Loading High Court cases…
544 orders · Page 6 of 11
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court found no reason to distinguish the present case from its prior judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income-tax v. DCM Shriram Ltd. In that judgment, the Court had extensively analyzed the comparability of power transactions. It held that power traded on the IEX is not comparable to regular supply by State Electricity Boards (SEBs) or power distribution companies due to its unpredictable nature, the bidding process for short durations, and the difference between rates for purchased versus consumed power. The Court accepted the assessee's internal uncontrolled transaction (supply to UPPCL at ₹4.39 per kWh) and external CUPs (rates charged by SEBs in Gujarat and Rajasthan) as valid for determining the Arm's Length Price (ALP). Furthermore, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Jindal Steel and Power Limited, the Court reiterated that the 'market value' for Section 80IA purposes should reflect prices in an open market driven by supply and demand, not regulated or contracted prices. The Court concluded that the rates at which SEBs supplied power to industrial consumers should be considered the market value. Therefore, the questions of law were answered in favour of the assessee, and the appeal was dismissed.
The Delhi High Court held that the issue regarding the taxability of interest on Government Securities and PSU Bonds under the Interest Tax Act, 1974, as amended, has been conclusively decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sahara India Savings and Investments Corporation Limited, 321 ITR 371 (SC). In that judgment, the Apex Court ruled that such interest is not exigible to tax under the Interest Tax Act, 1974, as amended. Therefore, following the precedent set by the Supreme Court, the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. No other issues were decided, and no specific relief was granted other than dismissing the appeal.
The Delhi High Court held that the first issue regarding the validity of the notice served upon Vijender Pal Jain has no substance. The Court reasoned that Vijender Pal Jain, by filing a reply on June 18, 2022, expressly stating that he was doing so in the capacity of the legal representative of the deceased assessee, had by his conduct become a Legal Representative. The Court clarified that the term 'legal representative' under Section 2(29) of the Act of 1961, which refers to Section 2(11) of the CPC, is wider than 'legal heir' and includes any person who represents the estate of the deceased, intermeddles with it, or on whom the estate devolves. Therefore, Vijender Pal Jain's conduct estopped him from contending that the notice served upon him was invalid. The Court rejected this ground. However, regarding the second issue, the Court found that the approval granted by the PCIT was not valid. Since the respondents had invoked the extended period of limitation, the approval ought to have been sought from and granted by the PCCIT, as provided under Section 151(ii) of the Act of 1961. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, and the impugned notice dated July 30, 2022, was quashed for want of proper approval.
The High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the issue was squarely covered by its own previous judgment in ITA 32/2004, which had been affirmed by the Supreme Court. The question of law framed at the time of admitting the appeal was answered in the negative and in favor of the appellant-assessee. The impugned order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, dated 12.01.2007, was set aside to the extent of the question framed. The reasoning was based on the principle of precedent, where a matter already decided by a higher court or a coordinate bench, and affirmed by the Supreme Court, binds the current bench. The ratio decidendi is that if tax on salaries paid to expatriate employees overseas is paid in accordance with CBDT Circular No. 685, such payments are permissible as a deduction in the computation of taxable business income, notwithstanding Section 40(a)(iii) and Article 7 of the Indo-UK DTAA, as per the established judicial pronouncements. The operative direction was to set aside the ITAT order and allow the appeal.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal. Regarding Question A, the Court noted that the Assessee's counsel correctly pointed out that this Court, in ITA 7/2023, had held that the Bright Line Test (BLT) is not provided under the Income Tax Act, 1961, or its rules, and therefore, being alien to statutory provisions, it cannot be adopted. For questions B to F, relating to royalty payments, the Assessee's counsel submitted that these aspects were decided in ITA No. 551/2023 and ITA No. 7/2023. The Revenue's counsel could not dispute this. The Court found that the Assessee's submissions regarding these questions were supported by previous judgments of this Court. Regarding Question H, concerning the comparability of Febulka Advertising Pvt. Ltd., the Court found that the ITAT had recorded a finding of fact that the entity was engaged in an entirely different business and its figures could not be taken selectively. The Court held that this aspect essentially involves a finding of fact and does not give rise to a substantial question of law, thus not warranting interference under Section 260A. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order dated 05.01.2026 passed by the ACIT. The Court observed that the ACIT had sought to rectify an order passed by the PCIT, which was beyond the ACIT's jurisdiction. More importantly, the Court noted that the scheme of the Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020, does not grant any power of rectification, even to the PCIT. Section 5(3) of the Act of 2020 clearly states that the amount determined and order passed under the Scheme shall be final and conclusive. The Court held that the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were not made applicable by the Act of 2020, rendering the ACIT's order contrary to the provisions of the Act of 2020. The Court found its view consistent with the judgment in Satish Kumar Dhingra (supra). The operative direction was to quash and set aside the impugned order.
The High Court held that both the CIT(A) and the Tribunal had concurrently found that the AO erred in disallowing the purchases and making an addition under Section 69C. The Court noted that the AO himself had accepted the genuineness of the purchases. The Court found it incomprehensible how the source of genuine purchases, executed through proper documents and banking channels, could be considered unexplained. The AO's reasoning that money in bank accounts came from unexplained cash deposits from retail sales was deemed misconceived. The Court stated that if an assessee is permitted to sell goods in cash without violating any statutory provision, the purchase cannot be disallowed. The Court also considered the assessee's opening stock and the value of imported diamonds, concluding that the sales were of diamonds purchased for business reasons. The Court found no substance or merit in the appeals.
The High Court held that both the CIT(A) and the Tribunal had correctly decided that the AO erred in disallowing purchases and making an addition under Section 69C. The Court found it incomprehensible how the source of genuine purchases, executed through proper documents and banking channels, could be considered unexplained. The AO's contention that money in bank accounts came from unexplained cash sales was deemed misconceived. The Court reasoned that if an assessee is permitted to sell goods in cash without violating any statutory provision, the purchases cannot be disallowed. Furthermore, the assessee had a substantial opening stock and imported diamonds worth Rs. 97 crores, indicating sales were made for business reasons. The Court concluded that even if the identity of sellers or buyers was not verifiable, it did not violate any statutory provisions. Therefore, the appeals lacked substance and merit.
The High Court held that both the CIT(A) and the Tribunal had concurrently held that the AO erred in disallowing the purchases and making an addition under Section 69C. The Court found no merit in the Revenue's appeals. The Court reasoned that if purchases are accepted as genuine and executed through proper documents and banking channels, their source cannot be considered unexplained. The AO's contention that money in bank accounts came from unexplained cash sales was deemed misconceived. The Court stated that if an assessee is permitted to sell goods in cash without violating any statutory provision, the purchase cannot be disallowed. The Court also noted the assessee's opening stock and the value of imported diamonds, indicating that sales were made for business reasons. The Court concluded that even if the identity of sellers or buyers was unknown, it did not violate any statutory provisions.
The High Court held that the concurrent findings of the CIT(A) and the Tribunal were correct. The Court found it incomprehensible how the source of genuine purchases, executed through proper documentation and banking channels, could be considered unexplained. The AO's reasoning that money in bank accounts originated from unexplained cash sales was deemed misconceived. The Court stated that if an assessee is permitted to sell goods in cash without violating any statutory provisions, the purchases cannot be disallowed. Furthermore, considering the assessee's substantial opening stock and the value of imported diamonds, the sales were for business reasons. The Court noted that even if the identity of sellers or buyers were unknown, it would not necessarily violate statutory provisions. Therefore, the appeals lacked merit.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petitions, setting aside the impugned orders to the extent they required the deposit of 20% of the demand as a condition for granting a stay. The Court reasoned that the leeway granted in the CBDT circular, allowing for a lesser deposit, cannot be interpreted to mean that 20% must always be deposited. When the jurisdictional High Court has taken a view, authorities deciding stay applications under Section 220(6) are expected to grant a complete stay, as High Court judgments are binding. The Court found the PCIT's order requiring 20% deposit contrary to this principle. Recovery proceedings against the petitioner were stayed until the disposal of appeals. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The Delhi High Court held that the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax lacked the jurisdiction to rectify an order passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court observed that the impugned order dated 05.01.2026 sought to rectify an order passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax. Furthermore, the scheme of the Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020, does not grant any power of rectification, even to the Principal Commissioner. Section 5(3) of the Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020, clearly states that the amount determined and order passed under the scheme shall be final and conclusive. The provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961, have not been made applicable by the Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020. Consequently, the order dated 05.01.2026 was found to be contrary to the provisions of the Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020, and liable to be quashed and set aside. The Court followed its view in Satish Kumar Dhingra (supra). The writ petition was allowed, and the impugned order was quashed and set aside.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petitions, setting aside the impugned orders to the extent they required the deposit of 20% of the demand as a condition for granting a stay. The Court reasoned that the leeway granted in the CBDT circular, allowing for a lesser deposit, cannot be interpreted to mean that 20% must be deposited in every case. Once the jurisdictional High Court has taken a view, in normal circumstances, a complete stay should be granted because High Court judgments are binding on all authorities, including those deciding stay applications. The Court noted that the pendency of a Supreme Court appeal does not negate the binding nature of the High Court's judgment. Recovery proceedings against the petitioner were stayed until the disposal of the appeals. The Assessing Officer was directed to make the necessary entry in the ITBA Portal.
The High Court held that the argument concerning the infraction of principles of natural justice warranted intervention in favour of the petitioner. The Court found that the entire addition made to the petitioner's income was based on the slip recovered from Mr. Pradeep Kumar Sehgal and his statement. The opportunity provided for cross-examination was deemed insufficient and a mere 'farce or eyewash' as the petitioner could not be expected to prepare for and conduct a cross-examination of a person on the very next day. Consequently, the assessment order dated 31.03.2026 was set aside for want of an adequate opportunity of cross-examination. The Assessing Officer was directed to fix a fresh date of hearing between 18.05.2026 and 20.05.2026, provide at least 7 days' advance notice, and ensure Mr. Sehgal's availability for cross-examination. After the cross-examination, a fresh assessment order was to be passed. The Court did not dilate upon other arguments, leaving them open for the petitioner to raise before the appellate authority if an appeal is filed.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax. While acknowledging the arguments presented by the Revenue's counsel as potentially raising a question of law, the Court chose to maintain consistency with a prior decision by a Coordinate Bench in ITA No. 606/2023 (International Taxation-3 v S. A. Chitra Ventures Ltd.), which had rejected the Department's appeal on similar grounds. The Court reproduced the reasoning of the Coordinate Bench, which highlighted that Section 144C of the Act, as it stood prior to the Finance Act, 2020 amendments, was attracted only by a "variation in the income or loss returned." Since there was no variation in the income returned, only a dispute regarding the applicable tax rate and entitlement to DTAA benefits, the AO was not empowered to frame a Draft Assessment Order under Section 144C. Consequently, the ITAT's view that the assessment order was invalid due to the improper use of Section 144C was found to be correct, and the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. While acknowledging that a beneficial circular should be interpreted liberally, the court found that the petitioner had failed to fall within the ambit of the circular. The court noted that the application was filed on 20.01.2025, which was beyond the stipulated period of three years from the end of AY 2020-21, making the deadline for filing such an application 31.03.2024, as per CBDT Circular No. 17/2024. The court observed that the petitioner had "woken up from its slumber after more than four years and almost 5 years from the end of relevant financial year." The court also pointed out that the petitioner had not filed Form 10-IC for AYs 2021-22 & 2022-23 nor filed any application under the 18.11.2024 circular for those years. Therefore, no error was found in the Commissioner's order rejecting the application for AY 2020-21.
The High Court of Delhi held that it did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-I Chandigarh v. ABC Papers Limited, the Court reasoned that since the situs of the ITAT which passed the impugned order was Mumbai, and the Assessing Officer was also in Mumbai, the appeal could not be maintained at the High Court of Delhi. The Court did not decide the merits of the appeal. The operative direction was to dispose of the appeal with liberty to the revenue to file a fresh appeal before the appropriate Court within 60 days.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by Ramakant (HUF). The Court held that the petition was misconceived on multiple grounds. Firstly, a statutory remedy of appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, exists against ITAT orders, making a writ petition inappropriate. Secondly, the ITAT's order clearly recorded that the assessee had expressed no objection to a remand to the AO. Thirdly, if the assessee disputed the recording of 'no objection', the proper course was to file a miscellaneous application or review before the ITAT, not approach the High Court. Fourthly, the remand was to the AO for passing a fresh order after providing adequate opportunity of hearing, which did not warrant interference by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 260A of the Act. The Court found no reason to interfere with the ITAT's direction for a fresh assessment.
The Delhi High Court allowed the appeals. On the issue of non-compete fees, the Court held that the Supreme Court's judgment in *Sharp Business System (supra)* clearly establishes that such fees are allowable as revenue expenditure. Regarding the deferment of this expenditure, the Court, following *Taparia Tools (supra)*, held that since the non-compete agreement was for a period exceeding one year and the assessee claimed it annually, it is entitled to claim the expenditure proportionately each year. The Court noted that the assessee had consistently adopted this practice, which was accepted by the Department. For ice boxes, the Court found that their distribution is a necessary business need, they serve as advertisements due to the company's branding, and the company practically loses ownership. Therefore, the expenditure on ice boxes was held to be revenue expenditure. Similarly, for dealer signboards, the Court held that these are a business requirement for advertisement and do not create enduring value, thus allowing them as revenue expenditure. The Assessing Officer was directed to pass an order in accordance with law.
The Delhi High Court allowed the appeals. Regarding the non-compete fee, the Court held that the Supreme Court's decision in *Sharp Business System* (supra) clearly establishes it as allowable revenue expenditure. For the deferment of this expenditure, the Court, following *Taparia Tools* (supra), held that since the non-compete agreement was for more than one year and the assessee claimed it annually, it is entitled to claim the amount as revenue expenditure proportionately each year. The Court noted that the assessee had consistently adopted this practice, which was accepted by the Income Tax Department. The Court reasoned that the non-compete fee is paid for the period of the contract, justifying its spread over the agreement's tenure. For ice boxes, the Court held that their distribution is a necessary business need, and while they may have enduring benefit for the shopkeeper, for the appellant, it's a business necessity. The ice boxes, bearing the company's name and logo, also serve as advertisement. Thus, the expenditure on ice boxes was deemed revenue expenditure. Similarly, dealer sign boards, bearing the company's logo and dealer's name, were considered a business requirement and advertisement rather than creating enduring value. Therefore, the expenditure on dealer sign boards was also allowed as revenue expenditure. The Assessing Officer was directed to pass an order in accordance with law.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court noted that the ITAT's order for AY 2012-13 was based on its previous orders for AYs 2013-14, 2014-15, and 2015-16. Crucially, the Court referred to its own prior decision in ITA 493/2025 (Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi 1 v. M/s Dabur Invest Corp. Ltd.) dated 08.10.2025, which had dismissed the Revenue's appeal for AY 2015-16. In that prior decision, the High Court had relied on its earlier orders and the ITAT's consistent findings in favour of the assessee for multiple assessment years, from AY 2002-03 to AY 2023-24, concerning the 'Option Price Contribution' issue. The High Court had found no justification to entertain those appeals due to the persistent view taken and the absence of distinguishing facts, thereby upholding the principle of consistency. Applying the same reasoning and the principle of consistency, the present appeal was dismissed as no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The Delhi High Court allowed the appeals. Regarding the non-compete fee, the Court held that the Supreme Court's decision in Sharp Business System (supra) clearly establishes it as allowable revenue expenditure. For the issue of spreading the expenditure, the Court, following Taparia Tools Ltd. (supra), held that since the non-compete agreement was for more than one year and the assessee claimed it annually, it is entitled to claim the amount as revenue expenditure proportionately each year. The Court noted that the assessee had consistently adopted this practice, which was accepted by the Department. The Court reasoned that the non-compete fee is paid for the period of the contract, justifying its deferred booking. Concerning ice boxes, the Court found them to be a necessary business need, serving as advertisement due to the company's branding, and that the company practically loses ownership upon distribution. Therefore, the expenditure was held to be revenue. Similarly, dealer sign boards, with the company's logo and dealer's name, were considered a business requirement and advertisement, not creating enduring value, and thus allowed as revenue expenditure. The Assessing Officer was directed to pass an implicit order in accordance with the law.
The Delhi High Court allowed the appeals. Regarding the non-compete fee, the Court held that the Supreme Court's decision in Sharp Business System leaves no room for doubt that it is an allowable revenue expenditure. For the deferment of this expenditure, the Court found that since the non-compete agreement was for more than one year and the assessee had claimed it annually, it is entitled to claim the amount as revenue expenditure each year proportionately, following Taparia Tools. The Court noted that the assessee had consistently adopted this practice, which was accepted by the department. The Court reasoned that the non-compete fee was paid for the period of the contract, justifying its deferred booking. Concerning ice boxes, the Court held that once given to shopkeepers, the company practically loses ownership. These are a necessary business need, and with the company's name and logo, they serve as advertisement rather than creating an asset. Therefore, the expenditure on ice boxes was deemed revenue expenditure. Similarly, dealer sign boards, provided to dealers with the company's logo and dealer's name, serve as advertisement and a business requirement, not creating enduring value. Thus, the expenditure on dealer sign boards was also allowed as revenue expenditure. The Assessing Officer was directed to pass an order in accordance with law.
The Delhi High Court held that the expenditure incurred on account of non-compete fee paid to sellers of bottling business is allowable as revenue expenditure, following the Supreme Court's decision in Sharp Business System v. Commissioner of Income Tax-III. Regarding the deferment of this expenditure, the Court found that since the non-compete agreement was for a period of more than one year and the assessee had claimed it as expenditure each year until the agreement's continuation, the assessee is entitled to claim the amount as revenue expenditure proportionately each year, in line with the judgment in Taparia Tools Ltd. The Court noted that the assessee had consistently adopted this practice, which was accepted by the Income Tax Department. The expenditure on ice boxes was also held to be revenue expenditure. The Court reasoned that ice boxes, when distributed to shopkeepers, are a necessary business need for the appellant to ensure its products are ready for use, and they also serve as advertisements due to the company's branding. Similarly, dealer sign boards, provided with the company's logo and dealer's name, are a business requirement and serve the purpose of advertisement rather than creating enduring value. Therefore, the Tribunal erred in treating the expenditure on ice boxes and dealer sign boards as capital expenditure. The appeals were allowed, and the Assessing Officer was directed to pass an order in accordance with the law.
The Delhi High Court held that the non-compete fee paid to the sellers of the bottling business is allowable as revenue expenditure, following the Supreme Court's decision in Sharp Business System. Regarding the deferment of this expenditure, the Court ruled that since the non-compete agreement was for a period exceeding one year and the assessee claimed it annually, it is entitled to claim the amount as revenue expenditure proportionately each year, in line with the judgment in Taparia Tools. The Court noted that the assessee had consistently adopted this practice, which was accepted by the Income Tax Department. The Court also held that expenditure on ice boxes is revenue expenditure, as their distribution is a necessary business need, they serve as advertisement due to the company's branding, and the company practically loses ownership. Similarly, expenditure on dealer signboards was deemed revenue expenditure, serving as a business requirement and advertisement rather than creating enduring value for the company. Therefore, the Tribunal erred in treating these expenditures as capital in nature. All appeals of the assessee were allowed.
The Delhi High Court held that the expenditure incurred on non-compete fees is allowable as revenue expenditure, citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Sharp Business System (supra). Regarding the deferment of this expenditure, the Court found that since the non-compete agreement was for a period of more than one year and the assessee had claimed it annually, the assessee is entitled to claim the amount as revenue expenditure proportionately each year, in line with the Supreme Court's decision in Taparia Tools (supra). The Court noted that the assessee had consistently adopted this practice, which had been accepted by the Income Tax Department. The expenditure on ice boxes was also held to be revenue expenditure, as their distribution is a necessary business need, and they serve as an advertisement with the company's name and logo. Similarly, expenditure on dealer sign boards was deemed revenue expenditure, serving as a business requirement and advertisement rather than creating enduring value. The Tribunal's decision to treat these expenditures as capital in nature was therefore overturned.
The Delhi High Court allowed the appeals. Regarding the non-compete fee, the Court held that the Supreme Court's judgment in Sharp Business System (2026) clearly establishes it as allowable revenue expenditure. For the issue of deferment or splitting of the non-compete fee, the Court, following Taparia Tools Ltd. (2015), held that since the agreement was for more than one year and the assessee claimed it annually, it is entitled to claim the expenditure proportionately each year. The Court noted that the assessee had consistently adopted this practice, which had been accepted by the department. The Court reasoned that the non-compete fee is paid for the period of the contract, justifying its deferred booking. Concerning ice boxes, the Court found them to be a necessary business need, losing ownership upon distribution. It reasoned that they serve as advertisements due to the company's name and logo, rather than creating an asset for the company, thus classifying the expenditure as revenue. Similarly, dealer sign boards, bearing the company's logo and dealer's name, were deemed a business requirement and advertisement, not creating enduring value, and thus allowed as revenue expenditure. The Tribunal's findings on all these issues were reversed.
The High Court held that the expenditure incurred on account of non-compete fee paid to the sellers of the bottling business is allowable as revenue expenditure, citing the Supreme Court's decision in *Sharp Business System* (supra). Regarding the deferment of this expenditure, the Court held that since the non-compete agreement was for a period of more than one year and the assessee claimed it annually, it is entitled to claim the amount as revenue expenditure proportionately each year, in line with the *Taparia Tools* (supra) judgment. The Court noted that the assessee had consistently adopted this practice, which was accepted by the Income Tax Department. The Court further held that the expenditure on ice boxes is revenue expenditure, as these are necessary business needs that serve as advertisement rather than creating an asset for the company, and the company practically loses ownership upon distribution. Similarly, the expenditure on dealer sign boards was held to be revenue expenditure, serving the purpose of advertisement and business requirement rather than creating enduring value for the company. The Tribunal erred in treating these expenditures as capital in nature. The Assessing Officer is directed to pass an order in accordance with law.
The Delhi High Court allowed the appeals. On the issue of non-compete fees, the Court held that the Supreme Court's decision in *Sharp Business System* (supra) clearly establishes that non-compete fees are allowable as revenue expenditure. Regarding the deferment of this expenditure, the Court found that since the non-compete agreement was for more than one year and the assessee had claimed it annually, it was entitled to claim the amount as revenue expenditure proportionately each year, in line with the *Taparia Tools* judgment. The Court noted that the assessee had consistently followed this practice, which was accepted by the Income Tax Department. The Court reasoned that the non-compete fee was paid for the duration of the contract, justifying its spread over the agreement period. For ice boxes, the Court held that their distribution was a necessary business need, serving as an advertisement due to the company's name and logo, and thus constituted revenue expenditure, reversing the Tribunal's view. Similarly, for dealer sign boards, the Court found them to be a business requirement and an advertisement, not creating enduring value, and therefore allowed them as revenue expenditure. The operative direction was for the Assessing Officer to pass an order in accordance with law.
The Delhi High Court granted the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petition. The Court allowed the petitioner the liberty to prefer an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) against the order dated 23.09.2024 passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax. The reasoning for this decision is that the petitioner wished to pursue the statutory remedy of appeal before the ITAT. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The pending application was also disposed of. No specific findings were made on the merits of the case, as the petition was withdrawn.
The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the issue was squarely covered by its previous judgment in ITA 32/2004, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The Court answered the framed question in the negative, in favor of the assessee. The reasoning was based on the precedent set by the High Court and Supreme Court in the assessee's own prior case. The impugned order of the ITAT dated 12.01.2007 was set aside to the extent of the question framed. The operative direction was to allow the appeal and set aside the ITAT's order concerning the specific issue. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Delhi High Court, in its order dated 27.04.2026, dismissed the appeal filed by the revenue. The Court referred to its own judgment dated 15.01.2026 in ITA 4/2026 (The Commissioner of Income Tax - International Taxation -3 v. Sri Lanka Cricket), which held that 'live feed' does not attract royalty. The Court noted that in the Sri Lanka Cricket case, the revenue had withdrawn its Special Leave Petition (SLP) on an identical issue. The Court found that the rights granted in the present case were confined to 'live telecast' and did not extend beyond the 'live feed'. The reasoning was that royalty presupposes enduring benefits, and if the licensee's rights are limited to a specific event and do not involve recording or re-telecasting for future benefits, the payment cannot be considered royalty. The Court found no substance or merit in the present appeal in light of the aforementioned precedent. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal.
The High Court held that the CIT(A) was justified in declaring the reassessment proceedings as illegal. The reasoning was that once the Assessing Officer (AO) had applied his mind and made additions, which were subsequently set aside by the CIT(A), the AO could not have invoked Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, to initiate fresh reassessment proceedings for the same issues. The Court noted that this decision of the CIT(A) had been rightly affirmed by the Tribunal in the impugned order. Furthermore, since the High Court had, by a separate order of even date, rejected the Department's appeal (ITA No. 1427/2006) which examined the merits of the additions, the present appeal, stemming from the reassessment order, was liable to be rejected on the ground of the validity of the proceedings, independent of the merits. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.
The Tribunal held that while the principle that prior period income and its related expenditure should be treated in the same year is correct, the assessee failed to substantiate its claim for the expenditure of Rs. 4,26,772/-. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) had provided an opportunity to the appellant to furnish proof, but the assessee did not adduce the requisite evidence, such as supporting vouchers or bills. The Tribunal observed that no documents were filed by the appellant in relation to its claim. Consequently, the CIT(A) was justified in rejecting the appellant's ground of appeal concerning this expenditure. The Tribunal found no error of law in rejecting the appellant's appeal. The appeal was dismissed as it did not involve any substantial question of law.
The High Court held that while the Tribunal was correct in its view that an opportunity of hearing should have been provided to the assessee before appointing a special auditor (answering question (i) in the affirmative in favour of the assessee), it was not justified in quashing the assessment order outrightly. The Court reasoned that for procedural lacunae or breaches, legitimate revenue should not be lost. The ITAT ought to have either remanded the matter back to the AO to ignore the special auditor's report and frame the assessment based on existing material, or decided the appeal on merits, as the CIT(A) had done. The subsequent developments, including the passing of the assessment order, should not have been ignored. The Court noted that the consequence of the Tribunal's order was the complete loss of assessed income of Rs. 6,62,95,139/- to the exchequer. The Court also observed that if the assessee was aggrieved by the special auditor's appointment, they could have approached a constitutional court. Therefore, the Tribunal was not justified in quashing the assessment order outrightly. The appeal was restored to the Tribunal for deciding on other grounds raised by the AO.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court held that the assessee had neither misrepresented nor suppressed facts, nor concealed any material particulars that would suggest misreporting of income as defined under Section 270A(9) of the Act. The Court found the Assessing Officer's order rejecting the Section 270AA application to be contrary to facts and law. The Court emphasized that penalty provisions are intended to deter evasion and misreporting, requiring a finding of mens rea or contumacious conduct, which was absent. The Court noted that the assessee had voluntarily paid the tax and interest. Consequently, the petitioner's application under Section 270AA was allowed, and the impugned order rejecting it, along with the penalty order, was quashed. The Court directed that the penalty should not be considered a source of revenue and that penalty provisions are for cases of evasion or misreporting with intent to evade tax.
The High Court addressed the issues sequentially. For question (i), concerning the addition of Rs.1,71,30,343/- under Section 2(24)(iv), the revenue informed the court that this amount had been taxed in the subsequent assessment year 2006-07 and the requisite tax paid by the assessee. Consequently, the appeal on this specific question was rejected due to this subsequent development. Regarding questions (ii) to (v), the revenue argued that the ITAT had not properly appreciated the facts. However, the assessee contended that these issues were based on factual findings concurrently made by the CIT(A) and the ITAT, and no substantial question of law arose. The High Court, after hearing both sides, found no perversity in the findings of the CIT(A) as affirmed by the ITAT concerning the deletion of Rs.10,37,275/- (business expansion/diversification), Rs.4.56 crores (interest-free loan), and the disallowance under Section 14A. The court concluded that no substantial question of law arose for its consideration on these points as well. Therefore, the appeal on questions (ii) to (v) was also rejected. The operative direction was that the entire appeal was rejected.
The Delhi High Court quashed the impugned notice dated 31.08.2024, along with the show cause notice dated 20.08.2024, and all consequential proceedings. The Court's decision was based on the concession made by the Revenue that the case was covered by the Supreme Court's ruling in Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal. The ratio decidendi is that if reassessment notices are issued beyond the period of limitation as per the prevailing law and judicial pronouncements, they are liable to be quashed. The Court found the notices to be time-barred, rendering them invalid. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the Tribunal was correct in allowing the appeals of the respondents-assessees. The Court reasoned that a company is a juristic person and a separate legal entity from its members, as enshrined in Section 9 of the Companies Act, 2013. The Court found that the assessees' investment in CCL shares, made through banking channels under the permitted Liberalized Remittance Scheme (LRS) of the RBI, was not in violation of any law. It was presumed that these remittances had valid approval. The Court noted that CCL acquired properties using its own sources and bank loans, paid applicable UK taxes, and the documents seized related to company expenditures, which shareholders are entitled to possess. Legally, shareholders are owners of shares, not the company's property, and the company's income is not automatically the assessees' income; only dividend income is taxable. The AO's attempt to apply the doctrine of 'substance over form' was deemed an attempt to enrich the exchequer without statutory backing and was unknown to the Act of 1961. Fiscal statutes must be interpreted strictly, and tax can only be levied if a transaction falls within statutory provisions. The AO's effort to pierce the corporate veil was misplaced as it was not a case of tax avoidance or evasion. The Court stated that assessees cannot be penalized for earning income through legally permissible methods. The appeals were dismissed.
The High Court dismissed the appeal. Regarding the disallowance under Section 14A, the Court held that this issue had been decided against the Department by the High Court itself in the case of Cheminvest Ltd. v. CIT. For the second question, which the Court considered to be essentially a question of fact and appreciation of evidence, it was held that no perversity could be alleged in the findings of the Appellate Authority (CIT(A) and ITAT). Concerning the issue of interest-free loans to subsidiaries, the Court noted that the CIT(A) had found that the respondent-assessee had sufficient funds available to make these advances, a finding affirmed by the Tribunal. Therefore, based on these findings, the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the Tribunal was not justified in directing the grant of registration under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) and approval under Section 80G of the Act of 1961. The Court reasoned that the application was made under Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii), which falls under Section 12AB(1)(b) of the Act, requiring the Commissioner to conduct an inquiry to satisfy himself about the genuineness of the trust's activities and compliance with other laws. The Tribunal failed to record such findings and instead issued a sweeping direction. Furthermore, for Section 80G registration, the genuineness of activities is a mandatory requirement, not just a relevant consideration. The Court relied on its previous judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax – Exemption v. Kush Innovative Foundation. Consequently, the matter was remanded to the Commissioner to decide the application afresh after conducting the requisite inquiry.
The High Court noted that while most issues raised by the Revenue pertained to the appreciation of evidence and findings of fact, which do not warrant interference under the limited jurisdiction of Section 260A of the Act, one specific question arose: Whether the possession of cheque books of concerns from whom purchase bills were allegedly procured, and statements indicating provision of bills, are sufficient to conclude that the assessee procured bogus purchase bills. However, the Court ultimately dismissed the appeal. The primary reason for dismissal was that the tax effect in the appeal fell below the limits prescribed by CBDT Circular No. 5/2024 and Circular No. 9/2024. Therefore, the appeal was liable to be dismissed on this ground. The Court did not decide the substantial question of law framed.
The High Court held that in light of the submission made by the Revenue's counsel and the fact that the ITAT had relied on its own prior orders for AYs 2013-14 and 2014-15, and to maintain consistency, no substantial question of law arose for consideration. The Court referred to its previous order in ITA 493/2025 (Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi 1 v. M/s Dabur Invest Corp. Ltd.) where it had dismissed the Revenue's appeals for AYs 2002-03 to 2023-24 on the issue of 'Option Price Contribution' due to consistent findings in favour of the assessee and the principle of consistency. Consequently, the present appeal was dismissed along with pending applications.
The Delhi High Court held that the Tribunal had not committed any error of law in remanding the matter back to the Assessing Officer. The Court found that the breach of the mandate of Rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, was evident, as the additional evidence led before the CIT(A) was not provided to the Assessing Officer. Consequently, the Assessing Officer was deprived of his opportunity to put forth his stand on those documents. The Court explicitly stated that it confined its adjudication to the issue of non-observance of Rule 46A and did not comment on the merits of the assessment order. The Court also noted that since the Tribunal had not decided the addition or correctness of the assessment order on merits but remanded it due to the breach of Rule 46A, neither the Tribunal nor the High Court was required to delve into the issue of carry forward of income, as it hinged upon the merits of the addition. The Assessing Officer was directed to consider the material in accordance with law without being influenced by previous orders.
The High Court held that the certificate dated 19.05.1998, issued by the appropriate authority under Section 269UD of the Act of 1961, has a necessary bearing on the determination of the cost of acquisition. The Court observed that since this certificate was relied upon before the AO and cited before the Tribunal, it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to have pronounced upon its effect. The Court found that the Tribunal had failed to do so. Consequently, the impugned order of the Tribunal was set aside to the extent of the issue relating to capital gain. The Tribunal was directed to decide the issue of capital gain afresh, after considering the certificate dated 19.05.1998 and the appellant's arguments in this regard. The Court explicitly stated that it had not commented upon the merits of the issue, particularly the effect of the certificate, and that its observations were only for the purpose of remand. Other parts of the Tribunal's order remain intact.
The High Court held that the issue was purely a question of fact and appreciation of evidence. It concurred with the findings of the Tribunal and the CIT(A) that the Assessing Officer cannot substitute his judgment for that of the assessee. Given that the investor, Nidra Holdings Pte Ltd., Singapore, is the holding company of the respondent-assessee, the Court found no error in the appellate authorities' conclusion that the transaction was genuine and that the AO's role was not to question the business wisdom of the investor. Consequently, the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
The High Court held that the assessment order dated 05.03.2026 was illegal and contrary to law because the Assessing Officer passed the final assessment order without supplying a copy of the draft assessment order to the assessee. The Court distinguished the present case from Sumitomo Corporation India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) by noting that in Sumitomo, a draft assessment order was not passed at all, whereas in this case, a draft assessment order was passed. The Court set aside the assessment order and the consequential penalty notice. The Assessing Officer was directed to serve the draft assessment order to the assessee within seven days from the date of the order. The petitioner was granted liberty to file objections before the Competent Authority under Section 144C of the Act. The period from 05.03.2026 to 21.04.2026 was excluded from the time limits prescribed under law. The Court explicitly stated that it had not dealt with any contentions regarding the merits of the assessment order.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that it lacked merit. The Court found that the petitioner's argument based on the interim order from the Punjab and Haryana High Court was untenable. The Court reasoned that an interim order is only a prima facie view and does not render the search illegal until it is declared so. Furthermore, the legality of the proceedings against the petitioner had to be examined as of the date of initiation, March 31, 2025, when no stay was in effect against the searched person. The Court noted that the interim order by the Punjab and Haryana High Court on February 18, 2026 (and a subsequent order on March 28, 2025, which only restrained the passing of the final assessment order) did not stay the proceedings or the effect of the search. The Court affirmed the well-settled principle that material recovered during a search can be relied upon for assessment even if the search is subsequently declared illegal. The Court distinguished the cited precedents, stating that they were predicated on the invalidity of the search directly against the searched persons, whereas in this case, the petitioner was proceeded against based on material recovered from a search at another entity's premises. The Court held that the Assessing Officer had valid jurisdiction on the date of notice issuance, and a subsequent declaration of the search as invalid would not divest the officer of jurisdiction or annul the proceedings. The petitioner was granted liberty to file an appeal on quantum or merit within fifteen days, with the Appellate Authority directed to consider it without raising objections about limitation.
The High Court held that issues arising from Questions A, B, G, and H concerning disallowance under Section 14A and additions under Section 115JB were squarely covered against the Department by the decision in H.T. Media Ltd. v. Pr. CIT. Issues related to excise duty refund/subsidy (Questions D, E, I) were decided by the Supreme Court's judgment in CIT v. Shree Balaji Alloys, rendering them no longer res integra. Questions F and J, pertaining to deductions under Sections 80IB/80IC, were covered against the assessee by the decision in CIT v. Sadhu Forging Ltd. The Court noted that Questions C and K, concerning the deletion of additions for seized cash, involved appreciation of evidence and findings of fact. As no question of law remained to be answered, the appeal was dismissed. No specific finding was recorded on Questions C and K, other than that they appeared to be factual matters.
The Delhi High Court held that the petitioner ought to pursue their remedy before the Pr.CIT/CIT in terms of Clause 4(c) of the CBDT Circular dated 29.02.2016. The Court noted that the objection regarding the availability of the review remedy before the Pr.CIT/CIT was not brought to the notice of the coordinate bench in the cited case of Clearmedi Healthcare (P.) Ltd., and no adjudication was made on this point in that judgment. Therefore, the Court directed that if the petitioner prefers a review application within two weeks from the date of the order, the concerned Pr.CIT/CIT shall consider it in accordance with law. The Court clarified that the Pr.CIT/CIT shall not be influenced by the rejection of the writ petition, as the merits of the petitioner's case were not examined by the High Court. The petition was disposed of with these observations.