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The Tribunal affirmed the disallowance of the claim as revenue expenditure, stating that Explanation-1 to Section 32(1) applies to capital expenditure on leased buildings, and depreciation would be allowed. The High Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's order.
The High Court held that the matter should be remanded back to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal for a fresh consideration on merits. The Court found that the ITAT had not considered the assessee's claim for depreciation on spare parts on merits, citing the non-production of evidence as the reason. However, the Court noted that evidence supporting the claim had actually been filed before the Tribunal via an e-mail (Annexure E), which was produced before the High Court. Therefore, to serve the ends of justice, the High Court set aside the ITAT's common order on the issue of depreciation for the relevant assessment years. The ITAT is directed to pass fresh orders after considering the evidence produced by the assessee, within three months of receiving a copy of the judgment. The assessee is also directed to furnish a fresh set of documents related to Annexure E to the Tribunal within two weeks. The Court clarified that other issues decided by the ITAT, which are not impugned in these appeals, are to be treated as finally decided.
The High Court found that evidence supporting the claim for depreciation had indeed been filed before the ITAT via email. Therefore, the matter was remanded back to the ITAT for a fresh consideration on merits.
The High Court modified the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge. While upholding the direction for the First Respondent (Commissioner of Income-Tax (Exemptions)) to dispose of the applications under Section 119 of the Income Tax Act within a specified time, the Court found the direction to pay 20% of the assessed amounts pending consideration of stay and delay condonation applications to be legally unsustainable. The Court reasoned that the appellant had made out a prima facie case warranting protection from recovery of disputed demands. Accordingly, the recovery of amounts confirmed by the assessment orders was kept in abeyance until the Fifth Respondent (National Faceless Appeal Centre) passed orders on the delay condonation and stay applications. The Fifth Respondent was directed to consider these applications along with the appeals within two months from the date of receipt of the judgment.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court held that the penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) could not be legally sustained. Firstly, the Court agreed with the ITAT that the notice proposing the penalty was inherently defective as it failed to specify the exact ground (concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars) on which the penalty was being levied, rendering it bad in law. Secondly, and more importantly, the Court found that the essential preconditions for invoking Section 271(1)(c) were not established. The assessee had voluntarily disclosed the error in the computation of capital gains and paid the differential tax and interest well before the issuance of the Section 148 notice. The Court reasoned that in such a scenario, where the assessee proactively admits and rectifies the mistake, the Assessing Authority is effectively estopped from claiming satisfaction of concealment or inaccurate particulars. To penalize an assessee who honestly discloses their tax liability before it is determined by the authority would be unfair and discourage voluntary disclosures. The payment of interest adequately compensated the exchequer, and further penalization would be an act of overkill. The Court also referred to Explanation 1 to Section 271, noting that a bona fide explanation, if substantiated, would not attract penalty. Therefore, the additional income disclosed by the assessee could not be treated as concealed income for the purposes of Section 271(1)(c). The questions of law were answered against the Revenue.
The High Court of Kerala, in its limited writ jurisdiction, directed the 3rd respondent, the Income Tax Commissioner (Appeals), to take up and dispose of the appeal (Ext.P4) and the stay petition (Ext.P5) filed by the petitioner. The Court ordered that the stay petition should be heard and disposed of within two months. As an interim measure, coercive steps for recovery of the demand were ordered to be kept in abeyance until the disposal of the stay petition. The Court did not delve into the merits of the assessment order or the appeal itself, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of expediting the appellate process. The ratio decidendi is that when a taxpayer has a pending appeal and stay petition before the appellate authority, and there is a prayer for expeditious disposal, the High Court can direct the authority to consider the same within a stipulated timeframe, while keeping coercive steps in abeyance.
The High Court admitted the writ petition and directed the 3rd respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to take up the appeal (Ext.P2) and the stay petition (Ext.P3) filed by the petitioner. The court ordered that the stay petition be heard and disposed of within two months from the date of the order. Furthermore, the court directed that coercive steps for recovery of any demand shall be kept in abeyance until the disposal of the stay petition. The court did not decide on the merits of the appeal or the assessment order.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with a specific direction to the 3rd respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to take up the stay petition (Ext.P4) filed by the petitioner. The 3rd respondent was ordered to pass orders on the stay petition after providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. This directive was to be complied with within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. Furthermore, the Court ordered that all further proceedings pursuant to the impugned order (Ext.P1) shall be kept in abeyance until orders are passed on the stay petition as directed. The High Court did not decide on the merits of the original appeal or the stay petition.
The High Court, after hearing both sides, was inclined to dispose of the writ petition with a specific direction. The Tribunal directed the third respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), NFAC, Delhi) to take up the stay petition (Ext.P3) and dispose of it within an outer limit of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. Furthermore, until a decision is taken on the stay petition, all coercive steps pursuant to the penalty order (Ext.P1) were directed to be kept in abeyance. The court did not decide on the merits of the appeal itself, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of expediting the stay petition.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the 1st respondent (National Faceless Appeal Centre) to take up the petitioner's appeal (Ext.P2) and pass appropriate orders thereon in accordance with law within an outer limit of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. The Court also directed that an opportunity of being heard be afforded to the petitioner. Furthermore, all coercive steps pursuant to Ext.P1 (the assessment order) were to be kept in abeyance until a decision is taken on the appeal. The principle established is that courts can direct authorities to expedite pending appeals within a reasonable timeframe, ensuring due process.
The High Court of Kerala, after hearing both sides, inclined to dispose of the writ petition with a specific direction. The court directed the 3rd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) to take up the stay petition (Ext.P4) and pass orders thereon within an outer limit of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. Furthermore, the court ordered that all proceedings pursuant to the order of assessment (Ext.P2) shall be kept in abeyance until a decision is taken on the stay petition as directed. The court did not decide on the merits of the appeal itself, but rather on the procedural aspect of ensuring a timely decision on the stay application.
The High Court, after hearing both sides, is inclined to dispose of the writ petition by directing the 3rd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) to take up the stay petition (Ext.P4) and pass appropriate orders thereon within an outer limit of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. Furthermore, the Court directed that all further proceedings pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P1) shall be kept in abeyance until a decision is taken on the stay petition as directed. The Court did not decide on the merits of the assessment order or the appeal itself, focusing solely on the procedural aspect of the pending stay petition.
The High Court of Kerala disposed of the writ petition with a specific direction to the 3rd respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre. The 3rd respondent was directed to take up the stay petition (Ext.P4) and pass orders thereon. This decision was to be made after providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The court set a timeline of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment for the 3rd respondent to pass these orders. Furthermore, the court ordered that all further proceedings pursuant to Ext.P1 shall be kept in abeyance until orders are passed on the stay petition as directed. The court did not decide on the merits of the appeal or the stay petition itself, but rather directed the authority to consider it.
The High Court directed the 3rd respondent, the Income Tax Commissioner (Appeals), to dispose of the petitioner's appeal (Ext.P4) on its merits, in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. Furthermore, the Court ordered that no coercive steps shall be initiated against the petitioner pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P2) and demand notice (Ext.P3) until the disposal of the appeal. The Court did not decide on the merits of the assessment order or the demand notice, as the primary focus was on the procedural aspect of appeal disposal.
The High Court of Kerala disposed of the writ petition with a specific direction to the 3rd respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-3. The Tribunal directed the 3rd respondent to consider and pass orders on the stay petitions (Exts.P7 to P9) within a period of two months from the date of the order. Furthermore, the Court ordered that the recovery proceedings against the petitioner for the amounts confirmed by the assessment orders (Exts.P1 to P3) shall be kept in abeyance until orders are passed on the stay petitions. The appeals themselves were not decided on merits, but the interim relief of staying recovery was granted pending disposal of stay petitions.
The High Court of Kerala disposed of the writ petition with a specific direction to the 1st respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The Tribunal directed the 1st respondent to consider and pass orders on the petitioner's stay petition (Ext.P4) within a period of two months from the date of the order. Furthermore, the Court ordered that recovery proceedings against the petitioner for the amount confirmed by the assessment order (Ext.P1) shall be kept in abeyance until the stay petition is decided. The appeal itself (Ext.P3) was not directly addressed in terms of its disposal timeline, but the stay petition's consideration was prioritized to provide interim relief. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court of Kerala disposed of the writ petition with a direction to the 4th respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), NFAC, to dispose of the stay application (Ext.P8) within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. The Court also ordered that recovery proceedings against the petitioner for the amount confirmed by the assessment order (Ext.P2) shall be kept in abeyance until the stay application is decided. The principle established is that appellate authorities should consider stay applications expeditiously, and recovery can be deferred pending such consideration.
The High Court held that since the appeal (Ext.P5) and stay petition (Ext.P6) are pending before the respondent, a decision thereon should be taken within a time limit. The Court found that the fact that an amount higher than that demanded in Ext.P4 has already been seized from the petitioner is a significant reason to grant a temporary stay on recovery proceedings. Accordingly, the respondent was directed to consider and pass appropriate orders on the stay petition (Ext.P6) within one month from the date of receiving a copy of the judgment. Until a decision is taken on the stay petition, recovery proceedings pursuant to Ext.P4 are to be kept in abeyance. No specific finding was made on the merits of the appeal itself.
The High Court of Kerala disposed of the writ petition by directing the 3rd respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), NFAC, to consider and pass orders on the stay applications (Exts.P5 and P6) filed by the petitioner. This consideration must be done after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Furthermore, the Court ordered that any proceedings for the recovery of amounts due under the assessment orders (Exts.P1 and P2) shall be kept in abeyance until such time as orders are passed on the stay applications. The petitioner is required to produce a certified copy of the judgment before the 3rd respondent for compliance. No specific finding was made on the merits of the assessment orders themselves.
The High Court decided not to delve into the merits of the assessment or the appeals. Instead, it focused on the procedural aspect of the pending stay petition before the ITAT. The Court directed the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (4th respondent) to consider and pass orders on the stay petition (Ext.P6) within a period of two months from the date of receiving a copy of the judgment. Furthermore, the Court ordered that all coercive proceedings against the petitioner concerning the assessment order (Ext.P1), the order of the Additional Commissioner (Ext.P3), and the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) (Ext.P4) shall be kept in abeyance until a decision is taken on the stay petition. The High Court did not decide on the substantive issues of the appeal.
The High Court of Kerala, after considering the submissions of both the petitioner and the respondents, decided to dispose of the writ petition with a specific direction. The Court directed the 3rd respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to consider and pass orders on the appeal filed by the petitioner (Ext.P3) within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. Furthermore, the Court ordered that all coercive proceedings against the petitioner shall be kept in abeyance until such a decision is taken by the appellate authority. The Court did not delve into the merits of the assessment order or the grounds of appeal, focusing solely on ensuring that the appeal process is not prejudiced by coercive actions.
The High Court did not decide the merits of the case. Instead, it acknowledged that the petitioner had already preferred an appeal (Ext.P4) before the first respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)), which was pending consideration. The Court deemed it appropriate to dispose of the writ petition by directing the Appellate Authority to consider the pending appeal in a time-bound manner. The first respondent was directed to consider and pass appropriate orders on Ext.P4 expeditiously, within two months from the date of receiving a certified copy of the judgment. Furthermore, the Court ordered that no coercive steps would be initiated against the petitioner pursuant to the assessment order (Ext.P2) until the disposal of the appeal. No specific issue was left undecided, as the court's action was procedural.
The High Court of Kerala disposed of the writ petition by directing the 3rd respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to consider and pass orders on the stay application (Ext.P3) filed along with the appeal (Ext.P2). This consideration must be done after providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner within three months from the date of receiving a certified copy of the judgment. Crucially, the court ordered that until orders are passed on the stay application, all proceedings for recovery of the amount due under the assessment order (Ext.P1) shall remain suspended. The court did not decide on the merits of the assessment order or the appeal itself, focusing solely on the interim relief sought.
The High Court did not decide the merits of the assessment order or the appeal. Instead, the Court found that the petitioner had already preferred an appeal before the 3rd respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)) and that this appeal was pending. Therefore, the High Court deemed it appropriate to dispose of the writ petition by directing the Appellate Authority to consider the appeal in a time-bound manner. The Court directed the 3rd respondent to consider and pass appropriate orders on Ext.P3 (the appeal) as expeditiously as possible. Additionally, the Court ordered that no coercive steps shall be initiated against the petitioner pursuant to Ext.P2 assessment order until the disposal of the appeal. The issue of whether the petitioner is eligible for deduction under Section 80P was expressly left undecided by the High Court, as it was to be determined by the appellate authority.
The High Court directed the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (1st respondent) to consider and pass necessary orders on the petitioner's application for condonation of delay and the stay application expeditiously, preferably within two months. The Court further ordered that the demand arising from the assessment order (Exhibit P1) shall remain stayed until a decision is made on the condonation of delay and stay petition. This stay is conditional upon the petitioner depositing 15% of the total demand as per the assessment order within one week from the date of the order. The writ petition was disposed of with these directions. The issue of quashing the demand notice was not decided on merits but was linked to the outcome of the pending applications before the appellate authority.
The High Court held that the assessment order dated 13.03.2024 suffered from a violation of the principles of natural justice. The Court noted that the petitioner was not provided an effective hearing due to technical failures on the Department's part, which prevented the petitioner from logging in and presenting their arguments. The Revenue's counsel could not dispute the evidence supporting this claim. Consequently, the impugned assessment order was set aside. The matter was remitted back to the second respondent (Assessment Unit Income Tax Department) to provide the petitioner with a fresh link, intimating the date and time for a hearing. After hearing the petitioner, the assessment order was to be finalized expeditiously in accordance with the law. No other issues were expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the writ petition had become infructuous. The reasoning was based on an order passed in another writ petition, W.P.(C.) No.14760 of 2024. The Court stated that in view of that order, nothing survived in the present writ petition. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as infructuous. The ratio decidendi is that if a subsequent event or order renders a pending writ petition moot, the Court will dismiss it as infructuous. No specific relief was granted to the assessee, nor was any issue decided on merits. The operative direction was the dismissal of the writ petition.
The High Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction to the first respondent, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), to consider and pass orders on the stay petitions filed by the petitioners (Exts.P10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22 & 24) along with the Income Tax Appeals before him. The Court directed that this should be done expeditiously, preferably within a period of three months. Furthermore, the Court ordered that no coercive steps should be taken against the petitioners in pursuance to the assessment orders (Exts.P1 to P8) until the disposal of the stay petitions. The court did not decide on the merits of the assessment orders or the validity of the pre-deposit requirement, but rather focused on expediting the appellate process and ensuring no coercive action during that period.
The High Court considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, who expressed a desire to withdraw the writ petition. Based on this submission, the Court decided to dismiss the writ petition as withdrawn. There was no decision on the merits of any underlying tax dispute. The operative direction was solely to dismiss the petition as withdrawn.
The High Court held that the impugned assessment order suffers from a violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner had explicitly opted for a hearing through video conferencing in their reply dated March 23, 2024, to the additional show cause notice dated March 22, 2024. Since this opportunity was not provided before the assessment order was passed, the order was deemed to be vitiated. The Court set aside the impugned assessment order and directed the Assessing Authority to provide a link to the petitioner for addressing their arguments and pass appropriate orders in accordance with the law expeditiously. The petitioner was directed to utilize the opportunity provided in compliance with this judgment. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court noted that the questions of law raised in these appeals were already decided in favour of the assessee by a Supreme Court judgment. Therefore, the appeals were allowed based on that precedent.
The High Court noted that the questions of law raised in these appeals were already decided in favour of the assessee by a Supreme Court judgment. Therefore, the appeals were allowed based on that precedent.
The High Court held that since the learned Single Judge had directed the appellant to pursue the alternate remedy before the statutory authority, it was incumbent upon the learned Judge to protect the appellant from recovery proceedings while her application was pending before the Appellate Authority. Consequently, the Court modified the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge to the extent that pending the disposal of the stay application or appeal, whichever is earlier, by the appellate authority, recovery proceedings against the appellant for the amounts confirmed by the assessment order shall be kept in abeyance. The rest of the directions in the impugned judgment were not interfered with.
The High Court noted that the questions of law raised in these appeals were already decided in favour of the assessee by a Supreme Court judgment. Therefore, the appeals were allowed based on that precedent.
The High Court held that the appellant was indeed given ample opportunity to respond to the show cause notices and hearing notices, as well as to file returns under Section 142 of the Income Tax Act. The assessment order (Ext.P7) was passed only because the appellant did not respond to the notices issued by the Department. Consequently, the Court found no reason to interfere with the learned Single Judge's decision, which had relegated the appellant to his alternate remedy of filing an appeal against the assessment order before the Appellate Authority under the Income Tax Act. The ratio decidendi is that failure to respond to statutory notices, despite ample opportunity, disentitles an assessee from claiming a violation of natural justice in the subsequent ex-parte assessment.
The High Court noted that the questions of law raised in these appeals were already decided in favour of the assessee by a Supreme Court judgment. Therefore, the appeals were allowed based on that precedent.
The High Court allowed the writ appeal and the writ petition unconditionally. The Court held that the orders passed under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Exts.P6 and P7), were liable to be quashed. The Court found merit in the appellant's contention that the reassessment proceedings were unsustainable. This was based on the fact that the deposits, which formed the basis for initiating reassessment against the appellant, had been treated as unexplained investments of third parties, Mr. Rejilal, Sajilal, and Pankajam, under Section 69 of the IT Act. The Court questioned the continuation of reassessment proceedings against the appellant when the income had already been assessed in the hands of these third parties, particularly since the assessment against them was not a protective one. Consequently, the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge, which remanded the matter for fresh orders under Section 148A(d), was set aside. The Court also quashed consequential orders (Exts.P8 and P9, and Annexures A and B).
The High Court found a mismatch between the petitioner's submission of documents and the department's stand in the impugned order. The Court noted that the department's order suggested the petitioner did not submit documents on the date fixed for hearing (22.11.2022). Considering this discrepancy, the Court concluded that a mistake or omission had occurred in the impugned order. Consequently, the order was set aside. The writ petition was allowed, and the matter was remitted back to the respondent (Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption)) to reconsider the petitioner's application (Ext.P2) afresh. The petitioner was permitted to appear before the respondent with all relevant documents on 09.04.2024. The principle established is that procedural lapses or factual inaccuracies in the assessment order leading to rejection of an application warrant reconsideration.
The High Court held that for the issue concerning the payment of Rs. 14,54,59,169/- for construction of infrastructure, there was evidence of construction activity carried out by the assessees, and the payments were for the construction of buildings for establishing an educational institution. Therefore, it could not be said that there was no construction activity or that payments were not made towards construction. This ground of appeal by the assessee was allowed. For the issue concerning the deletion of additions of Rs. 8 crores each received as compensation for relinquishment of trusteeship, the Court noted that the payments were made to the St. Thomas Education Trust and not to the trustees in their individual names. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s view, upheld by the Tribunal, that the amount could not be considered income in the hands of the trustees was not interfered with. Consequently, the appeals related to this issue were dismissed. The Court also noted that some appeals were partly allowed by way of remand.
The High Court held that for the issue concerning the payment of Rs. 14,54,59,169/- for construction of infrastructure, there was evidence of construction activity carried out by the assessees, and the payments were for the construction of buildings for establishing an educational institution. Therefore, it could not be said that there was no construction activity or that payments were not made towards construction. This ground of appeal by the assessee was allowed. For the issue concerning the deletion of additions of Rs. 8 crores each received as compensation for relinquishment of trusteeship, the Court noted that the payments were made to the St. Thomas Education Trust and not to the trustees in their individual names. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s view, upheld by the Tribunal, that the amount could not be considered income in the hands of the trustees was not interfered with. Consequently, the appeals related to this issue were dismissed. The Court also noted that some appeals were partly allowed by way of remand.
The High Court held that payments made for construction of buildings for an educational institution were not a diversion of funds and allowed the appeals on this ground. However, it upheld the Tribunal's view that donations received by a trust, not paid to trustees individually, were not taxable in the hands of the trustees.
The High Court held that payments made for construction of buildings for an educational institution were not a diversion of funds and allowed the appeals on this ground. However, it upheld the Tribunal's view that donations received by a trust, not paid to trustees individually, were not taxable in the hands of the trustees.
The High Court held that payments made for construction of buildings for an educational institution were not a diversion of funds and allowed the appeals on this ground. However, it upheld the Tribunal's view that donations received by a trust, not paid to trustees individually, were not taxable in the hands of the trustees.
The High Court dismissed ITA Nos. 54/2020, 55/2020, 56/2020, 68/2020, and 6/2021, answering the substantial questions of law against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. The Court found no reason to differ from the CIT(A) and the Tribunal's view that the payments in question were made to the trust and not to the trustees in their individual names, thus not taxable in the hands of the assessees as compensation for relinquishment of trusteeship or as diverted sale consideration. For ITA Nos. 46/2020, 48/2020, 49/2020, and 51/2020, the appeals were partly allowed by way of remand. The substantial questions of law, other than those remanded to the Tribunal, were answered against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. ITA No. 47/2020 was allowed by way of remand on specific questions. The reasoning for the dismissal of the first set of appeals was that the payments were made to the trust, not the individuals, and the Tribunal's finding was upheld. The remand orders indicate that certain issues require further examination by the Tribunal.
The High Court held that for the issue concerning the payment of Rs. 14,54,59,169/- for construction of infrastructure, there was evidence of construction activity carried out by the assessees, and the payments were for the construction of buildings for establishing an educational institution. Therefore, it could not be said that there was no construction activity or that payments were not made towards construction. This ground of appeal by the assessee was allowed. For the issue concerning the deletion of additions of Rs. 8 crores each received as compensation for relinquishment of trusteeship, the Court noted that the payments were made to the St. Thomas Education Trust and not to the trustees in their individual names. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s view, upheld by the Tribunal, that the amount could not be considered income in the hands of the trustees was not interfered with. Consequently, the appeals related to this issue were dismissed. The Court also noted that some appeals were partly allowed by way of remand.
The High Court dismissed ITA Nos. 54/2020, 55/2020, 56/2020, 68/2020, and 6/2021, answering the substantial questions of law against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. The Court found no reason to differ from the CIT(A) and the Tribunal's view that the payments in question were made to the trust and not to the trustees in their individual names, thus not taxable in the hands of the assessees as compensation for relinquishment of trusteeship or as diverted sale consideration. For ITA Nos. 46/2020, 48/2020, 49/2020, and 51/2020, the appeals were partly allowed by way of remand. The substantial questions of law, other than those remanded to the Tribunal, were answered against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. ITA No. 47/2020 was allowed by way of remand on specific questions. The reasoning for the dismissal of the first set of appeals was that the payments were made to the trust, not the individuals, and the Tribunal's finding was upheld. The remand orders indicate that certain issues require further examination by the Tribunal.
The High Court held that payments made for construction of buildings for an educational institution were not a diversion of funds and allowed the appeals on this ground. However, it upheld the Tribunal's view that donations received by a trust, not paid to trustees individually, were not taxable in the hands of the trustees.
The High Court held that payments made for construction of buildings for an educational institution were not a diversion of funds and allowed the appeals on this ground. However, it upheld the Tribunal's view that donations received by a trust, not paid to trustees individually, were not taxable in the hands of the trustees.
The High Court held that the assessment order was not barred by limitation. The normal period of limitation for completing the assessment for the assessment year 2021-2022 was nine months from April 1, 2022. However, Section 153(9) read with Explanation 1, Clause XII of the IT Act provides for an exclusion of a period not exceeding 180 days when a search is initiated or a requisition is made under Section 132A, until the seized items are handed over to the Assessing Officer. In this case, 171 days elapsed between the requisition and the handing over of the seized items. Therefore, the Assessing Officer had nine months from April 1, 2022, plus an additional 171 days to complete the assessment, which extended the limitation period up to January 20, 2023. The assessment order was dated June 17, 2022, which fell within this extended period. Consequently, the court found no jurisdictional error in completing the assessment order.