SUMANGLAM SEWA AIVAM EDUCATION SAMITI vs. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE 2
What did the High Court hold?
The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petitions. The Court held that while the Supreme Court's dismissal of an SLP may affirm the law laid down by a High Court, it does not necessarily set aside other judgments or imply merger of the lower court's order with the Supreme Court's order if the SLP was dismissed on grounds other than merits, such as delay. The Court noted that the Supreme Court had dismissed the SLP in the case of ADIT (International Taxation)-2, Hyderabad & Anr. v. Deepanjan Roy without dealing with the issue on merits, and therefore, it could not be said to have set aside the Delhi High Court's judgment in TKS Builders (P.) Ltd. Furthermore, the SLP preferred against TKS Builders (P.) Ltd. was still pending adjudication before the Supreme Court. Consequently, the judgment in TKS Builders (P.) Ltd. was held to continue to hold fort concerning the jurisdiction in Delhi, and the Court was bound by it. The issue of concurrent jurisdiction between JAO and FAO was also noted as pending consideration before the Supreme Court. The Court found no merit in the present petitions and dismissed them, along with pending applications.
What were the facts?
Multiple writ petitions were filed before the Delhi High Court challenging notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO). The petitioners contended that these notices and subsequent proceedings were without jurisdiction, void ab initio, and in contravention of Section 151A of the Act read with the 'E-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022'. The core issue was whether the JAO had the jurisdiction to initiate reassessment proceedings under Section 148, given the introduction of Section 151A and the faceless assessment regime.
What were the issues?
1. Whether the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) has the jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in light of Section 151A of the Act and the 'E-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022'? (Question of law) Assessee's Contentions: - Section 151A, inserted by the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2022, mandates that all notices under Section 148 must be issued by the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) alone. - The E-Assessment Scheme, 2022, further stipulates that all re-assessments and issuance of Section 148 notices shall be conducted in a faceless manner as per Section 144B. - Therefore, only the Assessment Unit functioning under the National Faceless Assessment Centre (NFAC), i.e., the FAO, has the lawful authority to issue such notices, divesting the JAO of this power. - Reliance was placed on various High Court judgments (Hexaware Technologies Ltd., Prakash Pandurang Patil, Sri Venkataramana Reddy Patloola, Deepanjan Roy, Jatinder Singh Bhangu, Royal Bitumen (P.) Ltd., Everest Kanto Cylinder Ltd., Sundaram Multi Pap Ltd., Venus Jewel, Dadha Pharma LLP, Arene Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd., Ganesh Nivrutti Jagtap, Rajesh Todwal) holding that the JAO lacks jurisdiction. - The Supreme Court's dismissal of SLP in ADIT (International Taxation)-2, Hyderabad & Anr. v. Deepanjan Roy affirmed the ratio that only the FAO has jurisdiction. - The Delhi High Court's own judgments in TKS Builders (P.) Ltd., Mala Petrochemicals and Polymers, and Mehak Jagga, which recognized concurrent jurisdiction between JAO and FAO, were argued to be erroneous and contrary to the statutory mandate. Revenue's Contentions: - Not recorded in the judgment.
Which sections of the Income-tax Act were involved?
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
Heard together (14 matters)
Read from the judgment's own cause title. This page is filed under one of them.
Cause title — parties, addresses and appearances
Constitution is attracted to such an order. Grounds entitling exercise of review jurisdiction conferred by Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or any other statutory provision or allowing review of an order passed in exercise of writ or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court (where also the W.P.(C) 16937/2025& Ors. principles underlying or emerging from Order 47 Rule 1 CPC act as guidelines) are not necessarily the same on which this Court exercises discretion to grant or not to grant special leave to appeal while disposing of a petition for the purpose. Mere rejection of a special leave petition does not take away the jurisdiction of the court, tribunal or forum whose order forms the subject-matter of petition for special leave to review its own order if grounds for exercise of review jurisdiction are shown to exist. Where the order rejecting an SLP is a speaking order, that is, where reasons have been assigned by this Court for rejecting the petition for special leave and are stated in the order still the order remains the one rejecting prayer for the grant of leave to appeal. The petitioner has been turned away at the threshold without having been allowed to enter in the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Here also the doctrine of merger would not apply. But the law stated or declared by this Court in its order shall attract applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution. The reasons assigned by this Court in its order expressing its adjudication (expressly or by necessary implication) on point of fact or law shall take away the jurisdiction of any other court, tribunal or authority to express any opinion in conflict with or in departure from the view taken by this Court because permitting to do so would be subversive of judicial discipline and an affront to the order of this Court. However this would be so not by reference to the doctrine of merger.
Once a special leave petition has been granted, the doors for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court have been let open. The order impugned before the Supreme Court becomes an order appealed against. Any order W.P.(C) 16937/2025& Ors. passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of doctrine of merger. It would not make a difference whether the order is one of reversal or of modification or of dismissal affirming the order appealed against. It would also not make any difference if the order is a speaking or non-speaking one. Whenever this Court has felt inclined to apply its mind to the merits of the order put in issue before it though it may be inclined to affirm the same, it is customary with this Court to grant leave to appeal and thereafter dismiss the appeal itself (and not merely the petition for special leave) though at times the orders granting leave to appeal and dismissing the appeal are contained in the same order and at times the orders are quite brief. Nevertheless, the order shows the exercise of appellate jurisdiction and therein the merits of the order impugned having been subjected to judicial scrutiny of this Court. xxx xxx xxx
We may look at the issue from another angle. The Supreme Court cannot and does not reverse or modify the decree or order appealed against while deciding a petition for special leave to appeal. What is impugned before the Supreme Court can be reversed or modified only after granting leave to appeal and then assuming appellate jurisdiction over it. If the order impugned before the Supreme Court cannot be reversed or modified at the SLP stage obviously that order cannot also be affirmed at the SLP stage.” (Emphasis supplied)
Further, in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. & Others vs. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal, (2019) 4 SCC 376, the W.P.(C) 16937/2025& Ors. Supreme Court held as under:- “26. 2. We reiterate the conclusions relevant for these cases as under: (Kunhayammed case, SCC p. 384) “(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order i.e. gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties. (vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation. (vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a W.P.(C) 16937/2025& Ors. petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.”
Mr. Abbas has endeavoured to demonstrate that the reasons assigned by the Supreme Court, in Prakash Pandurang Patil (supra), which we have reproduced in paragraph 3 above, would make it clear that the SLP has been dismissed both on merits and on delay. According to him, this would mean that by necessary implication, the judgment in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. (supra), relied upon by the Bombay High Court in the impugned judgment therein, would stand affirmed and the judgment of this Court in TKS Builders (supra) would stand negated. This plea does not appeal to us, for the reason that the Supreme Court has only dismissed the SLP without dealing with the issue. Going by the above discussed judicial pronouncements, the same cannot be said to have set aside TKS Builders (supra). That apart, we find that the SLP preferred against TKS Builders (supra) is still pending adjudication before the Supreme Court.
As such, the judgment in TKS Builders (supra) would still hold the fort insofar as the jurisdiction of Delhi is concerned. We are bound by the same.
Insofar as, the submission of Mr. Abbas that this Court in TKS Builders (supra), Mala Petrochemicals and Polymers (supra) and Mehak Jagga (supra), has erroneously recognized a concept of concurrent jurisdiction between JAO and FAO is concerned. Suffice to state, the said issue is pending consideration before the Supreme Court. W.P.(C) 16937/2025& Ors.
Insofar as, his submission that the Supreme Court in SLP (C) 29723/2025, All India Kataria Education Society (supra), arising from the order dated 15.09.2025 passed by this Court in W.P. (C) 14225/2025, has issued notice and stayed the assessment proceedings till the next date of hearing and similarly in Yukti Export v. Income Tax officer (supra), which arises from the order passed by this Court in W.P. (C) 15024/2025 dated 26.09.2025 and connected matters, that assessment proceedings have been stayed, are concerned, the same are matter of record. The Supreme Court has not stayed the effect of the orders passed in the aforesaid two writ petitions based on the judgment in the case of TKS Builders (supra). Similar is the position, insofar as, the SLP filed by the assessee in the case of P. C. Jeweller Ltd.(supra).
In view of the above discussion, we find no merit in the present petitions, the same are dismissed. The pending applications having become infructuous are also dismissed. V. KAMESWAR RAO, J VINOD KUMAR, J NOVEMBER 21, 2025 rk
More judgments on Section 148
- ACIT Central Bilaspur, Bilaspur vs Arun Kumar Agrawal, SaktiITSSA 26/RPR/2025[2018-19]Status: Disposed21 Oct 2026AY 2018-19
- Vinod Agrawal, Kawardha vs Assisstant Commissioner of Income Tax…ITA 666/RPR/2026[2019-20]Status: Heard21 Oct 2026AY 2019-20
- Sar Business Tradelink Private Limited… vs Income Tax Officer, Ward - 1(2), RaipurITA 599/RPR/2026[2014-15]Status: Heard21 Oct 2026AY 2014-15
- Neo Incorporation, Rajkot vs DCIT Circle- 1(2), RajkotITA 471/RJT/2026[2012-2013]Status: Disposed21 Oct 2026AY 2012-2013
- Adj Agri International LLP, Rajkot vs The Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(1)(1), RajkotITA 1198/RJT/2026[2018-19]Status: Disposed21 Oct 2026AY 2018-19
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