1,109 orders · Page 5 of 23
The Tribunal upheld the validity of the reassessment proceedings. However, it found that the CIT(A) had not adjudicated all the grounds of appeal related to the merits of the addition. Therefore, the issues on merits were restored to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that alleged on-money could only be considered in the assessee's hands for shops owned by them or where independent evidence proved their funding. For other shops, the investment had to be examined in the hands of the real liable person. The addition based on WhatsApp chats was confirmed as the assessee failed to reconcile it with disclosed turnover.
The Tribunal held that alleged on-money could only be considered in the assessee's hands for shops owned by them or where independent evidence proved their funding. For other shops, the investment had to be examined in the hands of the real liable person. The addition based on WhatsApp chats was confirmed as the assessee failed to reconcile it with disclosed turnover.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) should have provided an adequate opportunity to the assessee to explain the delay before deciding the condonation application. The impugned orders were set aside for lack of sufficient opportunity.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment orders were bad in law because the AO failed to follow the mandatory procedure under Section 148A of the Act, as well as the directions of the Supreme Court in the Ashish Agarwal case. For later assessment years, it was also found that the AO failed to obtain prior approval from the appropriate authority as required by Section 151.
The Tribunal held that alleged on-money could only be considered in the assessee's hands for shops owned by them or where independent evidence proved their funding. For other shops, the investment had to be examined in the hands of the real liable person. The addition based on WhatsApp chats was confirmed as the assessee failed to reconcile it with disclosed turnover.
The Tribunal held that interest received by the assessee under Section 244A of the Act is taxable under Article 11 of the India-Singapore DTAA, not as business profits attributable to the PE. The Tribunal relied on the ratio laid down in Clough Engineering Ltd. and affirmed by the Bombay High Court in DIT (Intl Tax) vs. Credit Agricole Indosuez and DHL Operations B.V. The assessee is entitled to the treaty rate of tax prescribed under Article 11(2)(b), and the AO is directed to recompute the tax liability accordingly. This ground raised by the assessee is allowed. Regarding the levy of surcharge and education cess, the Tribunal agreed with the Kolkata Tribunal's decision in DIC Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd. v. ADIT that surcharge and education cess cannot be levied over and above the rate prescribed under Article 11 of the DTAA, as it would exceed the contractual limit. However, this principle does not extend to cases where the DTAA Article (like Article 7) only allocates taxing rights and provides a basis for profit determination without prescribing a rate. In such cases, the Income-tax Act, including surcharge and cess, applies unless the Treaty expressly states otherwise. The AO is directed to apply tax rates as per this principle. This ground raised by the revenue is partly allowed. The appeals filed by the assessee and the revenue for all years are partly allowed.
The Tribunal restored the issue of unexplained cash deposits to the AO for fresh examination, allowing the assessee an opportunity to furnish corroborative evidence for the opening cash balance. The addition related to Section 54 was deleted by the CIT(A) and not challenged further.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were invalid due to defects in the notice and satisfaction note, and the lack of independent corroborative evidence. The Tribunal found that the jurisdictional requirements for initiating reassessment were not met.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 18.25 crores to Neelkanth Cities Pvt. Ltd. was unjustified as it represented repayment of earlier loans, supported by bank statements. For other lenders, the Assessing Officer failed to make necessary inquiries. Therefore, the additions made under Section 69 were deleted.
The Tribunal held that since the reassessment proceedings were initiated based on information from a search and seizure action, the assessment should have been done under Section 153C, not Section 147. Therefore, the notice under Section 148 and the subsequent assessment order were without jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its primary onus by providing documentary evidence for the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions. The repayment of the loan and share application money through banking channels before assessment proceedings were strong evidence of genuineness.
The Tribunal noted that the property was jointly purchased and the investment was allegedly made by the husband from a bank loan. Due to the assessee's non-representation before lower authorities, these facts were not examined. The Tribunal set aside the lower authority's order and restored the issue for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the Ld. CIT(A). Since the assessee failed to present any evidence or explanations to rebut the findings, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the lower authority's decision.
The Tribunal held that interest received by the assessee under Section 244A of the Act is taxable under Article 11 of the India-Singapore DTAA, not as business profits attributable to the PE. The Tribunal relied on the ratio laid down in Clough Engineering Ltd. and affirmed by the Bombay High Court in DIT (Intl Tax) vs. Credit Agricole Indosuez and DHL Operations B.V. The assessee is entitled to the treaty rate of tax prescribed under Article 11(2)(b), and the AO is directed to recompute the tax liability accordingly. This ground raised by the assessee is allowed. Regarding the levy of surcharge and education cess, the Tribunal agreed with the Kolkata Tribunal's decision in DIC Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd. v. ADIT that surcharge and education cess cannot be levied over and above the rate prescribed under Article 11 of the DTAA, as it would exceed the contractual limit. However, this principle does not extend to cases where the DTAA Article (like Article 7) only allocates taxing rights and provides a basis for profit determination without prescribing a rate. In such cases, the Income-tax Act, including surcharge and cess, applies unless the Treaty expressly states otherwise. The AO is directed to apply tax rates as per this principle. This ground raised by the revenue is partly allowed. The appeals filed by the assessee and the revenue for all years are partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that interest received by the assessee under Section 244A of the Act is taxable under Article 11 of the India-Singapore DTAA, not as business profits attributable to the PE. The Tribunal relied on the ratio laid down in Clough Engineering Ltd. and affirmed by the Bombay High Court in DIT (Intl Tax) vs. Credit Agricole Indosuez and DHL Operations B.V. The assessee is entitled to the treaty rate of tax prescribed under Article 11(2)(b), and the AO is directed to recompute the tax liability accordingly. This ground raised by the assessee is allowed. Regarding the levy of surcharge and education cess, the Tribunal agreed with the Kolkata Tribunal's decision in DIC Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd. v. ADIT that surcharge and education cess cannot be levied over and above the rate prescribed under Article 11 of the DTAA, as it would exceed the contractual limit. However, this principle does not extend to cases where the DTAA Article (like Article 7) only allocates taxing rights and provides a basis for profit determination without prescribing a rate. In such cases, the Income-tax Act, including surcharge and cess, applies unless the Treaty expressly states otherwise. The AO is directed to apply tax rates as per this principle. This ground raised by the revenue is partly allowed. The appeals filed by the assessee and the revenue for all years are partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the notice under section 148, issued on 24.04.2022 for AY 2015-16, was invalid and barred by limitation as per the Supreme Court's decision in Rajeev Bansal. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the benefit of Sections 11 and 12 of the Act for the assessment year under consideration, as registration was granted during the pendency of appellate proceedings. The case was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh assessment.
The Tribunal permitted the assessee to withdraw the appeals as the grievance was redressed. The legal issue regarding CIT(A)'s jurisdiction to enhance assessment beyond Section 143(1) was kept open.
The Tribunal held that the entire amount of disputed purchases could not be added, and only the profit element embedded therein was taxable. Following a co-ordinate bench decision, the addition was restricted to 10% of the disputed purchases.
The Tribunal noted that the AO's estimation of income was ad hoc and lacked specific evidence, similar to a previous assessment year. The Tribunal restored the issue to the AO for fresh adjudication, directing him to examine evidence and determine if the assessee was an accommodation entry provider.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to restore the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal found no merit in the assessee's challenge to the reopening proceedings and agreed that a fresh examination of factual issues was necessary due to the ex-parte assessment.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus under Section 68 by providing documentary evidence of identity, genuineness, and creditworthiness of the lenders. The revenue failed to provide any adverse material to disprove the transactions.
The Tribunal noted that the AO's estimation of income was ad hoc and lacked specific evidence, similar to a previous assessment year. The Tribunal restored the issue to the AO for fresh adjudication, directing him to examine evidence and determine if the assessee was an accommodation entry provider.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment orders were bad in law because the AO failed to follow the mandatory procedure under Section 148A of the Act, as well as the directions of the Supreme Court in the Ashish Agarwal case. For later assessment years, it was also found that the AO failed to obtain prior approval from the appropriate authority as required by Section 151.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's submission that the rectification issue was linked to the pending appeal against the original assessment order. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter to the CIT(A) to be decided along with the pending appeal.
The Tribunal held that Section 43CA is not applicable to transactions involving rights in properties under construction, as it applies to the transfer of completed land or building. The addition made by the Assessing Officer was directed to be deleted.
The Tribunal held that the Assessee had prima facie discharged the onus of substantiating purchases by providing documentary evidence. The addition was made solely on information from the GST Department without independent material to disprove the purchases.
The Tribunal held that the issue is settled by the Supreme Court in Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. The admission of an SLP in another case does not dilute the binding precedent of Checkmate Services. Therefore, the disallowance under section 36(1)(va) is confirmed.
The Tribunal held that interest received by the assessee under Section 244A of the Act is taxable under Article 11 of the India-Singapore DTAA, not as business profits attributable to the PE. The Tribunal relied on the ratio laid down in Clough Engineering Ltd. and affirmed by the Bombay High Court in DIT (Intl Tax) vs. Credit Agricole Indosuez and DHL Operations B.V. The assessee is entitled to the treaty rate of tax prescribed under Article 11(2)(b), and the AO is directed to recompute the tax liability accordingly. This ground raised by the assessee is allowed. Regarding the levy of surcharge and education cess, the Tribunal agreed with the Kolkata Tribunal's decision in DIC Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd. v. ADIT that surcharge and education cess cannot be levied over and above the rate prescribed under Article 11 of the DTAA, as it would exceed the contractual limit. However, this principle does not extend to cases where the DTAA Article (like Article 7) only allocates taxing rights and provides a basis for profit determination without prescribing a rate. In such cases, the Income-tax Act, including surcharge and cess, applies unless the Treaty expressly states otherwise. The AO is directed to apply tax rates as per this principle. This ground raised by the revenue is partly allowed. The appeals filed by the assessee and the revenue for all years are partly allowed.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeals. The assessee's cross-objection for AY 2015-16 was partly allowed, and the cross-objection for AY 2018-19 was dismissed as not pressed.
The ITAT held that the rejection of a condonation application under Section 119(2)(b) does not preclude appellate authorities from examining the substantive claim on merits. The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing Form 9A, considering it was the first year of electronic filing and the delay was not deliberate.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee had inadvertently failed to furnish the prior registration certificate and has now produced it, the matter should be reconsidered by the CIT(Exemptions). The rejection of the 80G application was consequential to the 12AB rejection, thus it also needs to be re-examined.
The Tribunal noted that the AO's estimation of income was ad hoc and lacked specific evidence, similar to a previous assessment year. The Tribunal restored the issue to the AO for fresh adjudication, directing him to examine evidence and determine if the assessee was an accommodation entry provider.
The Tribunal noted that the AO's estimation of income was ad hoc and lacked specific evidence, similar to a previous assessment year. The Tribunal restored the issue to the AO for fresh adjudication, directing him to examine evidence and determine if the assessee was an accommodation entry provider.
The Tribunal held that the amendment by the Finance Act, 2022, which clarified the position on disallowance even without exempt income, is prospective. Therefore, for the assessment year 2017-18, the disallowance was not sustainable if no exempt income was earned.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the addition. The AO's own remand report confirmed that the assessee had substantiated the purchases with proper documentation and banking transactions, negating the initial allegation of bogus purchases.
The Tribunal observed that the appellate order was passed ex parte due to the assessee's non-appearance. Considering the principles of natural justice and the documents produced by the assessee, the Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. This was done to provide the assessee with an opportunity to present its case due to reasons beyond its control for non-compliance.
The Tribunal held that once an appellate authority declines to condone delay, it cannot adjudicate the appeal on merits. However, since a subsequent appeal on the same assessment order was already sub-judice, the present appeal was dismissed as infructuous.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, following its own previous decisions for earlier assessment years where the issue was decided against the assessee. However, it directed that any favorable decision from the High Court or Supreme Court on the pending issue should be followed for the current year.
The Tribunal held that the first appellate authority should have considered the delay more sympathetically, given the cause and the astronomical quantum of additions. The Tribunal set aside the orders and restored the quantum appeal and penalty appeals to the file of the first appellate authority for de novo adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the first appellate authority should have considered the delay more sympathetically, given the cause and the astronomical quantum of additions. The Tribunal set aside the orders and restored the quantum appeal and penalty appeals to the file of the first appellate authority for de novo adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the first appellate authority should have considered the delay more sympathetically, given the cause and the astronomical quantum of additions. The Tribunal set aside the orders and restored the quantum appeal and penalty appeals to the file of the first appellate authority for de novo adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s orders were against statutory provisions as they lacked the power to set aside penalty appeals to the AO. Therefore, the appeals were restored back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the sanction for issuing the notice under Section 148 was granted by an incompetent authority, rendering the reassessment proceedings void ab initio.
The Tribunal held that the assessee bank could not be treated as an assessee in default for non-deduction of tax at source because it was bound by the interim order of the Madras High Court. The subsequent settlement of the substantive issue by the Supreme Court does not alter the position during the period of the binding interim order.
The Tribunal held that the assessee bank could not be treated as an assessee in default for non-deduction of tax at source because it was bound by the interim order of the Madras High Court. The subsequent settlement of the substantive issue by the Supreme Court does not alter the position during the period of the binding interim order.
The Tribunal held that the assessee bank could not be treated as an assessee in default for non-deduction of tax at source because it was bound by the interim order of the Madras High Court. The subsequent settlement of the substantive issue by the Supreme Court does not alter the position during the period of the binding interim order.
The Tribunal upheld the deletion of the addition by the CIT(A), finding that the AO relied solely on an investigation report without independent inquiry and that the assessee had provided sufficient documentary evidence. The fact that the money was refunded and accepted in a subsequent assessment also supported the assessee's case.