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The Tribunal held that the CPC was not justified in disallowing the claim of deduction of Rs. 37,22,491/- under section 80-IA without issuing a show-cause notice. The first proviso to section 143(1)(a) mandates that no adjustment shall be made unless an intimation is given to the assessee. The assessee's AR admitted that no such intimation was sent regarding the denial of the section 80-IA deduction; the only intimation sent was for a minor disallowance of Rs. 28,372/-. The Revenue failed to contradict this admission. Therefore, the adjustment made by the CPC was in violation of the principles of natural justice and the mandatory procedure prescribed under section 143(1)(a). Following its own decision in the case of Shikhar Enterprises, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and deleted the adjustment of Rs. 37,22,491/-. The appeal was allowed.
The ITAT held that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC is mandated to adjudicate all legal grounds raised by the assessee before it. The Tribunal found that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC had failed to do so and had instead simply remanded the case back to the AO. The ITAT emphasized that legal issues must be examined by the first appellate authority before any restoration to the AO, if at all. Therefore, in the interest of substantive justice, the ITAT set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC and remanded the matter back to its file. The CIT(Appeals)/NFAC was directed to adjudicate the legal grounds assailed by the assessee in accordance with the law and principles of natural justice. The assessee was directed to comply with the hearing notices issued by the First Appellate Authority. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's non-compliance before the Ld. CIT(A). However, in the interest of justice and fairness, and without commenting on the merits of the case, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for deciding the case afresh/denovo. The Ld. CIT(A) is directed to provide an adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee is also directed to cooperate in the remitted appellate proceedings. The appeal is allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the additions or the validity of the reassessment proceedings.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 503 and 289 days in filing the appeals for assessment years 2014-15 and 2015-16, respectively. The Tribunal acknowledged the severe medical ailments of the person responsible for filing the appeals, which were not disputed by the revenue. Following the principles of natural justice and consistency, and citing various Supreme Court and ITAT decisions, the Tribunal set aside the ex-parte orders of the Ld. CIT(Appeals). The matters were remanded back to the file of the Ld. CIT(Appeals) for denovo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal directed the assessee to comply with hearing notices from the Ld. CIT(Appeals) as this was a final opportunity. The Ld. CIT(Appeals) was instructed to pass a speaking order in terms with Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 503 and 289 days in filing the appeals for assessment years 2014-15 and 2015-16, respectively. The Tribunal acknowledged the severe medical ailments of the person responsible for filing the appeals, which were not disputed by the revenue. Following the principles of natural justice and consistency, and citing various Supreme Court and ITAT decisions, the Tribunal set aside the ex-parte orders of the Ld. CIT(Appeals). The matters were remanded back to the file of the Ld. CIT(Appeals) for denovo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal directed the assessee to comply with hearing notices from the Ld. CIT(Appeals) as this was a final opportunity. The Ld. CIT(Appeals) was instructed to pass a speaking order in terms with Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal first addressed the delay of 388 days in filing the appeal. Citing Supreme Court decisions in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs Mst. Katiji and others and N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy, and the Delhi High Court's decision in HL Malhotra & Company Pvt. Ltd. Vs DCIT, the Tribunal condoned the delay, considering the assessee's advanced age (94 years) and unfamiliarity with online compliances, finding no malafide or deliberate delay. The Tribunal then noted that the CIT(A) had not decided the appeal with a well-reasoned order as required by section 250(6) of the Act. Citing the Bombay High Court's decision in Prem Kumar Arjun Das Luthra HUF, the Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) is obliged to dispose of appeals on merit. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision (denovo) after providing the assessee an adequate opportunity of being heard. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal, after hearing both parties and perusing the record, noted that the CIT(A) had not decided the appeal after discussing the issues in detail. The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) was obliged under section 250(6) of the Act to dispose of the appeal in writing with a well-reasoned order on each point of determination. It was evident from the perusal of sections 251(1)(a), 251(1)(b), and the Explanation of section 251(2) that the CIT(A) is required to apply their mind to all issues arising from the impugned order. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) was not empowered to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution and was obliged to dispose of the appeal on merit, relying on the decision in Prem Kumar Arjun Das Luthra HUF, 291 CTR 614. In the interest of justice, and without commenting on the merits, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) for deciding the case afresh/denovo, after providing adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee was directed to cooperate in the remitted appellate proceedings.
The Tribunal declined to condone the inordinate delay of 619/650 days in filing the appeals. The Tribunal observed that the reasons provided by the assessees, such as financial crisis and bank recovery proceedings, did not constitute sufficient cause for such a prolonged delay. The Tribunal emphasized that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretion of the court, and it should not be granted as an act of generosity. Citing various Supreme Court judgments, including H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaish, Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaran & Anr., and State of Orissa Vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, the Tribunal held that delay caused by negligence or an inactive approach cannot be condoned. The Tribunal found the assessees' conduct to be grossly negligent and a casual approach to their rights. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed on the ground of limitation without going into the merits of the cases. No issue was left undecided; the appeals were dismissed solely on limitation.
The Tribunal declined to condone the inordinate delay of 619/650 days in filing the appeals. The Tribunal observed that the reasons provided by the assessees, such as financial crisis and bank recovery proceedings, did not constitute sufficient cause for such a prolonged delay. The Tribunal emphasized that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretion of the court, and it should not be granted as an act of generosity. Citing various Supreme Court judgments, including H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaish, Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaran & Anr., and State of Orissa Vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, the Tribunal held that delay caused by negligence or an inactive approach cannot be condoned. The Tribunal found the assessees' conduct to be grossly negligent and a casual approach to their rights. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed on the ground of limitation without going into the merits of the cases. No issue was left undecided; the appeals were dismissed solely on limitation.
The Tribunal declined to condone the inordinate delay of 619/650 days in filing the appeals. The Tribunal observed that the reasons provided by the assessees, such as financial crisis and bank recovery proceedings, did not constitute sufficient cause for such a prolonged delay. The Tribunal emphasized that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretion of the court, and it should not be granted as an act of generosity. Citing various Supreme Court judgments, including H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaish, Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaran & Anr., and State of Orissa Vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, the Tribunal held that delay caused by negligence or an inactive approach cannot be condoned. The Tribunal found the assessees' conduct to be grossly negligent and a casual approach to their rights. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed on the ground of limitation without going into the merits of the cases. No issue was left undecided; the appeals were dismissed solely on limitation.
The Tribunal declined to condone the inordinate delay of 619/650 days in filing the appeals. The Tribunal observed that the reasons provided by the assessees, such as financial crisis and bank recovery proceedings, did not constitute sufficient cause for such a prolonged delay. The Tribunal emphasized that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretion of the court, and it should not be granted as an act of generosity. Citing various Supreme Court judgments, including H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaish, Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaran & Anr., and State of Orissa Vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, the Tribunal held that delay caused by negligence or an inactive approach cannot be condoned. The Tribunal found the assessees' conduct to be grossly negligent and a casual approach to their rights. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed on the ground of limitation without going into the merits of the cases. No issue was left undecided; the appeals were dismissed solely on limitation.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT was not justified in invoking Section 263 regarding the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal reasoned that the AO's decision to allow the deduction was a possible and legally permissible view, and the PCIT's differing opinion did not make the order erroneous, especially since the Tribunal itself had, in principle, allowed such deductions in the assessee's own case. This constituted a case of change of opinion, rendering Section 263 inapplicable. Therefore, the finding of the PCIT on this issue was reversed, and the original assessment order was restored. Regarding the taxability of interest income earned on FDRs with banks other than cooperative banks (amounting to Rs. 3,94,82,24,597/-), the Tribunal agreed with the PCIT that the AO had not conducted sufficient inquiry or verification in the original assessment. Therefore, the PCIT was justified in setting aside the original assessment order on this issue and directing the AO to conduct further inquiries. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT was not justified in invoking Section 263 regarding the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal reasoned that the AO's decision to allow the deduction was a possible and legally permissible view, and the PCIT's differing opinion did not make the order erroneous, especially since the Tribunal itself had, in principle, allowed such deductions in the assessee's own case. This constituted a case of change of opinion, rendering Section 263 inapplicable. Therefore, the finding of the PCIT on this issue was reversed, and the original assessment order was restored. Regarding the taxability of interest income earned on FDRs with banks other than cooperative banks (amounting to Rs. 3,94,82,24,597/-), the Tribunal agreed with the PCIT that the AO had not conducted sufficient inquiry or verification in the original assessment. Therefore, the PCIT was justified in setting aside the original assessment order on this issue and directing the AO to conduct further inquiries. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT was not justified in invoking Section 263 regarding the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal reasoned that the AO's decision to allow the deduction was a possible and legally permissible view, and the PCIT's differing opinion did not make the order erroneous, especially since the Tribunal itself had, in principle, allowed such deductions in the assessee's own case. This constituted a case of change of opinion, rendering Section 263 inapplicable. Therefore, the finding of the PCIT on this issue was reversed, and the original assessment order was restored. Regarding the taxability of interest income earned on FDRs with banks other than cooperative banks (amounting to Rs. 3,94,82,24,597/-), the Tribunal agreed with the PCIT that the AO had not conducted sufficient inquiry or verification in the original assessment. Therefore, the PCIT was justified in setting aside the original assessment order on this issue and directing the AO to conduct further inquiries. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT was not justified in invoking Section 263 regarding the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal reasoned that the AO's decision to allow the deduction was a possible and legally permissible view, and the PCIT's differing opinion did not make the order erroneous, especially since the Tribunal itself had, in principle, allowed such deductions in the assessee's own case. This constituted a case of change of opinion, rendering Section 263 inapplicable. Therefore, the finding of the PCIT on this issue was reversed, and the original assessment order was restored. Regarding the taxability of interest income earned on FDRs with banks other than cooperative banks (amounting to Rs. 3,94,82,24,597/-), the Tribunal agreed with the PCIT that the AO had not conducted sufficient inquiry or verification in the original assessment. Therefore, the PCIT was justified in setting aside the original assessment order on this issue and directing the AO to conduct further inquiries. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to submit various evidence and relevant documents to substantiate her grounds before the First Appellate Authority. Furthermore, Sales Agent Agreements submitted for the first time at the appellate stage were not forwarded to the AO for verification, violating Rule 46A(3) of the IT Rules, 1962. The Tribunal found that the CIT(Appeals)'s order was not in compliance with Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act. In the interest of natural justice, the ITAT set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC and remanded the matter back to its file for de novo adjudication. The Tribunal directed the assessee to comply with hearing notices and submit all relevant documentary evidence. The penalty proceedings under Section 270A were directed to continue to the extent of additions sustained. The Tribunal noted that the disallowance of conveyance expenses of Rs. 75,240/- was allowed by the CIT(Appeals) but the other disallowances (advertisement expenses of Rs. 5,92,926/- and Rs. 5,67,849/-, Section 40A(2)(b) disallowance of Rs. 11,68,094/-, and travelling expenses of Rs. 46,295/-) were dismissed by the CIT(Appeals). The ITAT's decision to remand means the findings of the CIT(Appeals) on these specific issues are not being adjudicated on merits by the ITAT at this stage.
The Tribunal noted that it was an admitted fact that certain documents were not filed before the Assessing Officer (AO) and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)]. While the assessee claimed these were public documents, their absence before the lower authorities was critical for deciding the issue. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal found it important that these documents be duly verified by the AO or CIT(A). Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for de-novo adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to provide the assessee an opportunity of hearing and allow the filing of all necessary documents. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal set aside the assessment orders for both AYs and remanded the matters to the AO for de-novo adjudication. For AY 2022-23, the Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(A) confirmed the addition based on the assessee's failure to file details. However, the Tribunal observed that the assessee had pleaded that its reply dated 22.03.2024 was not considered by the AO. Crucially, the Tribunal found that the CGST Department had not arrived at a final decision regarding alleged bogus ITC claims when the assessment was finalized. Therefore, the AO was directed to provide the assessee an opportunity to file all necessary details and to adjudicate afresh. For AY 2023-24, the Tribunal noted the AO's assertion that e-way bills were not produced because transactions were 'EX-Factory'. However, the assessee claimed to have filed copies of e-way bills in the paper book. The Tribunal acknowledged that the CGST is the appropriate authority to verify the genuineness of e-way bills and directed the AO to obtain details from the Pr. Commissioner, CGST, regarding their genuineness and the final outcome of the ITC claim investigation. The AO was also directed to provide the assessee an opportunity to file necessary documents and adjudicate afresh. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal set aside the assessment orders for both AYs and remanded the matters to the AO for de-novo adjudication. For AY 2022-23, the Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(A) confirmed the addition based on the assessee's failure to file details. However, the Tribunal observed that the assessee had pleaded that its reply dated 22.03.2024 was not considered by the AO. Crucially, the Tribunal found that the CGST Department had not arrived at a final decision regarding alleged bogus ITC claims when the assessment was finalized. Therefore, the AO was directed to provide the assessee an opportunity to file all necessary details and to adjudicate afresh. For AY 2023-24, the Tribunal noted the AO's assertion that e-way bills were not produced because transactions were 'EX-Factory'. However, the assessee claimed to have filed copies of e-way bills in the paper book. The Tribunal acknowledged that the CGST is the appropriate authority to verify the genuineness of e-way bills and directed the AO to obtain details from the Pr. Commissioner, CGST, regarding their genuineness and the final outcome of the ITC claim investigation. The AO was also directed to provide the assessee an opportunity to file necessary documents and adjudicate afresh. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal admitted additional evidence filed by the assessee, including reconciliation statements for rent receipts, certificates from CG State Ware Housing Corporation regarding rent, and ledger accounts for AYs 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2013-14. These documents were not filed before the lower authorities. Considering that these documents went to the root of the issue and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the assessment order to the Assessing Officer (AO) for de novo adjudication. The AO was directed to provide an opportunity to the assessee to file all necessary documents. The appeal of the assessee was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition of Rs. 3,02,25,000/- made under Section 68 for AY 2009-10. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed share application forms with complete addresses and PANs, confirmations, and ITRs. The AO's assessment order consolidated the discussion for multiple assessment years, and the share applicants were listed in a consolidated table. The Tribunal found that the AO had not doubted the genuineness of the receipts and had not rendered any findings of non-fulfillment of primary conditions under Section 68, namely, identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of transactions. The AO's reliance on the assessment order for AY 2012-13 was found to be erroneous as that order was reversed by the ITAT. The Tribunal also referred to various High Court and Supreme Court decisions, including Mehta Parikh, N.C. Cables, Softline Creations, Gangeshwari Metals, and Jawahar Lal Oswal, emphasizing that the onus shifts back to the revenue to prove the transaction is not genuine once the assessee provides credible explanations and relevant facts. The Tribunal distinguished the Revenue's cited cases as being based on specific incriminating material and untraceable shareholders, which was not the case here. The Tribunal concluded that the concurrent findings of the lower appellate authorities were purely factual and no substantial question of law arose.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition of Rs. 3,02,25,000/- made under Section 68 for AY 2009-10. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed share application forms with complete addresses and PANs, confirmations, and ITRs. The AO's assessment order consolidated the discussion for multiple assessment years, and the share applicants were listed in a consolidated table. The Tribunal found that the AO had not doubted the genuineness of the receipts and had not rendered any findings of non-fulfillment of primary conditions under Section 68, namely, identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of transactions. The AO's reliance on the assessment order for AY 2012-13 was found to be erroneous as that order was reversed by the ITAT. The Tribunal also referred to various High Court and Supreme Court decisions, including Mehta Parikh, N.C. Cables, Softline Creations, Gangeshwari Metals, and Jawahar Lal Oswal, emphasizing that the onus shifts back to the revenue to prove the transaction is not genuine once the assessee provides credible explanations and relevant facts. The Tribunal distinguished the Revenue's cited cases as being based on specific incriminating material and untraceable shareholders, which was not the case here. The Tribunal concluded that the concurrent findings of the lower appellate authorities were purely factual and no substantial question of law arose.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, dismissing the Revenue's appeal. The primary issue was the validity of reassessment proceedings initiated beyond four years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The Tribunal noted that for reassessment beyond four years, the first proviso to Section 147 mandates that the Assessing Officer must record a finding that the assessee failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment. The Tribunal found that the reasons recorded by the AO did not contain any such finding or whisper of the assessee's failure to disclose material facts. Relying on the decisions of the Hon'ble Chhattisgarh High Court (the jurisdictional High Court) in Hariom Ingots and Power Pvt Ltd vs PCIT and other precedents, the Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was issued without jurisdiction and was bad in law. Consequently, the reassessment order could not be sustained. The Tribunal dismissed grounds 3, 5, and 6 of the Revenue's appeal. Since the notice under Section 148 was quashed, all other grounds were rendered academic. The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that in cases where an ex-parte order is passed by the NFAC due to the assessee's non-compliance, and considering the principles of natural justice, the matter should be remanded back to the NFAC for denovo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal relied on its own previous decisions in Brajesh Singh Bhadoria Vs. Dy./ACIT and Collector Mining, Kondagaon Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS), and also cited the decision in Amit Singh Thakur Vs. ACIT. The reasoning was that the NFAC is the first appellate authority and should pass a speaking order on merits. Allowing the Tribunal to decide a legal ground on an ex-parte order would usurp the NFAC's power and create an easy route for assessees to bypass compliance. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the NFAC and remanded the matter for denovo adjudication, directing the assessee to comply with future notices and present their case on merits. The NFAC was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard and pass an order within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the show cause notice issued under Section 148A(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dated February 24, 2023, which provided only 6 clear days for compliance, was invalid and void ab initio. The Tribunal relied on the interpretation of 'not less than 7 days' by various judicial forums, including the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pioneer Motors (Private) Ltd. vs. Municipal Counsel, Nagrecoil, and the Hon'ble High Courts of Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Gujarat, which mandate the exclusion of both the date of issuance and the date of compliance. Since the notice was invalid, any subsequent assessment order passed pursuant to it was also quashed and considered non-est in law. The Tribunal followed its own previous decisions in similar cases.
The Tribunal held that in cases where the CIT(Appeals) passes an ex-parte order due to the assessee's non-compliance, and the assessee raises legal grounds, the Tribunal should not adjudicate these grounds directly. Instead, to uphold the principles of natural justice and the statutory framework of adjudication, the matter should be remanded back to the CIT(Appeals) for a de novo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal reasoned that deciding legal grounds in such a scenario would bypass the first appellate authority's role and create an easy route for assessees to avoid compliance. The Tribunal cited its own decisions in Brajesh Singh Bhadoria and Collector Mining, Kondagaon, emphasizing that the CIT(Appeals) must pass a speaking order under Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act. Therefore, the CIT(Appeals)'s order was set aside, and the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication, with a direction to the assessee to comply fully and the CIT(Appeals) to pass an order within three months.
The Tribunal held that in cases where an ex-parte order is passed by the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC due to the assessee's non-compliance, and the assessee has not been heard on merits, the matter should be remanded back to the file of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for de novo adjudication. The Tribunal reasoned that it is not open for the Tribunal to adjudicate issues in the absence of a substantive order passed on merits by the first appellate authority as per Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act. This approach balances the scales of justice by providing a final opportunity to the assessee. The Tribunal cited its own previous decisions in Brajesh Singh Bhadoria and Collector Mining, Kondagaon, emphasizing that the first appellate authority must pass a speaking order on merits. The Tribunal directed the assessee to comply with future notices and present the case on merits, and the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard and pass an order within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC has no power to dismiss an appeal in limine solely on the ground of delay without referring to and discussing the contents available on record. Relying on the Bombay High Court's decision in CIT Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF) and a previous ITAT, Raipur Bench decision in Prabal Aadhar Seva Sansthan Vs. ITO, the Tribunal found that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC should have considered the delay aspect under Section 249(3) and then decided the appeal on merits as per Section 250(4) & (6). The Tribunal granted the assessee one final opportunity to represent their case before the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC regarding the condonation of delay. If the delay is condoned, the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC is to adjudicate the issues on merits while complying with the principles of natural justice. The orders of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC were set aside, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC has no power to dismiss an appeal in limine solely on the ground of delay without referring to and discussing the contents available on record. Relying on the Bombay High Court's decision in CIT Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF) and a previous ITAT, Raipur Bench decision in Prabal Aadhar Seva Sansthan Vs. ITO, the Tribunal found that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC should have considered the delay aspect under Section 249(3) and then decided the appeal on merits as per Section 250(4) & (6). The Tribunal granted the assessee one final opportunity to represent their case before the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC regarding the condonation of delay. If the delay is condoned, the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC is to adjudicate the issues on merits while complying with the principles of natural justice. The orders of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC were set aside, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that in cases where an ex-parte order is passed by the Ld. CIT(Appeals) due to the assessee's non-compliance, and despite several opportunities, no compliance is made, the principles of natural justice and the scheme of the Act necessitate remanding the matter back to the Ld. CIT(Appeals) for denovo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal cited its own decisions in Brajesh Singh Bhadoria and Collector Mining, Kondagaon, which followed a similar approach. The reasoning is that the Ld. CIT(Appeals) is the first appellate authority and must pass a speaking order on merits. If the Tribunal were to adjudicate a legal ground in such a scenario, it would usurp the power of the Ld. CIT(Appeals) and create an easy route for assessees to bypass the first appellate authority. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(Appeals) and remanded the matter back for denovo adjudication, directing the assessee to comply fully and the Ld. CIT(Appeals) to pass a speaking order within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were bad in law due to a defective approval under section 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that the approval provided by the revenue was neither digitally nor manually signed. The Tribunal respectfully followed the binding precedent of the coordinate bench in the case of M/s Aditya Plastic (supra), which held that an unsigned approval under section 151 renders the notice under section 148 bad in law and without jurisdiction. The reasoning was that the satisfaction of the prescribed authority is a prerequisite for the AO to assume jurisdiction to issue a notice under section 148. Since the approval was not validly obtained, the AO lacked jurisdiction. Consequently, the assessment order framed by the AO was quashed. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's grounds of appeal (II and III) alleged gross non-application of mind by the CIT(Appeals) and violation of principles of natural justice, specifically regarding the non-supply of the Section 133(6) reply and denial of cross-examination. The Tribunal referred to its own decision in Nimit Agrawal Vs. DCIT, where similar grounds concerning the violation of principles of natural justice and un-adjudicated grounds by the First Appellate Authority led to a remand. Following this precedent, the Tribunal found that the ground assailed by the assessee regarding the opportunity of cross-examination was not adjudicated by the First Appellate Authority. Therefore, without going into the merits of the additions, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC and remanded the matter back to its file for de novo adjudication, directing compliance with the principles of natural justice and a speaking order. The assessee was directed to duly comply with hearing notices from the First Appellate Authority. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that for unabated assessment years, additions under Section 153A can only be made if incriminating material is found during the search. The Supreme Court in PCIT v. Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd. has categorically held that in completed/unabated assessments, additions under Section 153A are permissible only on the basis of incriminating material found during the search. Since AY 2018-19 was an unabated assessment year and the assessment order did not record any incriminating material found during the search, the AO lacked jurisdiction to assess or reassess income. The Tribunal upheld the Ld. CIT(A)'s order in deleting the addition of Rs. 2,97,00,000/- under Section 68 and the addition of Rs. 21,99,989/- on account of commission income, as these were not based on any incriminating material found during the search for the unabated AY 2018-19. All other grounds raised by the Revenue were rendered academic and dismissed. The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 59 days in filing the appeal, finding no material or evidence on record to suggest malafide or deliberate conduct by the assessee. The Tribunal relied on several judicial pronouncements, including Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors, to justify the condonation. Regarding the substantive issue, the Tribunal observed that the Ld. ADDL/JCIT(A)/NFAC had dealt with the merits of the matter but failed to adjudicate the legal ground raised by the assessee concerning the applicability of the amended Section 115BBE. The Tribunal held that it is incumbent upon the quasi-judicial authority to first adjudicate such a legal ground that goes to the root of the matter. Therefore, the order of the Ld. ADDL/JCIT(A)/NFAC was set aside, and the matter was restored to its file for specific adjudication on this legal ground, ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessment completed under Section 147 read with Sections 144 and 144B of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is invalid and bad in law due to the non-issuance of a notice under Section 143(2) of the Act. The Tribunal relied on the judicial pronouncements of the Delhi High Court in Shaily Juneja Vs. ACIT and its own co-ordinate bench decisions in Bali Nagwanshi Vs. ACIT and Moammed Usman Vs. ITO. The reasoning is that if the Assessing Officer does not accept the return filed by the assessee at its face value, it is mandatory to issue a notice under Section 143(2) to provide an opportunity to the assessee. Failure to do so renders the assessment liable to be quashed. The Tribunal found that the revenue could not provide any evidence to suggest that such a notice was issued. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were quashed. The appeal was allowed on this legal ground, rendering other grounds academic.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's primary contention was the violation of principles of natural justice due to the denial of cross-examination by the AO, and that this ground was not adjudicated by the CIT(A). The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order did not contain any adjudication on the ground that cross-examination should have been provided by the AO. Therefore, without delving into the merits of the additions, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) for both assessment years. The matters were remanded back to the CIT(A) for adjudication of the specific ground concerning the opportunity of cross-examination. The Tribunal directed the CIT(A) to pass a speaking order in accordance with Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act, ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's primary contention was the violation of principles of natural justice due to the denial of cross-examination by the AO, and that this ground was not adjudicated by the CIT(A). The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order did not contain any adjudication on the ground that cross-examination should have been provided by the AO. Therefore, without delving into the merits of the additions, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) for both assessment years. The matters were remanded back to the CIT(A) for adjudication of the specific ground concerning the opportunity of cross-examination. The Tribunal directed the CIT(A) to pass a speaking order in accordance with Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act, ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the order of the CIT(Appeals) was to be set aside and the matter remanded back for denovo adjudication. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had clearly stated that tax liabilities had been completed in the hands of the sub-contractors. The CIT(Appeals) had not conclusively denied this fact and had not conducted any independent enquiry as mandated by Sections 250(4) & (6) of the Act. The First Appellate Authority had rested her findings on the submissions without following the mandate of the Act and without arriving at independent reasoning through proper verification. The findings of the CIT(Appeals) were considered vague and not matching the assessee's submissions due to the lack of independent enquiry. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the CIT(Appeals) for a speaking order after complying with the principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal held that the appeal of the assessee is allowed. The reasoning was that it is an undisputed fact that the first order passed under section 263 of the Act dated 30.03.2021 had already been quashed by the Tribunal. Once the original revisionary order itself has been set aside, every consequential proceeding flowing therefrom automatically loses its legal foundation. The assessment order dated 28.03.2022 was merely a consequence of the first order under section 263 of the Act and could not survive independently after the parent order had been quashed. The Tribunal further noted that the second section 263 order passed by the Ld. PCIT was on a different issue and not connected with the first section 263 order, making the second section 263 order unsustainable in law. The operative direction is that the appeal is allowed, implying the impugned order of the PCIT is set aside.
The Tribunal held that Section 69A applies when an assessee is found to be the owner of money not recorded in books, and no satisfactory explanation is provided for its nature and source. The Tribunal noted that the assessee's explanation of cash deposits representing either cash sales or re-deposits of earlier cash withdrawals significantly weakens the foundation for Section 69A. In this case, the cash withdrawals of Rs. 1,00,67,000/- substantially exceeded the impugned deposits of Rs. 20,25,800/-. The Tribunal found that the assessee, engaged in agricultural commodity trading, had explained the source of deposits as business receipts and earlier withdrawals. The availability of cash from documented withdrawals was considered sufficient, especially as the withdrawn cash was not shown to have been utilized elsewhere. Citing the Ahmedabad Bench decision in Gaurav Harshadbhai Chokshi v. ITO, the Tribunal deleted the addition of Rs. 20,25,800/-. The operative direction was the deletion of the addition.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 917 days in filing the appeal, finding the reasons provided by the assessee, including partner disputes, business closure, and tax consultant's negligence, to be convincing and constituting a reasonable cause. The Tribunal placed reliance on the decisions of ITAT, Kolkata in M/s. Garg Bros. Pvt. Ltd. & Others vs. DCIT, the Supreme Court in Investment Trust v. Ujagarsingh, and Gujarat High Court in Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd., emphasizing a pragmatic and liberal approach in condoning delays to avoid defeating substantive rights on technicalities. Regarding the additions, the Tribunal noted that the assessee had duly repaid the loans obtained from M/s. Malhar Exports, as evidenced by bank statements and ledger accounts. The Tribunal also observed that the assessee had paid interest on the loan and deducted the requisite TDS. Citing the judgments in CIT vs. Ayachi Chandrashekhar Narsangji (Guj. HC) and Ojas Tarmake (P.) Ltd. (Gujarat-HC), the Tribunal held that once the loan is repaid and interest has been paid with TDS deduction, the loan cannot be a subject matter of addition under section 68. Therefore, the Tribunal deleted the addition pertaining to the loan and interest, allowing the assessee's appeal.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal, deleting the addition made by the AO. The Tribunal respectfully followed the binding precedent of the Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Ashish Dubey vs. ACIT (ITA No. 222/Del/2020) for AY 2015-16. In that case, it was held that where an assessee provides evidence of donation to a registered political party through banking channels, including a receipt and confirmation, the assessee-donor cannot be faulted for the deduction denial merely because the political party failed to account for the donation in its own return. The Tribunal found that the present appeal was squarely covered by this decision, with no change in facts or law, and the Revenue could not produce materials to controvert the findings in Ashish Dubey. Therefore, the addition made by the AO was deleted. The appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal on two grounds. Firstly, regarding the disallowance of Rs. 14,77,741/- related to section 80-IA deduction, the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submission that common expenses were arbitrarily allocated. The assessee maintained separate internal accounts for windmills, and direct expenses were accounted for. The Tribunal noted that the AO applied an ad-hoc formula without establishing a direct nexus. Citing the principle that arbitrary apportionment of general overheads is impermissible without proving incurrence for the eligible undertaking, the Tribunal set aside the disallowance. Secondly, concerning the disallowance of Rs. 6,96,190/- under section 40(a)(ia) for royalty payments to a non-resident, the Tribunal accepted the assessee's contention that tax was duly deducted and deposited under section 195. The Tribunal held that disallowance cannot be sustained merely on the ground of a different TDS provision being applicable, especially when the tax was duly deposited. The AO was directed to delete the disallowance. The Tribunal also found merit in the assessee's contention regarding warranty expenditure, stating it is an integral part of the sale and incurred in the ordinary course of business, directing the AO to delete the disallowance of Rs. 52,37,441/-. The issue of GST expenditure was already allowed by the CIT(A).
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 273 days in filing the appeal, finding no material on record to suggest malafide or deliberate conduct by the assessee for the delay. Respectfully considering various judicial pronouncements, the delay was condoned. Regarding the ex-parte order, the Tribunal, following its own previous decisions in similar cases (Brajesh Singh Bhadoria and Collector Mining, Kondagaon), set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC and remanded the matter back for denovo adjudication. The Tribunal emphasized that the CIT(Appeals) must pass a speaking order in terms of Section 250(4) and (6) of the Act after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The assessee was directed to comply with the hearing notices and represent the matter on merits, as this was considered a final opportunity. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 172 days in filing the appeal, acknowledging that the non-compliance before the Ld. CIT(Appeals) was not attributable to any deliberate or malafide conduct of the assessee, but rather due to notices being sent to an incorrect email address. The Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(Appeals) had passed an ex-parte order due to the assessee's non-compliance. Following the principles of natural justice and consistent with its own prior decisions, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC and remanded the matter back to its file for denovo adjudication. The assessee was directed to comply with hearing notices and represent the matter on merits, and the Ld. CIT(Appeals) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard and pass a speaking order within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that in cases where an ex-parte order is passed by the CIT(A) due to the assessee's non-compliance, and the assessee raises legal grounds, the Tribunal should not usurp the powers of the CIT(A) by deciding such legal grounds. The Tribunal emphasized that the CIT(A) is the first appellate authority and is required to pass a speaking order on merits as per Section 250(4) and (6) of the Income Tax Act. Allowing the Tribunal to decide legal grounds in such circumstances would create an easy route for assessees to bypass the appellate process before the CIT(A), defeating the legislative intent. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for denovo adjudication on merits, providing one final opportunity to the assessee to comply. The CIT(A) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard and pass an order within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT) had rightly exercised his revisionary power under section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer (AO) had failed to carry out the requisite inquiries and verifications concerning the genuineness of the purchases. The non-response from the third-party suppliers and the assessee's inability to provide crucial supporting documents, such as confirmations from sellers, details of actual vehicle movement, and transporter payment proofs, indicated a lack of proper investigation. The Tribunal noted that merely calling for details without examining them in the right perspective, as highlighted by the Supreme Court in Paville Project Pvt. Ltd., can lead to an assessment order being deemed erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue. The Tribunal distinguished the case laws relied upon by the assessee, finding them factually different. Consequently, the assessment order was set aside as erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, and the PCIT's order was upheld. The appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that in cases where an ex-parte order is passed by the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC due to the assessee's non-compliance, and the assessee seeks to raise legal issues, the matter should be remanded back to the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for adjudication on merits. The Tribunal reasoned that it is not open for the ITAT to address any issue in the absence of a substantive order as per Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act by the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC. This approach balances the scales of justice and upholds the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal cited its own decisions in Brajesh Singh Bhadoria Vs. Dy./ACIT and Collector Mining, Kondagaon Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS), as well as Amit Singh Thakur Vs. ACIT, Central Circle, Bilaspur. The Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC and remanded the matter for denovo adjudication, granting one final opportunity to the assessee to comply and represent the matter on merits. The Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC was directed to pass a speaking order within three months.
The Tribunal held that when an ex-parte order is passed by the CIT(Appeals) due to the assessee's non-compliance, and a legal ground is raised before the Tribunal, the Tribunal should not adjudicate the legal ground directly. Doing so would usurp the power of the CIT(Appeals), which is a statutory authority, and would defeat the legislative intent of having a substantive order from the first appellate authority. The Tribunal emphasized that the framework of the Act requires the CIT(Appeals) to pass a speaking order on merits after substantial adjudication. Therefore, in such scenarios, following the principles of natural justice and providing a benefit of doubt to the assessee, the matter must be remanded back to the CIT(Appeals) for de novo adjudication on merits, with a final opportunity for the assessee to comply. The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals) and remanded the matter back to its file for adjudication on merits within three months, directing the assessee to comply with hearing notices.
The Tribunal held that when an ex-parte order is passed by the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC due to the assessee's non-compliance, the matter should be remanded back to the file of the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for denovo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal reasoned that it is not open for the ITAT to address any issue in the absence of a substantive order passed by the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC in terms of Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act. Allowing the Tribunal to decide a legal ground in such a scenario would usurp the power of the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC and create an easy route for assessees to bypass the appellate process, defeating the legislative intent. The Tribunal emphasized the principles of natural justice and the need for a speaking order on merits by the first appellate authority. Therefore, the appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, setting aside the order of the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC and remanding the matter back with a direction for the assessee to comply and for the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC to pass a speaking order within three months.