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328 orders · Page 3 of 7
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was invalid due to a lack of application of mind by the approving authority. The Tribunal noted that the wording of the approval for AY 2015-16 was identical across all assessment years under appeal. Crucially, the Tribunal reproduced the approval letter which stated, 'Approval is hereby accorded u/s 153D of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to the draft assessment order in the following case, on the basis of the detailed discussion held with you time to time, information available on record, facts mentioned in the Appraisal Report and relevant seized documents perused by you & brought to the notice of undersigned.' However, the Tribunal found that the approving authority had not perused any seized document/material, as evidenced by the assessee's submission and the content of paragraph 2 of the approval itself, which listed the assessee's income without detailing any specific seized material or discussion. The Tribunal concluded that this mechanical approval, lacking independent consideration, vitiated the assessment orders. Therefore, the assessment orders were quashed on this ground alone. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had demonstrated before it that it possessed a valid Registration Certificate for the year under consideration, having been registered under Section 12AB since 2002, and that its renewal had been granted vide a certificate dated 24.09.2021 for AY 2022-23 to 2026-27. In light of these facts and documentary evidence, the Tribunal deemed it expedient to restore the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer (AO) for considering the material evidence that would be submitted or had been submitted by the assessee. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and restored the matter to the AO to decide it afresh. The assessee was directed to present its case before the AO within 60 days from the date of the order. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal did not decide on the merits of the additions made by the AO, as the matter was restored for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as evidenced by the identical wording of proposals and approvals across years and entities. Consequently, the assessment orders were vitiated.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was invalid as it was mechanical, lacking application of mind, and not specific to each assessment year. The approving authority failed to demonstrate perusal of seized documents or independent consideration of the case.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was vitiated due to non-application of mind, as evidenced by the identical wording of the proposal and approval across assessment years and entities. This mechanical approval fails to meet the statutory requirement of independent verification.
The Tribunal held that the approval obtained under Section 153D was invalid as it was a common approval for multiple assessment years, granted mechanically without due application of mind. This vitiates the entire assessment.
The Tribunal observed that additions cannot be made solely on the basis of retracted statements. The CIT(A) had correctly deleted additions where suppliers provided supporting documents and filed returns, but confirmed additions where suppliers did not respond or file returns.
The Tribunal noted that it was an admitted fact that despite opportunities granted by the Ld. CIT(A), the assessee did not file submissions, leading to an ex-parte dismissal of the appeal by the Ld. CIT(A). The Tribunal found that the appeal should have been decided on merits as per Section 250 of the Act. Since the appeal was decided ex-parte without giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard, the Tribunal, considering the totality of facts and in the interest of justice, restored the issue to the file of the Ld. CIT(A). The Ld. CIT(A) was directed to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its claim and decide the issue on facts and law. The assessee was also directed to appear before the Ld. CIT(A) and cooperate. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had provided substantial documentary evidence to prove the identity, genuineness, and creditworthiness of the lender. The AO and CIT(A) had not fully appreciated this evidence.
The Tribunal set aside the lower authorities' orders and remitted the issues back to the Assessing Officer. The assessee is directed to provide all necessary documents and cooperate with the AO for a fresh decision.
The Tribunal deleted the disallowance on power and fuel expenses, noting that the income from power charges received from tenants exceeded the expenditure. Similarly, the disallowance on repair and maintenance expenses was deleted as the expenses were incurred against common area maintenance charges received, which were treated as business income.
The Tribunal deleted the disallowance on power and fuel expenses, noting that the income from power charges received from tenants exceeded the expenditure. Similarly, the disallowance on repair and maintenance expenses was deleted as the expenses were incurred against common area maintenance charges received, which were treated as business income.
The Tribunal deleted the disallowance on power and fuel expenses, noting that the income from power charges received from tenants exceeded the expenditure. Similarly, the disallowance on repair and maintenance expenses was deleted as the expenses were incurred against common area maintenance charges received, which were treated as business income.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal of the Revenue. The Tribunal noted that the Revenue's primary contention was that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nestlé SA & Others (Civil Appeal No. 1420 of 2023) had reversed the decision of the Hon'ble High Court relied upon by the CIT(A). The Supreme Court had categorically held that the benefit of the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) clause is not available in the absence of a specific notification, thereby settling that the applicable rate of tax on dividend payments under Article 10 of the India-Netherlands DTAA is 10%. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee had not controverted these facts and had, in compliance with the Supreme Court's judgment, suo motu deposited the differential tax and filed revised TDS returns. Therefore, in view of the settled legal position established by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the demand raised by CPC-TDS. The Tribunal clarified that the assessee's application for waiver of interest was not impacted by this order.
The Tribunal held that the impugned order of the Ld. CIT(A) was passed ex-parte without hearing the assessee and did not decide all grounds on merits. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh decision.
The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D was granted mechanically without due application of mind, thus vitiating the assessment order. Following its own previous decisions in similar cases for the assessee, the Tribunal quashed the assessment order.
The Tribunal restored the issue to the NFAC/CIT(A) for one final opportunity for the assessee to be heard and substantiate its claim, considering the totality of facts and circumstances and in the interest of justice.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 was invalid and bad in law because no valid sanction under Section 151 was obtained by the Assessing Officer. Consequently, the other grounds became academic.
The Tribunal held that since the assessee had declared cash sales in its books of account, which were not rejected by the lower authorities, the cash deposits during the demonetization period should be considered as arising from these declared cash sales. Therefore, no addition could be made on this account.
The Tribunal, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India vs. Rajeev Bansal, held that the reassessment notice issued under Section 148 on 29-07-2022 was time-barred as the extended due date was 13-06-2022. It further noted that approval for reassessment after three years was not obtained from the correct competent authority as required by Section 151(ii). Consequently, the reassessment order was quashed.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not file submissions before the lower authorities despite opportunities, leading to an ex-parte assessment by the AO and dismissal of the appeal by the NFAC for non-prosecution. However, considering that the NFAC dismissed the appeal without hearing the assessee and the AO completed the assessment ex-parte, the Tribunal, in the interest of justice, decided to restore the issue to the file of the AO. The AO was directed to grant one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its claim and decide the issue based on facts and law. The assessee was also directed to appear before the AO and cooperate in the proceedings. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes. No specific finding was made on the merits of the disallowance of cash deposits or the procedural fairness of the notice serving, as the matter was remanded.
The Tribunal held that when a case is reopened on specific reasons, the Assessing Officer cannot make additions on entirely different grounds. Since the addition was made on the issue of sham share transactions, which was not the basis for reopening, the reassessment was held to be invalid. The Tribunal allowed the appeal based on this legal ground.
The Tribunal noted that in a similar succeeding year, the AO accepted the assessee's business activities and only considered commission income. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the matter was restored to the AO for a de novo assessment to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the penalty proceedings under Section 271D, read with Section 269SS, were wrongly invoked by the AO and upheld by the CIT(A). The Tribunal observed that Section 269SS deals with loans or deposits and not the receipt of sale consideration in cash for immovable property.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal as unadmitted. Recognizing that the assessee has presented additional evidence, the Tribunal restored the matter to the AO for a fresh denovo reassessment on merits after proper inquiry and scrutiny.
The Tribunal noted that the additions made by the AO against the assessee had been deleted by the NFAC. Since the original additions were deleted, the appeal against the deletion order was not maintainable, and therefore liable to be dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the requirement of filing Form 10CCB is procedural and directory, not mandatory. Relying on judicial precedents, the Tribunal decided that belated filing of Form 10CCB, if done before the completion of assessment, does not disentitle the assessee from claiming the deduction. The order of CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the property was acquired in FY 2009-10, as payments were made during that financial year, and the allotment letter was issued by DLF on 09.12.2009 after all payments were accounted for. Therefore, indexation on the cost of acquisition, including brokerage, must be allowed from FY 2009-10, irrespective of the sale deed registration date in the subsequent financial year. The Tribunal directed the AO to allow indexation on the entire cost of acquisition from FY 2009-10. Regarding brokerage, the Tribunal directed its allowance as deduction, citing evidence of payment to the broker through banking channels. The Tribunal did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The tribunal held that the approval granted by the JCIT under Section 153D was mechanical and without application of mind, violating the mandatory requirements of the Act. Consequently, the assessment order was vitiated.
The Tribunal held that the impugned assessment order was invalid as it was passed without following the directions of the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP). Consequently, the assessment order was quashed, and the issues on merits were kept open.
The Tribunal held that filing Form 10B after the due date is a procedural requirement and not mandatory, and that the delay can be condoned. Therefore, the assessee is entitled to exemption under Section 11.
The Tribunal held that filing Form 10B after the due date is a procedural requirement and not mandatory, and that the delay can be condoned. Therefore, the assessee is entitled to exemption under Section 11.
The ITAT condoned the 614-day delay in filing the appeal before it, emphasizing the principle of condoning delay for substantial justice. It directed the CIT(A) to condone the initial three-month delay and decide the First Appeal on merits, providing an opportunity of hearing to the legal heirs.
The Tribunal noted that a co-ordinate bench had previously remanded a similar issue to the AO. Following the principle of consistency, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the AO to decide the controversy regarding the issuance of the notice under Section 143(2) and the assumption of jurisdiction.
The Tribunal noted that the international transaction exceeded Rs. 5 crores and was not referred to the TPO. Following the Supreme Court's decision in SG Asia Holdings (India) Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal set aside the issue to the AO to refer the matter to the TPO for determining the ALP.
The tribunal held that the approval granted by the JCIT under Section 153D was mechanical and without application of mind, violating the mandatory requirements of the Act. Consequently, the assessment order was vitiated.
The Tribunal held that a procedural defect like belatedly filing Form 67 should not extinguish the substantive right to claim FTC. The delay of 9 days was condoned, and the matter was restored to the AO for verification and allowance of the FTC.
The Tribunal noted that the NFAC had dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds without addressing the merits of the case. In the interest of justice, the matter was restored to the NFAC to provide the assessee with a final opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal restored the issue of additions made in the intimation u/s 143(1) to the AO for de novo adjudication. It directed the AO to verify the facts regarding the capital loss and rectify the mistake apparent from the record. The Tribunal also remitted the issue of notional interest to the AO for verification to avoid double taxation.
The Tribunal held that the cancellation of registration under Section 12A by the CIT(E) was not sustainable. The Tribunal found that the assessee's activities, including organizing medical conferences, workshops, and seminars, were aimed at the advancement of medical science and the dissemination of knowledge, which are recognized as charitable purposes. The Tribunal noted that while members might benefit from these activities, the predominant intention and effect were to advance the charitable objects of the association. The Tribunal distinguished between activities that are exclusively for the benefit of members and those where the benefit to members is incidental to the larger charitable purpose. The ratio decidendi is that an organization's activities will be considered charitable if their primary purpose is charitable, even if members derive incidental benefits. The registration under Section 12A was restored.
The Tribunal held that the issue requires re-examination by the Assessing Officer to determine the eligibility of the assessee under Section 10(23C) or Section 11 of the Act.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment notice issued under Section 148 on 05/04/2021 for AY 2015-16 was time-barred. Relying on Supreme Court judgments in Rajeev Bansal and Deepak Steel, it was affirmed that the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act (TOLA) does not extend the limitation period for this assessment year, a point conceded by the Revenue. Consequently, the reassessment order and the CIT(A)'s order were quashed.
The Tribunal noted that after some arguments, the appellant's counsel sought permission to withdraw the appeals. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's contention that the CIT(E) acted improperly by rejecting the 80G application based solely on the 12A rejection, without independent review or natural justice. The Tribunal noted a similar previous order regarding the 12A application.
The Tribunal noted that a co-ordinate bench had previously remanded a similar issue to the AO. Following the principle of consistency, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the AO to decide the controversy regarding the issuance of the notice under Section 143(2) and the assumption of jurisdiction.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not participate in the proceedings before the Ld. CIT(A) and the appeal was dismissed without deciding on merits. Relying on documents not submitted earlier, the Tribunal decided to remand the matter to the Ld. CIT(A) in the interest of natural justice.
The Tribunal noted that a co-ordinate bench had previously remanded a similar issue to the AO. Following the principle of consistency, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the AO to decide the controversy regarding the issuance of the notice under Section 143(2) and the assumption of jurisdiction.
The Tribunal deleted the disallowance under Section 14A as the assessee had no exempt income. It also held that Section 14A disallowances cannot be added to book profits under Section 115JB. Certain computational errors in the assessment order were remitted back to the AO for rectification.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, citing bonafide reasons and peculiar circumstances. The matter was restored to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration on merits, providing the assessee with an opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the PCIT cannot invoke revisionary powers under Section 263 merely because more inquiries could have been conducted or the assessment order was not elaborate. The PCIT must demonstrate a failure to conduct critical inquiries that 'should have been done' and were not.