Loading ITAT cases…
328 orders · Page 1 of 7
The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Additional Commissioner under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as a single approval was given for multiple assessment years without specific consideration. Consequently, the assessment orders were vitiated.
The Tribunal held that it could entertain pure legal grounds that go to the root of the matter and admitted the additional grounds. The Tribunal found that the prescribed authority failed to grant a proper approval under section 148B of the Act, vitiating the assessments. Furthermore, for AYs 2021-22 and 2022-23, the assessments ought to have been framed under section 148 r.w.s 147, not 143(3), following a search. Relief was also granted regarding unexplained investment in property and cash addition by allowing telescoping benefit.
The Tribunal noted that two appeals were filed by the assessee for the same matter, one physically and one electronically. Considering the assessee's request to withdraw the duplicate electronic appeal and the absence of objection from the Revenue, the Tribunal accepted the withdrawal.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Addl. CIT under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as it was a common approval for multiple assessment years. Consequently, the assessment orders were vitiated.
The Tribunal held that the right to collect toll is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation at 25%. The provision for resurfacing expenses was not allowed as it was not a certain liability. Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was deleted as disallowance of a claim does not automatically attract penalty.
The Tribunal held that the lower authorities wrongly sustained the addition of Rs. 9,60,000 as commission income. The Tribunal found that the assessee's bank account was used for providing accommodation entries and the credit entries remained unexplained. Therefore, the addition made by the AO was upheld.
The tribunal held that the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time before the Learned CITA. Therefore, the tribunal directed the Learned CITA to condone the delay, admit the appeal, and decide the issues afresh.
The Tribunal found that the NFAC dismissed the appeal without hearing the assessee. Considering the interest of justice, the Tribunal restored the issue to the NFAC, granting one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate his claims and directing the assessee to cooperate with the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(E) should have provided the assessee with adequate opportunity to explain its case, adhering to the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside.
The Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(E) did not consider the assessee's submissions before rejecting the applications. Therefore, to uphold the principles of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the orders and remanded the matters for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Addl. CIT under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as it was a common approval for multiple assessment years. Consequently, the assessment orders were vitiated.
The Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(E) did not consider the assessee's submissions before rejecting the applications. Therefore, to uphold the principles of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the orders and remanded the matters for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the right to collect toll is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation at 25%. The provision for resurfacing expenses was not allowed as it was not a certain liability. Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was deleted as disallowance of a claim does not automatically attract penalty.
The tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was invalid because the approval was obtained from the wrong authority (PCIT instead of PCCIT, as it was beyond 3 years). The Delhi High Court's decisions in Kids Dream International Pvt. Ltd. and H and M Hennes and Mauritz Retail P Ltd. were relied upon.
The Tribunal held that the right to collect toll is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation at 25%. The provision for resurfacing expenses was not allowed as it was not a certain liability. Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was deleted as disallowance of a claim does not automatically attract penalty.
The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D was granted mechanically and without application of mind, vitiating the entire assessment proceedings. Following its own precedent and High Court decisions, the Tribunal quashed the assessment order.
The Tribunal held that the AO must clearly specify the exact limb (concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income) at the stage of initiating penalty proceedings. The AO's failure to do so renders the penalty order invalid.
The Tribunal held that the penalty in dispute would not survive as the coordinate bench of the ITAT had already deleted the quantum addition. Therefore, the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the penalty.
The Tribunal held that the tax effect in the appeal was below the monetary limit prescribed by the CBDT for filing appeals by the revenue. Therefore, the appeal was not maintainable. The Tribunal noted that section 115BBE, which enhanced the tax rate to 60%, was not applicable to transactions prior to April 1, 2017.
The Tribunal noted that two appeals were filed for the same matter. Considering the assessee's request for withdrawal of the electronically filed appeal due to duplication and the absence of objection from the Revenue, the Tribunal allowed the withdrawal.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Addl. CIT under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as it was a common approval for multiple assessment years. Consequently, the assessment orders were vitiated.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(E) should have provided the assessee with adequate opportunity to explain its case, adhering to the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside.
The Tribunal held that it could entertain pure legal grounds that go to the root of the matter and admitted the additional grounds. The Tribunal found that the prescribed authority failed to grant a proper approval under section 148B of the Act, vitiating the assessments. Furthermore, for AYs 2021-22 and 2022-23, the assessments ought to have been framed under section 148 r.w.s 147, not 143(3), following a search. Relief was also granted regarding unexplained investment in property and cash addition by allowing telescoping benefit.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Addl. CIT under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as it was a common approval for multiple assessment years. Consequently, the assessment orders were vitiated.
The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Addl. CIT under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as it was a common approval for multiple assessment years. Consequently, the assessment orders were vitiated.
The Tribunal held that it could entertain pure legal grounds that go to the root of the matter and admitted the additional grounds. The Tribunal found that the prescribed authority failed to grant a proper approval under section 148B of the Act, vitiating the assessments. Furthermore, for AYs 2021-22 and 2022-23, the assessments ought to have been framed under section 148 r.w.s 147, not 143(3), following a search. Relief was also granted regarding unexplained investment in property and cash addition by allowing telescoping benefit.
The Tribunal held that the right to collect toll is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation at 25%. The provision for resurfacing expenses was not allowed as it was not a certain liability. Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was deleted as disallowance of a claim does not automatically attract penalty.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding that the assessee had provided sufficient documentary evidence to establish the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the loan and cash deposits. The Tribunal also agreed with the deletion of the share premium addition as the relevant notification was not applicable.
The Tribunal held that it could entertain pure legal grounds that go to the root of the matter and admitted the additional grounds. The Tribunal found that the prescribed authority failed to grant a proper approval under section 148B of the Act, vitiating the assessments. Furthermore, for AYs 2021-22 and 2022-23, the assessments ought to have been framed under section 148 r.w.s 147, not 143(3), following a search. Relief was also granted regarding unexplained investment in property and cash addition by allowing telescoping benefit.
The Tribunal held that the AO failed to specify whether the penalty was for 'under-reporting' or 'misreporting' of income, and did not provide reasons or specific clauses under section 270A(9) to justify the higher penalty for misreporting. Therefore, the penalty proceedings were considered vague and unsustainable.
The Tribunal held that the approval under Section 153D was granted mechanically and without application of mind, vitiating the entire assessment proceedings. Following its own precedent and High Court decisions, the Tribunal quashed the assessment order.
The Tribunal held that the lower authorities wrongly sustained the addition of Rs. 9,60,000 as commission income. The Tribunal found that the assessee's bank account was used for providing accommodation entries and the credit entries remained unexplained. Therefore, the addition made by the AO was upheld.
The Tribunal held that the approval for reopening the assessment under Section 151 was granted mechanically and without due application of mind by the competent authority, as evidenced by the perfunctory nature of the approval and discrepancies in the figures presented. Additionally, the notice under Section 148 was issued by an officer without the proper jurisdiction.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging the assessee's cause for prevention. It was held that both the lower authorities' orders were passed ex-parte, and in the interest of justice, the appeal was restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the benefit of Article 13(5) of the India-UAE DTAA, and the capital gains arising from the sale of mutual funds are not taxable in India. The reasoning followed the decision of a coordinate bench in the assessee's own case for AY 2021-22. The Tribunal emphasized that the expression 'liable to tax' in a DTAA refers to residence-based tax jurisdiction and not necessarily the actual payment of tax. Citing the Supreme Court's judgment in UOI vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan and commentary on Double Taxation Conventions, the Tribunal concluded that a tax treaty prevents not only current but also potential double taxation. Therefore, irrespective of whether the UAE actually levies taxes on such income, if the UAE has the right to tax UAE residents by reason of domicile, residence, etc., the assessee is considered 'liable to tax' in the UAE for treaty purposes. The benefit of the treaty is available even if the assessee is not actually taxable in the other contracting state. The capital gains were therefore deleted from the assessed income. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal allowed Ground No. 2, holding that the TPO/AO was not justified in rejecting Yatra Online Ltd. as a comparable. The Tribunal noted that Yatra Online Ltd. incurred losses in FY 2018-19 and FY 2020-21 but earned profits in FY 2019-20, thus not meeting the criteria of persistent loss for consecutive years. The case laws relied upon by the revenue were distinguished as they involved companies with losses for three or more consecutive years. The Tribunal directed the AO/TPO to include Yatra Online Ltd. as a suitable comparable. Ground No. 3 was dismissed as not pressed. Regarding Ground No. 4, the Tribunal directed the AO/TPO to grant working capital adjustment as directed by the DRP, noting that the assessee had furnished the necessary details and that the AO/TPO could seek further information if required. This ground was allowed for statistical purposes. For Ground No. 5, concerning the computation of operating margins, the AO/TPO was directed to look into the assessee's contentions and pass appropriate orders, and the ground was allowed for statistical purposes. For Ground No. 6, regarding the disallowance of business expenditure, the AO was directed to examine the assessee's submissions and furnished details and pass an order in accordance with law. The appeal was partly allowed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the benefit of Article 13(5) of the India-UAE DTAA, and the capital gains arising from the sale of mutual funds are not taxable in India. The reasoning followed the decision of a coordinate bench in the assessee's own case for AY 2021-22. The Tribunal emphasized that the expression 'liable to tax' in a DTAA refers to residence-based tax jurisdiction and not necessarily the actual payment of tax. Citing the Supreme Court's judgment in UOI vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan and commentary on Double Taxation Conventions, the Tribunal concluded that a tax treaty prevents not only current but also potential double taxation. Therefore, irrespective of whether the UAE actually levies taxes on such income, if the UAE has the right to tax UAE residents by reason of domicile, residence, etc., the assessee is considered 'liable to tax' in the UAE for treaty purposes. The benefit of the treaty is available even if the assessee is not actually taxable in the other contracting state. The capital gains were therefore deleted from the assessed income. The appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal held that the addition of Rs. 14,34,95,445/- on account of unexplained investment in foreign currency is not justified. The assessee had adequately explained the source of funds as the maturity of an FCNR deposit made in FY 2013-14. Since the source of the deposit was from FY 2013-14, treating the maturity proceeds in the current year as unexplained investment under section 69 was incorrect. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete this addition. Regarding the addition of Rs. 2,69,000/- for cash deposits, the Tribunal found that the assessee had provided a plausible explanation supported by sworn affidavits from her parents and parents-in-law, stating that cash gifts of Rs. 50,000/- each were given on the occasion of her daughter's birth. The AO rejected this explanation without issuing notices under section 131 to the donors or conducting further verification. The Tribunal held that the AO was not justified in rejecting the explanation without further enquiry and directed the deletion of this addition as well. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had satisfactorily explained the sources of funds invested in the purchase of immovable property. The Tribunal noted that the assessee furnished requisite evidence demonstrating that a loan was taken from Bank of America in the USA, and an amount equivalent to USD 1,10,000/- was received in the assessee's Indian account on 05.01.2016. This amount, along with the opening balance in the account, was utilized for the payment of consideration of Rs. 1,88,95,500/- (including registration charges) towards the property purchase. The Tribunal found these facts evident from the chart and supporting documents placed on record. Consequently, the addition of Rs. 1,81,00,000/- under section 69 was deleted. Regarding the addition of Rs. 784/- on account of interest income from the NRE account, the Tribunal held that this income is exempt under section 10(4)(ii) of the Act. Therefore, no addition was called for, and this amount was also deleted. As the appeal was allowed on merits, the legal grounds raised by the assessee were rendered academic and not adjudicated upon. The operative direction was the deletion of the additions.
The Tribunal held that the notice u/s 148 issued on 16.04.2023 was beyond the prescribed time limit of 31.03.2023 for AY 2016-17. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajeev Bansal (supra). The Court in Rajeev Bansal had clarified that the first proviso to Section 149(1)(b) prevents the issuance of a notice under Section 148 of the new regime at any time for an assessment year beginning on or before 1st April 2021, if such notice could not have been issued under the old regime's time limits. The Tribunal noted that the period of limitation for AY 2016-17 under the old regime expired on 31.03.2023. Since the notice was issued on 16.04.2023, it was beyond this date. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were quashed. As the proceedings were quashed, the remaining grounds of appeal, including the additions on account of unexplained investments and the levy of interest and penalty, were rendered academic and not adjudicated upon. The operative direction was to quash the notice and the consequent assessment.
The Tribunal noted that the appeals of the assessee were dismissed ex-parte by the Ld. CIT(A). In the interest of justice, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore the matters to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The assessee was directed to be vigilant and make requisite compliance before the Ld. CIT(A) to enable adjudication on merits. The Tribunal did not decide the substantive issues regarding the additions made under Section 69A or the charging of interest under Sections 234A and 234B. The finding on each issue was that the matter required fresh consideration by the lower appellate authority. The ratio decidendi is that ex-parte orders by appellate authorities should be set aside in the interest of justice to allow for a decision on merits, provided the assessee co-operates subsequently. The operative direction was to remand the appeals to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that all the issues were legacy issues covered by the decisions of co-ordinate benches in earlier assessment years. Regarding technical handling income, the Tribunal, following its earlier orders, held that the income from technical handling services is not taxable in India as it is covered under Article 8(2) read with Article 8(1) of the India-France DTAA. The Tribunal noted that the Indian branch office is merely a branch of the foreign company engaged in international air traffic operations, and there was no permanent establishment in India. The addition of Rs. 1,74,06,325/- was deleted. Concerning interest income on FDRs, the Tribunal respectfully followed the decision of co-ordinate benches which held that such interest income is covered under Article 8(3) of the DTAA and thus not taxable. The addition of Rs. 578/- was deleted. On commission income, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, following the order of a co-ordinate bench which held that commission earned by the assessee is directly connected to the operation of aircraft in international traffic and is therefore exempt under Article 8(1) read with Article 8(4) of the India-France DTAA. The addition of Rs. 18,73,269/- was deleted. However, regarding collection charges, the Tribunal upheld the addition of Rs. 3,99,544/-. Following a co-ordinate bench decision, it was held that these charges have no connection with the assessee's business of operating aircraft in international traffic, as they represent an incentive for timely payment to airports, not directly linked to international operations. Therefore, they are not exempt under Article 8 of the DTAA.
The Tribunal noted that the appeals of the assessee were dismissed ex-parte by the Ld. CIT(A). In the interest of justice, the Tribunal deemed it appropriate to restore the matters to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits. The assessee was directed to be vigilant and make requisite compliance before the Ld. CIT(A) to enable adjudication on merits. The Tribunal did not decide the substantive issues regarding the additions made under Section 69A or the charging of interest under Sections 234A and 234B. The finding on each issue was that the matter required fresh consideration by the lower appellate authority. The ratio decidendi is that ex-parte orders by appellate authorities should be set aside in the interest of justice to allow for a decision on merits, provided the assessee co-operates subsequently. The operative direction was to remand the appeals to the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that all the issues were legacy issues covered by the decisions of co-ordinate benches in earlier assessment years. Regarding technical handling income, the Tribunal, following its earlier orders, held that the income from technical handling services is not taxable in India as it is covered under Article 8(2) read with Article 8(1) of the India-France DTAA. The Tribunal noted that the Indian branch office is merely a branch of the foreign company engaged in international air traffic operations, and there was no permanent establishment in India. The addition of Rs. 1,74,06,325/- was deleted. Concerning interest income on FDRs, the Tribunal respectfully followed the decision of co-ordinate benches which held that such interest income is covered under Article 8(3) of the DTAA and thus not taxable. The addition of Rs. 578/- was deleted. On commission income, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, following the order of a co-ordinate bench which held that commission earned by the assessee is directly connected to the operation of aircraft in international traffic and is therefore exempt under Article 8(1) read with Article 8(4) of the India-France DTAA. The addition of Rs. 18,73,269/- was deleted. However, regarding collection charges, the Tribunal upheld the addition of Rs. 3,99,544/-. Following a co-ordinate bench decision, it was held that these charges have no connection with the assessee's business of operating aircraft in international traffic, as they represent an incentive for timely payment to airports, not directly linked to international operations. Therefore, they are not exempt under Article 8 of the DTAA.
The Tribunal held that the issue is squarely covered by the decisions of co-ordinate benches for earlier assessment years (2012-13 to 2018-19), which had held that remittances made by the assessee to its foreign subsidiaries were not taxable in India. Consequently, there is no obligation on the assessee to deduct tax at source under Section 195 of the Act. This proposition is settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of GE India Technology India Ltd. vs. CIT. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had allowed relief to the assessee by deleting the demand raised by the AO. The Tribunal further observed that in the earlier co-ordinate bench decisions, it was held that payments made by the assessee to foreign AEs for onsite software services could not be construed as FTS, as the services were utilized for business carried on outside India and for earning income from a source outside India, falling under the exception in Section 9(1)(vii)(b). The Tribunal also noted that the taxability under DTAA was rendered academic as the receipts were held not taxable under the Act, and receipts towards Infrastructure Services were also not chargeable to tax in India. Accordingly, the levy of interest under Section 201(1)/201(1A) by the AO was deleted. The appeals of the Revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the issue is squarely covered by the decisions of co-ordinate benches for earlier assessment years (2012-13 to 2018-19), which had held that remittances made by the assessee to its foreign subsidiaries were not taxable in India. Consequently, there is no obligation on the assessee to deduct tax at source under Section 195 of the Act. This proposition is settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of GE India Technology India Ltd. vs. CIT. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had allowed relief to the assessee by deleting the demand raised by the AO. The Tribunal further observed that in the earlier co-ordinate bench decisions, it was held that payments made by the assessee to foreign AEs for onsite software services could not be construed as FTS, as the services were utilized for business carried on outside India and for earning income from a source outside India, falling under the exception in Section 9(1)(vii)(b). The Tribunal also noted that the taxability under DTAA was rendered academic as the receipts were held not taxable under the Act, and receipts towards Infrastructure Services were also not chargeable to tax in India. Accordingly, the levy of interest under Section 201(1)/201(1A) by the AO was deleted. The appeals of the Revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the Delivery Order (DO) charges are not taxable in India. Following the decisions of co-ordinate benches in identical cases for Assessment Years 2021-22 (ITA No. 3776/Del/2023) and 2022-23 (ITA No. 942/Del/2025), the Tribunal found that the facts and circumstances were the same. The reasoning adopted by the co-ordinate benches, which was respectfully followed, was that the DO charges are not includible in the profits of the assessee airline from the operation of aircraft in international traffic, and therefore, not taxable in India as per Article 8 of the India-Turkey DTAA. The Tribunal noted that Article 8(2)(b) of the DTAA covers 'other activity directly connected with such transportation', and the DO charges were considered not to fall within this scope or the primary definition of profits from operation of aircraft in international traffic. Consequently, the addition made by the AO in respect of the delivery charges of Rs. 12,21,76,345 was deleted. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that Section 68 of the Act mandates that unexplained funds should be considered in the year they are credited to the books of account. Since the Rs. 80 lakh was credited on 01.04.1996, the addition for AY 1997-98 was valid.
The Tribunal held that IPO expenses for an aborted IPO are revenue expenditure allowable under Section 37(1). It also held that gains from foreign exchange and excess provisions are derived from the EOU unit and eligible for Section 10B deduction. The disallowance under Section 14A was limited to the extent of exempt income, and losses on forward contracts were considered normal business losses (hedging) and not speculative. The appeals filed by the assessee were allowed, while the appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) had rightly deleted the addition related to product development expenses, finding no merit in the revenue's appeals on this issue. Regarding the disallowance under Section 14A, the Tribunal followed the decision in Joint Investment (P) Ltd. v. CIT and its own prior ruling for AY 2008-09, holding that the disallowance cannot exceed the exempt income earned. Therefore, the disallowance under Section 14A was limited to the extent of exempt income. For the issue of losses on forward contracts, the Tribunal relied on a coordinate bench's decision for AY 2013-14 and decisions of the Delhi High Court in PCIT vs. Simon India Ltd and Bechtel India Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT. It was held that these losses were incurred in the course of business to hedge against foreign exchange fluctuation risks and were therefore normal business losses, not speculation losses, and were correctly deleted by the CIT(A). The Tribunal did not explicitly address the assessee's grounds regarding IPO expenses and Section 10B deduction, but the overall dismissal of revenue's appeals implies these were decided in favour of the assessee.