DCM SHRIRAM LIMITED,DELHI vs. ASSESSMENT UNIT, DELHI
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, DELHI BENCH ‘I’: NEW DELHI
Before: SHRI CHALLA NAGEMDRA PRASAD & SHRI S. RIFAUR RAHMAN
PER S. RIFAUR RAHMAN, AM
This appeal has been filed by the assessee against the final assessment order dated 24.10.2024 passed u/s 143(3) r.w.s.144C (13) of the Income Tax Act,
1961 (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) subsequent to the directions of the Ld. Dispute
Resolution Panel (DRP)/TPO for Assessment Year 2021-22. 2
Brief facts of the case are that the assessee is a public limited company engaged in the business of manufacturing and trading of chemical, PVC Resins, PVC compounds, UPVC Windows & Door Systems, Cement, Sugar, Fertilizers, seeds, textile yarn, power generation etc. The return of income was filed on 14.03.2022, declaring total income at INR 45,98,71,750/- after claiming deduction under section 80IA of the Act in respect of power generation units. The company has declared book profit u/s 115JB at INR 8,82,86,58,376/- and paid MAT on book profits. The case of the assessee was taken up for scrutiny and a reference under section 92CA of the Act was made to the TPO for determination of ALP in respect of international transactions and specified domestic transactions. Several transfer pricing adjustment as well non-transfer pricing additions were made in the final assessment order, which are agitated by the appellant before us in the following grounds of appeal. “1. That the National Faceless Assessment Centre ("NaFAC")/Ld. Assessing Officer ("AO") has erred in law and on facts and in the circumstances of the assessee's case in making the following additions/ adjustments / disallowances in its final assessment order passed under section 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act'): - a) 2,38,02,26,886/- on account of various additions/disallowances made in intimation under section 143(1)(a) of the Act dated 3
10.2022 which are also in contradiction to the directions of ld. DRP; b) 29,45,91,940/- on account of various transfer pricing adjustments proposed by Id. TPO and upheld by the Id. DRP, c) ₹5,44,84,880/-on account of corporate tax issue upheld by the Id. DRP. d) In considering incorrect amount of capital gains at 77,71,953/- against the capital loss reported by assessee in its ITR at 4,09,10,680/- 2. That the final assessment order passed by the Id. AO under section 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) of the Act dated 24th October, 2024 is bad in law. The adjustment/addition/ disallowances are on wholly illegal, unterable and on erroneous grounds. Income computed as per intimation u/s 143(1) of the Act is inaccurate and erroneous 3. That the Id. AO las erred in law and in facts and circumstances of the case in not rectifying the mistakes apparent from the records amounting 2,38,02,26,886/-, inspite of the specific directions of the Id. DRP vide para no. 4.2.2 of its directions with respect to additions/disallowance consisting of:- 3.1 Addition of ₹1,98,59,26,949/- being the deduction under section 80-1A of the Act claimed by the assessee in its income-tax return (ITR) duly supported by foms no. 10CCB e-filed before / along with the return of income.”
The above grounds of appeals are adjudicated hereinbelow.
Ground no 1 and 2: General Grounds
3. These were general and summarized version of specific grounds which are dealt along with the other specific grounds as below and hence are not adjudicated and dismissed as such.
4
Ground no 3: Income computed as per intimation u/s 143(1) of the Act is inaccurate and erroneous
The first issue pertains to additions/disallowances made to returned income of assessee in the intimation passed u/s 143(1) of the Act.
During the course of hearing, ld. AR stated that the above issue was also raised before the coordinate bench for AY 2021-22 (ITA No.1496/Del/2024), wherein the coordinate bench has restored the matter back to the file of assessing officer for de novo adjudication. Relevant extract of tribunal order dated 30.07.2025 (ITA No.1496/Del/2024) is reproduced below: “5. we find that the additions were made in the intimation u/s 143(1) of the Act by the ld. CPC without sufficient opportunity to the assessee. The rectification applications were preferred in this regard by the assessee which were not disposed of. Hence, the ld. DRP had directed the ld. AO to determine the final income after due disposal of rectification application of the assessee, which was not carried out by the ld. AO. Hence, in the interest of justice and fair play, we deem it fit and appropriate to restore this appeal against the additions made in the intimation u/s 143(1) of the Act to the file of the ld AO for de novo adjudication in accordance with law. Needless to mention that the assesse be given reasonable opportunity of being 5
heard. The assessee is at liberty to furnish fresh evidences, if any, in support of its contentions. Accordingly, grounds raised by the assessee are allowed for statistical purposes”.
In view of above, the ld. AR stated that since the issue has already been adjudicated by the Tribunal and restored back to the file of the assessing officer, the issue need not to be adjudicated again.
The ld. DR did not raise any contention on this issue and agreed with the submission of ld. AR.
Considered the rival submissions and material placed on record. It is seen that this issue has already been restored back to the file of assessing officer for de novo adjudication and assessee has not pressed this ground before us. Accordingly, ground of appeal No.3 raised by the assessee is accordingly, dismissed.
Ground no 4: Income and tax payable computed as per computation sheet forming part of final order u/s 143(3) of the Act is inaccurate and erroneous
6
The next issue raised by the assessee is that income and tax computed as per computation sheet forming part of final order u/s 143(3) of the Act is inaccurate and erroneous.
During the course of hearing, ld. AR stated that the assessing officer while computing the total income in the computation sheet attached with the final order inadvertently considered a long term capital gain amounting Rs. 77,71,953/- (P. no. 928 of PB), while in the income tax computation, the assessee had long term capital loss of Rs. 4,09,10,680/- (P. no. 88 of PB) and same was reported and carried forward in its ITR for the relevant year. The ld. AR also pointed out that the aforesaid carry forward of the long-term capital loss was duly accepted by the ld. CPC in the intimation issued u/s 143(1) of the Act dated 25.10.2022. To summarize its contentions, ld. AR relied upon the following table: -
Particulars
Income Tax
Return (ITR) AY
2021-22
Intimation u/s 143(3) dated
25.10.2022
Computatin sheet attached with final order dated
24.10.2024
7
Amount of Capital Gain during the year
Nil as there was a loss
(Pg. No. 88 of PB)
Nil as there was a loss
(Pg. No. 226 of PB)
77,71,953/-(Pg.
No. 928 of PB)
Long term capital loss
Carried forward for current year
4,09,10,680/-(Pg.
No. 88 of PB)
4,09,10,680/-(Pg.
No. 226 of PB)
Nil
(Pg. No. 928 of PB)
The ld. AR fairly submitted even though the mistake is apparent, the issue may still be remitted back to the assessing officer for factual verification assessee’s claim with reference to the materials on record and carry out necessary rectification.
Ld. DR also agreed for remitting back of the above issue to the assessing officer for verification.
Considered the rival submissions and the material available on record. It is seen that the intimation order u/s 143(1) clearly reflects the capital loss carried forward for the current year. Accordingly, we direct the AO to verify the facts on record and rectify the mistake apparent from record. Ground of appeal No.4 raised by the assessee is accordingly, allowed for statistical purposes. 8
Ground no 5: Transfer of Electricity from Eligible to Non-Eligible Units
– addition of Rs.28,00,16,724/-
12. Apropos the ground no.5 and its sub-grounds, the issue involved is the transfer pricing adjustment of Rs 28,00,16,724/- to the arm’s length price
(ALP) of the specified domestic transaction relating to transfer of electricity from eligible captive power unit to non-eligible units. Briefly stated the assessee owns various captive power plants for production of power and captive supply of such electricity generated therein to the other units. Such captive power units are eligible for deduction under section 80-IA of the Act.
The assessee in its transfer pricing study has benchmarked the prices charged for captive supply of electricity by applying internal CUP in the form of prices at which power was purchased from respective State Electricity Board. The TPO accepted the transaction of electricity at other eligible and non-eligible units such as Ajbapur, Uttar Pradesh be at ALP other than transactions between eligible and non-eligible units situated at Bharuch, Gujarat.
The TPO obtained information from the tariff order of the state electricity board (SEB) viz. DGVCL (Gujarat) to compute a rate without taking into effect of cross-subsidization cost. The TPO derived the rate of Rs.6.92 per unit 9
for Bharuch and proposed the adjustment for the difference at Rs.0.36 per unit
(TPO rate of Rs. 6.92 per unit and internal CUP as adopted by the assessee at Rs.7.28 per unit for Bharuch unit) aggregating to Rs.28,00,16,724/-. The DRP directed the assessing officer that if order of tribunal in assessee’s own case for AY 2014-15 has been accepted and not contested then such adjustment should be deleted, otherwise, it should be sustained.
During the course of hearing, Ld.AR for the assessee, Sh. Pradeep Dinodia pointed out that the issue is fully covered by the various judicial precedents in assessee’s own case. He drew our attention to the decision of Co-ordinate Bench of Tribunal in assessee’s own case for AY 2014-15 in ITA No.7362/Del/2018 where the Coordinate Bench vide order dated 28.10.2021 upheld the assessee’s benchmarking of transfer of electricity from eligible units to non-eligible units. The Tribunal has accepted the assessee’s benchmarking upholding the rate of power purchased from the respective State Electricity Boards which in the instant case is from Dakshin Gujarat Vij Company Limited (‘DGVCL’) at ALP.
Ld. AR further submitted that order of Co-ordinate Bench was confirmed by the Hon’ble Juri ictional High Court vide its order dated 21.01.2025 in ITA 10
No. 566 of 2023. Reliance was further placed on the judgement of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Jindal Steel and Power Limited reported in 460
ITR 162 (SC) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has defined the principle for determination of market value of goods and services for the purpose of deduction u/s 80IA of the Act. He also highlighted that the coordinate bench of Tribunal also accepted the identical issue various other years in AY 2015-
16 (ITA no 927/Del/2022), AY 2018-19 (ITA no 2587/Del/2022) and AY
2020-21 (ITA no 4328/Del/2024) vide consolidated order dated 30.06.2025
following the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Jindal Steel and Power Limited (supra) and Juri ictional High Court in assessee’s own case.
Thus, he submitted that since the addition in the instant year is based upon the identical facts of the case as in AY 2020-21, the addition w.r.t issue in hand shall be deleted.
The ld. DR on the other hand submitted that the facts w.r.t issue in hand are not identical with the previous years, thus the matter cannot be said as fully covered and need to be adjudicated afresh. He submitted that in the instance year the TPO has changed its approach from the earlier approach. He strongly contended that the TPO has used the tariff rates from annual tariff order issued 11
by the state electricity regulatory board and hence the same should be upheld as appropriate arm’s length rate in contrast to the assessee’s actual SEB price.
Ld. AR in rebuttal to the ld. DR’s submission stated that there is no change in the facts from earlier years, in as much as the assessee has been adopting same benchmarking approach of using SEB rates since inception. Moreover, as regard the change in TPO’s approach in the year under consideration, he submitted that TPO has adopted the same approach in the immediately preceding year viz. AY 2020-21 which has been reversed by the coordinate bench of this Tribunal while upholding the asssessee’s benchmarking approach which has been consistent since inception. The ld. AR filed the order passed by the TPO u/s 92CA of the Act and grounds of appeal filed AY 2020- 21 to establish that same approach similar to year under consideration has been adopted by the TPO in the immediately preceding year of adopting the tariff rate from annual tariff order of state electricity regulatory board. The ld. AR has further, submitted that Tribunal has in the immediately preceding year ie. AY 2020-21 has rejected the TPO approach and upheld the assessee’s approach vide order dated 30.06.2025 (ITA no 4328/Del/2024). The ld. AR also emphasised that TPO approach of adopting the tariff rate is also not in accordance with the law. He submitted that tariff rates give the general rates 12
which are prescribed by the tariff regulatory authority consisting of rate derived from the culmination of various categories viz. High tension, low tension consumers, industrial and agricultural users and hence such a blanket rate may not be adopted in the instant case where electricity is being used for industrial purposes. Further, TPO’s adoption of general tariff rate does not reflect the statutory prescription as contained in section 92C read with Rule
10C. Under the statutory provision, under the CUP method, the related party transactions are required to be compared with the unrelated third-party transaction. While as submitted, the tariff rates are generally prescribed rates rather than instance of actual transaction between unrelated parties under uncontrolled circumstances. Therefore, TPO is not justified under legal mandate to adopt such tariff rates without showing evidence of actual transaction based on such tariff order.
Ld. DR however, on a different note submitted that the order of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jindal Steel and Power case is not applicable to assessee’s case as the matter therein corresponds to AY 2001-02 i.e. before amendment of section 92BA. To substantiate his contention, he placed reliance on Para 33 of the order which read as under: - 13
“33. Before parting with this issue, we may mention that reliance placed by Mr. Rupesh Kumar, learned counsel for the revenue on the definition of the expression “market value” as defined in the explanation below sub-section (6) of Section 80 A of the Act is totally misplaced inasmuch as sub-section (6) was inserted in the statute with effect from 01.04.2009 whereas in the present case we are dealing with the assessment year 2001-2002 when this provision was note even borne.”
The ld. DR further submitted that even though the assessee’s comparable being internal CUP in the form of power purchased from the SEB was accepted by the coordinate bench of Tribunal in AY 2020-21, the basis for such acceptance was reliance on the judgment delivered for AY 2015-16 which in turn was based upon the ruling of Hon’ble ITAT in AY 2014-15. He stressed on the department’s approach in AY 2014-15 stating that tax department’s approach was different in those years as it took average of IEX rates with the assessee’s rates. The similar approach was used by the department in AY 2015-16 for making addition on this issue being averaging of IEX with asseessee’s rates, which was completely different from year under consideration and hence earlier tribunal order cannot be relied upon by the assessee.
Ld. DR also pointed out that the amendment in the explanation to section 80IA(8) of the act was made to expand the scope of the provision, which 14
provided that the market value for the purpose of section 80-IA shall be the Arm’s length price as defined in section 92F(ii) and the rulings of Hon’ble
Apex Court and Juri ictional High Court (supra) refers to the explanation pre amendment era.
The ld. AR in rebuttal submitted that Hon’ble Juri ictional High Court assessee’s case for AY 2014-15 (ITA no 566/2023) has dealt with the explanation to section 80-IA(8) in para 51 of the order on page no 510 and 514 of paper book and therefore, it is not correct to state that High Court has not dealt with the post amendment provisions of section 80-IA. Further, the High Court’s judgment in assessee’s case pertains to AY 2014-15 which is anyway the year post amendment made in 2012. 23. The ld. AR further contented that once the Hon’ble Apex Court along with Hon’ble Juri ictional High court and juri ictional Tribunal have held that in case of captive transfer of power, purchase price from SEBs is appropriate benchmark, then the revenue cannot go beyond this position. The aforesaid orders are binding on the tax authorities as well as on assessee. He further added that in case revenue has any issue with any of order of the appellate authorities, then they should have challenged the order rather than attempting 15
to disregard the binding precedent of Courts. He also highlighted that the assessee has been consistently applying SEB rates as Arms’ length price
(ALP) since AY 2013-14 (when Ts came into TP perspective) till date which has been accepted by the appellate authorities upto AY 2020-21, it is the tax department who is changing the benchmarking approach year on year.
Considered the rival submissions and material available on record. In the instant case, the assessee has produced electricity on various locations which were transferred for captive purposes from eligible units to non-eligible units. The TPO in its order passed under section 92CA has accepted all the transactions from eligible units to non-eligible units at arm length price except with regard to the electricity produced at Bharuch. The assessee has benchmarked the transfer of electricity at a price of INR 7.28 per KWH rate i.e. with reference to the rate at which the electricity was actually purchased from DGVCL in Gujarat region. The TPO on the other hand disregarded the assessee’s benchmark rate and instead obtained the rates from tariff orders tor eliminate effect of the cross subsidization effect which in our view is without any basis and contrary to the position taken by the Hon’ble High Court and Tribunal in assessee’s own case for various preceding years. It is noteworthy 16
that there is no change in the fact of the case as the assessee has been adopting same benchmarking approach year after year.
In the assessee’s own case for AY 2014-15 in ITA No.7362/Del/2018, the Co- ordinate Bench of the Tribunal has deleted the additions made on account of adjustment in the price and transfer of power between eligible units to non- eligible units by making following observations- “32. There is no doubt that the rates at which the SEBs supplies power to the assessee is an perfect external cup. Such rates are ₹ 8.35 per kilowatt. Rates of Indian energy exchange shown at Rs 2 .55 per kilowatt. If the rates of SEB compared with the rates of Indian energy exchange clearly shows that there is a wide disparity between the two rates. It is not in dispute that SEB in Rajasthan is supplying power to majority of the consumer using electricity. Therefore, much sanctity is attached to the rates adopted by SEBs. However, the learned transfer pricing officer has failed to show the reason of such a wide disparity between the rates of Indian energy exchange which is a spot exchange compared with the rates at which the energy is actually consumed in that geographical region. This does not mean that the quoted price cannot be used for the comparability analysis in cup method. But if the prices are so divergent and the difference between the two external cup becomes irreconcilable, the external cup price which is more reliable should be used. Therefore, in our view, IEX rates for these reasons cannot be said to be an external cup available for invoking the provisions of first proviso to Section 92C (2) of the act.
Further in case of the assessee for assessment year 2015 – 16 , external corporate of purchase price of power from SEB is used as a 17
comparable discarding the Indian energy exchange rate by the learned
CIT – A, and the same order has not been challenged before the higher forum, it becomes final. This shows that in the subsequent year the learned transfer pricing officer/assessing officer has accepted the methodology of benchmarking the transaction of transfer of power in Rajasthan from eligible unit to non eligible unit at the purchase price of power from SEB.
In view of the above facts we do not find any infirmity in the benchmarking analysis of the assessee wherein the assessee has considered rate of ₹ 6.30 per kilowatt against the rate of power purchase paid by the assessee to Jaipur Vidyiut Vitran Nigam Limited at the rate of ₹ 8.35 per kilowatt, using the external cup for comparability. Accordingly, the ground number 2 of the appeal of the assessee is allowed and the transfer pricing adjustment of ₹ 265,298,490/– is deleted.”
Further, the Hon’ble Juri ictional High Court in ITA No.566/2023 vide order dated 21.01.2025 upheld the tribunal order in assessee’s case. The observations of the Hon’ble High Court as contained in para 43 to 60 are reproduced as under- “43. In the present case, the question is to determine the market value or the ALP of power supplied by power plants established by the Assessee to its other units. Supplying of electricity is governed by the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and Electricity Act, 2003. The transmission of electricity is also governed by the Electricity Rules, 2005. 44. Thus, the market for supply of electricity is regulated. Thus, to apply the CUP method, it would be necessary to ascertain the comparable transactions that are similar in material aspects and there is no 18
difference between the transactions which has a bearing on the price of the power supplied.
45. The question whether the average IEX rate at which power is traded on IEX, is a comparable uncontrolled transaction, is required to be evaluated by determining whether there are any differences between the specified domestic transaction6 and the uncontrolled transaction of trade on the IEX.
46. The Assessee states - and the same is not controverted - that the availability of power on IEX is unpredictable and the supply of power is unreliable.
47. It is stated that in order for a party to purchase power from IEX, the said party has to participate in the bidding process. The same entails furnishing a bid in advance for supply of fifteen minutes slots.
Illustratively, it is stated that if a party requires power supply for a period of four hours, it would be required to submit sixteen bids for fifteen minutes slots. Further, the bidder cannot resile from the bids furnished by it in advance.
48. In view of the above, it is contended that power traded on IEX cannot be compared with the power supplied by a SEB.
49. It is not disputed that IEX is a platform, which is used by power producing units to sell surplus power for short term requirements. IEX is not a platform for sourcing continuous power for power consuming units. It is also pointed out that there is a high level of volatility in the IEX rates as it depends on immediate availability of surplus electricity.
50. It is also contended by the Assessee that the rates quoted on IEX are in respect of power supplied and not the power that is consumed and therefore, there is a material difference between the power that is purchased from IEX and the power which is supplied by the SEBs or power distribution companies. The said submission is also not controverted. The Assessee claims that it had on occasions purchased power from IEX.
51. We find considerable merit in the Assessee's contention that the transactions of sale and purchase of power on the IEX is not comparable to the regular supply of power by the SEB or the power distribution companies. Undisputedly, IEX is not a source for 19
uninterrupted power on the basis of which any power consumer can set up its unit. It is also not disputed that there is a wide fluctuation in the IEX rates. The Revenue has also not controverted the assertion that rates for power quoted on IEX are for power purchased and not for power consumed. Thus, if an entity bids for certain quantity of power on IEX and is successful, it is required to pay for the same. However, the electricity supplied by power distribution companies is charged on the basis of the power consumed, which is recorded in the metering devices.
52. It is also clear that the said material differences between the electricity supplied by SEBs or power distribution companies and those secured by bidding on IEX would have a significant bearing on the price of power.
53. As noted above, the CUP method is an appropriate method only in cases where there is sufficient degree of identity between the tested transactions and comparable uncontrolled transactions. The CUP method cannot be applied where there is significant dissimilarity between the comparable transactions and it is not feasible to determine an adjustment to eliminate the impact of the said differences on the prices of comparable transactions.
54. In the present case, the Assessee had supplied excess power to UPPCL in UP region at the rate of ₹4.39 per kWh. Thus, the said transaction was accepted by the learned DRP as well as the learned
ITAT as an internal uncontrolled transaction. The rate at which such electricity was supplied by the Assessee being ₹4.39 per kWh, was rightly accepted as an ALP.
55. As noted above, the learned ITAT also accepted the rates at which electricity was supplied by the SEBs/power distribution companies to the Assessee in Gujarat and Rajasthan regions as the said rates was considered as an external CUP.
56. Undoubtedly, there is a degree of similarity between the transaction of supply of electricity by SEBs to the Assessee and the supply of electricity by the Assessee's eligible units. However, there is a difference between the transactions being benchmarked, which is supply of electricity by captive units, and the transaction of supply of electricity
20
by distribution companies/corporations. The power distribution companies enjoy a near monopoly status. The tariff charged by such companies are regulated tariffs. However, we accept that there is a sufficient degree of similarity between the said transaction for reasonably determining the ALP by using the CUP method.
57. We also consider it apposite to refer to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Jindal Steel and Power Limited7. The principal issue involved in the said decision was the determination of market value of goods and services. In terms of Clause (i) of Explanation to Sub-section (8) of Section 80IA of the Act, the market value in relation to goods and services would mean the price that such goods or services would ordinarily fetch in the open market.
In the aforesaid context, the Supreme Court had considered the question of what would constitute an open market in the context of determining the market value of electricity supplied by captive power units of the assessee in that case. In that case, the assessee had entered into an agreement with the SEB of State of Madhya Pradesh to supply surplus electricity at the rate of ₹2.32 per unit. However, the Assessee had (2024) 460 ITR 162 computed the revenue from supply of electricity to its own unit at the rate of ₹3.72 per unit. It was the Assessee's case that the market value of the electricity was ₹3.72 per unit as that was the rate charged by the SEB for supply of electricity to industrial consumers including the Assessee. The learned ITAT had accepted the assessee's stand and had set aside the order passed by the CIT(A) rejecting the assessee's appeal in that regard. The High Court had also rejected the Revenue's appeal by referring to its earlier decision where the question of law had been answered against the Revenue and in favour of the Assessee.
58. The Revenue had approached the Supreme Court assailing the orders passed by the learned ITAT and the High Court. In the aforesaid context, the Supreme Court had held as under:
"23. This brings to the fore as to what do we mean by the expression "open market" which is not a defined expression.
21
Black's Law Dictionary, 10th Edition, defines the expression "open market" to mean a market in which any buyer or seller may trade and in which prices and product availability are determined by free competition. P. Ramanatha Aiyer's Advanced Law Lexicon has also defined the expression "open market" to mean a market in which goods are available to be bought and sold by anyone who cares to. Prices in an open market are determined by the laws of supply and demand. 25. Therefore, the expression "market value" in relation to any goods as defined by the Explanation below the proviso to sub- section (8) of section 80 IA would mean the price of such goods determined in an environment of free trade or competition. "Market value" is an expression which denotes the price of a good arrived at between a buyer and a seller in the open market i.e., where the transaction takes place in the normal course of trading. Such pricing is unfettered by any control or regulation; rather, it is determined by the economics of demand and supply. 26. Under the electricity regime in force, an industrial consumer could purchase electricity from the State Electricity Board or avail electricity produced by its own captive power generating unit. No other entity could supply electricity to any consumer. A private person could set up a power generating unit having restrictions on the use of power generated and at the same time, the tariff at which the said power plant could supply surplus power to the State Electricity Board was also liable to be determined in accordance with the statutory requirements. In the present case, as the electricity from the State Electricity Board was inadequate to meet power requirements of the industrial units of the assessee, it set up captive power plants to supply electricity to its industrial units. However, the captive power plants of the assessee could sell or supply the surplus electricity (after supplying electricity to its industrial units) to the State Electricity Board only and not to any other authority or person. Therefore, the surplus electricity had to be compulsorily supplied by the 22
assessee to the State Electricity Board and in terms of Sections 43
and 43A of the 1948 Act, a contract was entered into between the assessee and the State Electricity Board for supply of the surplus electricity by the former to the latter. The price for supply of such electricity by the assessee to the State Electricity Board was fixed at Rs. 2.32 per unit as per the contract. This price is, therefore, a contracted price. Further, there was no room or any elbow space for negotiation on the part of the assessee. Under the statutory regime in place, the assessee had no other alternative but to sell or supply the surplus electricity to the State Electricity Board.
Being in a dominant position, the State Electricity Board could fix the price to which the assessee really had little or no scope to either oppose or negotiate.
Therefore, it is evident that determination of tariff between the assessee and the State Electricity Board cannot be said to be an exercise between a buyer and a seller in a competitive environment or in the ordinary course of trade and business i.e., in the open market. Such a price cannot be said to be the price which is determined in the normal course of trade and competition.
27. Another way of looking at the issue is, if the industrial units of the assessee did not have the option of obtaining power from the captive power plants of the assessee, then in that case it would have had to purchase electricity from the State Electricity Board.
In such a scenario, the industrial units of the assessee would have had to purchase power from the State Electricity Board at the same rate at which the State Electricity Board supplied to the industrial consumers i.e., Rs. 3.72 per unit.
28. Thus, market value of the power supplied by the assessee to its industrial units should be computed by considering the rate at which the State Electricity Board supplied power to the consumers in the open market and not comparing it with the rate of power when sold to a supplier i.e., sold by the assessee to the State Electricity Board as this was not the rate at which an industrial consumer could have purchased power in the open
23
market. It is clear that the rate at which power was supplied to a supplier could not be the market rate of electricity purchased by a consumer in the open market. On the contrary, the rate at which the State Electricity Board supplied power to the industrial consumers has to be taken as the market value for computing deduction under Section 80 IA of the Act."
[emphasis added]
59. As is apparent from the above, the Supreme Court had accepted the rates at which electricity was supplied by the SEBs to industrial consumers as being the market value of the said supplies for the purposes of Sub-section (8) of Section 80IA of the Act.
60. In view of the above, the questions of law are answered in favour of the Assessee and against the Revenue.”
Thus, by respectfully following the decision of Hon’ble High Court and Co- ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of assessee itself and also by respectfully following the judgement of Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Jindal Steel & Power ltd. (supra), we hereby delete the transfer pricing addition of Rs 28,00,16,724/-. Ground of appeal No. 5 raised by the assessee is accordingly, allowed.
Ground no 6: Interest on foreign currency loan, addition of Rs.1,75,216/-
The next issue is with respect to interest income on loans denominated in foreign currency. The assessee has challenged the action of the AO/TPO in 24
making adjustment on account of interest on loan in foreign currency where the assessee has charged interest @ LIBOR + 200 basis point as against which the AO/TPO applied LIBOR + 400 basis points. The assessee has benchmarked the transactions using other method as most appropriate method.
During the course of hearing, the ld. AR submitted that this issue is covered by assessee’s own case for AY 2020-21 (ITA No. 4328/Del/2024) wherein on identical issue, the addition has been deleted by the ITAT.
The ld. AR further relied upon plethora of judgements wherein the methodology to benchmark the transaction using ‘LIBOR’ only as an appropriate benchmark was upheld. Few of the judgements are cited herewith:- (a) SRF Ltd. for AY 2010-11 (ITA No.356/Del/2015) (b) SRF Ltd. for 2014-15 (ITA No.6620/Del/2018) (c) Vaibhav Gems Ltd. [TS-1079-SC-2018] [TS-851-HC-2017(RAJ)] - SLP Dismissed (d) Cotton Naturals (I) Pvt. Ltd [TS-117-HC-2015(DEL)-TP] e) Tecnimont Pvt. Ltd. [TS-880-HC-2018(BOM)] f) Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd [TS-101-ITAT-2022(Ahd)-TP] g) Indian Oil Adani Ventures Ltd [TS-668-ITAT-2023(Mum)-TP] h) In addition to above, ld. AR relied upon the second proviso to the Section 92C(2) of the Act stating that the amount of addition is only 2.002% of total transaction amounting Rs 87,52,236/-, thus falling 25
under tolerance level of +/- 3% and thus no adjustment is warranted under any circumstance.
The Ld. DR for the Revenue supported the order of the lower authorities and submitted that the DRP has already upheld the order of ld. TPO. He also stated that this is not a covered matter as the judgment delivered by the coordinate Bench in AY 2020-21 relied upon their judgement in AY 2018-19 in which the addition was ‘NIL’ and the respective ground of the assessee was dismissed. He also pointed out that there is discrepancy in the submission of ld. AR on interest charged on foreign loans provided to assessee. He referred page no 116 of appeal set stating that as per TPO, assessee has charged only ‘6 months LIBOR’ as interest on foreign currency loans. Further, he drew our attention on page 142 and 143 of paper book that it cannot be identified from transfer pricing study. Thus, based on above he requested to not consider this as a covered matter and thus he supported the addition made by lower authorities.
The ld. AR of the assessee on rebuttal to the ld. DR’s contentions referred to page no 653 and 323 of paper book to show that assessee has charged ‘LIBOR’ + 200 bps from its associated enterprises (AE) on foreign currency loans. He reiterated its submission with reliance on ITAT’s ruling in the case of SRF Limited for AY 2010-11 (ITA no 356/Del/2015) wherein it was held that 26
‘LIBOR’ is an appropriate benchmark for benchmarking the transaction of interest income on foreign currency loans.
Considered the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. By respectfully following the decision of coordinate bench of ITAT in the case of SRF Limited (supra), we hold that LIBOR is an appropriate benchmark with respect to the foreign currency loans and hence adjustment made by TPO is unwarranted in assessee’s case. Moreover, the adjustment is liable to be set aside in terms of second proviso to the Section 92C(2) of the Act the same falls below the tolerance level of +/- 3%. We thus direct to delete the adjustment made on account of interest income on foreign currency loans. Thus, Ground of appeal No. 6 raised by the assessee is allowed. Ground no 7: Sale of Hybrid Seeds – Addition of Rs. 1,44,00,000/- 34. Apropos, ground of appeal No. 7 raised by the assessee is in relation to transfer pricing adjustment on sale of hybrid seeds to AEs. The assessee has benchmarked the transactions by using TNMM as most appropriate method with its Profit lever indicator (PLI) [operating profits / operating cost] at 8.50%. The TPO has rejected the approach of the assessee by observing that the assessee has not used appropriate filters and conducted his own search by modifying the filters and determined the ALP PLI at 19.78% resulting into 27
adjustment of Rs. 1,47,00,000/-. The TPO rejected four comparables taken by the assessee and had included five additional comparables. Against this order, assessee filed objections before the ld. DRP, which though upheld the filters applied by the TPO for selection of comparables and however, it has directed the TPO to recompute the PLI, according to which the TPO has reworked out the adjustment on sale of hybrid seeds of INR 1,44,00,000/- in the transfer pricing-order giving effect and simultaneously in final assessment order dated
24.10.2024. 35. Before us, Ld.AR for the assessee submitted that the TPO has rejected the comparables selected by the assessee by applying incorrect filters. He further submitted that one of the comparable included by the TPO namely ‘KRBL
Ltd.’ has already treated as incomparable by the DRP in the subsequent assessment year 2022-23 based upon product and functional dissimilarity. The TPO in AY 2022-23 has followed the directions given by DRP and excluded the comparable namely KRBL ltd. in final set of comparable. The ld. AR for the assessee submitted that even though the assessee has objected to the other comparable selected by the TPO, but without prejudice and for the ease of adjudication, he submitted that even if this one comparable ‘KRBL Ltd’ is excluded, the assessee’s PLI would fall within the ALP range and no 28
adjustment would then be required. He, thus requested to exclude KRBL
Limited in the instant year as well, as the comparable is the most prominent player in rice and its related products under the name ‘India Gate’. He drew our attention to page 769 of paper book being annual report of KRBL to substantiate its claim by referring to product wise revenue wherein revenue from rice was 95% of its total revenue. It was the contention of the ld. AR that if said comparable ‘KRBL’ is removed from the list of TPO based on the DRP’s own directions, the assessee’s margin would fall within the range as per TPO list of comparable sans KRBL. He referred to the TPO order giving effect to DRP, wherein the current ALP range is 16.70% [35th Percentile] to 23.07% [65th Percentile] while the assesse’s PLI is 8.50%. He submitted that if KRBL is excluded the revised ALP range would be 7.99% [35th Percentile]
to 24.41% [65th Percentile] warranting no adjustment.
The ld. CIT DR on the other hand stated that claim of the assessee regarding the comparable need to be examined and this would require study of annual reports of said comparable. However, he heavily relied on the findings of lower authorities. 29
Considered the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. In the instant case, the assessee while computing the ALP, followed the TNMM with OP/OC as most appropriate method for ascertaining the ALP of sale of Hybrid seeds and the margin was shown at 8.50 %. It is relevant to state that before us, the main emphasis of the AR is with regard to the exclusion of only one comparable incorporated by the TPO namely KRBL Limited. The DRP has itself held KRBL as non-comparable to the assessee in AY 2022-23, i.e. in the subsequent year. In this regard, Ld. AR drew our attention to page 769 of Paper Book wherein the note pertaining to product dealt by KRBL was given. According to it, the company is prominently engaged in production of basmati rice under the name ‘India Gate’ which is unlikely the case of assessee as assessee is engaged in hybrid seeds. The ld. AR also relied upon the directions of DRP for AY 2022-23 (P.no 64 of written submission) wherein KRBL was excluded on account of dissimilarity from the assessee. The relevant finding of DRP for AY 2022-23 is reproduced hereunder:
“The company is engaged in the business in trading of basmati rice under the brand name of India Gate. Hence, the company is functionally dissimilar to the assessee company. Thus, the AO is directed to remove the comparable.”
30
In view of these facts, in our considered opinion, this company KRBL Ltd should be excluded in the final set of comparables. Accordingly, we direct to exclude KRBL in the final set of comparables of TPO. We also direct that if after exclusion of above comparable, if assessee’s PLI falls within the range as computed in terms of section 92C rwr.10CA, the AO / TPO shall delete the aforesaid adjustment on sale of hybrid seeds. Therefore, Ground of appeal No. 7 raised by the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes. Ground no 8: Addition on account of notional Interest–Rs. 5,44,84,880/- 39. Ground of appeal No. 8 raised by the assessee is in respect of the addition made of Rs.5,44,84,880/- as notional interest.
Brief facts involved in this issue are that the assessee had given loan to its subsidiary company namely, M/s. Sriram Boiseed Ventures Ltd. in past and no interest was charged on the same. As there was uncertainty towards the recovery of interest therefore, the assessee has only recorded the amount of TDS deducted by the subsidiary on the interest payable to assessee and the principal amount of interest was offered for tax in the year when it was actually received. The objection of the assessee was dismissed by Hon’ble DRP by holding that interest must be accounted for on the accrual basis. 31
Before us, Ld.AR for the assessee submitted that the subsidiary company was incurring heavy losses and short of funds, therefore, the recovery of interest was doubtful. Accordingly, it was decided to account for the amount of TDS as income only which was received in the form of tax credit. It is further submitted that the balance amount of interest was received in FY 2022-23 and offered for taxation in AY 2023-24 relevant to FY 2022-23 and therefore, taxing the same on accrual basis in the year under appeal would tantamount to double taxation of same income and thus, it is requested that the addition made deserves to be deleted. He also drew our attention to the fact that the identical issue was adjudicated by the coordinate bench of Tribunal in assessee own case for AY 2018-19 (ITA no 2587/Del/2022) and AY 2020-21 (ITA no 4328/Del/2024) in which tribunal has remitted back to the file of assessing officer for verification and to decide in accordance with the law. The relevant finding of tribunal is reproduced hereunder for ready reference: - “111. Heard both the parties and perused the material available on record. The main contention of the assessee is that the interest income was offered for tax on receipt basis whereas the Revenue taxed the same on accrual basis. The assessee has duly offered the amount of TDS received by it as tax credit in this year and further stated the balance amount of interest was received in FY 2022-23 and the same was offered for tax in AY 2023-24 therefore, if the same is taxed in the year under appeal, it would be double taxation of income. Looking to these facts, we find force in the arguments of the assessee that an income should not be taxed twice. Once the interest income is offered for tax in the year of 32
receipt i.e. in AY 2023-24 and has been accepted by the department, same should not be included in the income for the year under appeal on accrual basis. Accordingly, the AO is directed to verify the claim of the assessee whether interest income was offered in AY 2023-24 and if the claim is found correct, no addition is required to be made in the year under appeal on account of interest on accrual basis. With these directions, Grounds of appeal Nos.79 to 81 raised by the assessee are partly allowed for statistical purposes.”
On the other hand, Ld. DR for the Revenue did not controvert the submission of AR. 43. Considered the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. The main contention of the assessee is that the interest income was offered for tax on receipt basis whereas the Revenue taxed the same on accrual basis. The assessee has duly offered the amount of TDS received by it as tax credit in this year and further stated the balance amount of interest was received in FY 2022-23 and the same was offered for tax in AY 2023-24 therefore, if the same is again taxed in the year under appeal, it would result into double taxation of same income. Looking to these facts, we find force in the arguments of the assessee that an income should not be taxed twice. Once the interest income is offered for tax in the year of receipt i.e. in AY 2023-24 and has been accepted by the department, same should not be included in the income for the year under appeal on accrual basis. Accordingly, following the finding of 33
tribunal in assessee’s case for AY 2018-19 and AY 2020-21 as referred above, the AO is directed to verify the claim of the assessee whether interest income was offered in AY 2023-24 and if the claim is found correct, no addition is required to be made in the year under appeal on account of interest on accrual basis. With these directions, Ground of appeal No.8 raised by the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.
44. Ground No.9 raised by the assessee in respect of initiation of penalty proceedings u/s 270A which is pre-mature at this stage and therefore, is dismissed.
45. Ground no 10 raised by the assessee, being a general ground is dismissed.
46. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed in above terms.
Order pronounced in the open court on this 18th March, 2026. /- (C.N.PRASAD) (S. RIFAUR RAHMAN)
JUDICIAL MEMBER
ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
Dated: 18th . 03.2026
Binita, Sr. PS