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11,126 orders from the Delhi High Court.
Most recent orders on record, from 2026.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with specific directions. The Court considered the petitioner's financial distress and its inability to conduct business due to the lien on its FDRs. It also noted that typically, a 20% deposit would secure a stay of demand as per CBDT circulars. Therefore, the Court directed the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 50 Crores (which was approximately 25% of the total outstanding demand of Rs. 200 Crores) under protest. Upon receipt of a post-dated cheque for Rs. 50 Crores, the Assessing Officer was directed to immediately lift the lien imposed on the FDRs by the order dated 10.11.2021, or recall the order passed under Section 281B. The petitioner was also required to furnish an undertaking not to transfer or create third-party rights on its assets, along with a list of its assets and any encumbrances. The Court did not explicitly decide on the interpretation of Section 281B's time limitations but provided a practical solution to alleviate the petitioner's financial hardship while securing the revenue's interest.
The High Court held that while the petitioner was indolent and negligent in not being available for cross-examination on 19.05.2026, the AO's subsequent action of agreeing to a fresh date (26.05.2026) condoned the petitioner's earlier lapse. By agreeing to a new date, the AO could not later claim that the petitioner had failed to avail the opportunity. Therefore, the impugned assessment order dated 22.09.2026 was set aside. However, the Court noted that witnesses cannot be repeatedly summoned. The Court directed the petitioner to pay costs of Rs. 25,000/- to each witness (Pradeep Kumar Sehgal and Yogesh Jain) for appearing for cross-examination. The AO was directed to fix a suitable date between 16.11.2026 and 30.11.2026 for cross-examination, ensuring the witnesses' presence. If witnesses failed to appear on three occasions, the AO could pass an order. If cross-examination was completed, a fresh assessment order was to be passed. The petitioner was to keep the cost payments ready.
The High Court held that the initial adjustment of Rs. 6,20,97,280/- could not be ordered to be refunded. This was because the petitioner had not prayed for a stay before any competent authority, and by the time the writ petition was filed, more than 80% of the amount had already been recovered. The Court acknowledged that this initial adjustment might have been arbitrary due to lack of opportunity but declined to order a refund after more than three years. However, the Court viewed the subsequent recovery of Rs. 1,93,15,522/- as a colourable exercise of power. The Court noted that the matter was pending before the High Court, the petitioner's stay application was pending, and the AO had disregarded the petitioner's representation that more than 80% of the demand had already been recovered. The Court emphasized that CBDT circulars are binding on the AO and that being declared in default does not negate the benefit of these circulars. The Court also noted the absence of a Section 245 intimation prior to this adjustment. Therefore, the Court directed the refund of Rs. 1,93,15,522/- with applicable interest. The Court also reiterated the direction for expeditious disposal of the appeal.
The High Court, without going into the merits of the case, decided not to entertain the appeal. The Court referenced the Supreme Court's judgment in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2693, which clarified that the amendment to Section 149(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, under the new regime is not prospective and applies to past assessment years. The Court noted that the time limit for issuing notices under Section 148 under the new regime is reduced to three years, and for past assessment years, the proviso to Section 149(1)(b) requires the time limit to survive under the old regime (six years). Consequently, the Court concluded that all such notices would have to be dropped. Based on this reasoning, the Court was not inclined to entertain the appeal.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court held that Section 275(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, unequivocally provides that penalty proceedings shall be kept in abeyance when an appeal under Section 253 of the Act is pending. The Court noted that the petitioner's appeal was pending before the ITAT on the date the impugned penalty order was passed, and it remained pending. Therefore, the penalty order was found to be contrary to the provisions of Section 275(1)(a). The Court quashed and set aside the impugned penalty order. However, the Court clarified that the Assessing Officer would be free to initiate penalty proceedings afresh if the ITAT decides the appeal against the petitioner and if the law permits.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, finding no substance or merit in it. The Court relied on its previous judgment in ITA 334/2026, which in turn was guided by the decision in ITA 4/2026 (The Commissioner of Income Tax - International Taxation -3 v. Sri Lanka Cricket). In that precedent, the Court held that 'live feed' does not attract royalty. The reasoning was that royalty presupposes enduring benefits, and if the license is confined to a live telecast of an event within a specific period and not for subsequent matches or future use, the payment cannot be considered royalty. The Court noted that the Special Leave Petition (SLP) filed by the department in an identical question had been withdrawn. The Court found that the rights granted to the respondent did not exceed the 'live feed' and did not involve the right to record, preserve, or re-telecast for enduring benefit. Therefore, the payments made were not royalty. The questions raised in the present appeal were answered against the revenue.
The High Court noted that the tax effect in the matter was less than Rs. 2 crores. The Revenue's counsel stated that prosecution had been initiated, bringing it within Clause (d) of Circular No. 5/2024. However, the assessee's counsel informed the Court that the prosecution had been dropped by an order dated 03.01.2026. In light of the tax effect being below Rs. 2 crores and the prosecution having been dropped, the Court was not inclined to proceed further with the appeal. The appeal was disposed of on these grounds. The Court explicitly stated that the question of law was left open.
The Delhi High Court, at this pre-cognizance stage, found it inappropriate to interdict the proceedings before the learned ACJM. The Court noted that the matter was fixed for hearing on the point of summoning, which is the appropriate stage for the petitioners to agitate their pleas. The Court disposed of the petition with a clear direction that the learned ACJM shall consider the aspects raised by the petitioners and pass a reasoned order on cognizance and summoning. The petitioners were granted liberty to avail appropriate remedies against any order that may be passed subsequently. The Court did not decide on the merits of the allegations but ensured the petitioners' contentions would be considered at the appropriate juncture.
The High Court held that while hearing the stay application of an assessee is imperative, the petitioner had approached the court prematurely without first moving a formal application before the CIT(A) for early listing or hearing of the stay application. The Court directed the petitioner to first file an application before the CIT(A) for taking up the stay application for consideration at an early date. If such an application is filed, the Appellate Authority shall consider it expeditiously, in accordance with law, subject to the pendency of other stay applications and urgent matters. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions.
The High Court noted that the petitioner informed the Court that the respondents have initiated the process for refund and expressed optimism about receiving it soon. Consequently, the Court decided to close the writ proceedings. The writ petition was disposed of based on the petitioner's submission that the refund process had commenced. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to apply for revival of the writ petition if the requisite amount along with applicable interest was not credited within 15 days. No specific findings were made on the merits of any tax dispute, as the matter was resolved procedurally.
The Delhi High Court granted the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The Court allowed the petitioner to take all his pleas before the Assessing Officer and, if required, before the Appellate Authority, as per the law. The reasoning for granting this permission was based on the petitioner's submission and the absence of any objection from the revenue. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The pending application was also disposed of accordingly. No specific findings were made on the merits of the underlying tax dispute, as the case was decided on a procedural point.
The High Court held that the ITAT was correct in quashing the assessments. The Court reasoned that Section 153D of the Income-tax Act, 1961, mandates that no order of assessment or reassessment shall be passed by an Assessing Officer below the rank of Joint Commissioner except with the previous approval of the Joint Commissioner. This provision, as clarified by CBDT Circular No. 3 of 2008, is applicable to orders of assessment or reassessment passed under Section 153A for each assessment year. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent is for superior authorities to apply their minds to the material for each separate year for which approval is sought. A consolidated approval for several years without such application of mind renders the facts of each assessment year otiose. The Court cited the principle that if a power is given to be exercised in a certain way, it must be exercised in that way or not at all. The Court found that its view was in consonance with decisions of the Orissa High Court and the Allahabad High Court, and therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration. The appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises from the ITAT's order and that the order is not perverse. Consequently, the Court was not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. Additionally, the Court noted that the tax effect involved in the appeal was below the monetary limit of ₹2 crores prescribed for appeals before the High Court as per CBDT Circular No. 5/2024, as amended by Circular No. 9/2024. Therefore, the appeal was liable to be disposed of on this ground as well, subject to the applicability of the circular and the absence of any exceptions. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal in terms of the applicable CBDT circular on monetary limits.
The Delhi High Court directed the appellate authority to consider the petitioner's early hearing application dated 25.09.2026 in accordance with law. The Court also requested the appellate authority to try and fix the appeal for hearing at an early date. The reasoning was based on the petitioner being a senior citizen and a retired professional against whom a substantial demand had been raised. The writ petition was disposed of with these observations. The operative direction was to consider the early hearing application and attempt to schedule the appeal for an early hearing. No specific issue was left undecided, as the Court focused on procedural expediting.
The High Court held that the ITAT was correct in quashing the assessments. The Court reasoned that Section 153D of the Income-tax Act mandates that no order of assessment or reassessment shall be passed by an Assessing Officer below the rank of Joint Commissioner except with the previous approval of the Joint Commissioner. This provision, as clarified by CBDT Circular No. 3 of 2008, requires approval for each assessment year, implying that the superior authority must apply its mind to the material for each separate year for which approval is sought. A consolidated approval for multiple years without application of mind to each assessment year renders the approval invalid. The Court cited the principle that if a statute prescribes a specific way to do a thing, it must be done in that way or not at all. The Court found that a coordinate bench had already interpreted Section 153D in consonance with the views of the Orissa High Court and Allahabad High Court, and no substantial question of law arose for consideration. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.
The Delhi High Court allowed the Revenue to withdraw the present appeal. The court noted that the tax effect involved was less than Rs. 2 crores. The Revenue was granted liberty to revive the appeal in the event the Hon'ble Apex Court reverses the law as laid down by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of Roca Bathroom Products (supra). Consequently, the appeal, along with any pending applications, was disposed of as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the substantive issues of the appeal.
The Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petitions. The Court directed the Assessing Officer to pay the requisite amount along with applicable interest under Section 244A and Section 244A(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in accordance with the law. This payment was to be made on or before November 30, 2026. The Court noted that the Assessing Officer had passed orders and determined the refund and interest, and the revenue assured payment within four weeks. The Court's direction was to ensure this payment was completed by the specified date. The interlocutory applications were also disposed of along with the writ petitions.
The Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petitions. The Court directed the Assessing Officer (AO) to pay the requisite refund amount along with applicable interest under Section 244A and Section 244A(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in accordance with the law. This payment was to be made on or before November 30, 2026. The Court noted the assurance from the revenue's counsel that the payment would be credited within four weeks. The writ petitions and any interlocutory applications were disposed of as a consequence of this direction.
The Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petitions. The Court noted that the Assessing Officer had passed orders determining the refund and applicable interest. The Senior Standing Counsel for the respondents assured that the payment would be made within four weeks. Consequently, the Court directed the Assessing Officer to pay the requisite amount along with applicable interest under Section 244A and Section 244A(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in accordance with the law, on or before November 30, 2026. The Court did not leave any issue undecided, as the matter was resolved by the assurance of payment and the subsequent directions.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arose in the appeal filed by the Revenue. This conclusion was reached because the Revenue's counsel conceded that treaty shopping was not an issue. The court relied on its own prior decision in Blackstone Capital Partners (Singapore) Vi Fdi Three Pte. Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax (International Taxation), which established the principle that a Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) cannot be questioned or gone behind. The court further noted that the Revenue had not presented any factual basis that would allow for doubting the TRC, as per the tests laid down in the Supreme Court judgments of UOI & Anr. vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan & Anr. and Vodafone International Holidays BV vs. UOI & Anr. Consequently, the appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.
The Delhi High Court quashed and set aside the notice dated March 30, 2026, issued under Section 148A(1), the order passed under Section 148A(3), and the consequential notice dated June 29, 2026, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court held that these actions were without jurisdiction. The Court explicitly reserved the right of the competent authority to issue a fresh notice in accordance with the law if deemed expedient. It also preserved the assessee's right to raise all permissible defenses before the Assessing Officer and to agitate all grounds, even those raised in the writ petition. The writ petition was allowed along with pending applications.
The Delhi High Court granted the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The Court permitted the petitioner to take appropriate remedies, including filing a fresh writ petition. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn, with the liberty as prayed for by the petitioner. All pending applications were also disposed of.
The Delhi High Court held that the penalty proceedings initiated under Section 271(1)(c) read with Section 274 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, are vitiated if the penalty show cause notice fails to specify the particular limb of Section 271(1)(c) under which the penalty is proposed. The Court noted that the Assessing Officer had issued a penalty show cause notice dated 14.03.2013 under Section 271(1)(c) read with Section 274 of the Income Tax Act, but it did not specify any particular limb thereunder. The High Court relied on its previous judgments in PCIT v. Sahara India Life Insurance Co. Ltd., (2021) 432 ITR 84 (Del), PCIT v. Gopal Kumar Goyal, (2023) 153 taxman.com 534, and Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Gragerious Projects (P) Ltd., (2024) 169 taxmann.com 291 (Delhi), and Commissioner of Income Tax (International Taxation)-1 v. Genpact Services LLC, (2025) 175 taxmann.com 847 (Delhi). The ratio decidendi is that a vague penalty notice without specifying the charge leads to vitiation of penalty proceedings. Consequently, no interference was required in the ITAT's order, and the appeal was disposed of.
The High Court held that the appreciation of material by the Assessing Officer, CIT(A), and ITAT was not perverse. The assessee had failed to prove the creditworthiness of his creditors. The Court reiterated the settled law that the initial onus is on the assessee to establish, by cogent evidence, the genuineness of the transaction, identity of creditors, and their capacity to advance money under Section 68 of the Act. The Court cited its own landmark judgments in Kale Khan Mohd. Hanif and Roshan Di Hatti, and the Delhi High Court's decision in CIT v. Oasis Hospitalities (P) Ltd., emphasizing that merely proving identity is insufficient if capacity or creditworthiness is not established. The Court distinguished the present case from CIT v. KRBL Infrastructure Ltd., where the lower authorities had accepted creditworthiness. Therefore, the question of law was answered in favour of the Revenue. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that a statement recorded under Section 132(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, does not, by itself, constitute incriminating material for making additions under Section 153A of the Act. The Court relied on its previous judgments in PCIT (Central)-3 v. Anand Kumar Jain (HUF), CIT v. Kabul Chawla, Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi v. Best Infrastructure (India) P. Ltd., and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Harjeev Aggarwal. The reasoning was that for a statement under Section 132(4) to form the basis of a block assessment under Section 153A, it must be relatable to other evidence or material found during the search and seizure operations. A standalone statement, without corroborative evidence unearthed during the search, cannot empower the Assessing Officer to frame a block assessment. The Court emphasized that there must be a nexus between the statement and the incriminating evidence found during the search. Since the ITAT's finding was based on insufficient material to support the additions, and the Revenue failed to produce corroborative material, the additions were rightly deleted. The appeal was disposed of in light of the settled legal position.