26 orders · Page 1 of 1
The High Court condoned the delay of 06 days in filing the Civil Miscellaneous Petition (C.M.P.) No. 14 of 2017, finding the reasons assigned in the interlocutory application to be acceptable. Subsequently, the Court considered the C.M.P. for restoration of Tax Appeal No. 17 of 2016. The Court found it fit and proper to restore the Letters Patent Appeal, which had been dismissed for default due to non-compliance with the peremptory order dated November 22, 2016. The restoration was granted without issuing notice to the respondent, as the appeal was dismissed at a stage prior to calling upon the respondent. The Tax Appeal No. 17 of 2016 was restored to its original file, subject to the removal of defects within two weeks. The operative direction is the restoration of the appeal.
The High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi granted the appellant's request to withdraw the appeal. The Court's decision was based on the appellant's submission that they wished to withdraw the appeal in light of Circular No. 17/2019, dated 8th August, 2019, which revised the monetary limits for filing appeals. The Tribunal reasoned that since the appellant sought withdrawal based on this circular, the appeal should be dismissed as withdrawn. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn. Pending interlocutory applications were also disposed of.
The Tribunal (High Court) granted the appellant's request to withdraw the appeal. The reasoning provided was based on Circular No. 17/2019, dated 8th August, 2019, issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, which revised the monetary limits for filing appeals. The appeal was accordingly dismissed as withdrawn. Pending interlocutory applications were also disposed of. No decision was made on the merits of the case.
The Tribunal (High Court) allowed the appellant's request to withdraw the appeal. The reasoning was based on the appellant's submission that the withdrawal was sought in view of CBDT Circular No. 17/2019, dated 8th August, 2019, which increased the monetary limits for filing appeals. The High Court accordingly dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. Pending interlocutory applications were also disposed of. No specific finding was made on the merits of the original appeal, as it was withdrawn.
The High Court dismissed the criminal revision. The Court found that the petitioner had claimed a refund of Rs. 35,500 based on a forged TDS Certificate and a housing loan that was never sanctioned. The petitioner's explanation of illiteracy and reliance on an office clerk was not accepted as a valid defence. The Court noted that the complainant (P.W.-4) stated that an inquiry was conducted, and the Bank of India confirmed no housing loan was sanctioned. P.W.-6 also proved the show cause notice and the petitioner's reply, confirming the reliance on forged documents. The Court extracted Sections 277 and 278E of the Income Tax Act, emphasizing that making a false statement in a verification or delivering a false account, knowing it to be false or not believing it to be true, is punishable. The Court found no valid reasons to interfere with the reasoned orders of the trial and appellate courts, holding that the petitioner had claimed a refund based on forged documents without valid explanation. The bail bond of the petitioner was cancelled, and he was directed to surrender within two months to serve the remaining sentence.
The High Court dismissed the criminal revision petition. The Court found that the petitioner had claimed a refund of Rs. 35,875/- based on a forged TDS Certificate and a non-existent housing loan. The complainant (P.W.-4) testified that the TDS Certificate was forged and that the Bank of India confirmed no housing loan existed in the petitioner's name. P.W.-6, the Branch Manager of Bank of India, also deposed that the housing loan account number claimed did not exist. The Court noted that the petitioner had not provided any satisfactory explanation or valid reasons for these claims. The Court extracted Sections 277 and 278E of the Income Tax Act, highlighting the provision for presumption of culpable mental state. The High Court found no valid reasons to interfere with the reasoned orders of the trial court and the appellate court, which had recorded concurrent findings of guilt. The petitioner was directed to surrender within two months to serve the remaining sentence.
The High Court allowed the appellant's (revenue's) request to withdraw both appeals. The reasoning was explicitly stated as being in view of Circular No. 17/2019, dated 8th August, 2019, which enhanced the monetary thresholds for filing appeals. Consequently, the Court dismissed both Tax Appeal No. 5 of 2017 and Tax Appeal No. 7 of 2017 as withdrawn. The pending interlocutory applications were also disposed of accordingly. No decision on the merits of the substantive tax issues was made.
The High Court held that the inter-se seniority between direct recruit Sub-Inspectors and those recruited through LDCE should be determined based on the date of completion of training and the subsequent confirmation of service. The Court found that the Jharkhand Police Manual, specifically Rule 689(c) and Rule 682(d), provides specific guidelines for determining seniority and does not leave it to general principles. Rule 682(d) explicitly excludes the period of training/probation for counting seniority, except for pension purposes. The Court noted that while the LDCE candidates were appointed earlier, their training completion and confirmation of service occurred later than that of the direct recruits. The Court was not impressed by arguments regarding delays in appointment or training, stating such delays are common. The impugned Seniority List dated September 9, 2024, was quashed and set aside. The Court directed the State to re-arrange and publish a Final Seniority List treating direct recruits as senior to LDCE recruits, with a caveat that if a direct recruit's probation was extended, their seniority would be fixed from the date of confirmation. This exercise was to be completed within ten weeks.
The Tribunal granted the appellant's request to withdraw the appeal. The reasoning was based on the Circular No. 17/2019, dated 8th August, 2019, issued by the CBDT, which enhanced the monetary thresholds for filing appeals. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal as withdrawn. Any pending interlocutory applications were also disposed of accordingly. No specific issue was left undecided as the appeal was withdrawn before merits were considered.
The High Court allowed the appellant's request to withdraw the appeal. The Court noted that the appellant sought permission to withdraw the appeal in view of CBDT Circular No. 17/2019, dated 8th August, 2019, which increased the monetary limits for filing appeals. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. All pending interlocutory applications were also disposed of as a consequence of the appeal being withdrawn. The Court did not decide on the merits of the original appeal.
The High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi allowed the appellant's request to withdraw both appeals. The decision was based on the Circular No. 17/2019, which revised the monetary limits for filing income tax appeals. Consequently, both appeals were dismissed as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of the substantive issues of the appeals was made. The ratio decidendi is that appeals can be withdrawn if they no longer meet the revised monetary thresholds for litigation set by the revenue authorities.
The High Court decided both appeals. On the claimant's appeal (M.A. No. 340/2019), the Court allowed it for enhancement. It held that for a deceased child aged 11 years with no earning capacity, a compensation of Rs. 3,75,000/- along with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of institution of the claim case is just and fair. This amount was determined based on principles discussed in various judgments, including National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Farzana and the need for liberal interpretation of the Motor Vehicles Act as a beneficial legislation. The Court directed deduction of any amount already paid and payment of the balance within a reasonable period. Regarding the Insurance Company's appeal (M.A. No. 2/2018), the Court allowed it. It found the Tribunal's decision on Issue No. (IV) to be contrary to the record, holding that there was ample evidence to prove the vehicle was used commercially, as the driver took fare from the claimant. This constituted a violation of the policy terms. Consequently, the Insurance Company was granted the right to recover the award amount from the owner of the offending vehicle after indemnifying the claimant. The delay in filing the appeal was condoned.
The High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi allowed the appellant's request to withdraw both appeals. The decision was based on the Circular No. 17/2019, which revised the monetary limits for filing income tax appeals. Consequently, both appeals were dismissed as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of the substantive issues of the appeals was made. The ratio decidendi is that appeals can be withdrawn if they no longer meet the revised monetary thresholds for litigation set by the revenue authorities.
The Tribunal held that the arguments regarding default in payment of rent were devoid of merit. It found the first appellate court's findings on default to be well-reasoned and based on appreciation of evidence, with no perversity pointed out by the appellants. The Tribunal considered the default in payment of rent to be essentially a question of fact, and therefore, no substantial question of law was involved. Regarding personal necessity, the Tribunal noted the concurrent findings of both lower courts. The trial court had found that the plaintiffs had experience in restaurant business (supported by Exhibit 13 and Exhibit 2) and that the suit premises were best suited for such business. It also held that partial eviction was not possible and that the defendants failed to prove the availability of suitable alternative premises. The first appellate court upheld these findings. The Tribunal concluded that there were concurrent findings on both default and personal necessity, and no perversity in evidence was demonstrated, thus no substantial question of law arose. The appeal was dismissed.