ITAT Raipur Judgments — September 2025

The ITAT condoned the 461-day delay. It ruled that the CIT(A), as a quasi-judicial authority, is statutorily obligated to decide an appeal on merits and cannot summarily dismiss it for non-prosecution. Citing various sections of the Income Tax Act and judicial precedents, the ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter for de novo adjudication on merits, directing the assessee to comply with future notices.

The tribunal held that the issuance of notice under Section 143(2) is mandatory for the completion of any assessment, including reassessments, as it upholds the principle of 'Audi alteram partem' (right to be heard). Citing various judicial precedents, the tribunal concluded that the failure to issue this mandatory notice rendered the reassessment proceedings and the resulting order invalid, arbitrary, and bad in law, thereby quashing them.

The tribunal held that, following the principles of consistency and completeness, the penalty appeals should also be remanded to the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC for de novo adjudication. The penalty will only survive if the quantum additions are sustained; otherwise, it will be quashed. This decision was supported by judgments from the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Hon'ble High Court of Delhi.

The ITAT condoned the 3-day delay in filing the appeal, finding it not malafide or deliberate. Following judicial precedents emphasizing natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(A)/NFAC and remanded the case for de novo adjudication on merits, providing the assessee one final opportunity to present their case.

The Tribunal condoned the 107-day delay, finding no malafide intent on the assessee's part, as the notices were sent to the wrong email ID. Upholding principles of natural justice and relying on judicial precedents, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s ex-parte order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, providing the assessee a final opportunity to represent their case.

The Tribunal, guided by judicial precedents (including Supreme Court and Delhi High Court), held that when quantum appeals are remanded for fresh adjudication, the corresponding penalty appeals should also be remanded. The penalty's sustainability is contingent on the outcome of the quantum appeals; if additions are deleted, the penalty automatically lapses.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It held that an unsigned approval under Section 151 of the Act violates Section 282A(1) and renders the approval invalid, arbitrary, and void ab initio. Consequently, the Assessing Officer ceased to have valid jurisdiction for reassessment under Section 147. Since the original reassessment was quashed and quantum additions deleted in the connected appeal, no tax liability or basis for penalty remained.

The tribunal condoned the 93-day delay, finding no deliberate or malafide conduct on the assessee's part. Recognizing the assessee's request for a final opportunity, the tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back for de novo adjudication. The assessee was granted a final chance to present relevant evidence to substantiate the source of the cash deposits.

The Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(Appeals)/NFAC, remanding the quantum appeal for a de novo adjudication as per law and natural justice, in accordance with Section 250(4) & (6) of the Act. It was clarified that the findings regarding the penalty proceedings, where Form 5 was obtained, were correct and required no further adjudication.

The ITAT held that the CIT(A)/NFAC, as a quasi-judicial authority, cannot dismiss appeals *in limine* for delay or non-prosecution. It emphasized that the CIT(A) must conduct an inquiry into the reasons for delay, as per Section 249(3) read with 250(4) & (6) of the Income Tax Act, and then adjudicate the matters on their merits, adopting a justice-oriented approach. The ITAT, citing judicial precedents, clarified that the CIT(A)'s powers are co-terminus with the AO and they are obligated to dispose of appeals on merits.

The tribunal, citing several High Court judgments, held that the approval under Section 153D was indeed granted in a mechanical and summary manner, lacking the required independent application of mind by the competent authority. Such a mechanical approval, particularly when covering multiple years and assessees without adequate reasoning or satisfaction, renders the subsequent assessment proceedings void ab initio. Thus, the assessment order loses legal validity.

The tribunal held that the unsigned approval u/s 151 of the Act is a violation of Section 282A(1), rendering the approval invalid, arbitrary, and void ab initio. This absence of valid approval stripped the Assessing Officer of jurisdiction to complete the reassessment proceedings. Citing judicial precedents, the tribunal concluded that such an unsigned communication cannot sustain the subsequent assessment.

The Tribunal held that a quasi-judicial authority like the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC must adopt a justice-oriented approach and cannot dismiss appeals in limine for delay or non-prosecution without due inquiry. Citing judicial precedents, the Tribunal emphasized that the CIT(Appeals) has powers and a duty under Sections 249(3) and 250(4) & (6) of the Income Tax Act to inquire into and decide on delay condonation and subsequently adjudicate on merits. Therefore, the orders of the CIT(Appeals)/NFAC were set aside, and the matters were remanded for de novo adjudication.

The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)/NFAC's orders, emphasizing that a quasi-judicial authority must adopt a justice-oriented approach and cannot dismiss appeals in limine solely on grounds of delay or non-prosecution. It remanded the cases back to the CIT(A)/NFAC to first decide on the condonation of delay under Section 249(3) after proper inquiry and then adjudicate the matters on merits.

The ITAT held that the CIT(A) did not have the jurisdiction to remand issues to the AO for fresh adjudication, as the original orders were passed under section 201 and not ex-parte under section 144 of the Act. The tribunal emphasized that the power of remand under the proviso to section 251(1)(a) (effective 01/10/2024) is strictly limited to orders framed under section 144. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s action of remanding sub-grounds (c), (d) & (e) of ground number 2 was beyond its jurisdiction and was set aside. The ITAT directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate these sub-grounds de-novo in accordance with law.

The Tribunal held that the First Appellate Authority (CIT(A)) lacks the power to remand any issue for fresh adjudication to the Assessing Officer when the original order appealed against was passed otherwise than under section 144 of the Income Tax Act. Since the orders were passed under section 201, the CIT(A)'s remand of sub-grounds (c), (d), and (e) of ground number 2 was beyond jurisdiction and was thus vacated. The CIT(A) was directed to adjudicate these sub-grounds de-novo in accordance with the law.

The ITAT held that the CIT(A) lacked the jurisdiction to remand issues to the AO when the original order was passed u/s 201 and not ex-parte u/s 144 of the Act. Citing Section 251(1)(a), both the erstwhile provisions and the amended provisions (w.e.f. 01/10/2024), remand is not permissible for orders other than those passed ex-parte u/s 144. Therefore, the ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s remand for sub-grounds (c), (d) & (e) of ground number 2 and directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo.

The Tribunal ruled that the First Appellate Authority (CIT(A)) lacked jurisdiction to remand issues for fresh adjudication to the Assessing Officer where the appealed order was not passed ex-parte under section 144 of the Act. Consequently, the tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s remand of specific sub-grounds and directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo.

The Tribunal ruled that the CIT(A) lacked the jurisdiction to remand issues for fresh adjudication to the AO when the original order was not passed ex-parte under section 144 of the Act, especially in light of the Finance Act 2024 amendment to section 251(1)(a) effective from 01/10/2024. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s remand of specific sub-grounds, directing the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo in accordance with the law.

The ITAT held that the CIT(A) lacked the jurisdiction to remand issues for fresh adjudication to the AO, as the original assessment orders were passed under Section 201, not ex-parte under Section 144 of the Income Tax Act. As per the amended Section 251(1)(a) (effective 01/10/2024), the power of remand by the first appellate authority is restricted only to orders framed ex-parte under Section 144. The ITAT, therefore, set aside the CIT(A)'s remand of sub-grounds 2(c), (d), and (e) and directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo.

The ITAT held that the first appellate authority (CIT(A)) lacked jurisdiction to remand issues to the AO for fresh adjudication, as the original assessment order was not passed ex-parte under section 144 of the Act. The Tribunal emphasized that the provisions of section 251(1)(a) (prior to 01/10/2024 amendment) did not permit such remands, and the subsequent amendment allowing remands is specifically limited to section 144 ex-parte orders. Consequently, the ITAT vacated the CIT(A)'s remand of sub-grounds (c), (d), & (e) of ground number 2, directing the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo according to law.

The Tribunal held that the First Appellate Authority (CIT(A)) lacks the jurisdiction to remand any issue for fresh adjudication to the Assessing Officer (AO) if the original order was not passed u/s 144 of the Act. The CIT(A)'s action of remanding sub-grounds 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e) for de-novo verification by the AO was deemed contrary to Section 251(1)(a) of the Act, which, especially after its amendment w.e.f. 01/10/2024, restricts such remand powers to cases where the assessment order was ex-parte u/s 144. The Tribunal set aside this portion of the CIT(A)'s order and directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate these specific sub-grounds de-novo, concluding that the CIT(A) had exceeded its jurisdiction.

The Tribunal ruled that the Ld. CIT(A) lacked jurisdiction to remand any issue for fresh adjudication to the Assessing Officer, as the original order was not passed under section 144 of the Act. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s partial remand of interconnected sub-grounds (c), (d), and (e) of ground 2 was contrary to sections 251(1)(a) and 250(6) of the Act. These sub-grounds were set aside for de-novo adjudication by the CIT(A).

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) lacked the jurisdiction to remand issues for fresh verification to the AO when the original order was passed under section 201 and not ex-parte under section 144 of the Act. With the Finance Act 2024 amendment effective 01/10/2024, the power to remand is explicitly restricted to cases where the assessment order was framed ex-parte under section 144. Therefore, the tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s remand of sub-grounds (c), (d), and (e) of ground number 2 and directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo.

The ITAT held that the CIT(A) lacked jurisdiction to remand issues to the AO when the original assessment order was not passed ex-parte u/s 144 of the Act. Citing amended section 251(1)(a) (w.e.f. 01/10/2024) and Supreme Court precedents, the Tribunal ruled that the CIT(A) must conclude appeals definitively and can only remand for de-novo assessment if the original order was ex-parte u/s 144. The ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s remand of sub-grounds (c), (d), & (e) of ground 2, directing the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo.

The ITAT held that the CIT(A) lacked the jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 251(1)(a) of the Act (prior to the Finance Act 2024 amendment effective 01/10/2024) to remand any issue for fresh verification to the Assessing Officer, as the original order was not passed ex-parte u/s 144. The tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s remand of sub-grounds (c), (d) & (e) and directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo in accordance with the law.

The ITAT held that the first appellate authority (CIT(A)) lacked the jurisdiction to remand any issue for fresh adjudication to the Assessing Officer if the original order was not passed ex-parte under Section 144 of the Income Tax Act. Since the orders in this case were under Section 201, the CIT(A)'s action of remanding certain interconnected sub-grounds for de-novo verification was beyond its powers and therefore vacated. The CIT(A) is directed to adjudicate these sub-grounds de-novo in accordance with law.

The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) lacked jurisdiction to remand issues for fresh adjudication to the Assessing Officer, as the original order was passed u/s 201 of the Act and not ex-parte u/s 144. The newly inserted proviso to section 251(1)(a), effective 01/10/2024, only permits remand when the assessment order appealed against is framed u/s 144. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s remand of sub-grounds (c), (d), & (e) of ground 2 was set aside as being beyond jurisdiction.

The Tribunal held that the First Appellate Authority (Ld. CIT(A)) lacked jurisdiction to remand any issue for fresh adjudication to the Assessing Officer if the original order was not passed ex-parte u/s 144 of the Act. The CIT(A)'s remand of specific sub-grounds (c), (d) & (e) for de-novo verification was in contravention of section 251(1)(a) and thus set aside. The Tribunal directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate these sub-grounds de-novo in accordance with law.

The Tribunal held that the First Appellate Authority (CIT(A)) lacks the jurisdiction to remand an issue for de-novo verification to the Assessing Officer unless the original order appealed against was passed ex-parte under Section 144 of the Income Tax Act. Consequently, the CIT(A)'s action of remanding specific sub-grounds of SECL's appeal was found to be beyond jurisdiction and in contravention of Section 251(1)(a) of the Act and was therefore set aside. The CIT(A) was directed to adjudicate these sub-grounds de-novo.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) lacked jurisdiction under Section 251(1)(a) of the Act to remand issues to the AO for fresh adjudication, as the original order was not passed ex-parte under Section 144. The amended Section 251(1)(a), effective from 01/10/2024, only permits remand in cases of ex-parte assessment orders under Section 144. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s remand of sub-grounds (c), (d), and (e) of ground 2, directing the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo.

The Tribunal ruled that the CIT(A) lacked jurisdiction to remand issues to the Assessing Officer as the original order was not passed under section 144 (ex-parte assessment). It clarified that the newly inserted proviso to section 251(1)(a) only permits remand for orders framed under section 144. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s remand order for the specified sub-grounds and directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) held that the CIT(A) lacked the jurisdiction to remand issues for fresh adjudication to the AO because the original order was passed under Section 201, not ex-parte under Section 144 of the Income Tax Act. The tribunal noted that the Finance Act 2024, effective from 01/10/2024, explicitly restricts the first appellate authority's power to remand only to cases where the assessment order was framed ex-parte under Section 144. Consequently, the CIT(A)'s remand of sub-grounds (c), (d), and (e) of ground number 2 was beyond jurisdiction and was set aside. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for de-novo adjudication of these specific sub-grounds.

The Tribunal held that the First Appellate Authority (CIT(A)) lacks jurisdiction to remand an issue for fresh adjudication to the Assessing Officer if the original order was not passed under Section 144 of the Act. The CIT(A)'s remand of sub-grounds (c), (d), and (e) of ground 2 for de-novo verification was deemed beyond jurisdiction and in contravention of Section 251(1)(a). The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s remand for these specific sub-grounds and directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) lacked the jurisdiction to remand issues for fresh adjudication where the original order was not passed ex-parte under Section 144 of the Act. The proviso to Section 251(1)(a), effective from 01/10/2024, restricts the power to remand only to orders framed u/s 144. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s remand of sub-grounds (c), (d), and (e) of ground number 2, directing the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo in accordance with law.

The tribunal held that the CIT(A) lacked jurisdiction to remand any issue for fresh adjudication to the AO when the original order challenged in appeal was passed under section 201 and not an ex-parte assessment order made under section 144 of the Act. Citing section 251(1)(a) (both prior to and after the Finance Act 2024 amendment), the tribunal clarified that remand power is restricted to orders framed u/s 144. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s action of remanding sub-grounds (c), (d), and (e) for de-novo verification was set aside, and the CIT(A) was directed to adjudicate those sub-grounds de-novo. The tribunal emphasized that appellate authorities must act within statutory provisions.

The Tribunal held that the first appellate authority (CIT(A)) lacked the statutory power to remand any issue for fresh verification to the Assessing Officer if the original order was not passed ex-parte u/s 144 of the Act. The power to remand for de-novo assessment, as introduced by the Finance Act 2024 (effective 01/10/2024), is strictly limited to cases where the assessment order appealed against was framed ex-parte u/s 144. Consequently, the CIT(A)'s impugned action of remanding sub-grounds (c), (d), & (e) of ground 2 was set aside, and the CIT(A) was directed to adjudicate them de-novo in accordance with law.

The ITAT held that the CIT(A) lacked the power to remand issues to the Assessing Officer when the original order was passed under Section 201 and not ex-parte under Section 144 of the Act. As per Section 251(1)(a) (as amended by Finance Act 2024), the power to remand is strictly limited to orders framed ex-parte under Section 144. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s direction to remand sub-grounds (c), (d), and (e) of ground number 2 was beyond its jurisdiction and set aside, with a directive for the CIT(A) to adjudicate these sub-grounds de-novo.

The Tribunal ruled that the CIT(A) lacked the jurisdiction to remand issues for fresh adjudication to the Assessing Officer (AO) because the original orders were passed u/s 201, not ex-parte u/s 144. It clarified that the power to remand, specifically under the proviso to section 251(1)(a) introduced by Finance Act 2024, is applicable only to orders framed u/s 144. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s remand of sub-grounds 2(c), (d), and (e) and directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo.

The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) lacked jurisdiction to remand issues back to the Assessing Officer for de-novo verification when the original order was not passed ex-parte under Section 144 of the Act. Citing judicial precedents, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s remand for sub-grounds (c), (d), and (e) of ground 2, directing the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo. The appeals by both the Revenue and the assessee were partly allowed for statistical purposes.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) ruled that the CIT(A) lacked the jurisdiction to remand issues for fresh adjudication to the Assessing Officer, as the original assessment orders were not framed ex-parte under Section 144 of the Act. The ITAT emphasized that the power to remand, introduced by the Finance Act 2024 (effective October 1, 2024), is strictly limited to orders passed ex-parte under Section 144. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s action of remanding sub-grounds (c), (d), and (e) of ground number 2 was beyond its statutory powers and contrary to Section 251 of the Act. The ITAT set aside the remand and directed the CIT(A) to de-novo adjudicate these sub-grounds.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) held that the CIT(A) acted beyond its jurisdiction in remanding issues for fresh adjudication to the Assessing Officer (AO), as the original order was passed under section 201 and not ex-parte under section 144 of the Act. The ITAT emphasized that prior to October 1, 2024, Section 251(1)(a) did not permit such remands, and the subsequent amendment allowing remands is specific to orders passed under Section 144. Therefore, the ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s remand order and directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate the remanded sub-grounds de-novo.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) held that the First Appellate Authority (CIT(A)) lacked the jurisdiction to remand issues to the AO for fresh adjudication if the original order was not passed ex-parte under Section 144 of the Act. The ITAT found the CIT(A)'s remand of specific sub-grounds (c), (d), & (e) of ground 2 to be in contravention of Section 251(1)(a) and Section 250(6) and thus vacated the remand. The Tribunal directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate these sub-grounds de-novo in accordance with the law.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) lacked jurisdiction to remand issues for fresh adjudication to the AO if the original order was not passed ex-parte under Section 144 of the Act, citing Section 251(1)(a). It noted that the CIT(A)'s partial remand of interconnected sub-grounds was incongruent with legal provisions and judicial precedents. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s remand for specific sub-grounds and directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo.

The ITAT ruled that the CIT(A) exceeded its jurisdiction by remanding issues to the Assessing Officer, as the original orders were not framed ex-parte under Section 144 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Citing Section 251(1)(a) and its amendment (effective 01/10/2024), the Tribunal clarified that remand powers are restricted to cases where the assessment order was passed ex-parte under Section 144. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s remand of the specific sub-grounds (c), (d), and (e) and directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) held that the CIT(A) acted beyond its jurisdiction by remanding issues to the Assessing Officer (AO) for fresh verification, as the original assessment order was not passed ex-parte under section 144 of the Act. The ITAT clarified that, particularly after the amendment to section 251(1)(a) effective from 01/10/2024, the first appellate authority's power to remand is restricted to cases where the assessment order was framed under section 144. Consequently, the ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s remand order for the specified sub-grounds and directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) lacked jurisdiction to remand any issue back to the assessing officer for fresh verification when the original assessment order was passed otherwise than under section 144 of the Income Tax Act. Referencing the legislative intent clarified by the Finance Act 2024's proviso to section 251(1)(a), which permits remand only for ex-parte orders under section 144, the Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s remand action invalid. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the remand directions and ordered the CIT(A) to adjudicate the remanded sub-grounds de-novo in accordance with the law.

The ITAT held that the CIT(A) lacked jurisdiction to remand issues for fresh adjudication to the Assessing Officer when the original assessment order was not passed ex-parte under section 144 of the Act. This power, as per the Finance Act 2024 amendment to section 251(1)(a) effective 01/10/2024, is strictly limited to ex-parte assessment cases. Consequently, the ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s remand of specific sub-grounds, directing the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo in accordance with the law.

The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) lacked jurisdiction to remand issues to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication when the original order was passed under Section 201 and not ex-parte under Section 144 of the Income Tax Act. The provisions of Section 251(1)(a), including amendments effective 01/10/2024, restrict the appellate authority's power to remand only to orders framed under Section 144. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s action of remanding sub-grounds 2(c), (d), & (e) was beyond jurisdiction and in contravention of Section 251, necessitating these sub-grounds to be adjudicated de-novo by the CIT(A).

The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) lacked jurisdiction to remand issues to the Assessing Officer (AO) for fresh adjudication because the original orders were passed under section 201 of the Act, not ex-parte under section 144. Referencing the amended section 251(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, which restricts remand powers to ex-parte orders, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s remand of sub-grounds (c), (d), and (e) and directed the CIT(A) to adjudicate them de-novo.