the view of the ITAT. The ITAT had found that the assessment year 2011-12 was the first year of operation for the assessee, a partnership firm with 17 partners. The partnership deed, detailing partner shares and remuneration, was submitted to the AO. The case was selected for compulsory and complete scrutiny. The ITAT noted that the AO had made inquiries on various issues, including remuneration to partners and expenses/receipts, and the assessee had provided supporting details, as evidenced by letters submitted to the AO and the production of books of accounts. Therefore, the ITAT concluded that the AO had taken into consideration the material before him, applied the law and facts, and conducted necessary inquiries. Consequently, the ITAT held that the assessment order passed under Section 143(3) was not erroneous and not prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. The High Court agreed that the nature of the assessment order did not bring the case within the purview of Section 263, as it could not be considered prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. The High Court relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala State, to define 'prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue' in conjunction with an erroneous order. The appeal was dismissed as it did not raise any substantial question of law.
The High Court concurred with the view taken by the ITAT and the CIT(A). The Court found that the present appeal did not raise any question of law, much less a substantial question of law. The ITAT had noted that the Investigation Wing, Mumbai, established that the assessee indulged in bogus bills without actual delivery of goods, based on the statement of Shri Praveen Kumar Jain, who ran M/s. JPK Trading (I) Pvt. Ltd. This concern issued accommodation bills on a commission basis. The assessee had shown purchases of Rs. 20,96,965/- from this entity, which were found to be bogus. The CIT(A) had reduced the addition to 15% of these purchases, relying on ITAT Jaipur Bench's decision in Anuj Kumar Varshney vs. ITO. The High Court found no reason to interfere with the ITAT's order. Consequently, the writ petition challenging the dismissal of the rectification application was also dismissed.
The High Court held that the entire case of the Revenue was based on the confession of the assessee made during search/seizure and survey proceedings, and it was undisputed that the assessee retracted this confession on 27.07.2009. It was also admitted that the allegation of undisclosed income was based solely on this confession, with no corroborative material or substantive proof collected by the Revenue. The Court found that CBDT Circular No.286/2/2003-IT (Inv.II) dated 10.03.2003, and general principles of evidence appreciation, require corroboration of a confessional statement by credible and tangible evidence. Without such corroboration, it is unsafe to rely solely on the confession to uphold the liability fastened upon the assessee. Since the Income Tax Authorities admittedly did not collect any tangible, corroborative evidence to substantiate the allegation of undisclosed income, the ITAT's view that the department failed to provide cogent, tangible, and satisfactory evidence was justified. The Court concluded that the impugned judgment of the ITAT was not illegal or perverse and no substantial question of law was involved. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the entire case of the Revenue was based on the confession of the assessee extracted during search/seizure and survey proceedings, which the assessee had retracted. It was admitted that no corroborative material or substantive proof was collected by the Revenue to substantiate the allegation of undisclosed income. The Court found that CBDT circular No.286/2/2003-IT (Inv.II) dated 10.3.2003, and general principles of evidence appreciation, require corroboration of confessional statements by credible and tangible evidence. Relying solely on a confession without such corroboration is unsafe. Since the Revenue admittedly failed to collect any tangible, corroborative evidence, the ITAT's view that the department failed to provide cogent, tangible, and satisfactory evidence regarding the additional undisclosed income was justified. The impugned judgment of the ITAT was not illegal or perverse. Therefore, no substantial question of law was involved, and the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the entire case of the Revenue was based on the confession of the assessee, which was retracted by the assessee on 27.7.2009. It was admitted that no corroborative material or substantive proof was collected by the Revenue during the search/seizure and survey proceedings to substantiate the allegation of undisclosed income. The Court referred to CBDT Circular No.286/2/2003-IT (Inv.II) dated 10.3.2003, and general principles of evidence appreciation, stating that corroboration of a confessional statement by credible and tangible evidence is required. Failing such corroboration, it is unsafe to rely solely on the confession. Since the Revenue admittedly failed to collect any tangible, corroborative evidence, the view taken by the I.T.A.T. that the department failed to provide cogent, tangible, and satisfactory evidence regarding the additional undisclosed income was justified. The impugned judgment was not found to be illegal or perverse. The Court was satisfied that no substantial question of law was involved. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the entire case of the Revenue was based on the confession of the assessee, which was admittedly retracted. It was also admitted that no corroborative material or substantive proof was collected by the Revenue during the search/seizure and survey proceedings to substantiate the allegation of undisclosed income. The Court referred to CBDT Circular No.286/2/2003-IT (Inv.II) dated 10.3.2003, which states that confessions not based on credible evidence and subsequently retracted do not serve any useful purpose. The Court found that the ITAT's view that the department failed to provide cogent, tangible, and satisfactory evidence regarding the additional undisclosed income was justified. The Court concluded that it was unsafe to rely solely on the confession without corroboration, especially when no tangible evidence was collected. Therefore, no substantial question of law was involved, and the impugned judgment of the ITAT was not illegal or perverse. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court, in view of the limited prayer addressed during the course of arguments, directed the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Alwar, to consider and adjudicate upon the pending appeal as early as possible. The Court specified a preference for disposal within two months from the date a certified copy of the order is presented. The reasoning was based on the limited scope of the arguments presented by the petitioner. The ratio decidendi is that the High Court can direct expeditious disposal of pending appeals when specifically prayed for and when no other substantive relief is sought. No issue was left undecided.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose in the appeal. The Court noted that the issue involved in the present appeal was squarely covered by its own previous judgment dated 11.09.2017 in ITA No. 385/2011, Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Smt. Pooja Agarwal. In that prior judgment, the issues were answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. Therefore, following the precedent, the present appeal was also decided in favour of the assessee. The Court did not provide specific reasoning on the genuineness of share transactions or payment methods, as it relied on the earlier judgment. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that it found no good reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the CESTAT. The Tribunal had provided detailed and weighty reasons to conclude that its earlier order contained a mistake apparent on the face of the record. Specifically, the Tribunal noted that two crucial facts – that the Commissioner of Customs (Preventive), Jodhpur had recorded a finding of requisite jurisdiction to issue the show cause notice, and that this order along with the notice was upheld by the High Court – were not brought to its notice. The Tribunal found that these material facts were omitted, and an attempt was made to persuade it to remand the matter based on the Mangali Impex Ltd. judgment, despite the consent being given against the record. The Tribunal's decision to recall the final order for rehearing on merits was therefore upheld. The High Court stated that it would still be open for the petitioner to argue before the Tribunal how the matter was covered by the Mangali Impex Ltd. judgment and thus required remand. The operative direction was that the appeals would be reheard on merits.
The High Court held that it cannot exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to determine the validity of an administrative action, such as the grant of prosecution sanction, until criminal proceedings are initiated. The court characterized the grant of prosecution sanction as an administrative act by the Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax. The appropriate remedy for the petitioner is to file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the order granting the prosecution sanction. Therefore, the present petition was disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to avail the lawful alternative remedy available if so advised. No issue was expressly left undecided, as the court directed the petitioner to pursue a different legal avenue.
The High Court held that the appeal preferred by the Revenue against the common order dated 21.02.2018 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Jodhpur Bench, in Income Tax Appeal No. 366/JODH/2017 has already been dismissed by this Court vide judgment dated 30.10.2018 in D.B. Income Tax Appeal No.149/2018, titled Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax Central, Jaipur Vs. Virendra Modi. Consequently, in light of the said decision, the present appeal filed by the Revenue also deserves to be dismissed. The operative direction is that the appeal is dismissed in light of the decision of this Court in Virendra Modi (supra). No specific issues were decided on merits in this judgment; the dismissal is based on precedent.
The Tribunal held that the investment in a TV channel by the assessee Trust should be considered in consonance with its objectives of imparting education, as education cannot be confined to a single subject. This principle was applied to conclude that the Trust's investment in the TV channel was within the purview of its objects. Regarding the retrospective cancellation of the Trust's registration under Section 12A, the Tribunal found it to be arbitrary and contrary to the Income Tax Act, 1961. It reasoned that Section 12AA(3) does not provide for retrospective cancellation, and such an interpretation would be vindictive. The Tribunal noted that the Commissioner's order appeared vindictive, especially after the ITSC's order went against the department. The Tribunal allowed the writ petition of the assessee Trust, directing the modification of the ITSC's orders dated June 30, 2017, and February 8, 2018. The Trust is entitled to the benefit of Section 11(1)(a) of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959, carry forward of unabsorbed losses, benefit of expenditure on new educational buildings, benefit for acquisition of TV channels, and quashment of telescoped benefit of cash expenses. The total income is to be re-computed within two months. Consequently, the Revenue's writ petition was dismissed.
The High Court dismissed both appeals filed by the Revenue. The Court noted that a co-ordinate bench had previously decided the same issue adversely to the Revenue in the cases of Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS), Jaipur Vs. M/s Bharti Hexacom Ltd. and Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS), Jaipur Vs. M/s Vodafone Digilink Ltd. The Revenue's counsel fairly referred to these orders and did not press the present appeals. The High Court held that the present appeals are to be governed by the judgments in the aforementioned cases. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeals.
The High Court noted that the counsel for the petitioner wished to withdraw the writ petition. Consequently, the Court dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn. There was no decision on the merits of any substantive issue related to income tax law. The principle that can be derived is that a writ petition can be dismissed as withdrawn if the petitioner so requests. No specific relief was granted or denied on the substantive grounds of the petition, as it was disposed of procedurally.
The High Court held that the previous judgment of a Co-ordinate Bench dated December 21, 2017, in M/s. Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-2, Ajmer (D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 298/2016 and other connected matters) squarely covered the present appeals. In that prior judgment, the High Court had found that the assessee-company was covered by the Notification issued by the State Government on January 18, 2002. Consequently, the basis of the ITAT's consideration, treating the assessee under the Companies Act, was deemed to be based on wrong presumptions and required reconsideration. The High Court quashed and set aside the order of the Tribunal and remitted the matters back to the Tribunal. The Tribunal was directed to reconsider the matters after taking into consideration the Notification of 2002, allowing parties to raise all contentions and place all relevant documents. The High Court also directed the Tribunal to decide the present and earlier set of appeals within six months from March 7, 2019.
The High Court held that the previous judgment of a Co-ordinate Bench dated December 21, 2017, in M/s. Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-2, Ajmer (D.B. Income Tax Appeal No. 298/2016 and other connected matters) squarely covered the present appeals. In that prior judgment, the High Court had found that the assessee-company was covered by the Notification issued by the State Government on January 18, 2002. Consequently, the basis of the ITAT's consideration, treating the assessee under the Companies Act, was deemed to be based on wrong presumptions and required reconsideration. The High Court quashed and set aside the order of the Tribunal and remitted the matters back to the Tribunal. The Tribunal was directed to reconsider the matters after taking into consideration the Notification of 2002, allowing parties to raise all contentions and place all relevant documents. The High Court also directed the Tribunal to decide the present and earlier set of appeals within six months from March 7, 2019.