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544 orders · Page 5 of 11
The High Court held that no substantial question of law was involved, let alone requiring interpretation. The court noted the procedural history where the addition made by the AO was set aside by the CIT(A) and affirmed by the ITAT. Furthermore, a subsequent remand to the AO, in light of the decision in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Bharti Hexacom (2014), was also decided in favour of the assessee. The assessee's argument that no penalty could be imposed without a finding of concealment or contumacious conduct, given the setting aside of the addition on merits, was implicitly accepted by the court's finding that no substantial question of law arose. The appeal filed by the Revenue was therefore dismissed.
The High Court set aside the impugned orders of the ITAT in all appeals. For question (A) (taxability of secondment payments as FTS), the Court answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. For question (B) (application of the "Make available" clause for FTS), the Court answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee in ITA 423/2025, allowing that appeal. However, for question (B) in ITA 753/2025, ITA 715/2025, ITA 424/2025, and ITA 760/2025, and for question (C) (applicability of Article 12(5)(e)), the Court deemed it appropriate to remand these issues back to the ITAT for reconsideration. The reasoning for setting aside the ITAT's orders was that the ITAT had overlooked crucial aspects, such as the AO already providing benefits under Article 12(5)(e) for certain services and failing to examine the nature and scope of services that remained chargeable as FTS versus those exempted. The Court noted that the ITAT had made a blanket finding without proper examination of the distinctions between different service categories and the specific applicability of DTAA provisions.
The High Court held that the proceedings were well within the period of limitation. The Court reasoned that the notice under Section 148A(b) was issued on 28.03.2024. The petitioner sought an adjournment on 05.04.2024, and the hearing was deferred to 15.04.2024. As the petitioner's request for a further adjournment on 15.04.2024 was turned down, 15.04.2024 was considered the deemed date of filing the reply. The AO then passed the order under Section 148A(d) and issued the notice under Section 148 on 16.04.2024. According to the sixth proviso to Section 149, the AO had seven days from the deemed date of reply (15.04.2024) to pass the order. Therefore, the last date for passing the order was 22.04.2024. Since the order and notice were issued on 16.04.2024, they were within the prescribed limitation period. The writ petition was dismissed.
The Delhi High Court granted permission to the petitioner to withdraw the writ petitions. The Court noted that the petitioner had received an order dated 20.05.2026 passed under Section 220(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi-7, which, according to the petitioner, redressed their grievance. Based on this submission and the granted permission, the High Court formally dismissed the writ petitions as withdrawn. All pending applications associated with these petitions were also disposed of.
The Delhi High Court granted permission to the petitioner to withdraw the writ petitions. The Court noted that the petitioner's counsel submitted that an order dated 20.05.2026, passed under Section 220(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi-7, had redressed the petitioner's grievance. Based on this submission and the request for withdrawal, the Court allowed the withdrawal. The ratio decidendi is that if a petitioner's grievance, which formed the basis of a writ petition, is subsequently redressed by the concerned authority, the Court may permit the withdrawal of the petition. The Court dismissed the writ petitions as withdrawn and disposed of all pending applications.
The High Court decided to substitute paragraphs 1 and 2 of its earlier order dated 20.05.2026. The substituted paragraphs state that the officer concerned did not understand or know the basic position of law and should have issued the notice under the old Act, specifically Section 536(ii)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 2025. The impugned notice dated 07.04.2026 was quashed, and liberty was granted to issue a fresh notice in accordance with the law. The Court cautioned the Assessing Officer to be careful in the future and directed that a copy of the order be sent to the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax to ensure officers do not file frivolous applications. The application for correction was disposed of.
The Delhi High Court held that substantial compliance had been made by the Income Tax Department, as the petitioner had received the refund and interest under Section 244A. However, the Court directed the Assessing Officer (AO) or the concerned authority to make the payment of applicable statutory interest under Section 244A(1A) of the Act of 1961 within a period of six weeks from the date of the order. The Court also stipulated that if the due interest was not paid by July 15, 2026, the petitioner would be at liberty to apply for the revival of the writ petition. The ratio decidendi is that while partial compliance might be acknowledged, the obligation to pay all statutory interest remains, and failure to do so can lead to the revival of proceedings. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court acknowledged that the issue stands concluded so far as the High Court is concerned, citing its own judgment in Puri Construction Private Limited. However, the Court could neither admit the appeal nor keep it pending indefinitely, as the Supreme Court's final decision might take time. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of with the observation that the fate of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in M/s Florentine Estates Of India Ltd. will bind both parties. Until the Supreme Court decides the matter, the recovery of the disputed demand against the appellant is stayed. If the Supreme Court decides in favour of the assessees, they can move an application to drop the demand. If decided against the assessees, the Department can enforce the demand. No specific finding was given on the merits of the ITAT's order, as the appeal was disposed of on procedural grounds pending the Supreme Court's decision.
The High Court held that no interference was warranted under its limited appellate jurisdiction under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court noted that the assessee's mother, Ms. Ritu Verma, had taken the plea before the authority under the Black Money Act that she was not the beneficial owner, and alternatively, if she was the beneficial owner, the property would devolve upon the assessee, Shriti Verma, after her demise. The Court found that the mere fact that the property was likely to devolve upon the assessee after her mother's demise could not lead to an addition in the assessee's hands for the years under consideration. The apprehension of the revenue regarding a future change in Ms. Ritu Verma's stance was also found to be without substance. Consequently, the appeals were rejected.
The High Court held that no interference was warranted under its limited appellate jurisdiction under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court reasoned that the mere fact that the assessee was likely to inherit the property after her mother's demise did not make the addition taxable in her hands for the years under consideration. The finding that Ms. Ritu Verma was the beneficial owner, as concluded in the proceedings under the Black Money Act, was determinative. The Court found no substance in the revenue's apprehension that Ms. Ritu Verma might change her version later. Consequently, the appeals filed by the revenue were rejected. The operative direction was the rejection of the appeals.
The High Court held that no interference was warranted under its limited appellate jurisdiction under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Regarding the first issue, the Court noted that the assessee's mother, Ms. Ritu Verma, had taken the plea before the authority under the 2015 Act that she was not the beneficial owner, and alternatively, if she were, the property would devolve upon the assessee (her daughter) after her demise. The Court reasoned that the mere fact that the property was likely to devolve upon the assessee after her mother's demise could not change the legal position or justify an addition in the hands of the assessee in the year under consideration. The Court found no substance in the revenue's apprehension that Ms. Ritu Verma could change her version later. Consequently, the appeals were rejected. The operative direction was the rejection of the appeals.
The High Court held that no interference was warranted under its limited appellate jurisdiction under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court reasoned that the mere fact that the assessee's mother, Ms. Ritu Verma, stated that the property would vest in the respondent-assessee after her demise does not change the legal position. Simply because the respondent-assessee is likely to inherit such property, an addition cannot be made in the year under consideration. The Court found no substance in the apprehension expressed by the revenue that Ms. Ritu Verma could change her version later. Therefore, the ITAT's decision to set aside the assessment order was upheld.
The Delhi High Court held that the notice dated 31.03.2024, issued for assessment year 2014-15, was clearly beyond the period of 10 years, if calculated backward from the assessment year 2024-25 (which would be the relevant assessment year if the notice was issued on 31.03.2024). The Court found that the issue was squarely covered by its previous judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1 (Central-1) v. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. (supra). Consequently, the impugned notice was quashed as time-barred. The writ petition was allowed, and pending applications were disposed of.
The High Court held that while the service of notice on the address provided in the PAN or passport of an NRI is generally considered sufficient compliance, the assessment order in this case deserved to be set aside because the petitioner was not heard. The Court reiterated its earlier observation that orders passed contrary to the principles of natural justice can be interfered with under Article 226. The Court noted that the rectification order dated 25.04.2024, which significantly increased the tax demand, was also passed without proper service of notice under Section 154(3), depriving the assessee of a hearing. Therefore, the impugned assessment order dated 31.03.2022, and all consequential demand notices, penalty orders, and recovery proceedings were quashed and set aside. The Assessing Officer was directed to serve a fresh notice in accordance with law and proceed while observing principles of natural justice. The petitioner would not be entitled to plead that the fresh proceedings are time-barred.
The High Court held that the notice impugned, issued on 31.03.2024, for assessment year 2013-14, is clearly beyond the period of 10 years if calculated backward from assessment year 2024-25. The Court found that the issue was squarely covered by its previous judgments, including Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1 (Central-1) v. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. The notice was therefore quashed as time-barred. The writ petition was allowed, and the pending application stood disposed of. The ratio decidendi is that a notice under Section 148 for a past assessment year, if issued beyond the statutory time limits as applicable at the time of issuance, is invalid and liable to be quashed.
The Delhi High Court acknowledged that the issue is concluded so far as the High Court is concerned, referencing its own judgment in Puri Construction Private Limited. However, the Court noted that it cannot keep the present appeals pending indefinitely, as the Supreme Court's final decision may take time. Therefore, the Court disposed of all the appeals by observing that the fate of the Supreme Court's decision in the case of M/s Florentine Estates Of India Ltd. (which is the SLP against the Puri Construction judgment) will bind both parties. Until the Supreme Court decides, the recovery of disputed demand against the appellants is stayed. If the Supreme Court rules in favor of the assessees, they can apply to drop the demand. If the ruling is against the assessees, the Department can enforce the demand. No specific issue was left undecided; the appeals were disposed of based on the pendency before the Supreme Court.
The Delhi High Court held that for the first two issues concerning interest expenditure, the Supreme Court's judgment in National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India v. Alimenta S.A. ([2020] 7 SCR 789), which set aside the arbitrator's award, rendered the question of interest payment moot. Consequently, the provision for interest of Rs. 7,46,44,929/- made by the assessee was to be disallowed. Regarding the third issue, the Court found no error in the ITAT's decision to allow the expenditure of Rs. 42,89,207/- on gifts, boarding, and lodging for the General Body Meeting as business expenditure under Section 37. The Court reasoned that a General Body Meeting is a statutory requirement, and expenditure related to it cannot be deemed non-business. The Assessing Officer cannot question the quantum of such expenditure, and providing usual courtesies like gifts and hospitality is acceptable. The Court answered question 3 in the affirmative, against the Revenue. The appeal was dismissed in totality, with directions for the Assessing Officer to disallow the provision for interest.
The Delhi High Court acknowledged that the matter was concluded so far as the High Court was concerned, referencing its own judgment in Puri Construction Private Limited. However, the Court recognized that the matter was pending before the Supreme Court. The Court declined to keep the appeals pending indefinitely, stating that a final decision from the Supreme Court might take time. Consequently, the High Court disposed of all the appeals with the observation that the fate of the Supreme Court's decision in the case of M/s Florentine Estates Of India Ltd. (which is the SLP against the Puri Construction judgment) would bind both parties. Until the Supreme Court's decision, recovery of disputed demands against the appellants was stayed. The Court further directed that if the Supreme Court decides in favour of the assessees, they can apply to drop the demand, and if against the assessees, the Department can enforce the demand. No specific issue was left undecided; rather, the appeals were disposed of pending the Supreme Court's final verdict.
The High Court held that the Tribunal adopted a correct approach in remanding the matter back to the CIT(A) for deciding the appeal afresh. The Court found that the CIT(A)'s order, which was 27 pages long, contained nothing but a reproduction of the assessee's reply and the Assessing Officer's findings. The CIT(A) had allowed the appeal in just three lines by relying on a previous order for a different assessment year and a different, though group, assessee, without providing any specific reasoning for upturning the Assessing Officer's disallowance of Rs.10,30,65,230/- on account of support service expenses. The Court emphasized that an appellate authority cannot examine the correctness of issues unless the order under challenge is reasoned, as recording of reasons is essential for an order to survive and for the appellate authority to ascertain the basis of the decision. The Court also distinguished the judgment in Arvind Kumar Jaiswal, stating it did not favor the assessee's cause in this instance. The appeal was dismissed, and the pending application was disposed of.
The Delhi High Court acknowledged that, as far as the High Court itself is concerned, the matter stands concluded by its judgment in Puri Construction Private Limited. However, recognizing that the issue is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court decided not to keep the present appeals pending indefinitely. The Court disposed of all appeals by stating that the fate of the judgment from the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Florentine Estates Of India Ltd. (which is the SLP referred to) will bind both parties. Until the Supreme Court decides, recovery of disputed demand against the appellants is stayed. If the Supreme Court rules in favour of the assessees, they can apply to drop the demand. If the Supreme Court rules against the assessees, the Department can enforce the demand. No specific issue was left undecided; rather, the appeals were disposed of pending the Supreme Court's decision.
The Delhi High Court acknowledged that the issue was concluded by its own judgment in Puri Construction Private Limited. However, it also noted that the matter was pending before the Supreme Court, and it could not keep the present appeals pending indefinitely. Consequently, the Court disposed of all the appeals. The fate of the appeals was made contingent upon the Supreme Court's decision in the SLP filed by M/s Florentine Estates Of India Ltd. The Court ordered that recovery of the disputed demand against the appellants shall remain stayed until the Supreme Court's decision. If the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the assessees, they could move an application to drop the demand. Conversely, if the decision was against the assessees, the Department would be free to enforce the demand. No specific issue was left undecided; rather, the resolution of all issues was deferred pending the Supreme Court's verdict.
The High Court acknowledged that the issue regarding TDS on External Development Charges (EDC) stands concluded so far as the High Court is concerned, referencing its own judgment in Puri Construction Private Limited. However, the Court noted that since the matter is pending before the Supreme Court, it cannot keep the present appeals pending indefinitely. Consequently, the Court disposed of all the appeals. The fate of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Florentine Estates Of India Ltd. (in the SLP) will bind both parties. Until the Supreme Court decides the matter, the recovery of the disputed demand against the appellants shall remain stayed. If the Supreme Court decides in favour of the assessees, they can move an application to drop the demand. If the decision is against the assessees, the Department can enforce the demand. No specific issue was left undecided; rather, the appeals were disposed of based on the pendency of the Supreme Court matter.
The Delhi High Court acknowledged that the matter was concluded so far as its own jurisdiction was concerned, referencing the Puri Construction judgment. However, it also noted that the matter was pending before the Supreme Court. The Court found itself unable to keep the present appeals pending indefinitely, as the Supreme Court's final decision might take time. Consequently, the Court disposed of all the appeals by observing that the fate of the judgment to be passed by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Florentine Estates Of India Ltd. (which is the SLP arising from the Puri Construction case) would bind both parties. Until the Supreme Court's decision, the recovery of disputed demands against the appellants was stayed. The Court directed that if the Supreme Court decides in favour of the assessees, they can move the Assessing Officer to drop the demand. Conversely, if the decision is against the assessees, the Department can enforce the demand. No specific issue was left undecided; rather, the appeals were disposed of based on the pending Supreme Court proceedings.
The Delhi High Court acknowledged that, as far as the High Court is concerned, the matter stands concluded by its own judgment in Puri Construction Private Limited. However, the Court noted that since the matter is pending before the Supreme Court, it cannot keep the present appeals pending indefinitely. The Court disposed of all the appeals by observing that the fate of the Supreme Court's decision in the case of M/s Florentine Estates Of India Ltd. (which is the SLP referred to by the appellant) will bind both parties. Until the Supreme Court decides, the recovery of disputed demand against the appellants shall remain stayed. If the Supreme Court decides in favour of the assessees, they can move the Assessing Officer to drop the demand. If the decision is against the assessees, the Department can enforce the demand. No specific finding was given on the merits of the TDS issue itself, as the appeals were disposed of based on the pendency before the Supreme Court.
The Delhi High Court acknowledged that the issue of TDS on External Development Charges stands concluded by its own judgment in Puri Construction Private Limited. However, it also noted that a Special Leave Petition (SLP) is pending before the Supreme Court concerning this matter, and the Supreme Court has granted interim relief. The Court found that it could not indefinitely keep the present appeals pending, as the Supreme Court's final decision might take time. Therefore, the Court disposed of all the appeals with the observation that the outcome of the Supreme Court's decision in the case of M/s Florentine Estates Of India Ltd. (which is related to the SLP) will bind both parties. Until the Supreme Court decides the matter, the recovery of disputed demands against the appellants is stayed. The Court further directed that if the Supreme Court decides in favour of the assessees, they can apply to drop the demand, and if it decides against them, the Department can enforce the demand. No specific issue was left undecided; rather, the appeals were disposed of pending the Supreme Court's decision.
The Delhi High Court acknowledged that the matter was concluded so far as the High Court was concerned, referencing its own judgment in Puri Construction Private Limited. However, the Court noted that it could not keep the present appeals pending indefinitely due to the ongoing proceedings before the Supreme Court. The Court disposed of all the appeals by stating that the final decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Florentine Estates Of India Ltd. (which was the subject of the SLP) would bind both parties. Until the Supreme Court's decision, the recovery of disputed demands against the appellants was stayed. The Court further directed that if the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the assessees, they could apply to drop the demand, and if the ruling was against the assessees, the Department could enforce the demand. No issue was expressly left undecided; the appeals were disposed of pending the Supreme Court's final verdict.
The Delhi High Court acknowledged that, as far as the High Court itself is concerned, the matter stands concluded by its judgment in Puri Construction Private Limited. However, considering that the matter is pending before the Supreme Court, the High Court stated that it cannot keep the present appeals pending indefinitely. The Court disposed of the appeals, stating that the fate of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Florentine Estates Of India Ltd. (which is related to the SLP filed against the Puri Construction judgment) shall bind both parties. Until the Supreme Court decides the matter, the recovery of the disputed demand against the appellant shall remain stayed. If the SLP is decided in favor of the assessees, they can move an application to drop the demand. If decided against the assessees, the Department can enforce the demand. The right of the appellant to approach the Supreme Court remains reserved.
The High Court acknowledged that, so far as the High Court was concerned, the matter was concluded by its own judgment. However, it noted that since the matter was pending before the Supreme Court, the appeals could not be kept pending indefinitely. Consequently, the Court disposed of the appeals by observing that the fate of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s Florentine Estates Of India Ltd. would bind both parties. Until the Supreme Court's decision, recovery of the disputed demand against the appellant was stayed. If the Supreme Court decided in favour of the assessees, they could move for the demand to be dropped. If decided against the assessees, the Department could enforce the demand. The right of the appellant to approach the Supreme Court was reserved. No specific finding was given on the merits of the TDS issue itself, as the appeals were disposed of based on the pendency before the Supreme Court.
The High Court allowed the appeal in favour of the Revenue. The Court disagreed with the ITAT's findings, stating that the scale of operation of comparable companies relative to the tested entity is a crucial factor. The Court noted that the assessee's turnover from its ITeS segment was Rs.782,63,63,57,677/-, while a comparable, CG Vak Software and Exports Ltd., had a total turnover of Rs.7,23,39,181/- and an ITeS export turnover of Rs.86,10,268/-. This vast difference, approximately 100 times, was considered significant. The Court relied on the Bombay High Court's decision in CIT-2, Pune v. Principal Global Services Pvt. Ltd. and the Delhi High Court's decision in Avaya India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT, which held that substantial differences in turnover between the tested party and comparables necessitate the exclusion of such comparables. The Court concluded that the substantial question of law regarding comparability was answered in favour of the Revenue. The appeal was disposed of.
The Delhi High Court acknowledged that, as far as the High Court is concerned, the matter stands concluded by its own judgment in Puri Construction Private Limited. Therefore, the Court cannot admit the appeals or keep them pending indefinitely, as the Supreme Court's decision may take time. The Court disposed of the appeals by stating that the fate of the judgment from the Supreme Court in M/s Florentine Estates Of India Ltd. will bind both parties. Until the Supreme Court decides, recovery of the disputed demand against the appellant is stayed. If the Supreme Court rules in favour of the assessees, they can apply to drop the demand. If the ruling is against the assessees, the Department can enforce the demand. No specific finding was made on the merits of the TDS issue itself, as the appeals were disposed of based on the pendency of the Supreme Court matter.
The Delhi High Court acknowledged that the issue concerning TDS on External Development Charges stands concluded so far as the High Court is concerned, referencing its own judgment in Puri Construction Private Limited. However, recognizing that the matter is pending before the Supreme Court with an SLP filed by an affected assessee (Florentine Estates Of India Ltd.), the Court decided not to keep the present appeals pending indefinitely. The Court disposed of all the appeals by stating that the final decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Florentine Estates Of India Ltd. will bind both parties. Until the Supreme Court's decision, the recovery of disputed demands against the appellants was stayed. The Court further directed that if the Supreme Court decides in favor of the assessees, they can apply to drop the demand, and if against the assessees, the Department can enforce the demand. No specific issue was left undecided; rather, the appeals were disposed of pending a higher court's decision.
The Delhi High Court acknowledged that the matter was concluded so far as its own jurisdiction was concerned, referencing its judgment in Puri Construction Private Limited. However, it noted that since the issue is pending before the Supreme Court, it could not keep the present appeals pending indefinitely. Consequently, the Court disposed of all the appeals. The fate of these appeals will be bound by the final decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Florentine Estates Of India Ltd. Until the Supreme Court decides, recovery of the disputed demand against the appellants is stayed. If the Supreme Court rules in favor of the assessees, they can apply to the Assessing Officer to drop the demand. If the Supreme Court rules against the assessees, the Department can enforce the demand. No specific issue was left undecided, as the Court's decision was based on the pendency before the apex court.
The Delhi High Court acknowledged that the matter was concluded so far as the High Court was concerned, referencing its own judgment in Puri Construction Private Limited. However, recognizing that the issue was pending before the Supreme Court with an interim order staying coercive measures, the Court decided not to keep the appeals pending indefinitely. The Court disposed of all appeals by stating that the final decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Florentine Estates Of India Ltd. (which was the subject of the SLP) would bind both parties. Until the Supreme Court's decision, recovery of disputed demands against the appellants was stayed. The Court directed that if the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the assessees, they could apply to drop the demand, and if against the assessees, the Department could enforce the demand. No specific issue was left undecided; rather, the appeals were disposed of based on the pendency before the Supreme Court.
The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the appellant (Revenue). The Court noted that the respondent-assessee had pointed out that the ITAT's order was consistent with this Court's previous decisions in the assessee's own case for AY 2007-08 and 2008-09, and also with a subsequent High Court decision dated 29.08.2025 in ITA No. 361/2025, which had rejected the Department's appeals for later years. The learned Senior Standing Counsel for the appellant was not in a position to dispute this position. Therefore, in order to maintain consistency and following the prior decisions of this Court in the respondent-assessee's own case, the High Court dismissed the present appeals. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeals.
The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue. The Court noted the submission by the assessee's counsel that the ITAT had relied on a previous order of the High Court in the assessee's own case for AY 2007-08 and 2008-09. Crucially, the Court also observed that it had previously dismissed the Department's appeals for subsequent years in ITA No. 361/2025 dated 29.08.2025, taking the same view. Since the Revenue's counsel could not dispute this position, the High Court, in order to maintain consistency and following its own prior decision in the assessee's case, dismissed the present appeals. No specific issue was left undecided; the appeals were disposed of on the basis of precedent.
The Delhi High Court, in this procedural order, did not decide any substantive issues related to the income tax disputes of the petitioners. The court merely adjourned the hearing of the three writ petitions to May 14, 2026, at the request of the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondents. No findings were made, no reasoning was provided on any tax-related matter, and no operative directions were issued other than the adjournment of the case. The judgment is silent on any specific tax provisions or precedents.
The High Court held that the ITAT had erred in upholding the disallowance of 1/6th of telephone and car expenses. The Court reasoned that while a company is a separate legal person, it cannot incur personal expenses in the same way an individual can. Expenses incurred by a company, even if reimbursed to employees or directors, are considered part of the 'Cost to Company' and are necessary for the company's business, especially before the introduction of fringe benefit tax. The AO's disallowance based on the assumption of personal use was considered cursory. The Court clarified that a company is not required to maintain logbooks for its vehicles, and the AO should not dissect journeys to determine personal use. If a company allows employees to use cars for personal use, it's a facility and part of CTC. Therefore, such expenses, duly approved, should be allowed in toto. The ITAT's reliance on the Standard Chartered Bank judgment was deemed incorrect in this context. The appeal was allowed, and the ITAT's order was set aside.
The Delhi High Court did not decide any substantive issues in this excerpt. The court merely adjourned the hearing of the three writ petitions to a future date, May 14, 2026, as requested by the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondent. The reason for the adjournment is not specified. No findings were made on any of the merits of the cases, and no operative directions were issued beyond scheduling the next hearing.
The Delhi High Court did not decide the merits of the case in this order. The Court noted that April 14, 2026, was a holiday. The learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondent requested an adjournment, which was granted by the Court. The cases were adjourned to May 14, 2026. Therefore, no findings were made on any issues, and no operative directions were issued beyond adjourning the proceedings. The ratio decidendi, if any, would relate to the procedural aspect of granting adjournments in writ petitions. No issues were left undecided as the matter was not heard on merits.
The High Court dismissed the appeal. Regarding questions A, B, and C, the Court noted that these were different facets of the same question that had already been decided by the same Court in its judgment dated 05.12.2025, in the case of the respondent-assessee itself (ITA 728/2025). Therefore, no fresh adjudication was required on these points. Concerning question D, the Court held that it was purely a finding of fact and an appreciation of evidence. The Court further stated that the justification of distribution compensation is a business exigency, and the assessee is the best judge of such matters. The Assessing Officer cannot substitute their judgment for that of the businessman unless there is a finding supported by cogent material that the amount was not paid or the payment was fraudulent. Since no such finding was recorded, the addition in this regard could not be sustained. The Court found no error in the ITAT's decision on this aspect.
The High Court held that for both issues, the ITAT had relied on its own prior order for Assessment Year 2014-15. This prior order had been affirmed by the High Court itself in its judgments dated 02.05.2024 and 21.01.2025, specifically in ITA 566/2023, which involved the respondent-assessee. Consequently, as the issues had already been decided by the High Court in the case of the respondent-assessee, the Court found no substantial question of law to be elaborated upon. The appeal was therefore dismissed. The application for condonation of delay of 22 days in filing the appeal was allowed ex parte as no prejudice was caused to the assessee, given the dismissal on merits.
The Delhi High Court held that the ITAT was justified in allowing the miscellaneous application filed by the Department. The Court noted that the amendment to Section 80-P(2)(a)(iii) was made applicable retrospectively from April 1, 1968. This retrospective application meant that the amended provision was to be treated as having been in effect from that earlier date. The High Court referred to its own prior judgment in National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India v. Union of India ([2001] 251 ITR 285 (Delhi)), which affirmed the validity of the retrospective amendment, and the subsequent affirmation of this decision by the Supreme Court in National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India Ltd. v. Union of India ([2003] 260 ITR 548 (SC)). Given the retrospective nature of the amendment and the judicial pronouncements upholding it, the Court found no error in the ITAT's approach. The substantial question of law was answered against the assessee, and the appeals were dismissed.
The Delhi High Court held that the ITAT was justified in allowing the miscellaneous application filed by the revenue. The Court noted that the amendment to Section 80-P(2)(a)(iii) was made applicable retrospectively from April 1, 1968. The Court referred to its own judgment in National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India v. Union of India ([2001] 251 ITR 285 (Delhi)) and the Supreme Court's affirmation in National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India Ltd. v. Union of India ([2003] 260 ITR 548 (SC)), which upheld the vires of the retrospective amendment. Given that the amendment was effective from 1968, the Court found no error in the Tribunal's approach of allowing the department's miscellaneous application. The substantial question of law was answered against the assessee, and the appeals were dismissed.
The Delhi High Court held that the ITAT was justified in allowing the miscellaneous application filed by the revenue. The Court noted that the retrospective amendment to Section 80-P(2)(a)(iii) was made applicable from 01.04.1968. The validity of this retrospective amendment had been affirmed by the Delhi High Court itself in its judgment dated 16.02.2001 in National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India v. Union of India, [2001] 251 ITR 285 (Delhi), and subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court in National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India Ltd. v. Union of India, [2003] 260 ITR 548 (SC). Given the retrospective nature of the amendment, the Court found no error in the ITAT's approach to rectify its earlier order. The substantial question of law was answered against the assessee, and the appeals were dismissed.
The Delhi High Court rejected the appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax. The Court noted that the ITAT's impugned order was based on its earlier judgment in TSYS Card Tech Ltd. v. DCIT. Crucially, the Court observed that this earlier ITAT decision had been affirmed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court itself in a separate appeal, ITA No. 165/2024, decided on 16.07.2024. Since the revenue's counsel could not dispute this fact, the present appeal was dismissed in light of the binding precedent set by the Division Bench. The appeal and pending applications were disposed of.
The High Court held that while the ITAT's order, by relying on the Supreme Court's decision in 'Engineering Analysis Center of Excellence (P) Ltd. v. CIT', may have erroneously set aside the entire demand without specifically addressing all grounds, the remaining issues of maintenance support and other services, and education and training services, were indeed covered by this Court's subsequent judgment in 'The Commissioner of Income Tax – International Taxation-3 v. TSYS Card Tech Ltd.' (ITA No. 165/2024). Therefore, remanding the matter to the ITAT to decide these issues afresh would be futile as they have already been decided in favour of the assessee in the 'TSYS Card Tech Ltd.' case. Consequently, the appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed. The operative direction was the dismissal of both appeals.
The Delhi High Court held that while the ITAT's order, which relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Engineering Analysis (supra) concerning the treatment of software sales as business income and not royalty, might have overlooked or not explicitly decided the issues of maintenance support and education/training services, remanding the matter would be futile. The Court noted that the assessee's counsel had pointed out that these remaining issues were squarely covered by the Delhi High Court's own judgment in The Commissioner of Income Tax – International Taxation-3 v. TSYS Card Tech Ltd. (ITA No. 165/2024). Therefore, even if the matter were remanded, the outcome would likely be in favor of the assessee. Consequently, the Court found no fruitful purpose in remanding the matter and dismissed the appeals.
The Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petition in terms of the communication letter dated 11.05.2026 from the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. The Court noted the petitioner's lack of objection if the petition was disposed of as per the communication. The Court directed the Assessing Officer (AO) to either refund the entire amount lying against the petitioner's old PAN (AACCC1641E) along with statutory interest, or to refund the residuary sum after recovering the petitioner's tax liabilities for previous years, in accordance with the law. This action was to be completed by 31st August 2026. The Court did not comment on the Revenue's ability to adjust TDS amounts against tax liabilities but ordered the refund or adjustment as specified. The writ petition and pending application were disposed of accordingly.
The Delhi High Court held that no question of law remained to be framed or determined by it in the present appeal. The Court reasoned that the issue involved in the present appeal had already been decided by the High Court in the case of Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Vipin Jain (ITA 95/2021), and that decision was binding on the High Court itself. Therefore, the appeal was not required to be kept pending. The High Court dismissed the appeal in light of its prior judgment in Vipin Jain, which was decided on 12.03.2024. No specific amount in dispute was mentioned. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The Delhi High Court held that the issue regarding the taxability of interest on Government Securities and PSU Bonds under the Interest Tax Act, 1974, as amended, has been conclusively decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sahara India Savings and Investments Corporation Limited, 321 ITR 371 (SC). In that judgment, the Apex Court ruled that such interest is not exigible to tax under the Interest Tax Act, 1974, as amended. Therefore, following the precedent set by the Supreme Court, the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. No other issues were decided, and no specific relief was granted other than dismissing the appeal.