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The Tribunal held that in cases where an ex-parte order is passed by the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC due to the assessee's non-compliance, and considering the principles of natural justice, the matter should be remanded back to the file of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for denovo adjudication. The Tribunal reasoned that the CIT(Appeals) is the first appellate authority and must pass a speaking order on merits after providing a reasonable opportunity of being heard, as per Sections 250(4) and 250(6) of the Income Tax Act. Allowing the Tribunal to decide a legal issue arising from an ex-parte order without the assessee having complied before the lower authority would usurp the powers of the CIT(Appeals) and defeat the legislative intent. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC and remanded the matter for denovo adjudication, directing the assessee to comply with hearing notices and represent the matter on merits. The CIT(Appeals)/NFAC was directed to pass a speaking order within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC erred in dismissing the appeal in limine solely on the ground of delay without adjudicating the merits. Following the principles laid down in CIT Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF) (Bom) and Prabal Aadhar Seva Sansthan (ITAT, Raipur), the Tribunal stated that an appellate authority has to adjudicate all grounds on merits and cannot dismiss an appeal solely on delay or non-prosecution. The Tribunal found that the assessee had not provided sufficient reasons for the delay under Section 249(3) of the Act. Therefore, to balance the scales of justice and serve the purpose of natural justice, the Tribunal granted the assessee one final opportunity to represent its case before the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC, specifically on the issue of condonation of delay under Section 249(3). The Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC was directed to decide the issue of condonation of delay and, if condoned, then adjudicate the appeal on merits as per law, while complying with the principles of natural justice. The order of the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the cash withdrawals by the assessee from M/s. Balaji Construction were not in the nature of a loan, but rather a withdrawal of his own money against his credit balance in the firm. The ledger account clearly indicated a substantial credit balance of Rs. 61,71,991.71, from which the assessee withdrew Rs. 15 lakhs. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had never submitted that a loan was received from the firm. Furthermore, the Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in CIT vs. Muthoot Financiers, which held that loan transactions between a partner and a partnership firm do not attract the rigors of Section 269SS. Even if it were considered a loan, the assessee was in a better position as he was withdrawing his own money, for which Section 269SS is not applicable. The CIT(Appeals)/NFAC's order was set aside, and the penalty was deleted. The ratio decidendi is that withdrawals by a partner from their credit balance in a partnership firm do not constitute a loan transaction attracting Section 269SS, and even if it were a loan, transactions between a partner and a firm are outside the purview of Section 269SS.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC, dismissing the assessee's appeal as barred by limitation. The Tribunal found that the assessee had been negligent in pursuing his rights, leading to an inordinate delay of 2443 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC. The Tribunal emphasized that delay cannot be condoned merely as an act of generosity and that the pursuit of substantial justice should not prejudice the opposing party. Citing pronouncements from the Hon'ble Apex Court, the Tribunal reiterated that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretion of the court, which must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. The court must ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered, and if the delay is caused by negligence or an inactive approach, it cannot be condoned. The Tribunal noted that procedural rules are essential for orderly and efficient administration of justice and are not mere technicalities to be ignored. Therefore, the delay was not condoned, and the appeal was dismissed in limine.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(Appeals) was not justified in quashing the penalty order on the grounds of limitation. The Tribunal, referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Armour Security (India) Ltd., clarified that "initiation of proceedings" occurs when the competent authority manifests its decision to proceed by issuing the statutory notice. The Tribunal found that the AO recorded satisfaction in the assessment order dated 31.03.2024, proposed penalty proceedings to the Joint CIT/Addl. CIT on 22.04.2024, the Joint CIT/Addl. CIT issued the penalty notice on 01.05.2024, and levied the penalty on 23.11.2024. These actions were considered well within reasonable time and in accordance with the law. The Tribunal distinguished the case laws relied upon by the assessee, particularly JKD Capital & Finlease Ltd. and M/s. Adma Solutions Pvt. Ltd., stating they were distinguishable on facts. The Tribunal applied the ratio laid down in JCIT Vs. Ganesh Agrawal and others (Karnataka High Court). Consequently, the finding of the Ld. CIT(A) that the penalty order was barred by limitation was reversed. The impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the case was remitted back to the Ld. CIT(A) for adjudicating all other grounds raised in Form-35, excluding the issue of limitation.
The Tribunal held that the order of the Ld. CIT(Exemption) rejecting the renewal of registration under Section 12A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was set aside. The matter was remanded back to the file of the Ld. CIT(Exemption) with a direction to grant the assessee a final opportunity to comply with the hearing notices and represent its case on merits under Section 12AB of the Act. The Tribunal emphasized the importance of adhering to the principles of natural justice and noted that the Revenue had not brought on record any evidence of deliberate or willful negligence by the assessee. Furthermore, the Tribunal observed that the allegations regarding conversion, which led to the cancellation of the assessee's FCRA registration, were sub-judice before the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court. Therefore, it would be appropriate for the Ld. CIT(Exemption) to await the outcome of the High Court's decision before proceeding with the matter concerning Section 12AB of the Act. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC and remanded the matter back to its file. The Tribunal granted a final opportunity to the assessee to represent his case on merits by filing relevant documents to establish the nature and source of the cash deposits. The CIT(Appeals)/NFAC was directed to comply with the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal noted that while the assessee had submitted proof of land holding and cultivation expenditure, and affidavits of brokers, no documentary evidence linking the sale proceeds to the cash deposits for the assessment year under appeal was furnished. The CIT(Appeals) had correctly observed that a satisfactory nexus between agricultural activity and the specific deposits was missing. However, considering the assessee's submission that he would provide all documents and in the interest of substantive justice, the matter was remanded. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(Appeals) had passed an ex-parte order due to the assessee's non-compliance, despite providing several opportunities. The Tribunal, respectfully following its previous decisions in Brajesh Singh Bhadoria and Collector Mining, Kondagaon, set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(Appeals). The matter was remanded back to the file of the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for denovo adjudication on merits, while complying with the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal directed that this be a final opportunity for the assessee to comply with hearing notices and represent the matter on merits. The Ld. CIT(Appeals) was instructed to consider the assessee's submissions and pass a speaking order in terms with Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal noted that while legal issues can be raised at any appellate forum as per National Thermal Power Company Ltd. Vs. CIT, the present case involved principles of natural justice and an ex-parte order, necessitating a remand rather than adjudication of the legal ground by the ITAT.
The Tribunal held that in cases where the CIT(Appeals) passes an ex-parte order due to the assessee's non-compliance, and the assessee subsequently appeals to the Tribunal, the Tribunal should not adjudicate on the merits of the legal grounds. Instead, following the principles of natural justice and the scheme of the Act, the matter should be remanded back to the file of the CIT(Appeals) for de novo adjudication on merits. The Tribunal cited its own previous decisions in "Brajesh Singh Bhadoria" and "Collector Mining, Kondagaon" as precedents. The Tribunal directed the assessee to comply with the hearing notices from the CIT(Appeals) and represent the matter on merits, emphasizing that this would be a final opportunity. The CIT(Appeals) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard and pass a speaking order in terms of Section 250(4) and (6) of the Act within three months. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC was liable to be set aside and the matter remanded back for de novo adjudication. The Tribunal found that the CIT(Appeals) had summarily relied on the findings of the Assessing Officer and upheld the additions without complying with the provisions of Section 250(4) & (6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. It was observed that there was no independent enquiry by the First Appellate Authority and no reasoning provided for arriving at its decision, which is contrary to the functioning of a quasi-judicial authority. Therefore, the appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, and the matter was remanded to the CIT(Appeals) for fresh adjudication with specific enquiry and findings in terms of Section 250(4) & (6), while complying with the principles of natural justice. The assessee was directed to comply with hearing notices and represent the matter on merits.
The Tribunal held that the show cause notice issued under Section 148A(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was invalid and void ab initio. The Tribunal found that the notice dated March 21, 2022, requiring compliance by March 28, 2022, provided only 6 clear days, which is contrary to the statutory mandate of "not less than 7 days". Following the established interpretation by various judicial forums, including the Supreme Court in Pioneer Motors (Private) Ltd. vs. Municipal Council, Nagrecoil, and decisions of the Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in Bijendra Singh vs. PCCIT and Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in PCCIT vs. Smt. Komarla Yogendra Keertana, the Tribunal reiterated that both the date of issuance and the date of compliance must be excluded when calculating the period. Since the notice failed to provide the mandatory minimum period, it was deemed invalid and quashed. Consequently, any assessment order passed pursuant to this void notice was also quashed, rendering all subsequent proceedings non-est in law. The Tribunal noted that similar views were taken in other cases by the same Bench. The issue of other grounds was rendered academic.
The Tribunal held that deciding the fate of condonation petitions without affording an opportunity of being heard to the assessee is against the principle of natural justice. The right of appeal is a valuable substantive right, not merely procedural, and should be viewed liberally. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) did not provide a specific opportunity of being heard on the issue of limitation before non-admitting the appeals. Considering the affidavit of the erstwhile counsel admitting the delay and the principle of natural justice, the Tribunal found that the assessee's petitions for delay condonation in all three cases needed fresh consideration by the CIT(A). The Tribunal set aside all three impugned orders and remitted the matters back to the CIT(A) to decide the condonation petitions afresh after affording an opportunity of being heard to the assessee. If the condonation petitions are found satisfactory, the CIT(A) should then decide the appeals on merit. The Tribunal refrained from commenting on the merits of the additions or the claim for deduction under Section 54B, as these were not adjudicated by the CIT(A). The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that deciding the fate of condonation petitions without affording an opportunity of being heard to the assessee is against the principle of natural justice. The right of appeal is a valuable substantive right, not merely procedural, and should be viewed liberally. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) did not provide a specific opportunity of being heard on the issue of limitation before non-admitting the appeals. Considering the affidavit of the erstwhile counsel admitting the delay and the principle of natural justice, the Tribunal found that the assessee's petitions for delay condonation in all three cases needed fresh consideration by the CIT(A). The Tribunal set aside all three impugned orders and remitted the matters back to the CIT(A) to decide the condonation petitions afresh after affording an opportunity of being heard to the assessee. If the condonation petitions are found satisfactory, the CIT(A) should then decide the appeals on merit. The Tribunal refrained from commenting on the merits of the additions or the claim for deduction under Section 54B, as these were not adjudicated by the CIT(A). The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued by the AO under Section 148A(b) of the Act on 16.03.2023, requiring compliance on or before 23.03.2023, did not provide the mandatory 'not less than seven days' compliance time. This was based on the calculation excluding the date of issuance and the date of compliance. The Tribunal respectfully followed its own previous decisions in similar cases (DCIT-1(1), Raipur Vs. Avani Ferro Alloys Pvt. Ltd and Atal Agrawal vs. ITO-1, Raigarh) and the decision of the Hon'ble Chhattisgarh High Court in MM Wonder Park Pvt. Ltd. Consequently, the notice under Section 148A(b) was quashed as not being in accordance with law. The Tribunal directed the AO to afford proper opportunity of hearing to the assessee and decide the matter afresh. As the Section 148A(b) notice was quashed, all subsequent proceedings were held to be non-est. Other grounds were rendered academic and not adjudicated. The addition of Rs. 3,11,22,300/- under Section 69 r.w.s. 115BBE was not adjudicated on merits due to the quashing of the initial notice.
The Tribunal held that deciding the fate of condonation petitions without affording an opportunity of being heard to the assessee is against the principle of natural justice. The right of appeal is a valuable substantive right, not merely procedural, and should be viewed liberally. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) did not provide a specific opportunity of being heard on the issue of limitation before non-admitting the appeals. Considering the affidavit of the erstwhile counsel admitting the delay and the principle of natural justice, the Tribunal found that the assessee's petitions for delay condonation in all three cases needed fresh consideration by the CIT(A). The Tribunal set aside all three impugned orders and remitted the matters back to the CIT(A) to decide the condonation petitions afresh after affording an opportunity of being heard to the assessee. If the condonation petitions are found satisfactory, the CIT(A) should then decide the appeals on merit. The Tribunal refrained from commenting on the merits of the additions or the claim for deduction under Section 54B, as these were not adjudicated by the CIT(A). The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal, following its own decision in the case of Bhimji Bhikhabhai Tukadiya (ITA No. 1072/RJT/2026 for AY 2020-21, order dated 01.10.2026), held that the ex-gratia amount received by BSNL employees under the VRS Scheme, 2019, which was approved by the Central Government, qualifies for exemption under section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeals without considering the BSNL scheme, which was a violation of the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal condoned the significant delays in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) (1860 days in one case and 1553 days in another) on the grounds that the assessees were pursuing alternative remedies and seeking legal opinions. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) and remanded the issues back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessees an opportunity to produce evidence. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal, following its own decision in the case of Bhimji Bhikhabhai Tukadiya (ITA No. 1072/RJT/2026 for AY 2020-21), held that the ex-gratia amount received by BSNL employees under the VRS Scheme, 2019, which was approved by the Central Government, is eligible for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeals without considering the BSNL Scheme approved by the Central Government, which violated the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the Tribunal condoned the significant delays in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) (1860 days in one case and 1553 days in another) as the assessees were pursuing alternative remedies and seeking legal opinions. The orders of the CIT(A) were set aside, and the appeals were remanded to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, with liberty to the assessees to produce sufficient evidence. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal, following its own decision in the case of Bhimji Bhikhabhai Tukadiya (ITA No. 1072/RJT/2026 for AY 2020-21), held that the ex-gratia amount received by BSNL employees under the VRS Scheme, 2019, which was approved by the Central Government, is eligible for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeals without considering the BSNL Scheme approved by the Central Government, which violated the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the Tribunal condoned the significant delays in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) (1860 days in one case and 1553 days in another) as the assessees were pursuing alternative remedies and seeking legal opinions. The orders of the CIT(A) were set aside, and the appeals were remanded to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, with liberty to the assessees to produce sufficient evidence. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the issue was similar to a previous decision in Nitaben Kirtikumar Parekh v. ITO, ITA No. 506/Rjt/2026, where the addition was restricted to 10% of the disclosed income. Following this precedent and considering the similarity of facts, the Tribunal decided to restrict the addition to 10% of Rs. 3,98,000/-, amounting to Rs. 39,800/-. The Tribunal further directed that this restricted addition should be taxed under the normal provisions of the Act and not under section 115BBE. The grounds raised by the assessee were accordingly partly allowed.
The Tribunal, while acknowledging the assessee's grievance and the smallness of the amount, found that some documents submitted by the assessee were self-serving and could not be relied upon entirely. However, it also recognized that the assessee merited some relief, though not entirely. To protect the interest of the revenue and considering the inconsistencies in the evidence, the Tribunal directed an ad hoc estimated addition. It held that a net profit rate of 10% on the disputed amount of Rs. 30,100/-, amounting to Rs. 3,010/-, should be added to the assessee's income. This addition was to be made at the normal rate of income tax, not under section 115BBE. The Tribunal explicitly stated that this adjudication would not serve as a precedent for any other assessment year. The operative direction was for the AO to make an addition of Rs. 3,010/-.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 7,00,000/- was not sustainable. The Tribunal noted that the issue was squarely covered in favour of the assessee by the decision of a Coordinate Bench of the ITAT Rajkot in the case of M/s. RC Buildcon/ M/s. RC Heights Pvt. Ltd. (supra). The Tribunal emphasized that an excel sheet found from a third party's premises, which was neither signed by the assessee nor the seller, and from which the assessee's name was not reflected, could not be the sole basis for addition. The Tribunal further relied on the judgment of the jurisdictional High Court of Gujarat in the case of PCIT vs. Kaushik Nanubhai Majithia, which held that proceedings under section 153C initiated on the basis of an excel sheet found from a third party, without corroborative material and without providing an opportunity for cross-examination, were vitiated. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the Coordinate Bench's decision and deleted the addition, allowing the appeal. The issue regarding the initiation of action under section 148 was implicitly decided in favour of the assessee by allowing the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal held that the issue was squarely covered in favor of the assessee by the decision of a Coordinate Bench of the ITAT, Rajkot, in the case of M/s. RC Buildcon/M/s. RC Heights Pvt. Ltd. The Tribunal noted that the seized excel sheet was neither signed by the purchaser nor the seller, and the assessee's name was not reflected in it. Crucially, the Tribunal emphasized that the opportunity for cross-examination of the third party from whom the data was seized ought to have been provided. The Tribunal relied on the principle that additions made in the absence of providing an opportunity for cross-examination of persons whose statements are relied upon violate principles of natural justice, citing Supreme Court decisions in Krishnachand Chelaram and Andaman Timber Industries. The Tribunal also referred to the Gujarat High Court's decision in PCIT vs. Kaushik Nanubhai Majithia, which held that proceedings under section 153C initiated based on an unsigned excel sheet found from a third party, without corroborative material, are vitiated. Therefore, the Tribunal deleted the addition of Rs. 15,00,000/- and allowed the appeal.
The Tribunal found that while the assessee's case merited some relief, complete relief could not be granted. The Tribunal noted that some documents and evidence relied upon were self-serving and not entirely trustworthy. Considering the smallness of the disputed amount and to protect the revenue's interest, the Tribunal directed an ad hoc, estimated addition. It held that a net profit rate of 10% on Rs. 1,00,000/-, amounting to Rs. 10,000/-, would address inconsistencies in the evidence. The AO was directed to make an addition of Rs. 10,000/- at the normal rate of income tax, not under section 115BBE. The Tribunal clarified that this adjudication, due to the small amount, should not be treated as a precedent. The issue regarding the initiation of action under section 148 was not explicitly decided, but the appeal was allowed partly based on the quantum addition.
The Tribunal, following its own decision in the case of Bhimji Bhikhabhai Tukadiya (ITA No. 1072/RJT/2026 for AY 2020-21, order dated 01.10.2026), held that the ex-gratia amount received by BSNL employees under the VRS Scheme, 2019, which was approved by the Central Government, qualifies for exemption under section 10(10B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeals without considering the BSNL scheme, which was a violation of the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal condoned the significant delays in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) (1860 days in one case and 1553 days in another) on the grounds that the assessees were pursuing alternative remedies and seeking legal opinions. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the orders of the CIT(A) and remanded the issues back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessees an opportunity to produce evidence. The appeals were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the reopening of assessment under Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was not valid in this case. The primary reasoning was that the assessee had not filed the original return of income under Section 139 for the Assessment Year 2016-17. Consequently, the conditions precedent for invoking Section 147, which typically requires a belief formed by the Assessing Officer that income has escaped assessment based on tangible material, were not satisfied. The Tribunal found that the information received from the Sub-Registrar, which triggered the RMS selection, did not, in itself, constitute sufficient material to form a valid belief of escapement of income in the absence of a filed return. Therefore, the assessment framed under Section 147 was quashed. The operative direction was the deletion of the additions made.
The Tribunal, considering the submissions of both parties and the interest of substantive justice, decided to provide one final opportunity to the assessee to furnish details before the First Appellate Authority. The issue of the Rs. 40,00,000/- addition (Grounds 2-8) was restored to the file of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for denovo adjudication. The Tribunal emphasized that this is a final opportunity and the assessee must comply with hearing notices and furnish all relevant evidence. Similarly, Ground of appeal No. 9 regarding the disallowance of exemption under Section 10(13A) was also restored to the file of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for denovo adjudication. Grounds 1 and 11 were noted as general, and Ground 10 as consequential. The ratio decidendi is that in the interest of justice, a final opportunity for presenting evidence can be granted to the assessee, especially when the revenue does not object to a remand, allowing for a fresh adjudication by the lower appellate authority.
The Tribunal held that while the identity of the loan creditors (parents) and the fact that transactions were routed through banking channels were accepted by the AO, the documents and evidence submitted by the assessee were self-serving. Therefore, full relief could not be granted. Considering the smallness of the amount and to protect the interest of revenue, an ad-hoc estimated addition was deemed appropriate. The Tribunal directed the AO to make an addition of Rs. 1,00,000/- (10% of Rs. 10,00,000/-) at the normal rate of income tax, not under section 115BBE. This decision was made considering the specific facts and the amount involved and was explicitly stated not to be treated as a precedent. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contention for some relief but not entire relief.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal for statistical purposes. The Judicial Member acknowledged the assessee's submission regarding practical difficulties in furnishing documentary evidence due to the area's past Naxalite issues. Considering this, and in the interest of substantive justice, the Tribunal granted one final opportunity to the assessee to furnish all relevant documentary evidence to the First Appellate Authority. The CIT(Appeals) was directed to determine the validity of the assessee's contentions and pass a speaking order in terms of Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act, following the principles of natural justice. The assessee was cautioned to comply with hearing notices and submit documents. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(Appeals) had dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution, but felt that a final opportunity was warranted.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271B is not leviable in this case. The Tribunal considered the provisions of Section 273B, which states that no penalty shall be imposable for any failure if the assessee proves that there was a reasonable cause for the failure. While the Revenue disregarded the assessee's contention of viral fever due to lack of documentary evidence, the Tribunal noted that the Revenue also failed to produce any report refuting the assessee's submissions. The Tribunal relied on the case laws cited by the assessee and the provision of Section 273B, concluding that once a reasonable cause is explained by the assessee, there should not be an imposition of penalty under Section 271B. The order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC was set aside. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, dated 25.07.2022, for the assessment year 2013-14, is barred by limitation. The reasoning followed the precedent set by the Tribunal's own bench in similar cases, specifically referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Rajeev Bansal. The Tribunal found that the notice was issued beyond the permissible time limit for reopening the assessment. Consequently, the reopening of the assessment was quashed. The Tribunal further held that once the reassessment itself is quashed, all subsequent proceedings become non-est (as if they never existed). The appeal of the assessee was allowed on this ground, rendering other grounds academic. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC had upheld the reassessment proceedings, finding that the SFT data provided sufficient tangible material to form a prima facie belief of escaped income. The CIT(Appeals)/NFAC rejected the assessee's arguments regarding mechanical reliance on SFT data, prior knowledge from the case of Late Maimuna Begum, and violation of natural justice. The appellate authority also found that the assessee failed to discharge the burden of proving the source of cash deposits, even with the submission of audit reports, VAT returns, and reconstructed summaries, as these were additional evidences not filed before the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal, however, observed that the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC, while admitting additional evidence, failed to comply with Rule 46A(3) of the IT Rules, 1962, by not providing these to the AO for comment and verification. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC and remanded the matter back to its file to comply with Rule 46A(3), obtain a remand report from the AO, and then pass a fresh order in accordance with Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act, while adhering to principles of natural justice. The assessee was also directed to comply with hearing notices.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(Appeals) order was perverse as it failed to consider the assessee's submissions dated 22.04.2025, which clearly stated that the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme was opted for penalty proceedings only and not for the quantum appeal. The Tribunal emphasized that a quasi-judicial authority must consider all submissions and evidence on record before arriving at a conclusion. Summarily dismissing an appeal without adjudicating on merits constitutes injustice to the taxpayer. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(Appeals) and remanded the matter back to his file for de novo adjudication of all grounds of appeal on merits, in accordance with the law and the decision in CIT Vs. Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF). The Ld. CIT(Appeals) was directed to pass a speaking order as per Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessment order was not in accordance with the mandatory procedure laid down under Section 144B of the Act. It was noted that the AO had not followed the principles of natural justice by failing to issue a show cause notice to the assessee before making the addition of Rs. 52,96,834/- on account of disallowance of the cost of acquisition/construction. The Tribunal relied on the concession made by the revenue's representative, who admitted that no show cause notice was issued. The Tribunal also referred to judicial pronouncements, including the Bombay High Court's decision in Piramal Enterprises Ltd. Vs. Addl/Joint/Deputy/Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax/Income Tax Officer, which held that assessments made without adhering to Section 144B are non-est. Consequently, the Tribunal declared the assessment order as non-est, holding that the AO lacked valid inherent jurisdiction to pass such an order. As the assessment order was non-est, any subsequent proceedings were rendered invalid. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated on the basis of information received from the ADIT (Inv.), Raipur, and that the Income Tax Department had already completed scrutiny assessments in the cases of the group companies, Debdaru Vinmay Pvt. Ltd. and DKS Tradecom Pvt. Ltd., accepting their returned income for AY 2012-13. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer had not pointed out any defects in the documents submitted by the assessee (MoA, Articles of Association, ROC certificate, IT returns, financials, bank statements, board resolutions) for these group companies. Since the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions with these group companies were verified by the Income Tax Department in the assessments of those companies, it was incorrect for the Assessing Officer to allege that the assessee failed to prove these aspects. Therefore, the addition made by the AO under Section 68 of the Act was found to have no merit. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the addition. Consequently, Ground No. 3 raised by the assessee was allowed. As the notice under Section 148 was held to be bad in law, other legal grounds raised by the assessee were dismissed as un-adjudicated.
The Tribunal held that the valuation of stock/inventories should be at the lower of cost or Net Realizable Value (NRV), considering the amendment to Section 145A as declaratory of the existing intent. It further held that NRV should be based on realizable value around the balance sheet date, especially where prices fluctuate significantly. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submission of valuing stock based on prevailing market prices around the balance sheet date, as followed consistently. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s finding was set aside, and the AO was directed to adopt the prevailing market price as on and around the balance sheet date for valuation, granting consequential relief. Regarding the quantitative discrepancy in closing stock of Acid Oil, the Tribunal found that the CIT(A) was satisfied with the assessee's submission but did not admit the evidence due to late production. The Tribunal considered the production register and balance sheet as primary documents that should prevail over the 3CD report. The addition on this score was deleted, granting consequential relief to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the right of appeal is a valuable substantive right and should be viewed liberally. It found that the CIT(A) had not provided a specific opportunity of being heard to the assessee before rejecting the delay condonation petition and dismissing the appeal. This was considered against the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh consideration of the delay condonation petition. The CIT(A) was directed to afford an opportunity of being heard to the assessee before deciding the condonation petition. If the condonation petition is found satisfactory, the CIT(A) should then decide the appeal on merits. The Tribunal refrained from commenting on the merits of the condonation petition or the case itself. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that deciding the delay condonation petition without affording an opportunity of being heard to the assessee is against the principle of natural justice. The right to appeal is a valuable right and should be viewed liberally. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) rejected the delay condonation petition without sufficient satisfaction and without providing a specific opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee denied proprietorship of M/s R. R. Enterprises and that the AO had not provided material to establish it. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for a fresh consideration of the delay condonation petition, after affording an opportunity of being heard to the assessee. If the condonation petition is found satisfactory, the CIT(A) should then decide the appeal on merit. The Tribunal refrained from commenting on the merit of the condonation petition or the case itself. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had not been given a sufficient opportunity of being heard and could not plead his case successfully before the CIT(A). The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) himself admitted that the assessee could not file the details and documents on merit. Citing the settled law that principles of natural justice and fair play require that the affected party is granted a sufficient opportunity of being heard to contest their case, the Tribunal decided not to delve into the merits of the case. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remitted the matter back to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication. The CIT(A) was directed to pass a speaking order after affording a sufficient opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The assessee was also directed to contest his stand forthwith. For statistical purposes, the appeal of the assessee was treated as allowed.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was bad in law. The reasoning was that the notice was issued after a lapse of 4 years from the end of the assessment year, and the proviso to Section 147, which requires the AO to record satisfaction about the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts, was not complied with. The Tribunal relied on the judgment in Sumangal Techpark (P) Ltd. vs. ITO, which held that if the AO does not disclose anything on the evidences furnished during the original assessment proceedings and fails to identify particular facts not fully and truly disclosed, then initiation of reassessment proceedings beyond four years is void ab initio. Therefore, the Tribunal allowed the additional ground raised by the assessee regarding the invalidity of the notice under Section 148. Consequently, all other grounds raised by the assessee were dismissed as un-adjudicated. The appeal filed by the Revenue was also dismissed as infructuous because the Tribunal had already held that the notice under Section 148 was bad in law, rendering the consequential assessment order void ab initio. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was bad in law. The reasoning was that the notice was issued after a lapse of 4 years from the end of the assessment year, and the proviso to Section 147, which requires the AO to record satisfaction about the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts, was not complied with. The Tribunal relied on the judgment in Sumangal Techpark (P) Ltd. vs. ITO, which held that if the AO does not disclose anything on the evidences furnished during the original assessment proceedings and fails to identify particular facts not fully and truly disclosed, then initiation of reassessment proceedings beyond four years is void ab initio. Therefore, the Tribunal allowed the additional ground raised by the assessee regarding the invalidity of the notice under Section 148. Consequently, all other grounds raised by the assessee were dismissed as un-adjudicated. The appeal filed by the Revenue was also dismissed as infructuous because the Tribunal had already held that the notice under Section 148 was bad in law, rendering the consequential assessment order void ab initio. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the assessment was carried out under section 144 read with section 144B of the Act, and the impugned order by the Ld. CIT(A) was an ex-parte and non-speaking order. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had not been given a sufficient opportunity of being heard and could not plead their case successfully before the Ld. CIT(A). Citing the settled law that principles of natural justice and fair play require granting sufficient opportunity of being heard, the Tribunal, in the interest of justice and without delving into the merits, restored the matter back to the file of the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication. The AO was directed to pass a speaking order after affording sufficient opportunity of being heard to the assessee, who was also directed to contest their stand forthwith and was at liberty to adduce relevant evidence. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal noted that the issue was similar to the one decided in Nitaben Kirtikumar Parekh v. ITO, ITA No. 506/Rjt/2026, where the Tribunal had partly allowed the appeal by restricting the addition to 10% of the disclosed income. The Ld. AR for the assessee also submitted that the issue was covered by the said decision. Respectfully following the precedent and considering the similarity of facts, the Tribunal decided to restrict the addition to 10% of Rs. 4,08,400/-. The addition was therefore restricted to Rs. 40,840/-. The Tribunal further directed that this restricted addition shall be taxed under the normal provisions of the Act. The grounds raised by the assessee were partly allowed.
The Tribunal found merit in the Revenue's submission that the CIT(A) allowed the assessee's tactical non-compliance to succeed over technicalities and shortcomings in the assessment order. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had no answer for not responding to the AO's query regarding the genuineness of Rs. 1,15,47,186/- during the assessment proceedings. The Tribunal held that tactical non-compliance should not be used as a tool to gain an advantage. Since the genuineness of Rs. 1,15,47,186/- was neither examined by the AO nor explained by the assessee, the Tribunal was not satisfied with the CIT(A)'s deletion. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s finding and remitted the matters concerning additions of Rs. 1,15,47,186/- (under section 69A) and Rs. 1,15,471/- (under section 69C) back to the AO for denovo assessment. Regarding the addition of Rs. 23,25,000/-, the Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s deletion unconvincing due to the absence of corroboratory evidence for opening and closing stock and subsequent ITRs. Therefore, this matter was also remitted back to the AO for denovo assessment.
The Tribunal dismissed all grounds of appeal raised by the Revenue. Regarding the Rs. 3,50,00,000/- loan from M/s Shivnath Capital Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal found that the loan was disclosed as an asset in the lender's balance sheet and sourced from its Reserves & Surplus and Provisions. The AO failed to pinpoint any infirmity or anomaly in the assessee's submissions and simply doubted the transaction due to intercompany transfers without adverse material. For the Rs. 27,00,000/- loan from Smt. Kaushilya Devi Gupta and the Rs. 20,80,000/- from M/s Shivnath Krishak (for repaying a loan to M/s Shivanath Tractors), the Tribunal noted that the AO doubted these transactions based on the source of funds (bank loan diversion or intercompany transfers) without bringing any adverse material on record to prove their lack of genuineness. The Tribunal found no substance in the AO's findings and no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s well-reasoned order, thus declining to interfere.