ITAT Delhi Judgments — March 2026

The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) failed to consider the submissions made by the assessee before rejecting the applications. Therefore, in the interest of natural justice, the orders were set aside for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging the assessee's cause for prevention. It was held that both the lower authorities' orders were passed ex-parte, and in the interest of justice, the appeal was restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(E) should have provided the assessee with adequate opportunity to explain its case, adhering to the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the impugned orders were set aside.

The Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(E) did not consider the assessee's submissions before rejecting the applications. Therefore, to uphold the principles of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the orders and remanded the matters for fresh adjudication.

The tribunal held that the reopening of assessment was invalid because the approval was obtained from the wrong authority (PCIT instead of PCCIT, as it was beyond 3 years). The Delhi High Court's decisions in Kids Dream International Pvt. Ltd. and H and M Hennes and Mauritz Retail P Ltd. were relied upon.

The tribunal held that the assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time before the Learned CITA. Therefore, the tribunal directed the Learned CITA to condone the delay, admit the appeal, and decide the issues afresh.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Additional CIT under section 153D was mechanical and lacked proper application of mind, as a single approval was given for multiple assessment years without due diligence. Relying on various judicial precedents, the Tribunal quashed the assessment orders.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Additional CIT for multiple assessment years in a single letter was mechanical and lacked application of mind, thus vitiating the assessment orders. The Tribunal relied on the decisions of the Delhi High Court and coordinate benches that stated approval must be granted for each assessment year independently.

The Tribunal held that the Commissioner ought to have provided adequate opportunity to the assessee to present its case. Therefore, the orders of the Commissioner were set aside on the grounds of natural justice.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked the necessary application of mind. The use of ambiguous phrases like 'as amended' in the approval letter, coupled with the approving authority's reliance on the assessee's certification regarding electronic evidence without independent verification, indicated a non-application of mind. The Tribunal also noted the lack of proper reporting and adherence to the Digital Evidence Investigation Manual.

The Tribunal found that the NFAC dismissed the appeal without hearing the assessee. Considering the interest of justice, the Tribunal restored the issue to the NFAC, granting one final opportunity to the assessee to substantiate his claims and directing the assessee to cooperate with the Assessing Officer.

The Tribunal held that the penalty in dispute would not survive as the coordinate bench of the ITAT had already deleted the quantum addition. Therefore, the CIT(A) was justified in deleting the penalty.

The Tribunal held that the 'right to collect toll' is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation at 25%, following a Special Bench decision. It also upheld the AO's disallowance of provision for resurfacing expenses as it was not based on a scientific method and was contingent. Depreciation on carriageways was disallowed as it was considered a 'building' eligible for 10% depreciation.

The Tribunal held that the right to collect toll is an intangible asset eligible for 25% depreciation, following a Special Bench decision. However, it upheld the disallowance of the provision for resurfacing expenses as it was not based on a scientific and rational method. The claim of depreciation on capitalized negative grants for carriageways was also dismissed as it was not an ascertained liability. The penalty levied under Section 271(1)(c) was deleted.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Additional CIT under section 153D was mechanical and granted for multiple assessment years in a single order, without proper application of mind. This was found to be contrary to the judicial precedents and the High Court rulings which emphasize independent application of mind for each assessment year.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax under section 153D was mechanical, lacking independent application of mind. It was granted for multiple assessment years in a single letter, which is contrary to the requirement of approving for 'each assessment year' independently.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the JCIT under section 153D was mechanical and vitiated the assessment proceedings. The Tribunal found that the approval letter, which used ambiguous phrases like 'as amended' and merely relied on the AO's certification of electronic evidence without independent verification, indicated a lack of application of mind. The Tribunal also noted the AO's failure to comply with the CBDT's Digital Evidence Investigation Manual.

The tribunal held that the right to collect toll is an intangible asset eligible for 25% depreciation, following a Special Bench decision. However, a subsidy received for project cost had to be reduced from the asset's cost, impacting depreciation. The provision for resurfacing expenses was disallowed as it was not based on a scientific method and was a contingent liability. Depreciation on capitalized negative grant for carriageways was also disallowed as it was not an ascertained liability.

The tribunal held that the 'right to collect toll' is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation at 25%, following a Special Bench decision. However, the subsidy received from NHAI, meant to meet capital costs, was correctly reduced from the project cost as per Section 43(1) Explanation 10, impacting depreciation. The provision for resurfacing expenses was disallowed as it was not an ascertained liability and was calculated without a scientific basis, not meeting the criteria for a contingent liability under AS-29.

The Tribunal held that the AO failed to specify whether the penalty was for 'under-reporting' or 'misreporting' of income, and did not provide reasons or specific clauses under section 270A(9) to justify the higher penalty for misreporting. Therefore, the penalty proceedings were considered vague and unsustainable.

The Tribunal held that the tax effect in the appeal was below the monetary limit prescribed by the CBDT for filing appeals by the revenue. Therefore, the appeal was not maintainable. The Tribunal noted that section 115BBE, which enhanced the tax rate to 60%, was not applicable to transactions prior to April 1, 2017.

The tribunal held that the approval for reopening the assessment under section 151 was granted mechanically and without proper application of mind by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT). Additionally, the notice under section 148 was issued by an officer without proper jurisdiction, violating CBDT instructions. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were vitiated.

The Tribunal noted that two appeals were filed for the same matter. Considering the assessee's request for withdrawal of the electronically filed appeal due to duplication and the absence of objection from the Revenue, the Tribunal allowed the withdrawal.

The Tribunal noted that two appeals were filed by the assessee for the same matter, one physically and one electronically. Considering the assessee's request to withdraw the duplicate electronic appeal and the absence of objection from the Revenue, the Tribunal accepted the withdrawal.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted by the Addl. CIT under section 153D of the Act was mechanical and lacked proper application of mind, as it was a single approval for multiple assessment years. Following precedents, the Tribunal quashed the assessment orders.

The tribunal held that the approval granted by the Additional CIT under section 153D was mechanical and omnibus, lacking application of mind for each assessment year. Therefore, the assessment orders were vitiated.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus by providing sufficient documentary evidence for the loan from the sister concern, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transaction. The addition on share premium was deleted as the valuation report from a Chartered Accountant was valid for the book value method. The cash deposits were also found to be sufficiently explained by prior cash withdrawals.

The Tribunal held that mere presumptions and suspicions cannot lead to addition under section 69A. While the CIT(A) sustained Rs. 9,60,000 as commission income, the Tribunal found that the assessee's account was used for accommodation entries and credit entries remained unexplained. Thus, the addition made by the AO was upheld.

The Tribunal held that the revenue's objection to admitting additional grounds was not valid, as pure legal grounds going to the root of the matter can be entertained. It found that the prescribed authority failed to grant a proper approval under section 148B, vitiating the assessments. Further, for AYs 2021-22 and 2022-23, assessments ought to have been under section 148 r.w.s 147 due to the search conducted.

The Tribunal admitted the additional grounds, holding that pure legal grounds can be raised before it, especially when they go to the root of the matter and all facts are on record. It was held that the assessments were vitiated due to the failure of the prescribed authority to grant a proper approval under section 148B of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Furthermore, for AYs 2021-22 and 2022-23, assessments should have been under section 148 r.w.s 147 post-search. The Tribunal also granted relief on unexplained investment and directed the AO to grant telescoping benefit for cash addition.

The Tribunal held that additional grounds challenging the validity of assessment and reassessment proceedings on purely legal grounds can be admitted. It was found that the prescribed authority failed to grant a proper approval under section 148B, vitiating the entire assessment. Furthermore, for the relevant assessment years, assessments ought to have been framed under section 148 r.w.s 147 following the search.

The Tribunal held that it could entertain pure legal grounds that go to the root of the matter and admitted the additional grounds. The Tribunal found that the prescribed authority failed to grant a proper approval under section 148B of the Act, vitiating the assessments. Furthermore, for AYs 2021-22 and 2022-23, the assessments ought to have been framed under section 148 r.w.s 147, not 143(3), following a search. Relief was also granted regarding unexplained investment in property and cash addition by allowing telescoping benefit.

The Tribunal held that the lower authorities wrongly sustained the addition of Rs. 9,60,000 as commission income. The Tribunal found that the assessee's bank account was used for providing accommodation entries and the credit entries remained unexplained. Therefore, the addition made by the AO was upheld.

The Tribunal held that the AO must clearly specify the exact limb (concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars of income) at the stage of initiating penalty proceedings. The AO's failure to do so renders the penalty order invalid.

The Tribunal held that additions based solely on retracted statements without corroboration are not sustainable. For certain disputed purchases where suppliers did not comply with notices, a lump-sum disallowance of 5% of the disputed amount was considered just and proper. The addition for unexplained money was confirmed as rightly deleted by the CIT(A).

The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D of the Act was mechanical and lacked independent application of mind by the approving authority. This vitiated the assessment orders, rendering them non-est and a nullity.

The Tribunal found that additions cannot be made merely on the basis of statements, especially when retracted and supported by documentary evidence. The CIT(A) correctly deleted additions where parties responded and filed necessary documents, but confirmed additions where parties failed to comply. The deletion of the Section 69A addition was also upheld.

The Tribunal held that the approval granted under Section 153D was mechanical and lacked application of mind, as evidenced by its identical wording across years and the approving authority's failure to peruse seized documents. Consequently, the assessment orders were quashed.

The Tribunal noted that the CBDT had revised the monetary limit for filing appeals to Rs.60 lakhs. Since the amount in this case was below this revised limit, the appeal was deemed not maintainable.

The Tribunal held that IPO expenses incurred for an aborted IPO are revenue expenditure. It also held that income from foreign exchange differences and excess provisions written back are derived from the EOU unit and eligible for deduction u/s 10B. The disallowance under section 14A was held to be limited to the extent of exempt income. Losses on forward contracts were considered normal business losses, not speculative.

The Tribunal held that IPO expenses for an aborted IPO are revenue expenditure. It allowed deduction u/s 10B for foreign exchange differences as they were derived from the EOU unit's business. The disallowance under section 14A was held to be limited to the extent of exempt income. Forward contract losses were considered normal business losses and not speculative.

The Tribunal held that expenses incurred for an aborted Initial Public Offering (IPO) constitute revenue expenditure. Furthermore, income derived from foreign exchange fluctuations and excess provisions was considered to be derived from the eligible industrial undertaking, thus qualifying for deduction under Section 10B. Losses arising from forward contracts were determined to be business losses, not speculative losses as defined under Section 43(5).

The tribunal held that additions solely based on retracted statements without corroboration are unsustainable, and that the CIT(A) correctly deleted the addition on ticket sales due to lack of evidence. For remaining disallowed purchases, a 5% lump sum disallowance was deemed appropriate.

The Tribunal held that the AO erred in rejecting the DCF valuation report without providing an alternative valuation or demonstrating why the adopted method was incorrect. The commercial wisdom of the investors, who are reputable businessmen, investing in the startup was not to be questioned by the revenue.

The Tribunal held that additions cannot be made solely on retracted statements without corroboration. It also observed that the supplier's failure to respond to notices under Section 133(6) does not automatically justify an adverse inference against the assessee, especially when the assessee provides supporting documentation.

The Tribunal held that additions cannot be made solely on retracted statements without corroborative evidence, especially when the assessee provides a complete documentary chain for purchases. While a majority of the purchase disallowances were deleted, a 5% disallowance was maintained on the remaining disputed purchases where suppliers did not fully comply. The Section 69A addition was deleted.

The Tribunal held that Section 68 of the Act mandates that unexplained funds should be considered in the year they are credited to the books of account. Since the Rs. 80 lakh was credited on 01.04.1996, the addition for AY 1997-98 was valid.

The Tribunal held that additions cannot be made solely on the basis of retracted statements, especially when the assessee provides documentary evidence. For suppliers who did not respond to notices or file returns, a lump-sum disallowance of 5% of the remaining disputed purchases was deemed appropriate as a just and proper measure.

The Tribunal held that the unsecured loans were bogus accommodation entries and the repayment of such loans did not make the transaction genuine. The Tribunal upheld the addition made by the AO under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The Tribunal found that the approval granted under Section 153D was a mechanical exercise, lacking independent application of mind by the approving authority. This was evident from the repetitive wording across years and entities, and the failure to independently peruse seized material, rendering the assessment orders invalid.