Loading High Court cases…
955 orders · Page 2 of 20
The Tribunal held that the assessee did not constitute a service Permanent Establishment (PE) in India for AY 2020-21 and 2021-22. Consequently, the receipts were considered business profits not taxable in India.
The High Court set aside the ITAT's order and remanded the appeal back to the ITAT for fresh consideration. The ITAT was directed to re-adjudicate the appeal, considering the assessee's contentions.
The High Court of Delhi condoned the delay in filing the appeal by 38 days and the delay in refiling the appeal by 39 days. The Court found the reasons stated in the applications to be sufficient for condoning the delays. The applications for condonation of delay were disposed of. The main appeal (ITA 721/2025) was then listed for hearing on 21.05.2026. No decision was made on the merits of the appeal itself, as the proceedings were limited to the delay condonation applications.
The High Court condoned the delay in filing the appeals after considering the reasons provided in the applications. Exemption was also granted, subject to exceptions.
The Delhi High Court condoned the delay in filing the appeals after considering the reasons provided. Exemption from certain procedural requirements was also granted.
The Delhi High Court condoned the delay in filing the appeals and granted exemption, subject to all just exceptions. The matters were then re-notified for further hearing.
The High Court condoned the delay in filing the appeals by the Revenue. The court also granted exemption from filing certain documents, subject to just exceptions.
The Delhi High Court condoned the delay in filing the appeals by the Revenue. Exemption from certain procedural requirements was also granted.
The High Court condoned the delay in filing the appeals and granted exemption, subject to just exceptions. The matters were then re-notified for further hearing.
The High Court condoned the delay in filing the appeals by the Revenue. Exemption from certain procedural requirements was also granted to the Revenue.
The Delhi High Court condoned the delay in filing the appeals by the Revenue. The court also granted exemption to the Revenue from filing certain documents, subject to just exceptions.
The Delhi High Court condoned the delay in filing the appeals and granted exemption, subject to all just exceptions. The matters were then re-notified for a future date.
The Delhi High Court condoned the delay in filing the appeals by the Revenue. Exemption from filing certain documents was also granted.
The High Court of Delhi, acknowledging the Revenue's submission regarding errors in the appeal, allowed the withdrawal of the appeal. The Revenue was granted liberty to file the appeal afresh. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of the case was made. The specific errors in the appeal were not elaborated upon, nor were any substantive legal issues decided.
The High Court held that since the CIT(A) and ITAT concurrently found no incriminating material during the search, the ITAT was justified in dismissing the Revenue's appeal. No substantial question of law arose.
The High Court held that the ITAT's decision to delete the addition for intra-group services was justified, as the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) lacked cogent evidence. The court emphasized consistency with previous rulings.
The High Court upheld the ITAT's decision, agreeing that additions under Section 153A are invalid in unabated assessment years if no incriminating material is found during a search. The court found no substantial question of law arising from the ITAT's order.
The High Court upheld the ITAT's decision, agreeing that additions under Section 153A are invalid in unabated assessment years if no incriminating material is found during a search. The court found no substantial question of law arising from the ITAT's order.
The High Court held that the issue was squarely covered by its previous decision in Makemytrip India Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 16 (1) Delhi & Anr. In that case, the Court had considered the applicability of the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA) and the concession made by the Revenue in Union of India and Others v. Rajeev Bansal, where it was conceded that TOLA was not applicable for reopening assessments for AY 2015-16 for notices issued on or after April 1, 2021. Consequently, notices issued beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 149(1) of the Act, without the applicability of TOLA, were liable to be set aside. The Court also noted the dismissal of an SLP by the Supreme Court in a similar matter, reinforcing this position. Therefore, the impugned notice under Section 148 and the order passed under Section 148A(d) for AY 2015-16 were set aside.
The High Court held that both the CIT(A) and ITAT failed to properly adjudicate the assessee's plea regarding the non-issuance of the Section 143(2) notice and the validity of the Section 144 assessment. The High Court set aside the orders of the ITAT and CIT(A) and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The High Court held that the appeal by the Revenue failed to raise any substantial question of law. The court found that the Assessing Officer's inference of cash payments was based solely on emails, lacking corroborative evidence, and that suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute for evidence.
The Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petition, directing the petitioner to appear before the Assessing Officer (AO) to make all submissions, both on facts and in law. The Court noted that the petition was filed after more than one and a half years from the date of the order (April 12, 2024) and the notice under Section 142(1) (July 21, 2025). The AO was directed to consider these submissions and proceed in accordance with the law. This decision was made in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dehri Rohtas Light Rly. Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur (1992) 2 SCC 598. The Court did not decide the merits of the allegations regarding the vagueness of the notices or the validity of the order under Section 148A(d). The operative direction is for the petitioner to appear before the AO.
The High Court upheld the ITAT's decision, agreeing with the findings of the CIT(A) that the assessee's allocation of expenses between 10A and non-10A units could not be disturbed. The Court found that the allocation was based on common principles of costing and was reasonable, adhering to Accounting Standard-17. The royalty and management fees were paid to Hewitt Affiliates LLC by the consulting and human resource outsourcing divisions (non-10A units) for services utilized based on revenue contribution, and therefore, these expenses could not be apportioned to the 10A units. Similarly, legal and professional expenses were directly related to the non-10A divisions and accounted for in their P&L accounts. The Court found no substance in the Revenue's written submissions supporting their method of apportionment. The proposed questions of law did not arise for consideration, and the CIT(A)'s findings, as upheld by the ITAT, were not perverse. The Court also noted that the Revenue had accepted similar expense allocations by the assessee in other assessment years. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court noted that the issue was identical to a previous case where the appeal was dismissed. Therefore, for parity of reasons and absence of a substantial question of law, the present appeal was also dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee could not explain the source of excess cash deposits with any plausible evidence. The High Court found that the appeals raised pure questions of fact, not substantial questions of law.
The Delhi High Court noted that the issue was covered by its previous judgments in the same assessee's case for earlier assessment years. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose.
The Tribunal held that the assessee could not explain the source of excess cash deposits with any plausible evidence. The High Court found that the appeals raised pure questions of fact, not substantial questions of law.
The High Court noted that the issue was covered by its own prior judgments and that appeals against those judgments were dismissed by the Supreme Court. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petitions. The Court held that while the Supreme Court's dismissal of an SLP may affirm the law laid down by a High Court, it does not necessarily set aside other judgments or imply merger of the lower court's order with the Supreme Court's order if the SLP was dismissed on grounds other than merits, such as delay. The Court noted that the Supreme Court had dismissed the SLP in the case of ADIT (International Taxation)-2, Hyderabad & Anr. v. Deepanjan Roy without dealing with the issue on merits, and therefore, it could not be said to have set aside the Delhi High Court's judgment in TKS Builders (P.) Ltd. Furthermore, the SLP preferred against TKS Builders (P.) Ltd. was still pending adjudication before the Supreme Court. Consequently, the judgment in TKS Builders (P.) Ltd. was held to continue to hold fort concerning the jurisdiction in Delhi, and the Court was bound by it. The issue of concurrent jurisdiction between JAO and FAO was also noted as pending consideration before the Supreme Court. The Court found no merit in the present petitions and dismissed them, along with pending applications.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition, holding that the reassessment proceedings were initiated beyond the limitation period. The Court referred to its own decision in Suman Jeet Agarwal v. Income Tax Officer, Ward 61(1), & ORS, which established that the expression 'issue' in Section 149 of the Act means making an overt act to ensure due despatch of the notice. The Court found that the time taken by the ITBA's e-mail software system in triggering and transmitting e-mails is attributable to the Department. Therefore, for e-mails dispatched on April 1, 2021, or thereafter, the notices were held not to have been issued on March 31, 2021. Applying this principle to the present case, where the notice was dispatched on July 1, 2025, after the limitation period expired on June 30, 2025, the Court concluded that the initiation of proceedings was barred by limitation. Consequently, the impugned notice dated June 30, 2025, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2019-20, was set aside. The petition was disposed of.
The High Court noted the submission made by the Revenue's counsel that the appeal pertains to Assessment Year 2010-11 and has a low tax effect, and therefore, the Revenue would not press the appeal. Based on this submission, the High Court dismissed the appeal as not pressed. No decision was made on the merits of the case. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal.