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795 tribunal orders from the Raipur bench in 2026.
Showing 40 of 795 orders. Use the months below for the rest.
The Tribunal held that in cases where an ex-parte order is passed by the CIT(Appeals) due to the assessee's non-compliance, and the assessee subsequently raises legal grounds before the ITAT, the Tribunal should not adjudicate such legal grounds directly. Instead, the matter should be remanded back to the CIT(Appeals) for de novo adjudication on merits, providing one final opportunity to the assessee. The reasoning is that the CIT(Appeals) is the first appellate authority mandated to pass a speaking order on merits as per Section 250(4) & (6) of the Income Tax Act. Allowing the Tribunal to decide legal grounds in the absence of such an order would usurp the powers of the CIT(Appeals) and defeat the legislative intent of the Act. The Tribunal emphasized the principles of natural justice and the need for a substantive order by the first appellate authority. The assessee was directed to comply with hearing notices and represent the matter on merits before the CIT(Appeals). The CIT(Appeals) was directed to pass a speaking order within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that in cases where the CIT(Appeals) passes an ex-parte order due to the assessee's non-compliance, and the assessee subsequently raises legal grounds before the ITAT, the Tribunal should not adjudicate these grounds directly. Doing so would usurp the power of the CIT(Appeals) and bypass the statutory adjudication process mandated by Sections 250(4) and 250(6) of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal emphasized that the intent of the legislature is for the first appellate authority to pass a speaking order on merits after providing an opportunity to the assessee. Therefore, to uphold the principles of natural justice and the statutory framework, the matter should be remanded back to the CIT(Appeals) for denovo adjudication. The Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(Appeals) and remanded the matters, directing the assessee to comply with future notices and represent the case on merits. The CIT(Appeals) was directed to pass a speaking order within three months.
The Tribunal, respectfully following its earlier decision in the case of Sewaa Path Sanstha, set aside the order of the CIT(Exemption). The Tribunal found that the CIT(Exemption) ought to have provided a speaking order after deliberating upon all the documents and evidence furnished by the assessee, with regard to the objects and genuineness of the activities. The Tribunal held that the purpose of registration under Section 12A/12AB and recognition under Section 80G is to enhance socio-economic welfare and achieve the objectives of the Directive Principles of State Policy. The Tribunal remanded the matter back to the file of the CIT(Exemption) with specific directions to form satisfaction in terms of Section 12AB of the Act after examining all relevant details and evidence, complying with the principles of natural justice. The appeal pertaining to Section 80G exemption was also remanded with similar directions. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal, respectfully following its earlier decision in the case of Sewaa Path Sanstha, set aside the order of the CIT(Exemption). The Tribunal found that the CIT(Exemption) ought to have provided a speaking order after deliberating upon all the documents and evidence furnished by the assessee, with regard to the objects and genuineness of the activities. The Tribunal held that the purpose of registration under Section 12A/12AB and recognition under Section 80G is to enhance socio-economic welfare and achieve the objectives of the Directive Principles of State Policy. The Tribunal remanded the matter back to the file of the CIT(Exemption) with specific directions to form satisfaction in terms of Section 12AB of the Act after examining all relevant details and evidence, complying with the principles of natural justice. The appeal pertaining to Section 80G exemption was also remanded with similar directions. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that in cases where an ex-parte order is passed by the CIT(Appeals) due to the assessee's non-compliance, and the assessee subsequently appeals to the ITAT, the Tribunal should not directly adjudicate the legal grounds. Instead, the matter should be remanded back to the CIT(Appeals) for de novo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal reasoned that directly deciding legal grounds in such a scenario would usurp the power of the CIT(Appeals), who is the first appellate authority mandated to pass a speaking order after considering the assessee's submissions as per Sections 250(4) and 250(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Allowing the Tribunal to decide legal grounds without a substantive order from the CIT(Appeals) would also create an easy route for assessees to bypass compliance, defeating the legislative intent. Therefore, to uphold the principles of natural justice and the scheme of the Act, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals) and remanded the matter back for fresh adjudication, providing one final opportunity to the assessee to comply and represent the case on merits. The CIT(Appeals) was directed to pass a speaking order within three months.
The Tribunal held that in cases where the CIT(Appeals) passes an ex-parte order due to the assessee's non-compliance, and the assessee subsequently raises legal grounds before the ITAT, the Tribunal should not adjudicate these grounds directly. Doing so would usurp the power of the CIT(Appeals) and bypass the statutory adjudication process mandated by Sections 250(4) and 250(6) of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal emphasized that the intent of the legislature is for the first appellate authority to pass a speaking order on merits after providing an opportunity to the assessee. Therefore, to uphold the principles of natural justice and the statutory framework, the matter should be remanded back to the CIT(Appeals) for denovo adjudication. The Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(Appeals) and remanded the matters, directing the assessee to comply with future notices and represent the case on merits. The CIT(Appeals) was directed to pass a speaking order within three months.
The Tribunal held that in cases where the CIT(Appeals) passes an ex-parte order due to the assessee's non-compliance, and the assessee raises legal grounds, the Tribunal should not adjudicate such grounds directly. Instead, the matter should be remanded back to the CIT(Appeals) for de novo adjudication on merits, providing one final opportunity to the assessee. The Tribunal reasoned that adjudicating legal grounds in such a scenario would usurp the power of the CIT(Appeals), who is the first appellate authority required to pass a speaking order on merits as per Sections 250(4) and 250(6) of the Income Tax Act. Allowing direct adjudication by the Tribunal without prior substantive adjudication by the CIT(Appeals) would defeat the legislative intent and the established hierarchy of appeals. The Tribunal cited its own previous decisions in Brajesh Singh Bhadoria and Collector Mining, Kondagaon, as well as the principle of natural justice, to support this approach. The assessee was directed to comply fully with the hearing notices from the CIT(Appeals) in this final opportunity.
The Tribunal held that in cases where an ex-parte order is passed by the CIT(Appeals) due to the assessee's non-compliance, and the assessee seeks to have the matter decided on merits or raises legal grounds, the Tribunal should not usurp the powers of the First Appellate Authority. Instead, following the principles of natural justice and the scheme of the Act, the matter should be remanded back to the CIT(Appeals) for de novo adjudication on merits. This provides a final opportunity to the assessee to comply and present their case. The Tribunal cited its own decisions in Brajesh Singh Bhadoria and Collector Mining, Kondagaon, as well as other benches, to support this view. The Tribunal directed the CIT(Appeals) to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard and pass a speaking order within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CPC was not justified in disallowing the claim of deduction of Rs. 37,22,491/- under section 80-IA without issuing a show-cause notice. The first proviso to section 143(1)(a) mandates that no adjustment shall be made unless an intimation is given to the assessee. The assessee's AR admitted that no such intimation was sent regarding the denial of the section 80-IA deduction; the only intimation sent was for a minor disallowance of Rs. 28,372/-. The Revenue failed to contradict this admission. Therefore, the adjustment made by the CPC was in violation of the principles of natural justice and the mandatory procedure prescribed under section 143(1)(a). Following its own decision in the case of Shikhar Enterprises, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and deleted the adjustment of Rs. 37,22,491/-. The appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's non-compliance before the Ld. CIT(A). However, in the interest of justice and fairness, and without commenting on the merits of the case, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for deciding the case afresh/denovo. The Ld. CIT(A) is directed to provide an adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee is also directed to cooperate in the remitted appellate proceedings. The appeal is allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the additions or the validity of the reassessment proceedings.
The ITAT held that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC is mandated to adjudicate all legal grounds raised by the assessee before it. The Tribunal found that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC had failed to do so and had instead simply remanded the case back to the AO. The ITAT emphasized that legal issues must be examined by the first appellate authority before any restoration to the AO, if at all. Therefore, in the interest of substantive justice, the ITAT set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC and remanded the matter back to its file. The CIT(Appeals)/NFAC was directed to adjudicate the legal grounds assailed by the assessee in accordance with the law and principles of natural justice. The assessee was directed to comply with the hearing notices issued by the First Appellate Authority. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 503 and 289 days in filing the appeals for assessment years 2014-15 and 2015-16, respectively. The Tribunal acknowledged the severe medical ailments of the person responsible for filing the appeals, which were not disputed by the revenue. Following the principles of natural justice and consistency, and citing various Supreme Court and ITAT decisions, the Tribunal set aside the ex-parte orders of the Ld. CIT(Appeals). The matters were remanded back to the file of the Ld. CIT(Appeals) for denovo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal directed the assessee to comply with hearing notices from the Ld. CIT(Appeals) as this was a final opportunity. The Ld. CIT(Appeals) was instructed to pass a speaking order in terms with Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 503 and 289 days in filing the appeals for assessment years 2014-15 and 2015-16, respectively. The Tribunal acknowledged the severe medical ailments of the person responsible for filing the appeals, which were not disputed by the revenue. Following the principles of natural justice and consistency, and citing various Supreme Court and ITAT decisions, the Tribunal set aside the ex-parte orders of the Ld. CIT(Appeals). The matters were remanded back to the file of the Ld. CIT(Appeals) for denovo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal directed the assessee to comply with hearing notices from the Ld. CIT(Appeals) as this was a final opportunity. The Ld. CIT(Appeals) was instructed to pass a speaking order in terms with Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal first addressed the delay of 388 days in filing the appeal. Citing Supreme Court decisions in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs Mst. Katiji and others and N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy, and the Delhi High Court's decision in HL Malhotra & Company Pvt. Ltd. Vs DCIT, the Tribunal condoned the delay, considering the assessee's advanced age (94 years) and unfamiliarity with online compliances, finding no malafide or deliberate delay. The Tribunal then noted that the CIT(A) had not decided the appeal with a well-reasoned order as required by section 250(6) of the Act. Citing the Bombay High Court's decision in Prem Kumar Arjun Das Luthra HUF, the Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) is obliged to dispose of appeals on merit. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision (denovo) after providing the assessee an adequate opportunity of being heard. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT was not justified in invoking Section 263 regarding the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal reasoned that the AO's decision to allow the deduction was a possible and legally permissible view, and the PCIT's differing opinion did not make the order erroneous, especially since the Tribunal itself had, in principle, allowed such deductions in the assessee's own case. This constituted a case of change of opinion, rendering Section 263 inapplicable. Therefore, the finding of the PCIT on this issue was reversed, and the original assessment order was restored. Regarding the taxability of interest income earned on FDRs with banks other than cooperative banks (amounting to Rs. 3,94,82,24,597/-), the Tribunal agreed with the PCIT that the AO had not conducted sufficient inquiry or verification in the original assessment. Therefore, the PCIT was justified in setting aside the original assessment order on this issue and directing the AO to conduct further inquiries. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal declined to condone the inordinate delay of 619/650 days in filing the appeals. The Tribunal observed that the reasons provided by the assessees, such as financial crisis and bank recovery proceedings, did not constitute sufficient cause for such a prolonged delay. The Tribunal emphasized that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretion of the court, and it should not be granted as an act of generosity. Citing various Supreme Court judgments, including H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaish, Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaran & Anr., and State of Orissa Vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, the Tribunal held that delay caused by negligence or an inactive approach cannot be condoned. The Tribunal found the assessees' conduct to be grossly negligent and a casual approach to their rights. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed on the ground of limitation without going into the merits of the cases. No issue was left undecided; the appeals were dismissed solely on limitation.
The Tribunal declined to condone the inordinate delay of 619/650 days in filing the appeals. The Tribunal observed that the reasons provided by the assessees, such as financial crisis and bank recovery proceedings, did not constitute sufficient cause for such a prolonged delay. The Tribunal emphasized that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretion of the court, and it should not be granted as an act of generosity. Citing various Supreme Court judgments, including H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaish, Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaran & Anr., and State of Orissa Vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, the Tribunal held that delay caused by negligence or an inactive approach cannot be condoned. The Tribunal found the assessees' conduct to be grossly negligent and a casual approach to their rights. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed on the ground of limitation without going into the merits of the cases. No issue was left undecided; the appeals were dismissed solely on limitation.
The Tribunal, after hearing both parties and perusing the record, noted that the CIT(A) had not decided the appeal after discussing the issues in detail. The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) was obliged under section 250(6) of the Act to dispose of the appeal in writing with a well-reasoned order on each point of determination. It was evident from the perusal of sections 251(1)(a), 251(1)(b), and the Explanation of section 251(2) that the CIT(A) is required to apply their mind to all issues arising from the impugned order. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) was not empowered to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution and was obliged to dispose of the appeal on merit, relying on the decision in Prem Kumar Arjun Das Luthra HUF, 291 CTR 614. In the interest of justice, and without commenting on the merits, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) for deciding the case afresh/denovo, after providing adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee was directed to cooperate in the remitted appellate proceedings.
The Tribunal declined to condone the inordinate delay of 619/650 days in filing the appeals. The Tribunal observed that the reasons provided by the assessees, such as financial crisis and bank recovery proceedings, did not constitute sufficient cause for such a prolonged delay. The Tribunal emphasized that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretion of the court, and it should not be granted as an act of generosity. Citing various Supreme Court judgments, including H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaish, Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaran & Anr., and State of Orissa Vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, the Tribunal held that delay caused by negligence or an inactive approach cannot be condoned. The Tribunal found the assessees' conduct to be grossly negligent and a casual approach to their rights. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed on the ground of limitation without going into the merits of the cases. No issue was left undecided; the appeals were dismissed solely on limitation.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT was not justified in invoking Section 263 regarding the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal reasoned that the AO's decision to allow the deduction was a possible and legally permissible view, and the PCIT's differing opinion did not make the order erroneous, especially since the Tribunal itself had, in principle, allowed such deductions in the assessee's own case. This constituted a case of change of opinion, rendering Section 263 inapplicable. Therefore, the finding of the PCIT on this issue was reversed, and the original assessment order was restored. Regarding the taxability of interest income earned on FDRs with banks other than cooperative banks (amounting to Rs. 3,94,82,24,597/-), the Tribunal agreed with the PCIT that the AO had not conducted sufficient inquiry or verification in the original assessment. Therefore, the PCIT was justified in setting aside the original assessment order on this issue and directing the AO to conduct further inquiries. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT was not justified in invoking Section 263 regarding the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal reasoned that the AO's decision to allow the deduction was a possible and legally permissible view, and the PCIT's differing opinion did not make the order erroneous, especially since the Tribunal itself had, in principle, allowed such deductions in the assessee's own case. This constituted a case of change of opinion, rendering Section 263 inapplicable. Therefore, the finding of the PCIT on this issue was reversed, and the original assessment order was restored. Regarding the taxability of interest income earned on FDRs with banks other than cooperative banks (amounting to Rs. 3,94,82,24,597/-), the Tribunal agreed with the PCIT that the AO had not conducted sufficient inquiry or verification in the original assessment. Therefore, the PCIT was justified in setting aside the original assessment order on this issue and directing the AO to conduct further inquiries. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal declined to condone the inordinate delay of 619/650 days in filing the appeals. The Tribunal observed that the reasons provided by the assessees, such as financial crisis and bank recovery proceedings, did not constitute sufficient cause for such a prolonged delay. The Tribunal emphasized that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretion of the court, and it should not be granted as an act of generosity. Citing various Supreme Court judgments, including H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaish, Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaran & Anr., and State of Orissa Vs. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, the Tribunal held that delay caused by negligence or an inactive approach cannot be condoned. The Tribunal found the assessees' conduct to be grossly negligent and a casual approach to their rights. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed on the ground of limitation without going into the merits of the cases. No issue was left undecided; the appeals were dismissed solely on limitation.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT was not justified in invoking Section 263 regarding the claim of deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. The Tribunal reasoned that the AO's decision to allow the deduction was a possible and legally permissible view, and the PCIT's differing opinion did not make the order erroneous, especially since the Tribunal itself had, in principle, allowed such deductions in the assessee's own case. This constituted a case of change of opinion, rendering Section 263 inapplicable. Therefore, the finding of the PCIT on this issue was reversed, and the original assessment order was restored. Regarding the taxability of interest income earned on FDRs with banks other than cooperative banks (amounting to Rs. 3,94,82,24,597/-), the Tribunal agreed with the PCIT that the AO had not conducted sufficient inquiry or verification in the original assessment. Therefore, the PCIT was justified in setting aside the original assessment order on this issue and directing the AO to conduct further inquiries. The appeals were partly allowed.
The Tribunal noted that it was an admitted fact that certain documents were not filed before the Assessing Officer (AO) and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)]. While the assessee claimed these were public documents, their absence before the lower authorities was critical for deciding the issue. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal found it important that these documents be duly verified by the AO or CIT(A). Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for de-novo adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to provide the assessee an opportunity of hearing and allow the filing of all necessary documents. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that in cases where the CIT(Appeals) passes an ex-parte order due to the assessee's non-compliance, and the assessee raises legal grounds, the Tribunal should not adjudicate these grounds directly. Instead, to uphold the principles of natural justice and the statutory framework of adjudication, the matter should be remanded back to the CIT(Appeals) for a de novo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal reasoned that deciding legal grounds in such a scenario would bypass the first appellate authority's role and create an easy route for assessees to avoid compliance. The Tribunal cited its own decisions in Brajesh Singh Bhadoria and Collector Mining, Kondagaon, emphasizing that the CIT(Appeals) must pass a speaking order under Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act. Therefore, the CIT(Appeals)'s order was set aside, and the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication, with a direction to the assessee to comply fully and the CIT(Appeals) to pass an order within three months.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition of Rs. 3,02,25,000/- made under Section 68 for AY 2009-10. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed share application forms with complete addresses and PANs, confirmations, and ITRs. The AO's assessment order consolidated the discussion for multiple assessment years, and the share applicants were listed in a consolidated table. The Tribunal found that the AO had not doubted the genuineness of the receipts and had not rendered any findings of non-fulfillment of primary conditions under Section 68, namely, identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of transactions. The AO's reliance on the assessment order for AY 2012-13 was found to be erroneous as that order was reversed by the ITAT. The Tribunal also referred to various High Court and Supreme Court decisions, including Mehta Parikh, N.C. Cables, Softline Creations, Gangeshwari Metals, and Jawahar Lal Oswal, emphasizing that the onus shifts back to the revenue to prove the transaction is not genuine once the assessee provides credible explanations and relevant facts. The Tribunal distinguished the Revenue's cited cases as being based on specific incriminating material and untraceable shareholders, which was not the case here. The Tribunal concluded that the concurrent findings of the lower appellate authorities were purely factual and no substantial question of law arose.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the addition of Rs. 3,02,25,000/- made under Section 68 for AY 2009-10. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had filed share application forms with complete addresses and PANs, confirmations, and ITRs. The AO's assessment order consolidated the discussion for multiple assessment years, and the share applicants were listed in a consolidated table. The Tribunal found that the AO had not doubted the genuineness of the receipts and had not rendered any findings of non-fulfillment of primary conditions under Section 68, namely, identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of transactions. The AO's reliance on the assessment order for AY 2012-13 was found to be erroneous as that order was reversed by the ITAT. The Tribunal also referred to various High Court and Supreme Court decisions, including Mehta Parikh, N.C. Cables, Softline Creations, Gangeshwari Metals, and Jawahar Lal Oswal, emphasizing that the onus shifts back to the revenue to prove the transaction is not genuine once the assessee provides credible explanations and relevant facts. The Tribunal distinguished the Revenue's cited cases as being based on specific incriminating material and untraceable shareholders, which was not the case here. The Tribunal concluded that the concurrent findings of the lower appellate authorities were purely factual and no substantial question of law arose.
The Tribunal admitted additional evidence filed by the assessee, including reconciliation statements for rent receipts, certificates from CG State Ware Housing Corporation regarding rent, and ledger accounts for AYs 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2013-14. These documents were not filed before the lower authorities. Considering that these documents went to the root of the issue and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the assessment order to the Assessing Officer (AO) for de novo adjudication. The AO was directed to provide an opportunity to the assessee to file all necessary documents. The appeal of the assessee was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that in cases where an ex-parte order is passed by the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC due to the assessee's non-compliance, and the assessee has not been heard on merits, the matter should be remanded back to the file of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for de novo adjudication. The Tribunal reasoned that it is not open for the Tribunal to adjudicate issues in the absence of a substantive order passed on merits by the first appellate authority as per Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act. This approach balances the scales of justice by providing a final opportunity to the assessee. The Tribunal cited its own previous decisions in Brajesh Singh Bhadoria and Collector Mining, Kondagaon, emphasizing that the first appellate authority must pass a speaking order on merits. The Tribunal directed the assessee to comply with future notices and present the case on merits, and the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard and pass an order within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that in cases where an ex-parte order is passed by the NFAC due to the assessee's non-compliance, and considering the principles of natural justice, the matter should be remanded back to the NFAC for denovo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal relied on its own previous decisions in Brajesh Singh Bhadoria Vs. Dy./ACIT and Collector Mining, Kondagaon Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS), and also cited the decision in Amit Singh Thakur Vs. ACIT. The reasoning was that the NFAC is the first appellate authority and should pass a speaking order on merits. Allowing the Tribunal to decide a legal ground on an ex-parte order would usurp the NFAC's power and create an easy route for assessees to bypass compliance. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the NFAC and remanded the matter for denovo adjudication, directing the assessee to comply with future notices and present their case on merits. The NFAC was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard and pass an order within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that in cases where an ex-parte order is passed by the Ld. CIT(Appeals) due to the assessee's non-compliance, and despite several opportunities, no compliance is made, the principles of natural justice and the scheme of the Act necessitate remanding the matter back to the Ld. CIT(Appeals) for denovo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal cited its own decisions in Brajesh Singh Bhadoria and Collector Mining, Kondagaon, which followed a similar approach. The reasoning is that the Ld. CIT(Appeals) is the first appellate authority and must pass a speaking order on merits. If the Tribunal were to adjudicate a legal ground in such a scenario, it would usurp the power of the Ld. CIT(Appeals) and create an easy route for assessees to bypass the first appellate authority. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(Appeals) and remanded the matter back for denovo adjudication, directing the assessee to comply fully and the Ld. CIT(Appeals) to pass a speaking order within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC has no power to dismiss an appeal in limine solely on the ground of delay without referring to and discussing the contents available on record. Relying on the Bombay High Court's decision in CIT Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF) and a previous ITAT, Raipur Bench decision in Prabal Aadhar Seva Sansthan Vs. ITO, the Tribunal found that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC should have considered the delay aspect under Section 249(3) and then decided the appeal on merits as per Section 250(4) & (6). The Tribunal granted the assessee one final opportunity to represent their case before the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC regarding the condonation of delay. If the delay is condoned, the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC is to adjudicate the issues on merits while complying with the principles of natural justice. The orders of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC were set aside, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal set aside the assessment orders for both AYs and remanded the matters to the AO for de-novo adjudication. For AY 2022-23, the Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(A) confirmed the addition based on the assessee's failure to file details. However, the Tribunal observed that the assessee had pleaded that its reply dated 22.03.2024 was not considered by the AO. Crucially, the Tribunal found that the CGST Department had not arrived at a final decision regarding alleged bogus ITC claims when the assessment was finalized. Therefore, the AO was directed to provide the assessee an opportunity to file all necessary details and to adjudicate afresh. For AY 2023-24, the Tribunal noted the AO's assertion that e-way bills were not produced because transactions were 'EX-Factory'. However, the assessee claimed to have filed copies of e-way bills in the paper book. The Tribunal acknowledged that the CGST is the appropriate authority to verify the genuineness of e-way bills and directed the AO to obtain details from the Pr. Commissioner, CGST, regarding their genuineness and the final outcome of the ITC claim investigation. The AO was also directed to provide the assessee an opportunity to file necessary documents and adjudicate afresh. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the show cause notice issued under Section 148A(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dated February 24, 2023, which provided only 6 clear days for compliance, was invalid and void ab initio. The Tribunal relied on the interpretation of 'not less than 7 days' by various judicial forums, including the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pioneer Motors (Private) Ltd. vs. Municipal Counsel, Nagrecoil, and the Hon'ble High Courts of Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Gujarat, which mandate the exclusion of both the date of issuance and the date of compliance. Since the notice was invalid, any subsequent assessment order passed pursuant to it was also quashed and considered non-est in law. The Tribunal followed its own previous decisions in similar cases.
The Tribunal set aside the assessment orders for both AYs and remanded the matters to the AO for de-novo adjudication. For AY 2022-23, the Tribunal noted that the Ld. CIT(A) confirmed the addition based on the assessee's failure to file details. However, the Tribunal observed that the assessee had pleaded that its reply dated 22.03.2024 was not considered by the AO. Crucially, the Tribunal found that the CGST Department had not arrived at a final decision regarding alleged bogus ITC claims when the assessment was finalized. Therefore, the AO was directed to provide the assessee an opportunity to file all necessary details and to adjudicate afresh. For AY 2023-24, the Tribunal noted the AO's assertion that e-way bills were not produced because transactions were 'EX-Factory'. However, the assessee claimed to have filed copies of e-way bills in the paper book. The Tribunal acknowledged that the CGST is the appropriate authority to verify the genuineness of e-way bills and directed the AO to obtain details from the Pr. Commissioner, CGST, regarding their genuineness and the final outcome of the ITC claim investigation. The AO was also directed to provide the assessee an opportunity to file necessary documents and adjudicate afresh. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, dismissing the Revenue's appeal. The primary issue was the validity of reassessment proceedings initiated beyond four years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The Tribunal noted that for reassessment beyond four years, the first proviso to Section 147 mandates that the Assessing Officer must record a finding that the assessee failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment. The Tribunal found that the reasons recorded by the AO did not contain any such finding or whisper of the assessee's failure to disclose material facts. Relying on the decisions of the Hon'ble Chhattisgarh High Court (the jurisdictional High Court) in Hariom Ingots and Power Pvt Ltd vs PCIT and other precedents, the Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was issued without jurisdiction and was bad in law. Consequently, the reassessment order could not be sustained. The Tribunal dismissed grounds 3, 5, and 6 of the Revenue's appeal. Since the notice under Section 148 was quashed, all other grounds were rendered academic. The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to submit various evidence and relevant documents to substantiate her grounds before the First Appellate Authority. Furthermore, Sales Agent Agreements submitted for the first time at the appellate stage were not forwarded to the AO for verification, violating Rule 46A(3) of the IT Rules, 1962. The Tribunal found that the CIT(Appeals)'s order was not in compliance with Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act. In the interest of natural justice, the ITAT set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC and remanded the matter back to its file for de novo adjudication. The Tribunal directed the assessee to comply with hearing notices and submit all relevant documentary evidence. The penalty proceedings under Section 270A were directed to continue to the extent of additions sustained. The Tribunal noted that the disallowance of conveyance expenses of Rs. 75,240/- was allowed by the CIT(Appeals) but the other disallowances (advertisement expenses of Rs. 5,92,926/- and Rs. 5,67,849/-, Section 40A(2)(b) disallowance of Rs. 11,68,094/-, and travelling expenses of Rs. 46,295/-) were dismissed by the CIT(Appeals). The ITAT's decision to remand means the findings of the CIT(Appeals) on these specific issues are not being adjudicated on merits by the ITAT at this stage.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC has no power to dismiss an appeal in limine solely on the ground of delay without referring to and discussing the contents available on record. Relying on the Bombay High Court's decision in CIT Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF) and a previous ITAT, Raipur Bench decision in Prabal Aadhar Seva Sansthan Vs. ITO, the Tribunal found that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC should have considered the delay aspect under Section 249(3) and then decided the appeal on merits as per Section 250(4) & (6). The Tribunal granted the assessee one final opportunity to represent their case before the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC regarding the condonation of delay. If the delay is condoned, the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC is to adjudicate the issues on merits while complying with the principles of natural justice. The orders of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC were set aside, and the grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were bad in law due to a defective approval under section 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that the approval provided by the revenue was neither digitally nor manually signed. The Tribunal respectfully followed the binding precedent of the coordinate bench in the case of M/s Aditya Plastic (supra), which held that an unsigned approval under section 151 renders the notice under section 148 bad in law and without jurisdiction. The reasoning was that the satisfaction of the prescribed authority is a prerequisite for the AO to assume jurisdiction to issue a notice under section 148. Since the approval was not validly obtained, the AO lacked jurisdiction. Consequently, the assessment order framed by the AO was quashed. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee's grounds of appeal (II and III) alleged gross non-application of mind by the CIT(Appeals) and violation of principles of natural justice, specifically regarding the non-supply of the Section 133(6) reply and denial of cross-examination. The Tribunal referred to its own decision in Nimit Agrawal Vs. DCIT, where similar grounds concerning the violation of principles of natural justice and un-adjudicated grounds by the First Appellate Authority led to a remand. Following this precedent, the Tribunal found that the ground assailed by the assessee regarding the opportunity of cross-examination was not adjudicated by the First Appellate Authority. Therefore, without going into the merits of the additions, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC and remanded the matter back to its file for de novo adjudication, directing compliance with the principles of natural justice and a speaking order. The assessee was directed to duly comply with hearing notices from the First Appellate Authority. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.