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3,246 tribunal orders from the Raipur bench.
Counted from the judgments of this bench on BharatTax. The figure is how many of them cite each decision.
Appellate authorities can consider new claims and additional grounds if the relevant facts are already on record. The purpose of assessment is to correctly determine tax liability, allowing both parties to raise issues.
The appellate tribunal must render a proper decision on both facts and law, disposing of an appeal on its merits rather than dismissing it solely due to the appellant's absence. This obligation is derived from Section 33(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, and reflects principles of natural justice.
The ITAT fails to uphold natural justice when it doesn't address an infirmity regarding an assessee being denied a proper opportunity of being heard before the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC dismissed the matter ex-parte.
The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution or default in appearance. Under Section 250(6) of the Income-tax Act, the CIT(A) must decide the appeal on its merits, even in an ex parte proceeding.
Employee contributions to PF and ESIC, deposited beyond the due date under the respective Acts but within the due date for filing the income tax return under Section 139(1), are allowable deductions under Section 36(1)(va). Such disallowance cannot be made during processing under Section 143(1).
Employee contributions to provident fund or ESI, even if deposited after the due date specified in the respective welfare statutes, are allowable as a deduction under Section 36(1)(va) if paid before the due date for filing the income-tax return. This judgment aligns the treatment of employee contributions with employer contributions under Section 43B.
No disallowance can be made under Section 36(1)(va) or Section 43B for delayed payment of employee's contributions to ESI or PF if these amounts are deposited by the assessee on or before the due date for filing the return of income under Section 139(1). This aligns the treatment of employee contributions with employer contributions for allowability.
Amendments to the Income-tax Act that are curative, clarificatory, or beneficial in nature apply retrospectively from the date the original statutory provision was introduced, even if not explicitly stated.
A tax provision is retrospective only if legislative intent is explicit or if it is purely clarificatory and does not alter existing law. Provisions framed 'for the removal of doubts' are not presumed to be retrospective if they change the law as it stood.
A taxing statute must be interpreted strictly based on what is clearly expressed, without implying anything not stated or importing provisions to supply deficiencies. A person must clearly fall within the ambit of the charging section for tax to be levied.
Fiscal statutes must be construed strictly and literally. When the language is plain and unambiguous, courts must give effect to it without considering legislative intent or equitable considerations.
Mandatory provisions in taxation statutes must be strictly complied with. Non-compliance with a mandatory provision results in the cancellation of any concession granted.
The case holds that taxing statutes must be interpreted strictly based on their plain language. Courts should not read anything into the statute, imply intendment, or consider equity, hardship, or injustice.
If a statute or law prescribes that a thing must be done in a particular manner, then it must be done in that manner alone and in no other way. This principle mandates strict adherence to statutory procedures.
An order dismissing all grounds of appeal based on a single issue, in violation of Section 250(6), is an unlawful adjudication and renders the order irregular, making it a fit case for remand.
An appellate authority cannot travel beyond the provisions of law when adjudicating matters, as doing so is barred by jurisdiction and renders the action otiose.
Appealing a tax assessment requires more than just filing the appeal; it involves actively pursuing it. The assessee must effectively engage with the appellate process.
The interest income earned by a cooperative society from investing its surplus funds in fixed deposits with banks is not "derived from" its eligible business activities and is taxable as "income from other sources" under Section 56, thus not qualifying for deduction under Section 80P.
When there is a conflict between the decisions of non-jurisdictional High Courts, the view that favors the assessee should be preferred.
Most recent orders on record, from 2026.
The Tribunal held that the CPC was not justified in disallowing the claim of deduction of Rs. 37,22,491/- under section 80-IA without issuing a show-cause notice. The first proviso to section 143(1)(a) mandates that no adjustment shall be made unless an intimation is given to the assessee. The assessee's AR admitted that no such intimation was sent regarding the denial of the section 80-IA deduction; the only intimation sent was for a minor disallowance of Rs. 28,372/-. The Revenue failed to contradict this admission. Therefore, the adjustment made by the CPC was in violation of the principles of natural justice and the mandatory procedure prescribed under section 143(1)(a). Following its own decision in the case of Shikhar Enterprises, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and deleted the adjustment of Rs. 37,22,491/-. The appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's non-compliance before the Ld. CIT(A). However, in the interest of justice and fairness, and without commenting on the merits of the case, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for deciding the case afresh/denovo. The Ld. CIT(A) is directed to provide an adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee is also directed to cooperate in the remitted appellate proceedings. The appeal is allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the additions or the validity of the reassessment proceedings.
The ITAT held that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC is mandated to adjudicate all legal grounds raised by the assessee before it. The Tribunal found that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC had failed to do so and had instead simply remanded the case back to the AO. The ITAT emphasized that legal issues must be examined by the first appellate authority before any restoration to the AO, if at all. Therefore, in the interest of substantive justice, the ITAT set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC and remanded the matter back to its file. The CIT(Appeals)/NFAC was directed to adjudicate the legal grounds assailed by the assessee in accordance with the law and principles of natural justice. The assessee was directed to comply with the hearing notices issued by the First Appellate Authority. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 503 and 289 days in filing the appeals for assessment years 2014-15 and 2015-16, respectively. The Tribunal acknowledged the severe medical ailments of the person responsible for filing the appeals, which were not disputed by the revenue. Following the principles of natural justice and consistency, and citing various Supreme Court and ITAT decisions, the Tribunal set aside the ex-parte orders of the Ld. CIT(Appeals). The matters were remanded back to the file of the Ld. CIT(Appeals) for denovo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal directed the assessee to comply with hearing notices from the Ld. CIT(Appeals) as this was a final opportunity. The Ld. CIT(Appeals) was instructed to pass a speaking order in terms with Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 503 and 289 days in filing the appeals for assessment years 2014-15 and 2015-16, respectively. The Tribunal acknowledged the severe medical ailments of the person responsible for filing the appeals, which were not disputed by the revenue. Following the principles of natural justice and consistency, and citing various Supreme Court and ITAT decisions, the Tribunal set aside the ex-parte orders of the Ld. CIT(Appeals). The matters were remanded back to the file of the Ld. CIT(Appeals) for denovo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal directed the assessee to comply with hearing notices from the Ld. CIT(Appeals) as this was a final opportunity. The Ld. CIT(Appeals) was instructed to pass a speaking order in terms with Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT was not justified in invoking Section 263 regarding the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal reasoned that the AO's decision to allow the deduction was a possible and legally permissible view, and the PCIT's differing opinion did not make the order erroneous, especially since the Tribunal itself had, in principle, allowed such deductions in the assessee's own case. This constituted a case of change of opinion, rendering Section 263 inapplicable. Therefore, the finding of the PCIT on this issue was reversed, and the original assessment order was restored. Regarding the taxability of interest income earned on FDRs with banks other than cooperative banks (amounting to Rs. 3,94,82,24,597/-), the Tribunal agreed with the PCIT that the AO had not conducted sufficient inquiry or verification in the original assessment. Therefore, the PCIT was justified in setting aside the original assessment order on this issue and directing the AO to conduct further inquiries. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal declined to condone the inordinate delay of 619/650 days in filing the appeals. The Tribunal observed that the reasons provided by the assessees, such as financial crisis and bank recovery proceedings, did not constitute sufficient cause for such a prolonged delay. The Tribunal emphasized that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretion of the court, and it should not be granted as an act of generosity. Citing various Supreme Court judgments, including H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaish, Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaran & Anr., and State of Orissa Vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, the Tribunal held that delay caused by negligence or an inactive approach cannot be condoned. The Tribunal found the assessees' conduct to be grossly negligent and a casual approach to their rights. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed on the ground of limitation without going into the merits of the cases. No issue was left undecided; the appeals were dismissed solely on limitation.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT was not justified in invoking Section 263 regarding the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal reasoned that the AO's decision to allow the deduction was a possible and legally permissible view, and the PCIT's differing opinion did not make the order erroneous, especially since the Tribunal itself had, in principle, allowed such deductions in the assessee's own case. This constituted a case of change of opinion, rendering Section 263 inapplicable. Therefore, the finding of the PCIT on this issue was reversed, and the original assessment order was restored. Regarding the taxability of interest income earned on FDRs with banks other than cooperative banks (amounting to Rs. 3,94,82,24,597/-), the Tribunal agreed with the PCIT that the AO had not conducted sufficient inquiry or verification in the original assessment. Therefore, the PCIT was justified in setting aside the original assessment order on this issue and directing the AO to conduct further inquiries. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal declined to condone the inordinate delay of 619/650 days in filing the appeals. The Tribunal observed that the reasons provided by the assessees, such as financial crisis and bank recovery proceedings, did not constitute sufficient cause for such a prolonged delay. The Tribunal emphasized that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretion of the court, and it should not be granted as an act of generosity. Citing various Supreme Court judgments, including H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaish, Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaran & Anr., and State of Orissa Vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, the Tribunal held that delay caused by negligence or an inactive approach cannot be condoned. The Tribunal found the assessees' conduct to be grossly negligent and a casual approach to their rights. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed on the ground of limitation without going into the merits of the cases. No issue was left undecided; the appeals were dismissed solely on limitation.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT was not justified in invoking Section 263 regarding the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal reasoned that the AO's decision to allow the deduction was a possible and legally permissible view, and the PCIT's differing opinion did not make the order erroneous, especially since the Tribunal itself had, in principle, allowed such deductions in the assessee's own case. This constituted a case of change of opinion, rendering Section 263 inapplicable. Therefore, the finding of the PCIT on this issue was reversed, and the original assessment order was restored. Regarding the taxability of interest income earned on FDRs with banks other than cooperative banks (amounting to Rs. 3,94,82,24,597/-), the Tribunal agreed with the PCIT that the AO had not conducted sufficient inquiry or verification in the original assessment. Therefore, the PCIT was justified in setting aside the original assessment order on this issue and directing the AO to conduct further inquiries. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal first addressed the delay of 388 days in filing the appeal. Citing Supreme Court decisions in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs Mst. Katiji and others and N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy, and the Delhi High Court's decision in HL Malhotra & Company Pvt. Ltd. Vs DCIT, the Tribunal condoned the delay, considering the assessee's advanced age (94 years) and unfamiliarity with online compliances, finding no malafide or deliberate delay. The Tribunal then noted that the CIT(A) had not decided the appeal with a well-reasoned order as required by section 250(6) of the Act. Citing the Bombay High Court's decision in Prem Kumar Arjun Das Luthra HUF, the Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) is obliged to dispose of appeals on merit. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision (denovo) after providing the assessee an adequate opportunity of being heard. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT was not justified in invoking Section 263 regarding the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal reasoned that the AO's decision to allow the deduction was a possible and legally permissible view, and the PCIT's differing opinion did not make the order erroneous, especially since the Tribunal itself had, in principle, allowed such deductions in the assessee's own case. This constituted a case of change of opinion, rendering Section 263 inapplicable. Therefore, the finding of the PCIT on this issue was reversed, and the original assessment order was restored. Regarding the taxability of interest income earned on FDRs with banks other than cooperative banks (amounting to Rs. 3,94,82,24,597/-), the Tribunal agreed with the PCIT that the AO had not conducted sufficient inquiry or verification in the original assessment. Therefore, the PCIT was justified in setting aside the original assessment order on this issue and directing the AO to conduct further inquiries. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal declined to condone the inordinate delay of 619/650 days in filing the appeals. The Tribunal observed that the reasons provided by the assessees, such as financial crisis and bank recovery proceedings, did not constitute sufficient cause for such a prolonged delay. The Tribunal emphasized that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretion of the court, and it should not be granted as an act of generosity. Citing various Supreme Court judgments, including H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaish, Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaran & Anr., and State of Orissa Vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, the Tribunal held that delay caused by negligence or an inactive approach cannot be condoned. The Tribunal found the assessees' conduct to be grossly negligent and a casual approach to their rights. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed on the ground of limitation without going into the merits of the cases. No issue was left undecided; the appeals were dismissed solely on limitation.
The Tribunal, after hearing both parties and perusing the record, noted that the CIT(A) had not decided the appeal after discussing the issues in detail. The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) was obliged under section 250(6) of the Act to dispose of the appeal in writing with a well-reasoned order on each point of determination. It was evident from the perusal of sections 251(1)(a), 251(1)(b), and the Explanation of section 251(2) that the CIT(A) is required to apply their mind to all issues arising from the impugned order. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) was not empowered to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution and was obliged to dispose of the appeal on merit, relying on the decision in Prem Kumar Arjun Das Luthra HUF, 291 CTR 614. In the interest of justice, and without commenting on the merits, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) for deciding the case afresh/denovo, after providing adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee was directed to cooperate in the remitted appellate proceedings.
The Tribunal declined to condone the inordinate delay of 619/650 days in filing the appeals. The Tribunal observed that the reasons provided by the assessees, such as financial crisis and bank recovery proceedings, did not constitute sufficient cause for such a prolonged delay. The Tribunal emphasized that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretion of the court, and it should not be granted as an act of generosity. Citing various Supreme Court judgments, including H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaish, Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaran & Anr., and State of Orissa Vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, the Tribunal held that delay caused by negligence or an inactive approach cannot be condoned. The Tribunal found the assessees' conduct to be grossly negligent and a casual approach to their rights. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed on the ground of limitation without going into the merits of the cases. No issue was left undecided; the appeals were dismissed solely on limitation.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, dismissing the Revenue's appeal. The primary issue was the validity of reassessment proceedings initiated beyond four years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The Tribunal noted that for reassessment beyond four years, the first proviso to Section 147 mandates that the Assessing Officer must record a finding that the assessee failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment. The Tribunal found that the reasons recorded by the AO did not contain any such finding or whisper of the assessee's failure to disclose material facts. Relying on the decisions of the Hon'ble Chhattisgarh High Court (the jurisdictional High Court) in Hariom Ingots and Power Pvt Ltd vs PCIT and other precedents, the Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was issued without jurisdiction and was bad in law. Consequently, the reassessment order could not be sustained. The Tribunal dismissed grounds 3, 5, and 6 of the Revenue's appeal. Since the notice under Section 148 was quashed, all other grounds were rendered academic. The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that in cases where an ex-parte order is passed by the Ld. CIT(Appeals) due to the assessee's non-compliance, and despite several opportunities, no compliance is made, the principles of natural justice and the scheme of the Act necessitate remanding the matter back to the Ld. CIT(Appeals) for denovo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal cited its own decisions in Brajesh Singh Bhadoria and Collector Mining, Kondagaon, which followed a similar approach. The reasoning is that the Ld. CIT(Appeals) is the first appellate authority and must pass a speaking order on merits. If the Tribunal were to adjudicate a legal ground in such a scenario, it would usurp the power of the Ld. CIT(Appeals) and create an easy route for assessees to bypass the first appellate authority. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(Appeals) and remanded the matter back for denovo adjudication, directing the assessee to comply fully and the Ld. CIT(Appeals) to pass a speaking order within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition of Rs. 3,02,25,000/- made under Section 68 for AY 2009-10. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed share application forms with complete addresses and PANs, confirmations, and ITRs. The AO's assessment order consolidated the discussion for multiple assessment years, and the share applicants were listed in a consolidated table. The Tribunal found that the AO had not doubted the genuineness of the receipts and had not rendered any findings of non-fulfillment of primary conditions under Section 68, namely, identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of transactions. The AO's reliance on the assessment order for AY 2012-13 was found to be erroneous as that order was reversed by the ITAT. The Tribunal also referred to various High Court and Supreme Court decisions, including Mehta Parikh, N.C. Cables, Softline Creations, Gangeshwari Metals, and Jawahar Lal Oswal, emphasizing that the onus shifts back to the revenue to prove the transaction is not genuine once the assessee provides credible explanations and relevant facts. The Tribunal distinguished the Revenue's cited cases as being based on specific incriminating material and untraceable shareholders, which was not the case here. The Tribunal concluded that the concurrent findings of the lower appellate authorities were purely factual and no substantial question of law arose.
The Tribunal admitted additional evidence filed by the assessee, including reconciliation statements for rent receipts, certificates from CG State Ware Housing Corporation regarding rent, and ledger accounts for AYs 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2013-14. These documents were not filed before the lower authorities. Considering that these documents went to the root of the issue and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the assessment order to the Assessing Officer (AO) for de novo adjudication. The AO was directed to provide an opportunity to the assessee to file all necessary documents. The appeal of the assessee was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that in cases where the CIT(Appeals) passes an ex-parte order due to the assessee's non-compliance, and the assessee raises legal grounds, the Tribunal should not adjudicate these grounds directly. Instead, to uphold the principles of natural justice and the statutory framework of adjudication, the matter should be remanded back to the CIT(Appeals) for a de novo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal reasoned that deciding legal grounds in such a scenario would bypass the first appellate authority's role and create an easy route for assessees to avoid compliance. The Tribunal cited its own decisions in Brajesh Singh Bhadoria and Collector Mining, Kondagaon, emphasizing that the CIT(Appeals) must pass a speaking order under Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act. Therefore, the CIT(Appeals)'s order was set aside, and the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication, with a direction to the assessee to comply fully and the CIT(Appeals) to pass an order within three months.
The Tribunal held that in cases where an ex-parte order is passed by the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC due to the assessee's non-compliance, and the assessee has not been heard on merits, the matter should be remanded back to the file of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for de novo adjudication. The Tribunal reasoned that it is not open for the Tribunal to adjudicate issues in the absence of a substantive order passed on merits by the first appellate authority as per Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act. This approach balances the scales of justice by providing a final opportunity to the assessee. The Tribunal cited its own previous decisions in Brajesh Singh Bhadoria and Collector Mining, Kondagaon, emphasizing that the first appellate authority must pass a speaking order on merits. The Tribunal directed the assessee to comply with future notices and present the case on merits, and the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard and pass an order within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC has no power to dismiss an appeal in limine solely on the ground of delay without referring to and discussing the contents available on record. Relying on the Bombay High Court's decision in CIT Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF) and a previous ITAT, Raipur Bench decision in Prabal Aadhar Seva Sansthan Vs. ITO, the Tribunal found that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC should have considered the delay aspect under Section 249(3) and then decided the appeal on merits as per Section 250(4) & (6). The Tribunal granted the assessee one final opportunity to represent their case before the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC regarding the condonation of delay. If the delay is condoned, the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC is to adjudicate the issues on merits while complying with the principles of natural justice. The orders of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC were set aside, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the show cause notice issued under Section 148A(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dated February 24, 2023, which provided only 6 clear days for compliance, was invalid and void ab initio. The Tribunal relied on the interpretation of 'not less than 7 days' by various judicial forums, including the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pioneer Motors (Private) Ltd. vs. Municipal Counsel, Nagrecoil, and the Hon'ble High Courts of Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Gujarat, which mandate the exclusion of both the date of issuance and the date of compliance. Since the notice was invalid, any subsequent assessment order passed pursuant to it was also quashed and considered non-est in law. The Tribunal followed its own previous decisions in similar cases.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC has no power to dismiss an appeal in limine solely on the ground of delay without referring to and discussing the contents available on record. Relying on the Bombay High Court's decision in CIT Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF) and a previous ITAT, Raipur Bench decision in Prabal Aadhar Seva Sansthan Vs. ITO, the Tribunal found that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC should have considered the delay aspect under Section 249(3) and then decided the appeal on merits as per Section 250(4) & (6). The Tribunal granted the assessee one final opportunity to represent their case before the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC regarding the condonation of delay. If the delay is condoned, the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC is to adjudicate the issues on merits while complying with the principles of natural justice. The orders of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC were set aside, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that in cases where an ex-parte order is passed by the NFAC due to the assessee's non-compliance, and considering the principles of natural justice, the matter should be remanded back to the NFAC for denovo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal relied on its own previous decisions in Brajesh Singh Bhadoria Vs. Dy./ACIT and Collector Mining, Kondagaon Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS), and also cited the decision in Amit Singh Thakur Vs. ACIT. The reasoning was that the NFAC is the first appellate authority and should pass a speaking order on merits. Allowing the Tribunal to decide a legal ground on an ex-parte order would usurp the NFAC's power and create an easy route for assessees to bypass compliance. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the NFAC and remanded the matter for denovo adjudication, directing the assessee to comply with future notices and present their case on merits. The NFAC was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard and pass an order within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.