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The High Court held that no substantial question of law was involved in the appeal. It found that the cancellation of the penalty on Rs. 4,49,600/- was based on a question of fact. Consequently, the High Court found no merit in the appeal filed by the Revenue. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. The specific reasoning for the cancellation of the penalty on Rs. 4,49,600/- by the ITAT was not detailed in the High Court's order, but it was characterized as a factual determination. The High Court did not express any opinion on the penalty confirmed on Rs. 1,76,00,000/-.
The High Court held that the date of completion of training and the subsequent order confirming the Sub-Inspectors in service are the crucial dates for determining inter-se seniority. The Court found that the Jharkhand Police Manual does not leave the question of seniority to general principles but deals with it specifically through Rule 689(c). Rule 682(d) also excludes the period of training/probation for seniority calculation, except for pension. The Court distinguished the judgments cited by the respondents, emphasizing the specific provisions within the Police Manual regarding the importance of training completion and confirmation. The Court noted that while private respondents were appointed earlier, their training completion and confirmation were later than the direct recruits. The Court found neither the petitioners' nor the respondents' arguments regarding delays in appointment or training completion persuasive, stating such delays are common in administration. The critical factor is the determination of seniority based on existing rules. Consequently, the impugned seniority list dated September 9, 2024, was quashed and set aside. The respondents were directed to re-arrange and publish a final seniority list treating direct recruit candidates as senior to LDCE candidates, with an exception for direct recruits whose probation was extended, in which case their seniority would be fixed from their confirmation date. This exercise was to be completed within ten weeks.
The High Court held that the questions raised were primarily questions of fact, on which the ITAT had given findings after thorough consideration of the material on record. The Court found no substantial question of law to be framed and decided under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The ITAT's order was considered thoroughly discussed and well-considered. The ITAT had relied on the Supreme Court decision in CIT v. Lovely Exports (P) Ltd., stating that if share application money is received from alleged bogus shareholders whose names are provided, the department can proceed to reopen their individual assessments, and it cannot be regarded as undisclosed income in the hands of the assessee under Section 68. The ITAT also remanded the issue to the AO for fresh adjudication, noting that additions under Section 68 are for amounts received in the relevant financial year and the exact date of receipt was not established. The High Court dismissed the appeal.
The Tribunal held that while Section 140A(3) deems an assessee in default for non-payment of self-assessed tax or interest, the liability to pay interest under Section 220(2) is specifically linked to the service of a demand notice under Section 156. Section 220(1) requires payment within thirty days of the service of such a notice. The judgment notes that all tax liabilities, except advance tax, require a notice under Section 156, and interest accrues only upon failure to comply with this notice. Undisputedly, the notice under Section 156 was issued to the assessee only after the final assessment order dated March 24, 1992. Therefore, the authorities below were correct in holding that the assessee was liable to pay interest only from the date of the order dated March 24, 1992. The Tribunal answered the questions accordingly. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi dismissed the Tax Appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court found that the issue raised by the Revenue regarding the allowability of depreciation on moulds, treated as containers, was already decided by various High Courts. Specifically, the Court referred to the judgment of the Patna High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Steel City Beverages (P) Ltd. (1996) 222 ITR 744 (Pat.), the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Upasna Finance Ltd. (2006) 286 ITR 179 (Mad.), and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Margdarshi Chit Fund (P) Ltd. These decisions, according to the High Court, held that an assessee is entitled to depreciation on new purchases of containers, and by analogy, on moulds. The High Court concluded that the appeal was covered by these precedents and therefore dismissed it. No issues were left undecided.
The High Court held that the issue raised by the appellant (Revenue) is covered by the judgments of various High Courts. Specifically, the Court referred to the decisions of the Patna High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Steel City Beverages (P) Ltd., the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Upasna Finance Ltd., and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Margdarshi Chit Fund (P) Ltd. These judgments, according to the Court, have held that an assessee is entitled to depreciation on new purchases of containers. The Court found that the M.S. Bins in question are also containers. Therefore, based on these precedents, the Tax Appeal was dismissed. The ratio decidendi is that depreciation is allowable on items classified as containers, as established by multiple High Court rulings. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal noted that questions 1 and 2 were already answered in Tax Appeal No. 14/1999R dated June 13, 2012, and thus, these questions were answered in light of that prior decision. For question 3, concerning the deletion of disallowances for community development and sports, recreation, and game expenses, the Tribunal referred to two judgments of the Delhi High Court: CIT vs. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. ([1978] 115 ITR 659) and Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. vs. CIT ([1986] 158 ITR 64). The Tribunal found itself in full agreement with the reasoning of the Delhi High Court in these cases, which had ruled in favour of the assessee. Therefore, question 3 was answered in favour of the assessee. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution. The court noted the consistent absence of the appellant's counsel on multiple dates. Furthermore, the court observed that the question of law involved in this tax appeal no longer survives, referencing a decision made on the same day in Tax Appeal No. 40 of 2000. The reasoning for the dismissal is primarily the failure to prosecute the appeal and the mootness of the legal question.
The Court noted that questions 1, 2, and 4 had already been answered by this Court in a previous Tax Appeal (No. 14 of 1999(R)) between the same parties, vide order dated 13th June, 2012. Therefore, the Court did not need to provide separate answers for these questions and decided the appeal accordingly. Regarding question 3, concerning the provision for wages, the Court noted the ITAT's finding that the assessee had claimed this expenditure in the books for assessment year 1989-90 and not for assessment year 1990-91. The ITAT held that the assessee was unjustified in claiming it in assessment year 1990-91 and that the expenditure should be taken into account for Section 115J computation, allowing the assessee's appeal on this ground. However, the revenue's counsel could not demonstrate any variation in tax effect arising from this decision. Consequently, the Court deemed it unnecessary to answer question 3 and dismissed the appeal as it did not affect the revenue.
The High Court held that the ITAT's dismissal of the assessee's application under Section 254(2) was justified. While acknowledging the appellant's reliance on Honda Siel Power Products Ltd., the Court found it inapplicable. The ITAT's original order dated November 6, 2009, had explicitly noted the judgments cited by the assessee in paragraph 6 and considered the written submissions. Therefore, it could not be said that the judgments were ignored or not considered. The Court distinguished the present case from Honda Siel Power Products Ltd., where the Tribunal itself had found an oversight of a crucial judgment. In this case, the ITAT's reason for dismissal was not solely that it would amount to a review, but more importantly, that there was no mistake apparent from the record. The Court found that the original order provided reasons for its decisions, and the issues decided were questions of fact or decided with reasoning. Consequently, no question of law was involved, and the appeal lacked merit.
The High Court held that both the CIT(A) and the ITAT ignored the written agreement between the assessee and Hindalco Industries Limited dated 3.4.2003. This agreement stipulated that the company would pay the assessee Rs. 283/- per metric ton for bauxite transportation, inclusive of loading and unloading charges. The CIT(A) and ITAT's finding that the assessee earned Rs. 3/- per metric ton as commission and paid the rest to transporters was contrary to this written agreement. The Court noted that the evidentiary value of a letter dated 1.4.2004 from the New Chotanagpur Truck Owners Association, which mentioned a Rs. 3/- per metric ton commission, was not assessed by the lower authorities and its presence in their records was unclear. Consequently, the orders of the CIT(A) and ITAT were set aside. The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh assessment, considering all available materials, including the letter dated 1.4.2004.
The High Court held that the ITAT was justified in holding that the notice under Section 147 of the Act was issued beyond the provisions of law. The Court found force in the assessee's submission that the case was squarely covered by the Patna High Court's judgment in Hemraj Munshi Ram Vs. Union of India and Ors. In that case, the issuance of notice under Section 148 was found to be without reason and basis because the relevant material was already seized and in the possession of the revenue, and there was no failure by the assessee to disclose material facts. The Court observed that the facts in the present appeals were identical. The Court also noted that the Revenue's argument that the AO had jurisdiction to issue notice under Section 148 to comply with appellate directions was self-contradictory. If there was no bar of limitation after a remand order, then there was no necessity to opt for the mode of issuing notice under Sections 148 and 147. The Court concluded that no question of law was involved and the ITAT had not committed any error. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the appeals were not maintainable because the tax effect in both appeals was less than the prescribed limit of Rs. 04 lakhs for preferring an appeal by the revenue. The Court dismissed the tax appeals on this ground without making any observations on the question of law. The ratio decidendi is that appeals filed by the revenue below the stipulated monetary limit are liable to be dismissed on that procedural ground. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeals.
The High Court held that the appeals were not maintainable because the tax effect in both appeals was less than the prescribed limit of Rs. 04 lakhs for preferring an appeal by the revenue. The Court dismissed the tax appeals on this ground without making any observations on the question of law. The ratio decidendi is that appeals filed by the revenue below the stipulated monetary limit are liable to be dismissed on that procedural ground. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeals.
The High Court held that the ITAT was justified in cancelling the assessment order. The Court found the Revenue's argument that Section 150(1) read with Section 153(2) provided an extended limitation period for complying with appellate directions to be self-contradictory. The Court reasoned that if there was no bar of limitation, there was no necessity for the AO to resort to issuing notices under Sections 148 and 147. The Court noted that the assessment proceedings could have been completed by March 31, 1990, and the AO had two years to do so. The issuance of notice under Section 148 on March 9, 1990, appeared to be a pretext for extending the period of limitation. Furthermore, the Court found force in the assessee's submission, relying on the Patna High Court's decision in Hemraj Munshi Ram, that the issuance of notice under Section 148 was unjustified as the revenue already possessed the seized material and there was no failure on the part of the assessee to disclose material facts. Therefore, the ITAT did not commit any error in holding that the notice under Section 147 was issued beyond the provisions of law.
The High Court held that the question framed for appeal was not a question of law involved in the case. The Court found that the CIT(Appeal) and the ITAT had decided the questions of fact after appreciating the evidence. The Court was of the considered opinion that the findings of these two authorities were not vitiated by non-consideration of material evidence, consideration of irrelevant evidence, or perversity. Therefore, the High Court dismissed the tax appeal. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court held that the ITAT was justified in holding that the notice under Section 147 of the Act was issued beyond the provisions of law. The Court found force in the assessee's submission that the case was squarely covered by the Patna High Court's judgment in Hemraj Munshi Ram Vs. Union of India and Ors. In that case, the issuance of notice under Section 148 was found to be without reason and basis because the relevant material was already seized and in the possession of the revenue, and there was no failure by the assessee to disclose material facts. The Court observed that the facts in the present appeals were identical. The Court also noted that the Revenue's argument that the AO had jurisdiction to issue notice under Section 148 to comply with appellate directions was self-contradictory. If there was no bar of limitation after a remand order, then there was no necessity to opt for the mode of issuing notice under Sections 148 and 147. The Court concluded that no question of law was involved and the ITAT had not committed any error. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the tax appeal filed by the revenue is not maintainable. This decision was based on the undisputed fact presented by the respondent's counsel that the tax effect involved in the appeal was less than Rs. 4 lakhs. The Court found this pecuniary limit to be a decisive factor for the maintainability of the appeal by the revenue. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed on this preliminary ground. No decision was made on the merits of the case.
The High Court held that the ITAT was correct in its findings. Regarding the lease agreements, the Court noted that the provider was responsible for maintenance, and the option to purchase the air conditioners was not exercised in the relevant assessment year. Citing legal principles on hire-purchase versus lease agreements, particularly from Halsbury's Laws of England and the case of Helby v. Mathews, the Court concluded that the agreement was a lease, not a hire-purchase, as there was no binding obligation on the hirer to buy. Therefore, the lease rent was correctly treated as revenue expenditure. Concerning the abandoned project expenditure (Rs. 3,16,490), the Court agreed with the ITAT that it was pre-operational expenditure and thus revenue in nature, as no new industrial asset came into existence, citing judgments like Indo Rama Synthetics (I) Ltd. and C.I.T. v. Graphite India Ltd. The Court also upheld the ITAT's decision to allow employee welfare expenses, noting that a similar issue had already been decided against the revenue in T.A. No. 10 of 2001, where it was held not to be a question of law. All appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the lease agreement was indeed a lease and not a hire-purchase agreement. The Tribunal had considered the relevant terms, including the maintenance obligation of the lessor and the fact that the option to purchase the Air Conditioners for a nominal price was not exercised in the relevant assessment year. Therefore, the transaction was correctly treated as a lease in that year. The Court also held that the expenditure of Rs. 3,16,490/- incurred on the abandoned construction project was revenue expenditure. Citing judgments like Indo Rama Synthetics (I) Ltd. and C.I.T. vs. Graphite India Ltd., the court reasoned that since no new industrial asset came into existence and the project was abandoned due to adverse conditions, it constituted pre-operational or abortive expenditure, not capital expenditure. Regarding employee welfare expenses, the court noted that a similar issue had been decided against the revenue in a prior appeal (Tax Appeal No. 10 of 2001), rendering it not a question of law. Consequently, all appeals were dismissed against the revenue.
The High Court held that the lease agreement was indeed a lease and not a hire-purchase agreement. The Tribunal had considered the relevant terms, including the maintenance obligation of the lessor and the fact that the option to purchase the Air Conditioners for a nominal price was not exercised in the relevant assessment year. Therefore, the transaction was correctly treated as a lease in that year. The Court also held that the expenditure of Rs. 3,16,490/- incurred on the abandoned construction project was revenue expenditure. Citing judgments like Indo Rama Synthetics (I) Ltd. and C.I.T. vs. Graphite India Ltd., the court reasoned that since no new industrial asset came into existence and the project was abandoned due to adverse conditions, it constituted pre-operational or abortive expenditure, not capital expenditure. Regarding employee welfare expenses, the court noted that a similar issue had been decided against the revenue in a prior appeal (Tax Appeal No. 10 of 2001), rendering it not a question of law. Consequently, all appeals were dismissed against the revenue.
The High Court held that the ITAT was correct in its findings. Regarding the lease agreements, the Court noted that the provider was responsible for maintenance, and the option to purchase was not exercised in the relevant year, thus it remained a lease agreement and not a sale. The Court cited Halsbury's Laws of England and the case of Helby V. Mathews (1895) AC 471 to emphasize that a hire agreement with an option to buy, where the hirer is not legally obligated to buy, is not a hire-purchase agreement. Therefore, the lease rent was rightly treated as revenue expenditure. On the issue of abortive expenditure for the abandoned project, the Court agreed with the Tribunal that since no new industrial asset came into existence and the expenditure was pre-operational, it was revenue in nature. The Court also upheld the Tribunal's decision allowing expenses for employee get-togethers, etc., as revenue expenditure, noting that a similar issue had been decided against the revenue and was not considered a question of law. The subsidy paid to the school was also allowed as revenue expenditure, being in consonance with welfare schemes and supported by the Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. judgment.
The High Court held that the lease agreements were indeed lease agreements and not hire-purchase agreements. The Tribunal's finding was upheld because the agreement stipulated that the provider of the air conditioners was responsible for their maintenance, and the assessee had an option to purchase at a nominal price, which was not exercised in the relevant year. The transaction was therefore correctly treated as a lease, not a sale, in that year. The court cited Halsbury's Laws of England and the case of Helby v. Mathews to distinguish between hire-purchase and lease agreements, emphasizing the absence of a binding obligation to buy in a lease with an option. Regarding the abandoned project expenditure of Rs. 3,16,490, the Tribunal was justified in treating it as revenue expenditure. The court reasoned that since no new industrial asset came into existence and the project was abandoned due to adverse conditions, the pre-operational expenditure was revenue in nature, aligning with the ratio in Indo Rama Synthetics (I) Ltd. and Graphite India Ltd. Finally, the expenses for employee get-togethers, picnics, etc., were held to be revenue expenditure, consistent with a previous decision of the same court in CIT vs. M/s. Tata Robin Fraser Ltd. (Tax Appeal No. 10 of 2001), where it was held that such issues did not even raise a question of law. The appeals were answered against the revenue.
The High Court held that the ITAT erred in concluding that the AO did not make impugned additions under the regular provisions of the Act (Section 143(3)). The Court found that the AO's assessment order, in its operative part and reasoning, clearly indicated an assessment under Section 143(3), despite a contradictory line about Section 115JB. The Court also held that the ITAT committed an error of law in upholding the deletion of additions of Rs. 7,49,672/- and Rs. 34,44,754/-. The Court observed that the AO should have considered the assessee's plea under Section 115JB before proceeding under Section 143(3), especially since the assessee had shown a significant book profit. Consequently, the Court set aside the orders of the Tribunal, CIT(Appeal), and the AO. The matter was remanded to the AO for fresh consideration to decide whether the assessment should be made under Section 115JB or Section 143(3). The ratio is that an assessment order cannot simultaneously be under Section 143(3) and Section 115JB; the AO must determine the correct provision and proceed accordingly, considering the assessee's claims.
The High Court held that the initiation of proceedings under Section 271(1)(C) was not justified. The Court perused the final assessment order dated 24.03.1992 and found that no adverse finding was recorded against the assessee regarding concealment of any amount. The assessment order showed that the total income was recomputed, and certain additions were disallowed as the explanation furnished by the assessee was accepted. The Court noted that Section 271(1) requires the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer in the course of any proceeding regarding concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars. The Court found no evidence of the AO's intention or satisfaction that the assessee had concealed income or furnished inaccurate particulars. The Court also observed that the assessee's revised return showing a profit of 27.5% was accepted, which included the Rs. 50 lakh deposit. Therefore, the Court concluded that there was no question of law and the initiation of penalty proceedings was not justified. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the appeal involved no question of law. The Tribunal had upheld the findings of the CIT(Appeals), who had noted that the AO had not provided reasons for not accepting the assessee's explanation regarding the seized papers. The CIT(Appeals) found that the notations pertained to the arrangement of funds for margin money for a loan to purchase CT and MRI machines, which was verifiable from the books of account. The CIT(Appeals) also observed that while Rs. 36,00,000/- was alleged to be paid based on the seized paper, no further details were available, no statement was recorded, and there was no material to hold that the assessee company had made an undisclosed investment. The revenue's argument that the mention of 'Mithlesh Singh' warranted a presumption of a property transaction was rejected by the High Court as being without any further inquiry or material on record. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the issue of whether particular articles were gift articles used as incentives for business promotion was decided by the ITAT after considering the facts, and it was substantially a question of fact. The ITAT had found that the gift articles bore the company's official rubber stamp, indicating their use for incentive and promotion. The ITAT also held that Section 37(2A) of the Income Tax Act, which was omitted by the Finance Act, 1992, with effect from April 1, 1993, had no effect, and the assessee was entitled to the benefit under Section 37(2A). The Court found no error in the ITAT's impugned order and concluded that the appeal had no merit.
The High Court held that the ITAT's decision regarding gift articles used as incentives for business promotion was based on a consideration of the facts, specifically the presence of the company's official rubber stamp on the articles, which indicated their promotional purpose. The Court found this to be substantially a question of fact and saw no error in the ITAT's conclusion that the assessee was entitled to the benefit, except for Rs. 6,454/- which the assessee disowned. Regarding entertainment expenditure, the ITAT held that Section 37(2A) of the Income Tax Act, despite its omission by the Finance Act, 1992, with effect from April 1, 1993, was applicable, and remanded the matter to the AO for necessary computation. The Court found no error in the ITAT's impugned order on this point either, stating that the omission of Section 37(2A) had no effect and the assessee was entitled to the benefit. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the ITAT's decision regarding gift articles used as incentives for business promotion was based on a consideration of the facts, specifically the presence of the company's official rubber stamp on the articles, which indicated their promotional purpose. The Court found this to be substantially a question of fact and saw no error in the ITAT's conclusion that the assessee was entitled to the benefit, except for Rs. 6,454/- which the assessee disowned. Regarding entertainment expenditure, the ITAT held that Section 37(2A) of the Income Tax Act, despite its omission by the Finance Act, 1992, with effect from April 1, 1993, was applicable, and remanded the matter to the AO for necessary computation. The Court found no error in the ITAT's impugned order on this point either, stating that the omission of Section 37(2A) had no effect and the assessee was entitled to the benefit. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the issue regarding gift articles used as incentives for business promotion was a question of fact, which the ITAT had decided after considering the case's facts. The Tribunal's finding that the gift articles, despite lacking a company logo but bearing an official rubber stamp, were for business promotion and incentive was upheld. The ITAT had allowed the claim of Rs. 8,24,007/- (less Rs. 6,454/- disowned by the assessee), relying on earlier orders and finding an element of advertisement in the distribution of these articles. Regarding entertainment expenditure, the ITAT held that Section 37(2A) of the IT Act, though omitted by the Finance Act, 1992, with effect from April 1, 1993, was applicable, and remitted the matter to the AO for computation. The Court found no error in the ITAT's impugned order and concluded that the appeal lacked merit.
The High Court held that the doctrine of merger cannot be applied when an appeal is dismissed on the ground of limitation, as such dismissal does not decide the appeal on merits. Therefore, the order of the lower authority remains effective. Regarding the second issue, the Court referred to Section 184(7) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which states that once registration is granted, it is valid for subsequent assessment years unless there is a change in the firm's constitution or failure to furnish a declaration in Form No. 12 within the allowed time. Since the AO granted registration for AY 1987-88 and there was no subsequent disqualification for AY 1988-89, the firm is deemed to be registered for AY 1987-88 and all subsequent years. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the appellant-firm is to be treated as registered from AY 1987-88 and for AY 1988-89.
The High Court held that the lease agreements were indeed lease agreements and not hire-purchase agreements. The Tribunal's finding was upheld because the agreement stipulated that the provider of the air conditioners was responsible for their maintenance, and the assessee had an option to purchase at a nominal price, which was not exercised in the relevant year. The transaction was therefore correctly treated as a lease, not a sale, in that year. The court cited Halsbury's Laws of England and the case of Helby v. Mathews to distinguish between hire-purchase and lease agreements, emphasizing the absence of a binding obligation to buy in a lease with an option. Regarding the abandoned project expenditure of Rs. 3,16,490, the Tribunal was justified in treating it as revenue expenditure. The court reasoned that since no new industrial asset came into existence and the project was abandoned due to adverse conditions, the pre-operational expenditure was revenue in nature, aligning with the ratio in Indo Rama Synthetics (I) Ltd. and Graphite India Ltd. Finally, the expenses for employee get-togethers, picnics, etc., were held to be revenue expenditure, consistent with a previous decision of the same court in CIT vs. M/s. Tata Robin Fraser Ltd. (Tax Appeal No. 10 of 2001), where it was held that such issues did not even raise a question of law. The appeals were answered against the revenue.
The High Court held that the lease agreements were indeed lease agreements and not hire-purchase agreements. The Tribunal's finding was upheld because the agreement stipulated that the provider of the air conditioners was responsible for their maintenance, and the assessee had an option to purchase at a nominal price, which was not exercised in the relevant year. The transaction was therefore correctly treated as a lease, not a sale, in that year. The court cited Halsbury's Laws of England and the case of Helby v. Mathews to distinguish between hire-purchase and lease agreements, emphasizing the absence of a binding obligation to buy in a lease with an option. Regarding the abandoned project expenditure of Rs. 3,16,490, the Tribunal was justified in treating it as revenue expenditure. The court reasoned that since no new industrial asset came into existence and the project was abandoned due to adverse conditions, the pre-operational expenditure was revenue in nature, aligning with the ratio in Indo Rama Synthetics (I) Ltd. and Graphite India Ltd. Finally, the expenses for employee get-togethers, picnics, etc., were held to be revenue expenditure, consistent with a previous decision of the same court in CIT vs. M/s. Tata Robin Fraser Ltd. (Tax Appeal No. 10 of 2001), where it was held that such issues did not even raise a question of law. The appeals were answered against the revenue.