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The High Court disposed of the writ petition with specific directions. The Court considered the petitioner's financial distress and its inability to conduct business due to the lien on its FDRs. It also noted that typically, a 20% deposit would secure a stay of demand as per CBDT circulars. Therefore, the Court directed the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 50 Crores (which was approximately 25% of the total outstanding demand of Rs. 200 Crores) under protest. Upon receipt of a post-dated cheque for Rs. 50 Crores, the Assessing Officer was directed to immediately lift the lien imposed on the FDRs by the order dated 10.11.2021, or recall the order passed under Section 281B. The petitioner was also required to furnish an undertaking not to transfer or create third-party rights on its assets, along with a list of its assets and any encumbrances. The Court did not explicitly decide on the interpretation of Section 281B's time limitations but provided a practical solution to alleviate the petitioner's financial hardship while securing the revenue's interest.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court held that Section 275(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, unequivocally provides that penalty proceedings shall be kept in abeyance when an appeal under Section 253 of the Act is pending. The Court noted that the petitioner's appeal was pending before the ITAT on the date the impugned penalty order was passed, and it remained pending. Therefore, the penalty order was found to be contrary to the provisions of Section 275(1)(a). The Court quashed and set aside the impugned penalty order. However, the Court clarified that the Assessing Officer would be free to initiate penalty proceedings afresh if the ITAT decides the appeal against the petitioner and if the law permits.
The High Court held that the initial adjustment of Rs. 6,20,97,280/- could not be ordered to be refunded. This was because the petitioner had not prayed for a stay before any competent authority, and by the time the writ petition was filed, more than 80% of the amount had already been recovered. The Court acknowledged that this initial adjustment might have been arbitrary due to lack of opportunity but declined to order a refund after more than three years. However, the Court viewed the subsequent recovery of Rs. 1,93,15,522/- as a colourable exercise of power. The Court noted that the matter was pending before the High Court, the petitioner's stay application was pending, and the AO had disregarded the petitioner's representation that more than 80% of the demand had already been recovered. The Court emphasized that CBDT circulars are binding on the AO and that being declared in default does not negate the benefit of these circulars. The Court also noted the absence of a Section 245 intimation prior to this adjustment. Therefore, the Court directed the refund of Rs. 1,93,15,522/- with applicable interest. The Court also reiterated the direction for expeditious disposal of the appeal.
The High Court, without going into the merits of the case, decided not to entertain the appeal. The Court referenced the Supreme Court's judgment in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2693, which clarified that the amendment to Section 149(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, under the new regime is not prospective and applies to past assessment years. The Court noted that the time limit for issuing notices under Section 148 under the new regime is reduced to three years, and for past assessment years, the proviso to Section 149(1)(b) requires the time limit to survive under the old regime (six years). Consequently, the Court concluded that all such notices would have to be dropped. Based on this reasoning, the Court was not inclined to entertain the appeal.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, finding no substance or merit in it. The Court relied on its previous judgment in ITA 334/2026, which in turn was guided by the decision in ITA 4/2026 (The Commissioner of Income Tax - International Taxation -3 v. Sri Lanka Cricket). In that precedent, the Court held that 'live feed' does not attract royalty. The reasoning was that royalty presupposes enduring benefits, and if the license is confined to a live telecast of an event within a specific period and not for subsequent matches or future use, the payment cannot be considered royalty. The Court noted that the Special Leave Petition (SLP) filed by the department in an identical question had been withdrawn. The Court found that the rights granted to the respondent did not exceed the 'live feed' and did not involve the right to record, preserve, or re-telecast for enduring benefit. Therefore, the payments made were not royalty. The questions raised in the present appeal were answered against the revenue.
The High Court held that while the petitioner was indolent and negligent in not being available for cross-examination on 19.05.2026, the AO's subsequent action of agreeing to a fresh date (26.05.2026) condoned the petitioner's earlier lapse. By agreeing to a new date, the AO could not later claim that the petitioner had failed to avail the opportunity. Therefore, the impugned assessment order dated 22.09.2026 was set aside. However, the Court noted that witnesses cannot be repeatedly summoned. The Court directed the petitioner to pay costs of Rs. 25,000/- to each witness (Pradeep Kumar Sehgal and Yogesh Jain) for appearing for cross-examination. The AO was directed to fix a suitable date between 16.11.2026 and 30.11.2026 for cross-examination, ensuring the witnesses' presence. If witnesses failed to appear on three occasions, the AO could pass an order. If cross-examination was completed, a fresh assessment order was to be passed. The petitioner was to keep the cost payments ready.
The High Court held that while hearing the stay application of an assessee is imperative, the petitioner had approached the court prematurely without first moving a formal application before the CIT(A) for early listing or hearing of the stay application. The Court directed the petitioner to first file an application before the CIT(A) for taking up the stay application for consideration at an early date. If such an application is filed, the Appellate Authority shall consider it expeditiously, in accordance with law, subject to the pendency of other stay applications and urgent matters. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions.
The High Court noted that the tax effect in the matter was less than Rs. 2 crores. The Revenue's counsel stated that prosecution had been initiated, bringing it within Clause (d) of Circular No. 5/2024. However, the assessee's counsel informed the Court that the prosecution had been dropped by an order dated 03.01.2026. In light of the tax effect being below Rs. 2 crores and the prosecution having been dropped, the Court was not inclined to proceed further with the appeal. The appeal was disposed of on these grounds. The Court explicitly stated that the question of law was left open.
The High Court noted that the petitioner informed the Court that the respondents have initiated the process for refund and expressed optimism about receiving it soon. Consequently, the Court decided to close the writ proceedings. The writ petition was disposed of based on the petitioner's submission that the refund process had commenced. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to apply for revival of the writ petition if the requisite amount along with applicable interest was not credited within 15 days. No specific findings were made on the merits of any tax dispute, as the matter was resolved procedurally.
The Delhi High Court granted the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The Court allowed the petitioner to take all his pleas before the Assessing Officer and, if required, before the Appellate Authority, as per the law. The reasoning for granting this permission was based on the petitioner's submission and the absence of any objection from the revenue. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The pending application was also disposed of accordingly. No specific findings were made on the merits of the underlying tax dispute, as the case was decided on a procedural point.
The Delhi High Court, at this pre-cognizance stage, found it inappropriate to interdict the proceedings before the learned ACJM. The Court noted that the matter was fixed for hearing on the point of summoning, which is the appropriate stage for the petitioners to agitate their pleas. The Court disposed of the petition with a clear direction that the learned ACJM shall consider the aspects raised by the petitioners and pass a reasoned order on cognizance and summoning. The petitioners were granted liberty to avail appropriate remedies against any order that may be passed subsequently. The Court did not decide on the merits of the allegations but ensured the petitioners' contentions would be considered at the appropriate juncture.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the ITAT's order and that the order is not perverse. Consequently, the Court was not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. Additionally, the Court noted that the tax effect involved in the appeal was below the monetary limit of ₹2 crores prescribed for appeals before the High Court as per CBDT Circular No. 5/2024, as amended by Circular No. 9/2024. Therefore, the appeal was liable to be disposed of on this ground as well, subject to the applicability of the circular and the absence of any exceptions. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal in terms of the applicable CBDT circular on monetary limits.
The High Court held that the ITAT was correct in quashing the assessments. The Court reasoned that Section 153D of the Income-tax Act mandates that no order of assessment or reassessment shall be passed by an Assessing Officer below the rank of Joint Commissioner except with the previous approval of the Joint Commissioner. This provision, as clarified by CBDT Circular No. 3 of 2008, requires approval for each assessment year, implying that the superior authority must apply its mind to the material for each separate year for which approval is sought. A consolidated approval for multiple years without application of mind to each assessment year renders the approval invalid. The Court cited the principle that if a statute prescribes a specific way to do a thing, it must be done in that way or not at all. The Court found that a coordinate bench had already interpreted Section 153D in consonance with the views of the Orissa High Court and Allahabad High Court, and no substantial question of law arose for consideration. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.
The Delhi High Court directed the appellate authority to consider the petitioner's early hearing application dated 25.09.2026 in accordance with law. The Court also requested the appellate authority to try and fix the appeal for hearing at an early date. The reasoning was based on the petitioner being a senior citizen and a retired professional against whom a substantial demand had been raised. The writ petition was disposed of with these observations. The operative direction was to consider the early hearing application and attempt to schedule the appeal for an early hearing. No specific issue was left undecided, as the Court focused on procedural expediting.
The High Court held that the ITAT was correct in quashing the assessments. The Court reasoned that Section 153D of the Income-tax Act, 1961, mandates that no order of assessment or reassessment shall be passed by an Assessing Officer below the rank of Joint Commissioner except with the previous approval of the Joint Commissioner. This provision, as clarified by CBDT Circular No. 3 of 2008, is applicable to orders of assessment or reassessment passed under Section 153A for each assessment year. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent is for superior authorities to apply their minds to the material for each separate year for which approval is sought. A consolidated approval for several years without such application of mind renders the facts of each assessment year otiose. The Court cited the principle that if a power is given to be exercised in a certain way, it must be exercised in that way or not at all. The Court found that its view was in consonance with decisions of the Orissa High Court and the Allahabad High Court, and therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration. The appeals were dismissed.
The Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petitions. The Court directed the Assessing Officer to pay the requisite amount along with applicable interest under Section 244A and Section 244A(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in accordance with the law. This payment was to be made on or before November 30, 2026. The Court noted that the Assessing Officer had passed orders and determined the refund and interest, and the revenue assured payment within four weeks. The Court's direction was to ensure this payment was completed by the specified date. The interlocutory applications were also disposed of along with the writ petitions.
The Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petitions. The Court noted that the Assessing Officer had passed orders determining the refund and applicable interest. The Senior Standing Counsel for the respondents assured that the payment would be made within four weeks. Consequently, the Court directed the Assessing Officer to pay the requisite amount along with applicable interest under Section 244A and Section 244A(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in accordance with the law, on or before November 30, 2026. The Court did not leave any issue undecided, as the matter was resolved by the assurance of payment and the subsequent directions.
The Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petitions. The Court directed the Assessing Officer (AO) to pay the requisite refund amount along with applicable interest under Section 244A and Section 244A(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in accordance with the law. This payment was to be made on or before November 30, 2026. The Court noted the assurance from the revenue's counsel that the payment would be credited within four weeks. The writ petitions and any interlocutory applications were disposed of as a consequence of this direction.
The Delhi High Court allowed the Revenue to withdraw the present appeal. The court noted that the tax effect involved was less than Rs. 2 crores. The Revenue was granted liberty to revive the appeal in the event the Hon'ble Apex Court reverses the law as laid down by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of Roca Bathroom Products (supra). Consequently, the appeal, along with any pending applications, was disposed of as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the substantive issues of the appeal.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose in the appeal filed by the Revenue. This conclusion was reached because the Revenue's counsel conceded that treaty shopping was not an issue. The court relied on its own prior decision in Blackstone Capital Partners (Singapore) Vi Fdi Three Pte. Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax (International Taxation), which established the principle that a Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) cannot be questioned or gone behind. The court further noted that the Revenue had not presented any factual basis that would allow for doubting the TRC, as per the tests laid down in the Supreme Court judgments of UOI & Anr. vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan & Anr. and Vodafone International Holidays BV vs. UOI & Anr. Consequently, the appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.
The Delhi High Court quashed and set aside the notice dated March 30, 2026, issued under Section 148A(1), the order passed under Section 148A(3), and the consequential notice dated June 29, 2026, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court held that these actions were without jurisdiction. The Court explicitly reserved the right of the competent authority to issue a fresh notice in accordance with the law if deemed expedient. It also preserved the assessee's right to raise all permissible defenses before the Assessing Officer and to agitate all grounds, even those raised in the writ petition. The writ petition was allowed along with pending applications.
The Delhi High Court granted the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The Court permitted the petitioner to take appropriate remedies, including filing a fresh writ petition. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn, with the liberty as prayed for by the petitioner. All pending applications were also disposed of.
The Delhi High Court addressed two questions of law. Regarding question (B), concerning the disallowance of royalty payment, the Court noted that this issue was covered by its prior order dated 13.08.2026 in ITA 804/2019 (Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-3 vs. Escorts Ltd.). In that case, the Court held that 0.25% royalty paid for the use of the brand name 'Escort' was admissible and conformed to Section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and could not be considered capital expenditure. Therefore, the ITAT's decision on this issue was upheld. Regarding question (A), concerning the disallowance of upfront fee, the Court referred to its order dated 05.08.2026 in ITA 800/2019 (Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-3 vs. Escorts Ltd.). In that order, the Court, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in India Cements, held that expenditure incurred towards securing a loan is revenue expenditure, even if the loan is utilized for capital assets. The Court found no question of law and noted administrative hazards if the expenditure were deemed capital after over 20 years. The Court also stated it was not inclined to entertain the issue under Section 36(1)(iii) and left it open for future consideration. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court held that it was bound by judicial discipline to follow the view taken by a Coordinate Bench in the petitioner's own case for a preceding assessment year (2019-20), where an identical writ petition was dismissed. The Court found no merit in the petitioner's attempt to distinguish the present case based on a different assessment year when the facts and grounds were substantially the same. The Court reiterated that the previous judgment had already dealt with similar allegations concerning spurious transactions and escaped income, and that the Assessing Officer's role was to conduct the necessary inquiry. Therefore, the petition was dismissed on the grounds of judicial discipline and the lack of merit, following the precedent set in the petitioner's own prior case.
The High Court held that a statement recorded under Section 132(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, does not, by itself, constitute incriminating material for making additions under Section 153A of the Act. The Court relied on its previous judgments in PCIT (Central)-3 v. Anand Kumar Jain (HUF), CIT v. Kabul Chawla, Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi v. Best Infrastructure (India) P. Ltd., and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Harjeev Aggarwal. The reasoning was that for a statement under Section 132(4) to form the basis of a block assessment under Section 153A, it must be relatable to other evidence or material found during the search and seizure operations. A standalone statement, without corroborative evidence unearthed during the search, cannot empower the Assessing Officer to frame a block assessment. The Court emphasized that there must be a nexus between the statement and the incriminating evidence found during the search. Since the ITAT's finding was based on insufficient material to support the additions, and the Revenue failed to produce corroborative material, the additions were rightly deleted. The appeal was disposed of in light of the settled legal position.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court noted that the facts in the present case for AY 2020-21 were identical to the facts in the petitioner's own case for AY 2019-20, where a Coordinate Bench had previously refused to interfere and dismissed the writ petition. Guided by judicial discipline, the Court held that it could not take a view different from the one taken by the Coordinate Bench in the petitioner's prior case. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed. The Court did not decide on the merits of the allegations regarding escaped income but rather on the procedural aspect of the prior dismissal of an identical petition.
The Delhi High Court held that the writ petition had become infructuous. This was based on the submission made by the petitioner's counsel that the respondent had withdrawn the impugned order dated 16.03.2026, which had transferred the petitioner's jurisdiction under Section 127 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Consequently, the Court disposed of the petition as having been rendered infructuous. Any pending applications were also disposed of. The Court also noted that the competent authority would consider the petitioner's objection dispassionately and in accordance with law, as mentioned in a previous order dated 22.09.2026. No specific finding on the merits of the original transfer order was made as the petition was disposed of on a procedural ground.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court noted that the facts in the present case for AY 2020-21 were identical to the facts in the petitioner's own case for AY 2019-20, where a Coordinate Bench had previously refused to interfere and dismissed the writ petition. Guided by judicial discipline, the Court held that it could not take a view different from the one taken by the Coordinate Bench in the petitioner's prior case. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed. The Court did not explicitly decide on the merits of the allegations concerning escaped income but relied on the precedent set by the dismissal of the earlier writ petition.
The Delhi High Court held that a statement recorded under Section 132(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, does not, by itself, constitute incriminating material sufficient to justify additions under Section 153A of the Act. The Court relied on its previous judgments in PCIT (Central)-3 v. Anand Kumar Jain (HUF), CIT v. Kabul Chawla, Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi v. Best Infrastructure (India) P. Ltd., and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Harjeev Aggarwal. The reasoning was that while statements under Section 132(4) have evidentiary value and can be used in proceedings, they cannot be the sole basis for a block assessment unless they are relatable to other incriminating evidence or material discovered during the search and seizure operations. The Court emphasized that there must be a nexus between the statement and the evidence found. Without such corroborative material, additions based solely on a statement are not permissible. The ITAT's deletion of additions was upheld, as it was based on a finding of fact supported by the lack of sufficient corroborative material. The appeal was disposed of in line with these precedents.
The High Court granted permission to the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The court did not decide any substantive issues on merits. The ratio decidendi is that a petitioner has the right to withdraw their petition, and upon granting permission, the court will dismiss it accordingly. No issues were left undecided as the matter was disposed of on the petitioner's request.
The High Court held that the appreciation of material by the Assessing Officer, CIT(A), and ITAT was not perverse. The assessee had failed to prove the creditworthiness of his creditors. The Court reiterated the settled law that the initial onus is on the assessee to establish, by cogent evidence, the genuineness of the transaction, identity of creditors, and their capacity to advance money under Section 68 of the Act. The Court cited its own landmark judgments in Kale Khan Mohd. Hanif and Roshan Di Hatti, and the Delhi High Court's decision in CIT v. Oasis Hospitalities (P) Ltd., emphasizing that merely proving identity is insufficient if capacity or creditworthiness is not established. The Court distinguished the present case from CIT v. KRBL Infrastructure Ltd., where the lower authorities had accepted creditworthiness. Therefore, the question of law was answered in favour of the Revenue. The appeal was dismissed.
The Delhi High Court held that the penalty proceedings initiated under Section 271(1)(c) read with Section 274 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, are vitiated if the penalty show cause notice fails to specify the particular limb of Section 271(1)(c) under which the penalty is proposed. The Court noted that the Assessing Officer had issued a penalty show cause notice dated 14.03.2013 under Section 271(1)(c) read with Section 274 of the Income Tax Act, but it did not specify any particular limb thereunder. The High Court relied on its previous judgments in PCIT v. Sahara India Life Insurance Co. Ltd., (2021) 432 ITR 84 (Del), PCIT v. Gopal Kumar Goyal, (2023) 153 taxman.com 534, and Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Gragerious Projects (P) Ltd., (2024) 169 taxmann.com 291 (Delhi), and Commissioner of Income Tax (International Taxation)-1 v. Genpact Services LLC, (2025) 175 taxmann.com 847 (Delhi). The ratio decidendi is that a vague penalty notice without specifying the charge leads to vitiation of penalty proceedings. Consequently, no interference was required in the ITAT's order, and the appeal was disposed of.
The High Court noted that the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondents, on instructions, informed the court that the due refund has been calculated and credited to the petitioner's account, thereby rendering the writ petition infructuous. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to take an appropriate remedy by way of filing a rectification application or seeking revival of the writ petition if any grievance still persists. Consequently, the writ proceedings were closed and the writ petition, along with the pending application, was disposed of. No specific finding on the merits of the original grievance was made, as the matter was settled by the refund being credited.
The High Court held that while technically, based on Rule 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, and the Standing Order, the appeals might have been maintainable in Lucknow due to the location of the petitioners' business and the Assessing Officer, the situation was altered by the order dated 04.04.2006 under Section 120 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which conferred jurisdiction upon the CIT(A)-I, New Delhi. The Court found that the ITAT Delhi Bench erred in rejecting the appeals based on the ABC Papers Limited judgment, as that case dealt with the jurisdiction of High Courts under Section 260A after a transfer under Section 127, not the administrative transfer of appeals between ITAT benches by the President. The Court emphasized that an administrative order of the President of the Tribunal cannot be overturned by a judicial order of a Bench. Therefore, the Court set aside the impugned orders of the ITAT and restored the appeals to the Delhi Bench for decision on merits, noting that both parties preferred this arrangement and that over 200 appeals had been transferred to Delhi in 2006.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated February 15, 2024, issued for assessment year 2010-11, was time-barred. The Court reasoned that the satisfaction note was recorded on February 7, 2024, which falls within assessment year 2024-25. Calculating backward from assessment year 2024-25, and considering that the escaped income was more than Rs. 50,00,000/-, the limitation period would be 10 years, making the notice issued on February 15, 2024, fall beyond the permissible period. The Court found this position to be in line with a plain reading of Section 153A read with Section 153C of the Act of 1961 and the precedent set in Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. (supra). Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, and the notice was quashed. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that while technically, based on Rule 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, and the Standing Order, the appeals might have been maintainable in Lucknow due to the location of the petitioners' business and the Assessing Officer, the situation was altered by the order dated 04.04.2006 under Section 120 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which conferred jurisdiction upon the CIT(A)-I, New Delhi. The Court found that the ITAT Delhi Bench erred in rejecting the appeals based on the ABC Papers Limited judgment, as that case dealt with the jurisdiction of High Courts under Section 260A after a transfer under Section 127, not the administrative transfer of appeals between ITAT benches by the President. The Court emphasized that an administrative order of the President of the Tribunal cannot be overturned by a judicial order of a Bench. Therefore, the Court set aside the impugned orders of the ITAT and restored the appeals to the Delhi Bench for decision on merits, noting that both parties preferred this arrangement and that over 200 appeals had been transferred to Delhi in 2006.
The High Court held that the ITAT's decision to restrict additions to a lump-sum rate of 8% was perverse. The Tribunal had upheld the AO's and CIT(A)'s findings that the additions were based on seized electronic data and incriminating material, and the assessee had failed to provide satisfactory explanations. The Court found no legal basis for the ITAT to adopt an ad-hoc estimation of income without any supporting evidence, market practice, or statutory provision in the Income Tax Act. The conclusion that the assessee appeared to be in the accommodation-entry business did not justify disregarding the unexplained amounts and limiting taxable income to an estimated percentage. Consequently, the Court answered the questions of law in favour of the Revenue and set aside paragraphs 12 & 13 of the ITAT's impugned order. The appeals filed by the assessee would be heard separately, and if allowed, the matter would be remanded to the ITAT. If the assessee's appeals were dismissed, computation would be made in accordance with law.
The High Court held that while technically, based on Rule 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, and the Standing Order, the appeals might have been maintainable in Lucknow due to the location of the petitioners' business and the Assessing Officer, the situation was altered by the order dated 04.04.2006 under Section 120 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which conferred jurisdiction upon the CIT(A)-I, New Delhi. The Court found that the ITAT Delhi Bench erred in rejecting the appeals based on the ABC Papers Limited judgment, as that case dealt with the jurisdiction of High Courts under Section 260A after a transfer under Section 127, not the administrative transfer of appeals between ITAT benches by the President. The Court emphasized that an administrative order of the President of the Tribunal cannot be overturned by a judicial order of a Bench. Therefore, the Court set aside the impugned orders of the ITAT and restored the appeals to the Delhi Bench for decision on merits, noting that both parties preferred this arrangement and that over 200 appeals had been transferred to Delhi in 2006.
The High Court allowed the writ petitions, setting aside the impugned orders of the ITAT. The Court held that the ITAT, Delhi Bench, had erred in rejecting the appeals on the grounds of territorial jurisdiction. The reasoning was based on a pragmatic view, considering a prior order of the High Court in similar matters concerning the same group of companies. The Court emphasized that the ITAT's orders amounted to sitting over an administrative order of the President of the Tribunal, which a judicial bench cannot do. The Court distinguished the Supreme Court's ruling in ABC Papers Limited, stating it was not applicable to the present facts where administrative powers of the President were in question. The Court noted that the appeals were transferred from the Lucknow Bench to the Delhi Bench by the President of the Tribunal in 2006. The Court restored the appeals to the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal for decision on merits. It also directed that if any appeals were filed at the Lucknow Bench as a sequel to the ITAT's earlier orders, their hearing would remain deferred, and the Lucknow Bench would close them upon final disposal by the Delhi Bench. The Court explicitly stated that this order was passed in peculiar facts and should not be treated as a precedent.
The High Court held that while technically, based on Rule 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, and the Standing Order, the appeals might have been maintainable in Lucknow due to the location of the petitioners' business and the Assessing Officer, the situation was altered by the order dated 04.04.2006 under Section 120 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which conferred jurisdiction upon the CIT(A)-I, New Delhi. The Court found that the ITAT Delhi Bench erred in rejecting the appeals based on the ABC Papers Limited judgment, as that case dealt with the jurisdiction of High Courts under Section 260A after a transfer under Section 127, not the administrative transfer of appeals between ITAT benches by the President. The Court emphasized that an administrative order of the President of the Tribunal cannot be overturned by a judicial order of a Bench. Therefore, the Court set aside the impugned orders of the ITAT and restored the appeals to the Delhi Bench for decision on merits, noting that both parties preferred this arrangement and that over 200 appeals had been transferred to Delhi in 2006.
The High Court held that while technically, based on Rule 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, and the Standing Order, the appeals might have been maintainable in Lucknow due to the location of the petitioners' business and the Assessing Officer, the situation was altered by the order dated 04.04.2006 under Section 120 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which conferred jurisdiction upon the CIT(A)-I, New Delhi. The Court found that the ITAT Delhi Bench erred in rejecting the appeals based on the ABC Papers Limited judgment, as that case dealt with the jurisdiction of High Courts under Section 260A after a transfer under Section 127, not the administrative transfer of appeals between ITAT benches by the President. The Court emphasized that an administrative order of the President of the Tribunal cannot be overturned by a judicial order of a Bench. Therefore, the Court set aside the impugned orders of the ITAT and restored the appeals to the Delhi Bench for decision on merits, noting that both parties preferred this arrangement and that over 200 appeals had been transferred to Delhi in 2006.
The High Court held that while technically, based on Rule 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, and the Standing Order, the appeals might have been maintainable in Lucknow due to the location of the petitioners' business and the Assessing Officer, the situation was altered by the order dated 04.04.2006 under Section 120 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which conferred jurisdiction upon the CIT(A)-I, New Delhi. The Court found that the ITAT Delhi Bench erred in rejecting the appeals based on the ABC Papers Limited judgment, as that case dealt with the jurisdiction of High Courts under Section 260A after a transfer under Section 127, not the administrative transfer of appeals between ITAT benches by the President. The Court emphasized that an administrative order of the President of the Tribunal cannot be overturned by a judicial order of a Bench. Therefore, the Court set aside the impugned orders of the ITAT and restored the appeals to the Delhi Bench for decision on merits, noting that both parties preferred this arrangement and that over 200 appeals had been transferred to Delhi in 2006.
The High Court held that while technically, based on Rule 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, and the Standing Order, the appeals might have been maintainable in Lucknow due to the location of the petitioners' business and the Assessing Officer, the situation was altered by the order dated 04.04.2006 under Section 120 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which conferred jurisdiction upon the CIT(A)-I, New Delhi. The Court found that the ITAT Delhi Bench erred in rejecting the appeals based on the ABC Papers Limited judgment, as that case dealt with the jurisdiction of High Courts under Section 260A after a transfer under Section 127, not the administrative transfer of appeals between ITAT benches by the President. The Court emphasized that an administrative order of the President of the Tribunal cannot be overturned by a judicial order of a Bench. Therefore, the Court set aside the impugned orders of the ITAT and restored the appeals to the Delhi Bench for decision on merits, noting that both parties preferred this arrangement and that over 200 appeals had been transferred to Delhi in 2006.
The High Court held that the ITAT, Delhi Bench, had erred in rejecting the appeals solely on the grounds of territorial jurisdiction. While technically, the place of business and the Assessing Officer's location in Lucknow might suggest jurisdiction for the Lucknow Bench, the High Court took a holistic and pragmatic view. It emphasized that the appeals had been transferred to the Delhi Bench by an administrative order of the President of the Tribunal, and both the assessee and the Revenue had jointly submitted that they preferred the appeals to be heard in Delhi. The Court found the ITAT's reliance on the ABC Papers Limited judgment to be misplaced in the context of administrative transfers. The Court set aside the impugned orders of the ITAT, restored the appeals to the Delhi Bench, and directed that the Delhi Bench should decide the appeals on merits. The Court also clarified that any appeals filed at the Lucknow Bench as a sequel to previous orders would remain deferred and would be closed by the Lucknow Bench upon final disposal by the Delhi Bench. The Court explicitly stated that this order was passed in peculiar facts and would not be treated as a precedent.
The High Court held that while technically, based on Rule 4 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, and the Standing Order, the appeals might have been maintainable in Lucknow due to the location of the petitioners' business and the Assessing Officer, the situation was altered by the order dated 04.04.2006 under Section 120 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which conferred jurisdiction upon the CIT(A)-I, New Delhi. The Court found that the ITAT Delhi Bench erred in rejecting the appeals based on the ABC Papers Limited judgment, as that case dealt with the jurisdiction of High Courts under Section 260A after a transfer under Section 127, not the administrative transfer of appeals between ITAT benches by the President. The Court emphasized that an administrative order of the President of the Tribunal cannot be overturned by a judicial order of a Bench. Therefore, the Court set aside the impugned orders of the ITAT and restored the appeals to the Delhi Bench for decision on merits, noting that both parties preferred this arrangement and that over 200 appeals had been transferred to Delhi in 2006.
The Tribunal held that the notice dated 25.07.2022 issued under Section 153C of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, for assessment year 2016-17, was time-barred. The reasoning was that the satisfaction note was recorded on 16.06.2022, which falls within assessment year 2023-24. Calculating backwards from the preceding year (AY 2022-23 or FY 2021-22), and considering the escaped income was less than Rs. 50,00,000/-, the limitation period would extend to 6 years. Therefore, a notice issued on 25.07.2022 for AY 2016-17 was clearly beyond the permissible time limit. The Court relied on its own judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1 (Central-1) v. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. The writ petition was allowed, and the impugned notice was quashed.
The High Court dismissed the petition. Regarding the first issue, the Court held that merely because a stipulated pattern of questions was followed for a prolonged period does not bind the authorities to continue it. The petitioners failed to demonstrate any specific provision in the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018, that prescribed a numerical ceiling for questions from major or allied acts. Regulation 6(7) expressly contemplates questions from Allied Acts without specifying a ratio. Therefore, the grievance regarding the proportion of questions from Allied Acts was not accepted. Regarding the second issue, the Court reiterated that the scope of judicial review in competitive examinations is extremely limited and confined to examining the decision-making process for mala fides, arbitrariness, or patent illegality. The petitioners failed to demonstrate glaring discrepancies or patent errors in the substantive legal propositions tested. The key answer is presumed correct unless demonstrably wrong, and the onus is on the candidate to show a glaring mistake. The Court cannot sit in appeal over the opinion of experts. The mere possibility of another interpretation or disagreement with the proportion of questions does not warrant interference. The difficulty of the paper or a lower success rate does not make the examination defective or a ground for granting licenses or increasing attempts. No ground to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution was made out.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court accepted the petitioner's contention that the impugned order and notice were barred by limitation, acknowledging that the revenue's counsel was not in a position to dispute this position. Consequently, the order dated 30.08.2024 passed under Section 148A(d) and the notice dated 30.08.2024 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2016-17 were quashed. The Court held that the principle laid down in Manju Somani v. Income Tax Officer Ward-70(1) & Ors was applicable. The writ petition and pending applications were disposed of.
The Delhi High Court held that a statement recorded under Section 132(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, does not by itself constitute incriminating material sufficient to justify additions under Section 153A. The Court relied on its previous judgments in PCIT (Central)-3 v. Anand Kumar Jain (HUF), CIT v. Kabul Chawla, Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi v. Best Infrastructure (India) P. Ltd., and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Harjeev Aggarwal. The reasoning is that while such statements have evidentiary value and can be used in proceedings, they cannot form the sole basis for a block assessment under Section 153A without being linked to other incriminating evidence or material discovered during the search and seizure operations. The Court emphasized that there must be a nexus between the statement and the evidence found during the search. The High Court noted that if such statements were the sole basis, it could lead to arbitrary assessments, especially if the statements were retracted. Therefore, the ITAT's deletion of additions based on insufficient corroborative material was upheld.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated 19.03.2025 issued under Section 153C for assessment year 2012-13 was clearly beyond the limitation period. The Court reasoned that the satisfaction note was recorded on 15.03.2025, which falls within assessment year 2025-26. Calculating backwards, even if the escaped income was more than Rs. 50,00,000/- (implying a 10-year limitation period), the notice issued in AY 2025-26 for AY 2012-13 would be time-barred. The Court found the issue squarely covered by its own judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1 (Central-1) v. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. The writ petition was allowed, and the notice dated 19.03.2025 was quashed. The ratio decidendi is that a notice under Section 153C issued beyond the prescribed limitation period, as determined by the date of satisfaction note and the relevant assessment year, is invalid. The operative direction was to quash the notice.