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The High Court held that the petition was without merit and dismissed it. The Court found that the agreement granted a substantive right to use the ICC Marks and Event Marks to LG. The revenue's contention that the advertisement sites were under GCC's control and that LG obtained a license to use the ICC Mark was accepted. The Court distinguished the cases relied upon by the petitioner, Formula One World Championship Limited and Sheraton International, finding them factually distinguishable. In Formula One, the use of the trademark was held to be incidental to the purpose of advertising, whereas in this case, a substantive right to use the marks was created by the agreement. The Court agreed with the apportionment made by the Director of Income Tax, where 1/3rd of the payment was attributed to the right to use the trademark and subjected to tax as royalty, and found no fault with this order. The operative direction was the dismissal of the writ petition.
The High Court held that the DRP provided sufficient reasons for excluding the comparables based on functional dissimilarity and the 75% export turnover test. The ITAT's findings, which accepted the DRP's reasoning, were considered pure questions of fact.
The High Court held that the impugned certificate and orders dated 06.05.2025, 07.05.2025, and 16.05.2025 are set aside. The reasoning is that the sole basis for the Assessing Officer (AO) to reject the petitioner's application for a 'Nil Withholding Certificate' was the assessment orders for AYs 2021-22 and 2022-23, which concluded that the petitioner had a DAPE in India. However, these very assessment orders were subsequently set aside by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT). The Court emphasized that each assessment year must be considered on its own facts, and the ITAT's decision for AYs 2021-22 and 2022-23 conclusively settled the issue of DAPE for those years. The revenue's intention to appeal the ITAT's order does not permit them to disregard the subsisting order of the higher appellate authority, citing *Union of India v. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd*. Therefore, the basis for the AO's impugned order no longer holds good. The Court directed the AO to reconsider the application de novo for AY 2025-26, examining the issue afresh for the present assessment year, without being influenced by the revenue's pending appeals, and to pass an order within three weeks after granting a hearing.
The High Court held that the notice dated July 26, 2022, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the order dated July 26, 2022, passed under Section 148A(d) of the Act, are liable to be set aside. The Court's reasoning was based on the fact that the notice was issued beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 149 of the Act. The Court noted that the revenue did not dispute this position and conceded the applicability of the Supreme Court's judgment in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal (2024) 469 ITR 46 (SC) and this Court's own precedent in Roopa Goyal v. Income Tax Officer Ward 28(1), 2025 SCC OnLine Del 7864. These judgments established that the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation & Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020, was not applicable to notices under Section 148 for Assessment Year 2015-16, rendering the impugned notice invalid. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order and notice and disposed of the petition.
The Tribunal held that since the excise license for the new premises was granted only in the subsequent assessment year, the new premises were not utilized for business purposes in the year under consideration. Therefore, the rent paid was not an allowable deduction.
The High Court has decided the procedural matters before it. Firstly, it has condoned the delay of 36 days in the re-filing of the appeal by the Revenue, finding sufficient reasons stated in the application. Secondly, it has granted exemption to the Revenue, subject to all just exceptions. The High Court has not made any findings on the substantive merits of the appeal, as the appeal itself is at an early stage. The operative direction issued by the High Court is to issue notice to the respondent (Assessee) through all permissible modes, with the notice being returnable on July 20, 2026. No issues were expressly left undecided by the High Court, as it has only dealt with preliminary procedural applications and the issuance of notice.
The High Court found that the ITAT's order did not contain a finding regarding the satisfaction of the conditions of Section 69B of the Act. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the ITAT for fresh consideration.
The High Court found that the ITAT's order did not contain a finding regarding the satisfaction of the conditions of Section 69B of the Act. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the ITAT for fresh consideration.
The High Court of Delhi decided that the appeal filed by the Revenue would not be pressed. The Revenue's counsel explicitly stated that due to the low tax effect of the appeal, they would not be pressing it. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal as not pressed. The pending applications related to the appeal were also dismissed as infructuous. The judgment does not provide any findings on the merits of the case or the underlying tax dispute.
The Delhi High Court held that both the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) and the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) are competent to initiate proceedings under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This decision was based on parity of reasons and the fact that the issue stood settled by a prior judgment of the same court in the case of TKS Builders Pvt. Ltd. v Income Tax Officer Ward 25(3) New Delhi. Consequently, the sole submission made by the petitioner's counsel, that only the FAO is competent, could not be accepted. The writ petition and pending applications were dismissed.
The High Court framed substantial questions of law regarding whether cost-to-cost reimbursements for employee secondment constitute FTS under the Income Tax Act and the India-USA DTAA. The court also questioned the applicability of specific DTAA articles to the amounts received by the assessee.
The High Court noted the submissions of the Revenue regarding the ITAT's order. The appeals were renotified for further hearing.
The Delhi High Court noted the submission by the Revenue that the ITAT had allowed the assessee's appeals and dismissed the Revenue's appeals. The court decided to renotify the matter for further hearing.
The Delhi High Court admitted the appeal on substantial questions of law. The court will decide if the reimbursements are FTS and how they are treated under the DTAA.
The High Court directed both the Revenue and the Assessees to file complete paper books, including written submissions made before the ITAT. The matter was adjourned for further hearing.
The Court directed the parties to file complete paper books, including written submissions made before the ITAT. The Court also noted an issue raised by the assessee regarding the delay in filing appeals for Vatika Limited.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a US resident, was entitled to treaty benefits. It concluded that the conditions for establishing a PE in India were not fulfilled, and therefore, no income was attributable to India.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a US resident, was entitled to treaty benefits. It concluded that the conditions for establishing a PE in India were not fulfilled, and therefore, no income was attributable to India.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a US resident, was entitled to treaty benefits. It concluded that the conditions for establishing a PE in India were not fulfilled, and therefore, no income was attributable to India.
The High Court held that the ITAT's reasoning was justified and that no substantial questions of law arose from the ITAT's order. Therefore, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
The Tribunal found that the genuineness of incurring expenses was not disputed and that the revenue had not adequately inquired into the details provided by the assessee. The High Court agreed that no substantial question of law arose and dismissed the appeal.
The ITAT correctly held that a penalty notice under Section 271(1)(c) must clearly specify whether it is for concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars. The High Court found no substantial question of law and dismissed the appeal.
The Tribunal held that the six assessment years for Section 153C proceedings should be counted from the date of receiving the seized documents by the assessee's AO, not the date of the original search. Therefore, AY 2013-14 was outside the purview of Section 153C.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance under Section 14A should be restricted to the extent of exempt income earned (Rs. 50,000/-). The amendment brought by the Finance Act 2022 was considered prospective and not applicable to the assessment year in question.
The Tribunal held that the six assessment years for Section 153C proceedings should be counted from the date of receiving the seized documents by the assessee's AO, not the date of the original search. Therefore, AY 2013-14 was outside the purview of Section 153C.
The High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal, finding that the issues raised were covered by previous judgments. The court also noted a significant delay in re-filing the appeal.
The Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the Assessing Officer (AO) to evaluate the individual show cause notices (SCNs) under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in light of the judgments in T.K.S. Builders, Abhinav Jindal, Naveen Kumar Gupta, Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, and Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer & Anr. The AO is to examine the issue of the surviving period for each noticee under Section 148, guided by the aforementioned judgments. Consequently, the AO must pass a reasoned and speaking order addressing the impact of these judgments on the impugned reassessment notices. This order will determine whether the notices survive or are liable to be recalled. The petitioner retains the liberty to challenge any adverse orders. The pending application was disposed of as infructuous.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice under Section 148 and the order under Section 148A(d) dated 18.04.2024, pertaining to Assessment Year 2017-18, were required to be set aside. The Court noted the submission of the petitioner that the information was common to both Assessment Years 2017-18 and 2018-19, and that for the latter year, the Assessing Officer had concluded in an order dated 31.08.2024 that it was not a fit case for issuing a notice under Section 148. The Court found this reasoning applicable to the present case for Assessment Year 2017-18. The ratio decidendi is that if the foundational information for initiating reassessment proceedings under Section 148A and 148 is found to be erroneous or inapplicable for one assessment year, and this information is common to another assessment year, then the proceedings for the latter year should also be quashed. The Court ordered the setting aside of the impugned order and notice.
The Tribunal held that the DRI had correctly reassessed the value of the imported goods in accordance with CBEC Circular No. 493/124/86-Cus VI dated 19.11.1987. It found that the assessee's claim regarding depreciation rates for high-end broadcasting equipment was not supported by any instructions or notifications, and an Advance Ruling in a similar case supported the application of the circular. Consequently, the Settlement Commission's conclusion that the value assessed by the DRI was correct was upheld. Regarding penalties, the Tribunal found that both directors of EBSPL were aware of the misdeclaration and thus liable. However, considering the substantial customs duty already paid (approx. Rs. 9.73 crores) and the fact that the benefit was sought by the company, the penalty on EBSPL was restricted to Rs. 50,00,000/-, with Rs. 25,00,000/- already deposited and the remaining to be paid within three months. The penalty upon the individual directors was quashed, as the benefit was sought by the company, not the directors in their individual capacity. The immunity from prosecution and penalty under Section 127H of the Act was acknowledged as the benefit obtained by the petitioner.
The High Court found that the ITAT had not decided the appeal on its merits but relied on previous orders, contrary to the Court's earlier clarification. Therefore, the impugned ITAT order was set aside.
The High Court held that the license fee paid for the use of goodwill was not an expenditure for a purpose prohibited by law. The Court found that the payment was for utilizing the established goodwill and not for sharing revenue, thus not violating Bar Council Rules.
The High Court held that the license fee paid for the use of goodwill was not an expenditure for a purpose prohibited by law. The Court found that the payment was for utilizing the established goodwill and not for sharing revenue, thus not violating Bar Council Rules.
The High Court held that the license fee paid for the use of goodwill was not an expenditure for a purpose prohibited by law. The Court found that the payment was for utilizing the established goodwill and not for sharing revenue, thus not violating Bar Council Rules.
The High Court held that the license fee paid for the use of goodwill was not an expenditure for a purpose prohibited by law. The Court found that the payment was for utilizing the established goodwill and not for sharing revenue, thus not violating Bar Council Rules.
The High Court held that the ITAT's findings regarding the inclusion of comparables for benchmarking royalty payments were not perverse. The court found no substantial question of law arising from the ITAT's order.
The Delhi High Court held that the license fee paid for the use of goodwill was not an expenditure for a purpose prohibited by law. The Court found that the payment was for utilizing the established reputation and goodwill of the firm, not for sharing revenue in violation of Bar Council Rules.
The High Court held that the license fee paid for the use of goodwill was not an expenditure for a purpose prohibited by law. The Court found that the payment was for utilizing the established goodwill and not for sharing revenue, thus not violating Bar Council Rules.
The High Court held that the license fee paid for the use of goodwill was not an expenditure for a purpose prohibited by law. The Court found that the payment was for utilizing the established goodwill and not for sharing revenue, thus not violating Bar Council Rules.
The High Court held that the ITAT's findings regarding the inclusion/exclusion of comparables for benchmarking royalty payments were not perverse. The court found no substantial question of law arising from the ITAT's order.
The High Court held that the ITAT's findings regarding the inclusion/exclusion of comparables for benchmarking royalty payments were not perverse. The court found no substantial question of law arising from the ITAT's order.
The High Court held that the ITAT's findings regarding the inclusion/exclusion of comparables for benchmarking royalty payments were not perverse. The court found no substantial question of law arising from the ITAT's order.
The High Court has not decided any substantive issues on the merits of the appeals. The order primarily deals with procedural matters. The Court has condoned the delay of 38 days in filing the appeals, allowing the applications for condonation. Exemptions have also been granted, subject to just exceptions. Crucially, the Court has been informed that an identical issue is pending before it in ITA No. 681/2025, with a hearing date of December 18, 2025. At the joint request of the parties, the present appeals (ITA 725/2025, ITA 726/2025, and ITA 727/2025) have been re-notified to be heard along with ITA No. 681/2025 on December 18, 2025. No finding has been reached on any of the substantive grounds of appeal, and no operative directions have been issued beyond scheduling the hearing.
The High Court noted that the tax effect was below the threshold for appeals, and while the Revenue argued an exception applied, it ultimately closed the appeal, implying it was not maintainable on grounds of low tax effect.
The Tribunal held that the assessee did not constitute a service Permanent Establishment (PE) in India for AY 2020-21 and 2021-22. Consequently, the receipts were considered business profits not taxable in India.
The Tribunal held that the assessee did not constitute a service Permanent Establishment (PE) in India for AY 2020-21 and 2021-22. Consequently, the receipts were considered business profits not taxable in India.