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301 orders · Page 5 of 7
The High Court held that the petitioner was entitled to succeed. It was not disputed that the 2nd respondent was the correct appellate authority on the date of the initial manual filing. The Court found that the petitioner's mistake of filing a manual appeal instead of an online one, particularly given the recent introduction of the online filing requirement on March 1, 2016, constituted a sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The Court reasoned that the petitioner acted promptly upon realizing the mistake by filing an online appeal with a condonation application. Consequently, the order dismissing the condonation of delay was quashed, and the online appeal was restored to the file of the 3rd respondent. The 3rd respondent was directed to treat the appeal as filed within time, considering the date of the manual filing as the effective date, and to dispose of the appeal on merits after hearing the petitioner.
The High Court held that the petitioner had not made out a case for interference with the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. While acknowledging that the notices were issued without following the procedure under Section 148A, the Court found that this did not render them illegal. The Court reasoned that the situation was covered by the first proviso to Section 148A, which exempts cases where Section 132A of the 1961 Act is applicable. The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that filing an application under Section 451 Cr.P.C. meant Section 132A was not invoked. It accepted the Revenue's submission that a requisition under Section 132A was initially made to the Police, and the Section 451 Cr.P.C. application was filed only after learning the money was in court custody. Citing R. Ravirajan and Others (Supra), the Court clarified that while Section 132A cannot be directly applied to court-custodied items, the initial invocation of Section 132A proceedings by the department was sufficient to attract the proviso to Section 148A. Therefore, compliance with Section 148A was not mandatory before issuing the Section 148 notices. No other points were raised.
The High Court of Kerala did not decide the merits of the case. Instead, it disposed of the writ petition by directing the 3rd respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to consider and pass appropriate orders on the petitioner's pending appeal (Ext.P2) expeditiously. The Court also granted interim relief, stating that no coercive steps would be initiated against the petitioner pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1) and demand notice (Ext.P3) until the disposal of the appeal. The specific findings on the deductibility under Section 80P or the interpretation of the Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. judgment were not addressed in this order.
The High Court of Kerala, considering the limited nature of the relief sought by the petitioner, disposed of the writ petition. The Court directed that the amounts adjudicated as due from the petitioner in terms of the assessment order (Ext.P1) shall not be recovered until a decision is taken by the 2nd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) on the stay petition (Ext.P3) filed in the appeal (Ext.P2). This direction was issued with notice to the petitioner. The Court did not delve into the merits of the assessment order or the stay petition itself, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of recovery pending the appellate decision.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the 3rd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) to consider and pass orders on the delay petitions (Exhibits P-3 series) and stay petitions (Exhibits P-4 series) within six weeks of receiving a certified copy of the judgment. The court clarified that the appellate authority should only pass orders on the stay petitions on merits if it decides to condone the delay in filing the appeals. Crucially, the court ordered that until orders are passed on the delay and stay petitions as directed, any proceedings for recovery of amounts due under the assessment and penalty orders (Exhibits P-1, P-1(a), and P-1(b)) shall remain suspended. The court did not decide on the merits of the assessment or penalty orders themselves.
The High Court dismissed the writ appeals. The Court found that the assessment order and penalty order were passed after complying with all statutory formalities. The appellant was given sufficient opportunity to produce documents to substantiate his contentions but failed to do so. The Court held that the disputed questions of fact could not be adjudicated in writ petitions. Therefore, instead of availing the statutory appellate remedy, the appellant had rushed to the writ court. The Court found no merit in the appeals and accordingly dismissed them. The ratio decidendi is that writ jurisdiction is not a substitute for statutory remedies, especially when disputed questions of fact are involved and the assessee has failed to comply with procedural requirements.
The High Court held that Section 148A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, contemplates that the assessee should be granted an opportunity of being heard. This opportunity must include the right of personal hearing. The Court found that the learned Single Judge correctly held that the non-provision of a personal hearing to the assessee vitiated the impugned order and consequential notice. The judgment in Income Tax Officer v. Asamannoor Service Co-operative Bank Limited was found to squarely apply to the facts of this case. Consequently, the appeal filed by the Revenue was found to be devoid of merit. The operative direction from the Single Judge's order, which quashed the order and notice and directed the petitioner to appear for a hearing, was implicitly upheld.
The High Court held that the substantial questions of law raised in these appeals are indeed covered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue by the judgment of the same Court dated 14.09.2021 in ITA Nos. 5 and 7 of 2018. Consequently, the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The appeals filed by the Revenue are dismissed. The operative direction is the dismissal of the appeals, granting relief to the assessee.
The High Court of Kerala decided to grant a limited relief to the petitioner. The court directed that the demands arising from the assessment and penalty orders (Exts. P1 and P2) shall not be enforced until a decision is taken on the stay petitions (Exts. P5 and P6) filed by the petitioner before the 4th respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)). The court further directed the 4th respondent to endeavor to pass orders on the stay petitions within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment. The court did not decide on the merits of the assessment or penalty orders, nor on the validity of the appeals. The ratio decidendi is that in cases where appeals and stay petitions are pending before the appellate authority, the enforcement of demands can be deferred pending the decision on the stay petitions, to ensure that the appellate process is not rendered infructuous.
The High Court of Kerala, considering the limited nature of the relief sought by the petitioner, disposed of the writ petition. The Court directed that any demands arising from the assessment order (Ext.P5) shall not be enforced until a decision is taken by the 2nd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) on the stay petition (Ext.P7). The Court further directed the 2nd respondent to endeavor to decide the stay petition within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment. The principle established is that the High Court can grant interim relief by staying demands pending the disposal of a stay petition before the appellate authority, especially when the relief sought is limited and procedural.
The High Court dismissed the Writ Appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court affirmed the decision of the learned Single Judge, holding that Section 148A of the Income Tax Act contemplates that the assessee should be granted an opportunity of being heard. The Court further clarified that this opportunity must include the right of personal hearing. The reasoning was based on a previous Division Bench judgment of the same Court in Income Tax Officer v. Asamannoor Service Co-operative Bank Limited (2024 KHC OnLine 28), which held that a personal hearing is a component of the opportunity of being heard under Section 148A(b). Therefore, the non-provision of a personal hearing vitiated the orders and notices. The appeal was found to be devoid of merit.
The High Court held that the issue involved in these appeals was already covered in favor of the assessee and against the Revenue by its previous judgment in ITA Nos. 5 and 7 of 2018. Consequently, the appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.
The High Court held that Section 148A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, contemplates that the assessee should be granted an opportunity of being heard. This opportunity must include the right of personal hearing. The Court found that the learned Single Judge correctly applied the dictum laid down in Income Tax Officer v. Asamannoor Service Co-operative Bank Limited (2024 KHC OnLine 28), which held that a personal hearing is mandatory. Therefore, the failure to provide a personal hearing vitiated the order passed under Section 148A(d) and the consequential notice under Section 148. The appeal was dismissed as devoid of merit, upholding the quashing of the impugned order and notice by the learned Single Judge.
The Tribunal held that the limitation period prescribed under Section 153(2A) of the IT Act, which mandates that a fresh assessment order pursuant to an order under Section 250 or 254 (setting aside or cancelling an assessment) must be made within one year from the end of the financial year in which the order is received, applies even in cases of limited remand for de novo adjudication of one or more issues. The Tribunal reasoned that the scheme of the statutory provisions, including Section 153(3), aims to ensure expeditious finality in assessments. A remand requiring the Assessing Authority to re-adjudicate an issue, such as the deduction claim under Section 54F, necessitates a re-assessment. Therefore, the consequential order passed by the Assessing Authority on February 17, 2023, was beyond the time limit stipulated by Section 153(2A) (which would have been March 31, 2018). The Tribunal approved the view taken in Dr. R.P. Patel (supra) and was fortified by decisions from the Delhi, Bombay, and Madras High Courts. The writ petition was allowed, and Ext.P8 order was quashed.
The High Court of Kerala, upon hearing the submission from the learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Anil D. Nair, that the prayers in the writ petitions had become infructuous, decided to dismiss the petitions. The Court accepted the statement placed on record by the petitioners. Consequently, the writ petitions were dismissed as infructuous. No decision was made on the merits of the original challenge that led to the filing of these petitions. The operative direction was solely to dismiss the petitions based on their rendered infructuous status.
The High Court of Kerala, upon hearing the submission from the learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Anil D. Nair, that the prayers in the writ petitions had become infructuous, decided to dismiss the petitions. The Court accepted the statement placed on record by the petitioners. Consequently, the writ petitions were dismissed as infructuous. No decision was made on the merits of the original challenge that led to the filing of these petitions. The operative direction was solely to dismiss the petitions based on their rendered infructuous status.
The High Court held that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice and that the appellate order did not suffer from any manifest infirmity or illegality. The Court found the reason provided by the assessee for the significant delay of 115 days in filing the appeal, i.e., 'website problem', to be unconvincing and unsubstantiated by any evidence. The Court also noted the assessee's failure to respond to several notices issued by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) during the pendency of the appeal. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the writ petition and dismissed it. The operative direction was the dismissal of the writ petition, upholding the appellate order.
The High Court granted the petitioner's request for permission to withdraw the Crl.M.C. with the liberty to file a fresh one. The court's reasoning was based on the counsel's submission seeking this permission. Consequently, the Crl.M.C. was dismissed as withdrawn, with the liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh petition being expressly reserved. No decision was made on the merits of the original case.
The High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the Criminal Miscellaneous Cases. The court ordered that these Crl.M.Cs be dismissed as withdrawn. Crucially, the court explicitly reserved the liberty of the petitioner to raise all contentions before the trial court in accordance with the law. This means the withdrawal is without prejudice to the petitioner's rights and arguments at the trial stage. No specific findings were made on the merits of the underlying income tax proceedings or the criminal complaints.
The High Court held that Section 144B(1) of the Income Tax Act, which prescribes the faceless procedure, contains a non-obstante clause and applies to assessment, reassessment, or re-computation. However, it does not mandate that proceedings interior to these stages must also be faceless. Furthermore, Section 144B(2) states that faceless assessment shall be in respect of areas, persons, or classes of cases specified by the CBDT, and the petitioner had not produced any notification to show their case was covered. Even if the petitioner's case were covered by the faceless assessment procedure, the proceedings prior to the reassessment proceedings are not illegal for not being faceless. The assessment year is 2019-2020, and the faceless procedure was introduced with effect from April 1, 2021. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed.
The High Court held that the assessment order did not suffer from any jurisdictional error or violation of the principles of natural justice. The Court noted that the petitioner's written submissions and replies to show cause notices were indeed considered before the assessment order was finalized. Therefore, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction of judicial review, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the impugned order. The Court disposed of the writ petition, granting the petitioner liberty to approach the Appellate Authority against the assessment order if they were so advised. All contentions were kept open for the petitioner to raise in the appeal. The time spent prosecuting the writ petition was to be condoned for the purpose of filing an appeal, and the Appellate Authority was directed to consider the appeal expeditiously.
The High Court held that when a litigant is relegated to an alternative remedy before a statutory authority, it is incumbent upon the court to protect the litigant from recovery proceedings pending the disposal of their petitions by that authority. Therefore, the High Court modified the Single Judge's order to the extent that pending the disposal of the stay petitions or appeals by the appellate authority, whichever is earlier, recovery proceedings against the appellant for the amounts confirmed by Ext.P1 order shall be kept in abeyance. The rest of the directions in the impugned judgment were not interfered with. The principle is that statutory remedies should not be rendered nugatory by coercive actions before they are adjudicated.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court found no substance in the petitioner's claim of not being afforded an opportunity of hearing. It noted that the petitioner did not respond to notices issued under Sections 148 and 142(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, despite them being served. While the petitioner did file some submissions which were considered in the assessment order, they did not opt for a personal hearing as provided under Section 144B, even when an opportunity was granted. The Court emphasized that the admitted facts were that the petitioner did not respond to any notices except for filing a reply and did not opt for the personal hearing as provided under Section 144B. Therefore, the subsequent request for a personal hearing was deemed irrelevant. The ratio decidendi is that an assessee must actively participate in the assessment proceedings and avail the opportunities provided, including personal hearings, to challenge the final assessment order on grounds of procedural irregularity.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the assessee. The Court found no grounds to grant any indulgence to the petitioner, noting his lack of cooperation in assessment proceedings and that the appellate order was rendered ex-parte. The Court stated that such a petitioner is not entitled to any relief. However, despite dismissing the writ petition, the Court directed the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to consider the stay petition filed along with the appeal expeditiously. The primary reason for dismissal was the petitioner's non-cooperation and failure to deposit tax dues, rendering him disentitled to extraordinary relief from the High Court. The issue of the merits of the appeal before the ITAT was not decided by the High Court.
The High Court disagreed with the petitioner's contention that he was not given an opportunity to explain the cash deposits. The Court found that the facts indicated the petitioner failed to avail the opportunities provided despite being served with notices. Regarding the revision under Section 264, the Court held that although the section does not explicitly mandate a hearing, the principles of natural justice require an opportunity of hearing to be read into the provision, especially since the revisional order has civil consequences. The Court found a violation of natural justice by the Revisional Authority in passing the impugned order without affording a hearing. Consequently, the impugned order of the Revisional Authority (Ext.P11) was set aside. The matter was remanded back to the 1st respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax) with a direction to issue a notice of hearing to the petitioner and pass a fresh order after hearing him. The Court clarified that only one notice would be issued, and failure to avail this opportunity would result in no further chances. The writ petition was allowed in part.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that it was barred by the principle of res-judicata or constructive res-judicata. The court found that the grievance raised in the present writ petition was available to the petitioner and should have been raised in the earlier writ petition, which had already been concluded. The court observed that a litigant cannot file separate proceedings for each grievance as it arises, especially when the same issue was before the court previously. The court characterized the present petition as a gross abuse of the process of the court, with the petitioner attempting to stall the early completion of assessment proceedings. The court stated it would not be a party to such tactics. No specific issue was left undecided, as the petition was dismissed on procedural grounds.
The Court held that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. Commissioner of Income Tax, relied upon by the petitioner, was rendered before the insertion of Clause (ii) to Explanation 1 of Section 148 with effect from April 1, 2022. This new clause specifically permits re-opening of assessment based on an audit objection that the assessment was not made in accordance with the Act. The Court found that the present case falls under this amended provision, making the audit objection a statutory ground for re-opening. Therefore, it was not a mere change of opinion. The Assessing Authority had proceeded strictly in accordance with Clause (ii) of Explanation 1 to Section 148. Consequently, the Court found no error of law or jurisdiction in the impugned order. The writ petition was dismissed. The petitioner was granted four weeks to file the return if not already filed, and the assessment would be finalized after granting a hearing.
The High Court held that Ext.P5 order was liable to be quashed. The Court noted that the order itself indicated that although the petitioner's submissions were uploaded on 23-08-2023, the appellate authority proceeded to decide the appeal on the premise that no submissions were filed before 08-09-2023. Furthermore, the Court found that the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity of hearing. Therefore, the Court quashed Ext.P5 and restored the appeal (Ext.P2) to the file of the 2nd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)). The 2nd respondent was directed to reconsider the appeal after taking into account Ext.P4 and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court of Kerala, after hearing arguments, granted the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The Court dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn, granting the petitioner liberty to approach the appropriate appellate forum against the impugned assessment order. The petitioner was directed to file the appeal within 15 days, and the appeal was to be decided on its merits, without considering the question of limitation. The Court did not decide on the merits of the assessment order itself.
The High Court directed the petitioner to remit 20% of the assessed tax within two weeks. Upon compliance, the proceedings pursuant to the recovery notice (Ext.P4) would be kept in abeyance until the disposal of the appeal. The 2nd respondent (NFAC) was directed to dispose of the appeal expeditiously, preferably within six months. The court noted the significant delay of five years since the assessment order and the petitioner's admission of not paying any tax, leading to substantial interest liability. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions. The issue of whether the recovery notice was validly issued or enforceable in the interim was implicitly addressed by directing it to be kept in abeyance upon partial tax payment.
The High Court did not decide the merits of the case. Instead, after hearing arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that they would approach the assessing authority under Section 154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the reliefs sought in the writ petition. Consequently, the High Court disposed of the writ petition, granting the petitioner liberty to pursue their remedies before the assessing authority. No specific finding was made on the substantive issues that might have been raised in the writ petition, and the court did not delve into the merits of the petitioner's claim. The operative direction was to allow the petitioner to approach the assessing authority.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. Regarding the first issue, the Court held that the question of whether the petitioner had a 50% share or generated the entire income was a matter to be determined during the assessment proceedings. The Court clarified that the purpose of an order under Section 148A(d) is limited to satisfying the Assessing Authority on whether to proceed with reopening the assessment, not to conduct a detailed inquiry into the income. Since the impugned order indicated that over Rs. 99 lakhs of income from property sales had escaped assessment, the Court found no jurisdictional error in proceeding. Concerning the second issue of jurisdiction, the Court stated that if the International Taxation Ward lacked jurisdiction, it would transfer the matter to the relevant assessing officer. Therefore, the Court found no jurisdictional error or error of law apparent on the face of the record requiring interference. The petitioner was granted liberty to raise all contentions before the assessing authority during the finalization of the assessment order, and it was noted that the petitioner had already filed a return in pursuance to the notice under Section 148. The assessment order would be finalized by the jurisdictional assessing officer after hearing the petitioner.
The High Court found no grounds to entertain the writ petition. It held that the court should not interrupt the process that has commenced with the issuance of a notice under Section 148A, especially when an order under Section 148A(d) has been passed in accordance with the law. While acknowledging the petitioner's submission that the final assessment order had not been passed, the court granted the petitioner 15 days to file their return in response to the notice issued under Section 148. The court directed the assessing authority to examine the filed return and pass the final assessment order in accordance with the law. The principle established is that writ jurisdiction should not be exercised to interfere with ongoing reassessment proceedings unless there are compelling reasons, and parties should generally be relegated to the statutory remedies available.
The High Court held that there is no bar for the assessing authority to issue more than one notice under Section 142(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The court reasoned that since the previous assessment order was set aside and the process was directed to be redone, if the authority possessed information or material regarding other unexplained income of the petitioner, it was well within its power to ask for explanations concerning those incomes. Therefore, the impugned notices could not be considered as being without jurisdiction. The court found no substance in the petitioner's submission and dismissed the writ petition.
The High Court held that the petitioner had not approached the Settlement Commission with clean hands and had failed to disclose true and correct facts. The Court found that the petitioner had not adduced any reason or basis for apportioning the undisclosed income between himself and M/s Hailstone Innovations Private Limited, nor did he explain the difference between the unaccounted sales calculated by the Principal Commissioner and that computed by himself. The Settlement Commission's view that the petitioner had not fulfilled the conditions prescribed in Section 245C(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was upheld. The Court found no grounds to interfere with the reasoned order of the Commission. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Court found no error apparent on the face of the record to warrant a review of its previous judgment. It reiterated that the previous judgment considered all relevant documents and submissions, and review jurisdiction is limited to correcting clear errors, not rehearing the case.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition, finding it not maintainable. While acknowledging that Rule 24 of the ITAT Rules, 1963, requires the Tribunal to decide appeals on merits even if a party is absent, the Court considered the petitioner's gross delay and latches. The petitioner filed the appeal before the ITAT, which was dismissed for non-prosecution on 24.10.2016. A miscellaneous petition to recall this order was filed after approximately three years, on 09.04.2019. This application was rejected by the ITAT on 23.08.2019, citing the lack of power to condone the delay in filing the miscellaneous application, as it was filed with a delay of over three years against a six-month limitation period. The Court found that the petitioner's subsequent approach to the High Court via writ petition after such significant delays rendered the writ petition itself not maintainable. No specific finding was made on the merits of the original appeal concerning Sections 10A or 10B.
The High Court found no grounds to entertain the writ petition on the stated facts. The court dismissed the writ petition. However, it directed the 2nd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) to consider the stay petition expeditiously, preferably within four months. The court explicitly stated that no interim order was passed by it staying the recovery or penalty proceedings. The ratio decidendi is that a writ petition for stay of demand is not the appropriate remedy when the assessee has delayed in filing a stay application before the appellate authority and has not deposited any tax, especially when the appellate authority is yet to consider the stay petition.
The High Court held that the impugned order passed by the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax was prima facie incorrect. The Court noted that the petitioner had indeed filed written submissions on November 3, 2023, which were to be considered before deciding the application for condoning the 7-day delay in filing the return. The impugned order erroneously stated that neither the petitioner appeared nor filed written submissions. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned order. The matter was remitted back to the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala, for passing a fresh order. The petitioner was granted liberty to file fresh written submissions within one week from the date of the order, and the petitioner was to be served notice of hearing. The fresh order was to be passed expeditiously after considering the petitioner's submissions.
The High Court held that the question of whether the petitioner's explanation for the cash deposits is correct is a matter to be considered during the assessment proceedings after the return is filed. At the initial stage of re-opening under Section 148A, the assessing authority needs to be satisfied that income has escaped assessment. If the period of three years has elapsed from the relevant assessment year, the authority must also ascertain if the escaped income exceeds Rs. 50,00,000/-. In this case, the alleged escaped income was stated to be more than Rs. 50,00,000/-, making the three-year limitation period under Section 149(1)(a) inapplicable. Therefore, the Court found no substance in the writ petition. The operative direction was to dismiss the writ petition.
The High Court modified the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The Court held that when an assessee is relegated to an alternative remedy before a statutory authority, it is incumbent upon the Court to protect the assessee from recovery proceedings pending the disposal of the stay petition or appeal by the appellate authority, whichever is earlier. Accordingly, the Court directed that recovery proceedings against the appellant for the amounts confirmed by Ext.P13 order shall be kept in abeyance pending the disposal of the stay petition or appeal by the appellate authority. The Court also directed that the application for early hearing of the appeal (Ext.P19) should be considered by the Commissioner of Income-Tax in accordance with law. The rest of the directions in the impugned judgment were not interfered with.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction. The court directed the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) to consider and pass orders on the stay application (Ext.P8) after providing the petitioner with an opportunity of hearing. This consideration and order are to be completed within two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment. Furthermore, the court ordered that any demand arising from the assessment order (Ext.P1) shall be kept in abeyance until orders are passed on the stay application. The court did not decide on the merits of the assessment order itself, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of the stay application.
The High Court held that the petitioner's stand was not tenable. It was not disputed that the petitioner himself had provided multiple email IDs. The Court noted that notices of hearing were sent to the latest email ID provided by the petitioner, 'middleeast132@gmail.com', for which the petitioner had also submitted an online response concerning an appeal for assessment year 2017-18. Since the petitioner had responded to communications sent to this email ID, on which several notices for hearing were issued, the Court found no merit in the petitioner's claim of not receiving notices. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed. However, the petitioner was granted liberty to file an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal if aggrieved by the impugned appellate orders.
The High Court held that disputed questions of fact cannot be decided in a writ petition and that the appellant's remedy lies in filing an appeal. The Court granted the appellant ten days to file the appeal and directed the appellate authority to dispose of it within two months without considering the limitation period.
The High Court held that the learned Single Judge was absolutely justified in remitting the matter back to the respondent (ITO) to pass fresh orders after hearing the appellant. The Court noted that the core of the dispute, concerning whether there was a single transaction of ₹30,00,000/- or two such transactions in the relevant financial year, is a disputed question of fact. Such factual disputes cannot be adjudicated in a writ petition. The appellant was advised to raise all his contentions before the respondent during the fresh proceedings. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner expressed a desire to withdraw the writ petition and pursue remedies before the appropriate authority under the Income Tax Act. In light of this submission, the High Court allowed the withdrawal of the writ petition. The court dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn, granting the petitioner liberty to approach the relevant statutory authorities. No decision was made on the merits of any underlying tax dispute. The operative direction was to dismiss the petition as withdrawn.
The High Court held that the impugned assessment orders dated March 23, 2022, were vitiated because the petitioner was not afforded an adequate opportunity to file his responses/replies. The Court noted that it was admitted that the petitioner was not communicated any order declining his requests for time until March 24, 2022, to file his replies. Therefore, the assessment orders were set aside. The petitioner was granted a period of fifteen days from the date of the order to file his response to the show cause notices/pre-assessment notices dated March 4, 2022/March 17, 2022. The Court clarified that no further opportunity would be granted. If the petitioner filed the replies as directed, fresh assessment orders would be passed in accordance with the law. The ratio decidendi is that failure to communicate the rejection of a request for time to respond to notices, leading to non-filing of a response and subsequent ex-parte assessment, violates natural justice.
The High Court of Kerala, after hearing the matter, noted that the learned counsel for the petitioner sought permission to withdraw the writ petition in order to file an appeal. Considering this request, the Court dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn. The Court granted liberty to the petitioner to file an appeal against the impugned assessment order within a period of three weeks from the date of the order. The Court further directed that if an appeal is filed within this period, it shall be considered on its merits, without going into the question of limitation, given that the writ petition had been entertained and an interim order of stay was in operation in favour of the petitioner. No decision was made on the merits of the assessment order itself.
The High Court held that the impugned assessment orders dated March 23, 2022, were vitiated because the petitioner was not afforded an adequate opportunity to file his responses/replies. The Court noted that it was undisputed that the petitioner was not communicated any order declining his requests for time until March 24, 2022, to file his replies. Therefore, the assessment orders were set aside. The petitioner was granted a period of fifteen days to file his response to the show cause notices/pre-assessment notices dated March 4, 2022/March 17, 2022. The Court clarified that no further opportunity would be granted. If the petitioner filed the replies within the stipulated time, fresh assessment orders would be passed in accordance with the law. The writ petitions were disposed of accordingly.
The High Court of Kerala disposed of the writ petition by directing the appellate authority to consider and pass appropriate orders on the petitioner's applications for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and for interim stay. This consideration should be done expeditiously, preferably within four months, provided these applications are pending along with the appeal before the National Faceless Appeal Centre. The Court did not decide on the merits of the appeal or the applications themselves, but rather directed the appellate authority to proceed with them. No issue was expressly left undecided.