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The Tribunal held that the tenancy of the respondents was not protected under the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. It reasoned that the suit was instituted in 2007, and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act was not applicable as the rights were neither 'acquired' nor 'accrued' on the date of repeal. The Tribunal affirmed the trial court's finding on issue no. 6. Regarding issue no. 5, the Tribunal found in favor of the plaintiff. The Tribunal concluded that since the tenancy was not protected under U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the landlord could terminate it by issuing a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Tribunal found that the tenants had defaulted in rent payment despite demands and that their deposit of rent under Section 30 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 had no legal consequence. The Tribunal held that the trial court had erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of no rent default. Consequently, the revision filed by the landlord was allowed, and the revision filed by the tenants was dismissed. The Tribunal granted time to the tenants to vacate the premises by October 31, 2020, subject to certain conditions including filing an undertaking, depositing decretal amount, and continuing to pay rent.
The High Court held that the appeal is not pressed by the Revenue in view of the low tax effect, having regard to Circular No. 17/2019 dated August 8, 2019. The circular specifies monetary limits for appeals, with appeals before the High Court having a limit of Rs. 1,00,00,000. The Court disposed of the appeal accordingly. The Revenue was granted liberty to revive the tax appeal in case of any difficulty. The ratio decidendi is that appeals with a low tax effect, falling below the prescribed monetary limits in CBDT circulars, should be disposed of without a decision on merits.
The High Court partly allowed the appeal, modifying the MACT's award. The court increased the total compensation from Rs. 56,94,592/- to Rs. 66,33,441/-. The court awarded an additional Rs. 3,00,000/- for future medical expenses, considering the recurring need for medicines for bladder and bowel management. It also awarded Rs. 2,00,000/- towards attendant charges, acknowledging the appellant's 100% permanent disability and need for care, despite the lack of evidence for two attendants. The court found the compensation awarded for special diet and conveyance expenses to be justifiable and did not modify it. The compensation for pain, suffering, loss of amenities, and disfigurement was also deemed appropriate. The loss of earning capacity was recomputed, leading to a higher figure. The court directed the respondent No.3 to deposit the enhanced compensation amount with 7.5% interest within four weeks.
The Tribunal decided to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. This decision was based on the letter received from the Commissioner of Income Tax (Admn. & TPS.), Bhubaneswar, requesting withdrawal due to the tax effect being below the monetary limit specified in CBDT Circular No. 3/2018. The Tribunal noted that the circular, issued under Section 268A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, sets a monetary limit of Rs. 20,00,000 for filing appeals before the ITAT. The Tribunal also granted liberty to the appellant (Revenue) to revive the appeal if it is found not to be covered by the ambit of the aforementioned circular. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeal as withdrawn.
The High Court held that the denial of the assessee's right to cross-examine Mr. K. Ravindran, whose statement was crucial to the penalty proceedings, resulted in prejudice to the assessee. The Court found that the Tribunal's reasoning did not adequately address this prejudice. While acknowledging the Revenue's right to gather information, the Court emphasized that any material relied upon must be presented to the assessee with adherence to fair play and procedure. The Court noted that the penalty is a serious consequence, affecting even completed assessments. Consequently, the Court found the orders of the Intelligence Officer, Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), and the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal to be illegal and unsustainable due to the prejudice caused. The Court set aside the impugned orders and remitted the matters back to the Intelligence Officer for fresh consideration and disposal in accordance with law. The Revenue was granted liberty to serve additional re-assessment notices and the assessee was given an opportunity to file replies and cross-examine any further material or witnesses introduced by the Revenue.
The High Court held that the Tribunal was justified in upholding the CIT(A)'s decision that the appeal was not maintainable for non-payment of admitted tax under Section 249(4)(a). The Court reasoned that Section 249(4) does not confer discretion to waive the payment of admitted tax, making it a mandatory pre-condition for admitting an appeal. The Court rejected the assessee's contention that 'return' in Section 249(4) implies a 'valid return', stating that fiscal statutes cannot be re-written by implication. The judgment in T. Govindappa Setty was distinguished as not being on identical facts. The contention regarding the return being non est was not addressed as it did not arise from the order under challenge. However, in the larger interest of justice, the assessee was permitted to deposit the admitted tax within three months, after which the CIT(A) was directed to adjudicate the appeal on merits. The substantial questions of law were answered against the assessee.
The Tribunal decided to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn, in light of the Commissioner's letter and Circular No. 3/2018. The reasoning provided is that the Department itself sought to withdraw the appeal. The Tribunal explicitly stated that the questions of law are left open. This means the decision is not on the merits of the case. The Department is permitted to approach the court again if it later determines that the case falls within exceptions to the circular or if the circular is found not applicable. Consequently, any pending miscellaneous petitions in the appeal were also dismissed. No costs were awarded.
The High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi allowed the Interlocutory Application (I.A. No. 2800 of 2025) for withdrawal of the appeal. Consequently, the appeal filed by K. Prabhakar Rao was permitted to be withdrawn and was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. The court also noted that any pending Interlocutory Applications stood disposed of. The reasoning for allowing the withdrawal is not elaborated upon, but it implies that the appellant's request was acceded to. No specific findings on the merits of the original appeal were made, as the appeal was disposed of on procedural grounds.
The High Court held that the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed in terms of CBDT Circular No. 9 of 2024, dated 17.09.2024. The Court noted that the monetary effect of the appeal was well below the prescribed limit of Rs. 2.00 crore for filing appeals before the High Court. The judgment states that if the appeal falls within the exception of Circular No. 9 of 2024, it would be open for the Income Tax Department to seek revival of the appeal. No costs were awarded. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal. The substantive issues of the appeal were not decided on merits.
The High Court permitted the appellants (Revenue) to withdraw these appeals. The reasoning was based on the Revenue's submission regarding the revised monetary limits for filing appeals as per Circular No. 17 of 2019. The Court noted that the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) had clarified that the new monetary limit was applicable to all pending appeals. Consequently, the appeals were deemed not maintainable under the revised guidelines. The Court also granted liberty to the appellants to seek revival of these appeals if it is found that the matter falls within the exceptions carved out in Clause 10 of Circular No. 3 of 2018. No decision was made on the merits of the case.
The High Court noted that the appellant had been granted multiple opportunities to produce the Form 'C' declarations before the Assessing Authority but failed to do so. However, in the interest of justice, and based on the appellant's counsel's submission that the appellant is now in possession of the Form 'C' for the assessment year 1999-2000, the Court granted one last opportunity. The case was remanded to the Assessing Authority to consider and verify the Form 'C' declarations and pass a fresh order. The Court explicitly stated that no further opportunity would be granted, given the assessment year (1999-2000) and the original assessment order date (29.08.2003). The appellant was directed to produce the declarations within two weeks.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that no substantial questions of law were involved, as the matter pertained to the appreciation of evidence. The Court found that the addition was not based on 'no evidence'. For AY 2004-05, two customers denied transactions, and for AY 2005-06, notices to two customers were returned unserved with remarks 'not known' and 'no trace'. The assessee's response to a show-cause notice was ambiguous, and its explanation regarding cash entries in ledgers and demand drafts was not convincing. The Court noted that the assessee failed to discharge the onus shifted to it after the Revenue discharged its initial burden. The complaint regarding lack of cross-examination opportunity was not supported by the record, and the assessee could have presented the parties. The Court concluded that the appeal was an invitation to re-appreciate evidence, which is not permissible under Section 260-A of the Act, 1961, as there were concurrent findings of fact without perversity. The questions raised were not substantial questions of law.
The High Court allowed the Revenue's request to withdraw the appeal. The Court noted that the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the appellant sought leave to withdraw the appeal in light of Circular No. 09/2024, dated 17.09.2024, with the liberty to revive it if the subject matter fell within the exceptions of Circular No. 5/2024 dated 15.03.2024. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, with the liberty as prayed for. Miscellaneous applications pending were also closed. No order as to costs was made. The specific grounds for withdrawal or the exceptions mentioned in the circulars were not detailed in the judgment.
The Court held that the defendant had breached the Agreement dated June 14, 2014, by filing a criminal complaint despite receiving Rs. 3 crores in full and final settlement. The onus was on the defendant to prove a legitimate cause for filing the complaint, but as the defendant remained ex parte, this onus was not discharged. The Court found that the plaintiff suffered humiliation and inconvenience due to the investigation. Applying the principles laid down in Kailash Nath Associates v. DDA & Anr., the Court held the plaintiff entitled to recover liquidated damages of Rs. 3 crores from the defendant. The plaintiff's claim for Rs. 50 lakhs, paid earlier and not mentioned in the June 14, 2014 agreement, was rejected. The plaintiff was awarded interest at 4% per annum from the date of filing the suit till recovery. The claim against defendant no. 2 was rejected. The judgment clarified that it would not influence the investigation in FIR no. 37/2015.
The High Court held that the appeal was not pressed by the Revenue in view of the low tax effect, as per Circular No. 17/2019 dated 8th August, 2019. The circular provides monetary limits for filing appeals before various authorities, with appeals before the High Court having a monetary limit of Rs. 1,00,00,000. The court disposed of the appeal accordingly. The judgment explicitly reserves liberty for the Revenue to revive the tax appeal in case of any difficulty. No specific finding on the merits of the original dispute was made, as the appeal was not pressed.
The High Court held that all three essentials of a valid gift under Mohammedan Law – declaration of the gift by the donor, acceptance by the donee, and delivery of possession – were established. The court found that the donor, Syed Khizer Ahmed, had declared the oral gift, it was accepted by Mohd. Abdul Zia Baig on behalf of his minor son (Mohd. Irfan Baig) as natural guardian, and possession was delivered. Documentary evidence, including Ex. B1 to B33, supported the oral gift, its declaration in income tax returns, payment of gift tax, and subsequent property tax payments by the donee. The court found no infirmity in the trial court's appreciation of the evidence. Therefore, the partition suit filed by Syed Iftikhar Ahmed was dismissed, and the suit for possession filed by Mohd. Irfan Baig was decreed, confirming the trial court's common judgment and decree. No order as to costs was made due to the relationship between the parties.
The High Court held that a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act needs to be proved on the touchstone of preponderance of probability, not beyond reasonable doubt. While the eyewitness (PW-2) did not detail the accident's manner or speed, the police charge-sheet against the Army Vehicle's driver was considered prima facie evidence. The Court found the Army's internal inquiry report (Exhibit-A) less convincing than the police charge-sheet. The Court recalculated the compensation. The yearly income was assessed at Rs. 1,58,000/-. Future prospects were added at 25% (Rs. 39,500/-), and 1/3rd was deducted for personal expenses (Rs. 65,833/-), resulting in Rs. 1,31,667/-. With a multiplier of 15, this amounted to Rs. 19,74,990/-. General damages, loss of estate, and funeral expenses were added, totaling Rs. 20,44,990/-. The Army Vehicle was held responsible for 60% of this amount, leading to Rs. 12,26,994/-. The Army Vehicle's In-charge was directed to deposit the remaining amount with interest.
The High Court held that the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act is a rebuttable presumption, and the standard of proof required to rebut it is that of a preponderance of probabilities. The accused can rely on evidence led by her, materials submitted by the complainant, and circumstances. It is not necessary for the accused to enter the witness box. Applying these principles, the Court found that DW.1 (the accused) stated she did not issue the cheque for the loan as she had no occasion to borrow from the complainant and was in America when the cheque was allegedly taken by the complainant through Chowdamma. DW.2 corroborated that the accused was not in India during the relevant period. The Court noted that the trial court had given a sound finding that the presumption was rebutted by the accused's evidence. The Court also observed that the complainant's financial capacity to advance a loan of Rs. 6 lakhs was not duly proved, as he produced no documents other than the cheque. The judgments relied upon by the complainant were found not applicable to the facts of this case. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the impugned judgment of acquittal was confirmed.
The High Court held that the income earned by the assessee from the sale of tissue-cultured plants constitutes agricultural income under Section 2(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and is therefore exempt under Section 10(1). The Court reasoned that tissue culture operations represent a natural evolution and modernization of traditional agricultural practices. The cultivation of mother plants on land involves basic agricultural operations. The subsequent laboratory-based multiplication process is an extension and intensification of propagation. The legislature did not intend to freeze the concept of agriculture to primitive methods. The introduction of tissue culture technology serves the same purpose as traditional methods – the production of plant material – but with greater efficiency. Denying its agricultural character due to modern scientific techniques would ignore contemporary practices. The Court followed its own precedent in *The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. M/s. Nuzaveedu Seeds Ltd.*, which held that even with scientific research and extensive supervision, if cultivation occurs on agricultural land under the company's control, the income retains its agricultural character. The Court found that mother plants are grown on leased land through basic agricultural operations, and the tissue culture process is an advanced method of propagating and multiplying plant material derived from those mother plants. The laboratory environment does not sever the essential connection to agriculture. Therefore, both appeals were allowed.
The High Court held that the CIT(A) was justified in admitting the exemption order dated 31.07.2001 as additional evidence under Rule 46-A(1)(c) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962. The Court reasoned that this exemption order went to the very root of the grounds of appeal, as it exempted the assessee from the charge of Expenditure Tax. The fact that the exemption order was passed after the AO's assessment order and during the pendency of the appeal before the CIT(A) did not preclude its admission, especially since its validity was not disputed. The Court found that the CIT(A)'s reasoning for admitting the evidence, stating that it removed the assessee from the mischief of Section 3 of the ET Act, was sufficient. Furthermore, even if the matter had been remanded to the AO, the same outcome would have resulted, making the CIT(A)'s direct consideration an efficient approach. The Court also noted that sub-rule (4) of Rule 46-A provides a wide power to the CIT(A) to direct production of documents to dispose of an appeal. The ITAT had rightly confirmed the CIT(A)'s view. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the primary issue was to verify whether the respective toll lessees had already paid taxes on their income/sale turnover while collecting tolls. If the lessees had indeed paid their taxes, the appellant (Excise & Taxation Department) could not be held liable to pay the tax again, even if TCS was not deducted. However, if the toll lessees had not paid the tax that ought to have been deducted as TCS, the appellant would be liable. The Court directed the appellant to share details of toll lessees with the Assessing Officers. The Assessing Officers were then to verify the lessees' returns. If tax had been paid by the lessees, no tax would be levied on the appellant. If not, the appellant would be liable. Additionally, the appellant was held liable to pay interest under Section 206C(7) of the Act for the period of default in TCS deduction until the date the toll licensee actually paid the income tax. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The Tribunal decided to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. The reasoning was based on the letter received from the Commissioner of Income Tax requesting withdrawal in light of CBDT Circular No. 3/2018. This circular sets revised monetary limits for filing departmental appeals before the ITAT, High Courts, and Supreme Court. The appeal was deemed to involve a tax effect less than the prescribed limit of Rs. 20,00,000 for appeals before the ITAT. The Tribunal noted that the appellant (Department) is at liberty to revive the appeal if it is found not to fall within the ambit of the circular. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises for consideration on most of the issues. Regarding the exclusion of comparables with negative or abnormally high profits (Issue 1), the Court found the Tribunal's reasoning to be in conformity with the Act and Rules, and in the absence of perversity, such findings of fact cannot be re-examined. For the exclusion of comparables with profit margins below 6% (Issue 2), the Court found no infirmity in the Tribunal's approach, given the assessee's cost-plus 6% contract and risk-mitigated environment. For the acceptance of Satyam Computers Limited as a comparable (Issue 3), the Court found no reason to exclude it based on the grounds urged, especially when its profit margin was within the range of other comparables and no prima facie material of falsification was presented. Issue 4, concerning donations and income-tax refunds, was not adjudicated as it did not fall within the ambit of the directions for reconsideration by the Supreme Court. The appeals were disposed of accordingly.
The High Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove an essential aspect of their case: that money had been lent and advanced to the defendant by cheques. The court found that the trial judge had ignored the vital fact that the claim lacked actual basis and that the "strong preponderance of evidence" mentioned by the trial court remained unsubstantiated. The court noted that the plaintiffs' witness admitted to no records proving loan disbursement or cheque encashment, relying only on a handwritten statement and BIFR/AAIFR proceedings. Crucially, the plaintiffs withdrew applications under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC to adduce additional documents, including bank statements, which the court viewed as a "hara-kiri" and indicative of a lack of requisite evidence. The court cited Mohd. Seraj vs. Adibar Rahaman Sheikh (AIR 1968 Cal 550) regarding the evidentiary value of statements made in legal proceedings. Consequently, the impugned judgment and decree were set aside, and all appeals were allowed. Liberty was granted to the defendant to withdraw security furnished. The issue of limitation and the quantum of relief were rendered irrelevant due to the failure to prove the primary claim.
The High Court held that the inter-se seniority between direct recruit Sub-Inspectors and LDCE candidates is to be determined by the date of completion of training and consequent confirmation in service. The Court found that Rule 689(c) of the Jharkhand Police Manual specifically deals with the determination of inter-se seniority and Rule 682(d) excludes the period of training/probation for counting seniority, except for pension. The Court distinguished the arguments regarding confirmation relating back to initial appointment, stating that this general principle yields to specific service rules governing seniority. The Court noted that while private respondents were appointed earlier, their training completion and confirmation were later than the direct recruits. Consequently, the impugned Seniority List dated 09.09.2024 was quashed. The Court directed the State to re-arrange and publish a final seniority list, treating direct recruits as senior to LDCE candidates, with an exception for direct recruits whose probation was extended, whose seniority would be fixed from their confirmation date. This exercise was to be completed within ten weeks.
The High Court of Jharkhand disposed of the appeal on the grounds of low tax effect, acknowledging that the tax effect was admittedly below Rs. 2 crores. The court noted that the appellant's counsel had no instructions to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of by keeping the questions of law open. Liberty was granted to the appellant to apply for restoration of the appeal by filing a Civil Miscellaneous Petition (CMP) within a reasonable period not exceeding three months from the date of the order, if they found that the matter was covered by any exceptions in the CBDT circulars. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal with liberty in the stated terms, and pending interlocutory applications were also disposed of.
The Tribunal, after perusing the letter from the Commissioner of Income Tax and the CBDT Circular No. 3/2018, allowed the withdrawal of the appeal. The reasoning was based on the explicit request from the revenue authority citing the low tax effect and the provisions of the aforementioned circular. The circular sets a monetary limit of Rs. 20,00,000 for appeals before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal noted that the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn in view of the Commissioner's letter. However, the appellant (Department) was granted liberty to revive the appeal if it was found not to fall within the ambit of the circular. The ratio decidendi is that appeals with a tax effect below the prescribed monetary limits, as per CBDT circulars issued under Section 268A, can be withdrawn by the Department.
The High Court held that the income earned by the assessee from the sale of tissue-cultured plants constitutes agricultural income under Section 2(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and is therefore exempt under Section 10(1). The reasoning was that the cultivation of mother plants on land involves basic agricultural operations. The subsequent laboratory-based multiplication process is an extension and intensification of propagation, serving the same purpose as traditional methods but with greater efficiency. The court found that the legislature did not intend to freeze the concept of agriculture to primitive methods. The introduction of tissue culture technology is a modernization of traditional agricultural practices. The court also referred to its own decision in *The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. M/s. Nuzaveedu Seeds Ltd.*, which held that even with scientific research and indirect involvement, income can be agricultural if cultivation occurs under supervision on agricultural land. The court concluded that the tissue culture operations begin with basic agricultural operations and use laboratory techniques as an advanced method of propagation, not a complete departure from agriculture. The appeals were allowed.
The High Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned judgment and decree. The Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove an essential aspect of their case: that money had been lent and advanced to the defendant by cheques. The Court noted that the plaintiffs' witness admitted a lack of records to prove loan disbursement and cheque encashment, relying only on a handwritten statement and BIFR/AAIFR proceedings. The Court found the trial judge's reliance on balance sheets and BIFR/AAIFR orders insufficient, especially in light of the witness's admissions. The withdrawal of applications under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, seeking to adduce additional documents like bank statements, was described as 'hara-kiri' and left a 'lurking doubt' about the plaintiffs' evidence. The Court held that the averments made in these withdrawn applications could not be ignored as admissions. Consequently, the failure to prove the advancement of loans by cheques rendered all other issues irrelevant. Liberty was granted to the defendant/appellant to withdraw the security furnished.
The Tribunal disposed of the appeals on the grounds of low tax effect, acknowledging that the tax effect was below Rs. 2 crores. The Court noted that the appellant (Revenue) had no instructions to withdraw the appeals. Consequently, the appeals were disposed of, keeping the questions of law open. Liberty was granted to the appellant to apply for restoration of these appeals within a reasonable period not exceeding three months from the date of the order, should they find that the matter is covered by any exceptions mentioned in the CBDT circulars. Pending interlocutory applications were also disposed of as they did not survive.
The High Court held that the appellant (complainant) had not made out any grounds to allow the appeal and convict the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. The Court found that the accused had successfully probabalised his defence by stating that he issued blank cheques which were misused. This defence rebutted the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act. Consequently, the burden shifted to the complainant to prove their financial capacity and the existence of a legally recoverable debt. The Court noted that the complainants failed to produce evidence of their financial capacity, such as partition deeds or income tax assessments, and did not explain why large cash amounts were paid. The Court found no illegality or perversity in the trial court's judgment of acquittal and therefore dismissed the appeals.
The High Court held that the Labour Court had correctly appreciated the evidence. It affirmed the principle that it is impossible to lay down a single test for determining what constitutes one establishment, and the relation between units depends on facts and the statute's object. Citing Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products Ltd. Vs. Employees' Insurance Court & Another, the Court reiterated that employees working within or outside the factory, for administrative purposes, or for raw material purchase/sale of goods are all included under the definition of 'employee' in Section 2(9) of the ESI Act, 1948. The Court also referenced M/s. Sumangali Vs. Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation, stating that even with separate registrations, interdependent and complementary units can be clubbed. The Court found functional integrality between the three units, justifying their clubbing. The Labour Court's conclusion that clubbing the three units was proper was upheld. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as lacking merit, and no substantial question of law was found.
The High Court acknowledged that the issue of whether partially constructed buildings are subject to wealth tax has been settled in favour of the Revenue by the Supreme Court in *Giridhar G. Yadalam v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax and Another*. However, the Court noted that the appeals were filed when the departmental circular prescribed a monetary limit of Rs. 4 lakhs for appeals. The total demand in these appeals exceeded Rs. 6 lakhs. Considering the assessee's death in 2010, the refund orders issued by the Tribunal, and the fact that the appeals were below the monetary limit at the time of filing, the Court decided not to pursue recovery. The appeals were closed with the observation that while the question of law is in favour of the Revenue, no recovery steps would be taken due to the appeals being below the monetary limit at the time of their institution. The Court also noted that the Wealth Tax Act is no longer in force, and the current litigation policy restricts appeals for demands less than Rs. 50 lakhs.
The High Court held that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal was inadequate in both appeals. In First Appeal No. 85 of 2012, the court found that the compensation for permanent visual disability (30% to the left eye) should have been at least Rs. 2,00,000/- instead of Rs. 50,000/-, and for 100% loss of sense of smell, it should have been at least Rs. 75,000/- instead of Rs. 30,000/-. Travel and incidental expenses were enhanced to Rs. 50,000/- from Rs. 27,652/-, and compensation for pain, suffering, and loss of amenities was deemed inadequate. The total compensation was enhanced to Rs. 5,95,793.96. In First Appeal No. 87 of 2012, compensation for disfigurement was enhanced to Rs. 1,00,000/- from Rs. 40,000/-, and for 20% visual disability, it was enhanced to Rs. 1,00,000/- from Rs. 45,000/-. Medical expenses were enhanced to Rs. 50,000/-, and travel and miscellaneous expenses to Rs. 75,000/-. Compensation for loss of income and loss of amenities was also awarded. The total compensation was enhanced to Rs. 4,50,000/-. The ratio is that tribunals must adequately compensate for established disabilities and losses, even if they don't directly impact immediate income, considering future hardship and quality of life.
The High Court held that the findings recorded by the ITAT were findings of fact based on the consideration of relevant evidence on record. Therefore, the High Court found no manifest error of law in the impugned order of the ITAT. Consequently, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed. No substantial question of law was answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
The High Court held that the revision petitions under Section 25 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, against an intimation issued under Section 16(1) of the Act were maintainable. The Court found that the Commissioner had not examined the matter on merits and that the analogy from the Income Tax Act, as laid down by the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Anderson Marine & Sons Pvt. Ltd., was applicable. The reasoning was that the process of taking a decision, including sending an intimation, is in itself a decision in the nature of an order passed by the concerned authority. This provides sufficient scope within the Act of 1957 to invoke the jurisdiction of revision under Section 25. The Court noted that the intimation under Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act was considered to have the force of an order, and this interpretation was reinforced by the legal fiction that such an intimation shall be deemed to be a notice of demand under Section 156, which presupposes an order passed under the Act. Therefore, the special appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the CESTAT's conclusion that the demand of duty separately for the period prior to 07.04.2008 was not sustainable and that common registration could not be denied retrospectively was correct. The Court found no reason to defer from the view held by the CESTAT and the Supreme Court in M/s Lohia's case (Supra). The reasoning was based on the interpretation that the term 'factory of production' does not necessarily imply a single physical premise, but rather the complete process of production. The eight factors outlined by the Board were considered indicative of interlinkage, and in this case, the units were found to be part of the same integrated manufacturing process for tractors, despite physical separation by public roads. Therefore, the separate demand of duty was not sustainable.
The Tribunal considered the letter from the Commissioner of Income Tax requesting the withdrawal of the appeal due to the tax effect being below the monetary limit prescribed by CBDT Circular No. 3/2018. The Tribunal perused the letter and the Circular. Based on the request from the Revenue, the Tribunal decided to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. The Tribunal also granted liberty to the appellant to revive the appeal if it was found not to be covered by the said Circular. The Circular itself clarifies that appeals shall not be filed where the tax effect does not exceed Rs. 20,00,000 before the Appellate Tribunal and that pending appeals below the specified tax limits may be withdrawn or not pressed. The ratio decidendi is that appeals can be withdrawn or dismissed if they fall below the monetary limits set by the CBDT for filing appeals, as per the powers vested under Section 268A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
The High Court held that the findings recorded by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal were based on a consideration of relevant materials on record. The Court repeatedly asked the learned counsel for the appellant (Revenue) to point out any perversity in the Tribunal's findings, but the counsel was unable to do so. Consequently, the Court found no reason to interfere with the findings of fact. The substantial question of law was answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. The appeal was dismissed. No specific issue was left undecided.
The Tribunal considered the letter of request from the Commissioner of Income Tax (Admn. & TPS.), Bhubaneswar, and the provisions of CBDT Circular No. 3/2018. The circular, issued under Section 268A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, revised the monetary limits for filing departmental appeals. For appeals before the ITAT, the monetary limit was set at Rs. 20,00,000. Since the Revenue's request for withdrawal was based on the tax effect being less than this prescribed limit, the Tribunal acceded to the request. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. However, the appellant (Revenue) was granted liberty to revive the appeal if it was found not to fall within the ambit of the aforementioned circular.
The Tribunal decided to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. This decision was based on the request made by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Admn. & TPS.), Bhubaneswar, citing CBDT Circular No. 3/2018. The circular stipulates that appeals involving a tax effect below a certain monetary limit (Rs. 20,00,000 for appeals before the ITAT) should not be filed or, if pending, should be withdrawn or not pressed. The Tribunal found the request to be in order, given the provisions of the circular and Section 268A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. However, the appellant was granted liberty to revive the appeal if it was found not to be covered by the aforementioned circular.
The High Court held that the acquittal appeal is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. The Court noted that for a second marriage to be prosecuted under Section 494 IPC, it must be proved that the second marriage was also solemnized in accordance with the customary rites and ceremonies, meaning both marriages must be valid. The appellate court rightly found that there was no credible evidence to prove all the rituals of the second marriage, specifically the 'Saptapadi'. While the witness Manish Singh (CW/3) stated he saw seven steps, he admitted he went to capture photographs at the behest of the appellant and her father, making him not an independent witness. Furthermore, he admitted he could not capture photographs due to darkness, despite having a light camera. The High Court emphasized that in appeals against acquittal, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is fortified, and interference is warranted only if the view adopted by the appellate court is not reasonable or its conclusion is not grounded on the material on record. The appellate court's finding that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt was based on proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and was in accordance with law and the guidelines of the Apex Court. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal considered the request for withdrawal made by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Admn. & TPS.), Bhubaneswar, based on CBDT Circular No. 3/2018. This circular, issued under Section 268A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, revised the monetary limits for filing departmental appeals. For appeals before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, the monetary limit was set at Rs. 20,00,000. The Commissioner's letter indicated that the tax effect in the present appeal (ITA No. 99 of 2008) was less than this prescribed limit. Consequently, the Tribunal allowed the withdrawal of the appeal. The appellant was granted liberty to revive the appeal if it was found not to fall within the ambit of the aforementioned circular. No specific finding was made on the merits of the original appeal.
The High Court held that the appellate forums below had failed to consider, discuss, or rely upon the order dated 18.02.2003 passed by the Joint Director of Income Tax granting exemption under Section 195(3) of the Act. The Court noted that the appellant had consistently taken this stand before both the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal. The Court found that if the contents of the Joint Director's order were accepted as genuine, the remittances made to M/s IGTL Solutions (U.S.A.) would be non-taxable concerning TDS, and the action of the respondent in carrying out TDS deduction would be per se bad. Consequently, the High Court was of the considered opinion that the matter should be remitted back to the Tax Tribunal for reconsideration. The Tribunal was directed to decide the matter on priority within 90 days from the receipt of the order, taking into consideration the exemption granted to the appellant on 18.02.2003. The appeal was allowed to the aforesaid extent.
The High Court held that the investment made by the assessee in its joint venture companies, namely Sudha Modern Dhall Mill Limited, Delta Oils & Fats Limited, Sri Gumvaurappan Swamy Oil Foods & Fats Limited, and Godavari Edible Bran Oil Limited, constituted a violation of Section 11(5) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This was because the investments were made in shares of companies that were not Government Companies or corporations established under Central or provincial Acts, and the shares were held beyond the cut-off date of November 30, 1983. Consequently, the assessee was not entitled to claim the benefit of exemption under Section 11 of the Act for these investments. However, the Court clarified that only the income derived specifically from such an investment made in violation of Section 13(1)(d) of the Act is liable to tax, and not the entire income of the assessee. The Court relied on decisions from the Bombay, Delhi, and Karnataka High Courts, and noted the dismissal of a Special Leave Petition by the Supreme Court in a similar matter. The orders of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal were modified to this extent.
The Tribunal rejected the memo of retirement of the counsel for the appellant. The reasoning was that there was no communication on record to establish that the counsel had duly intimated the appellant of his intention to retire from the case. Furthermore, the appellant was called out, and no one appeared, meaning there was no representation. Considering the appeal has been pending for 13 years and no good ground for adjournment was found, the appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution. The Tribunal did not decide any substantive issues related to the income tax assessment itself, as the dismissal was procedural.