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544 orders · Page 7 of 11
The Delhi High Court directed the petitioner to appear before the Assessing Officer (AO) on April 30, 2026, at 11:00 am. The petitioner was to furnish a post-dated cheque dated July 1, 2026, for Rs. 20,35,166 from his HDFC Bank account (no. 50100028212070). Additionally, the petitioner had to provide an undertaking to the AO, stating that the entire proceeds from the released KVPs and FDRs would be deposited into the same bank account. The undertaking would also confirm that the post-dated cheque would be honored upon presentation. The AO was instructed to release all seized FDRs and KVPs as soon as the cheque and undertaking were furnished. The Court stipulated that if the petitioner faced difficulties in crediting the proceeds, he could approach the High Court for further directions. In case the cheque was dishonored, the respondents were permitted to initiate recovery proceedings, including those under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and contempt proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The writ petition and pending applications were disposed of.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court held that the notice dated 31.08.2024, bearing the name and designation of the issuing authority, was validly authenticated in accordance with Section 282A(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court reasoned that in the current digital era, where computer-generated notices are common, the inscription of the name and designation is sufficient authentication, as a digital document may not bear a physical signature. While a digital signature might be a proper course, Section 282A(2) does not mandate it. The Court found no irregularity in the notice. The Court also noted that the judgments relied upon by the petitioner were from an era before the widespread use of computers and electronically generated documents and were therefore not guiding in the present context. The Court directed the Appellate Authority to consider the time spent by the petitioner in pursuing the writ petition when deciding the appeal.
The Delhi High Court held that the amount of Rs. 17,67,63,000/- represents a provision made by the respondent-assessee for compensation calculated at Rs. 5/- per square foot per month, which was an expressly agreed-upon term in the contract. The court found this to be an accepted or agreed amount and thus an accrued liability, as the project was indisputably delayed. The court reasoned that once the project exceeded the timeline guaranteed in the contract, the respondent's liability automatically arose by virtue of the contract terms. The demur from flat buyers to not accept this amount was solely to claim extra compensation or higher interest. Therefore, the liability to the extent of Rs. 5/- per square foot per month was not in a fluid state. The court concluded that this amount was an accrued liability the moment the project got belated, and the respondent-assessee admitted to pay it. The provision made was legally and accounting-wise correct. The court agreed with the ITAT's view that the liability for the relevant period calculated at Rs. 5/- per square foot per month is deductible from the income of each year, irrespective of when it is paid. The dispute regarding additional interest/compensation is for the Consumer Court to decide and is not an issue before the High Court. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the reassessment proceedings initiated were within limitation and that the petitioner had not produced sufficient evidence before the Court to warrant interference. While the Court acknowledged that amounts of Rs.3,75,000/- and Rs.4,90,000/- transferred intra-bank from the petitioner's PNB account to his BOI NRE account did not warrant interference, the crucial issue of an Rs.8,50,00,000/- deposit, purportedly a gift from the petitioner's father, and accrued interest, required examination. The Court noted the petitioner had not produced any permission from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) for opening the NRE account, which was essential if the funds were deposited without such permission. The Court also observed that the plea of the amount being a gift from the father was taken at a late stage. Citing observations from AGR Investment Limited v. ACIT, the Court held that it would not act as an Assessing Officer (AO) and that these aspects should be examined by the AO during the reassessment proceedings. Therefore, the petition was dismissed, with liberty to the petitioner to urge all submissions before the AO.
The High Court held that the interest earned on funds temporarily deposited in the bank, which were earmarked for project expenses and inextricably linked to the setting up of the business, should not be taxed as income from other sources. The Court distinguished this from cases where surplus funds are invested.
The High Court noted that the Revenue's counsel conceded that all the substantial questions of law proposed in the appeal were covered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee by various judicial authorities. The chart provided in the judgment details the ITAT's reasoning for each issue and the legal authorities supporting the assessee's position. For instance, regarding foreign exchange fluctuations, the ITAT held that direct value derived from forex fluctuations on trading items cannot be treated as non-operating, and the matter was restored to the TPO to verify if forex fluctuations related to trading items. The court also noted that the Revenue's appeals on similar issues for AY 2010-11 were dismissed by the High Court. Given this concession and the existing jurisprudence, the High Court found no substantial question of law requiring determination.
The High Court held that the cash deposit of Rs. 39,83,63,741 by the respondent-Trust during the demonetization period was not unusual and therefore not taxable under Section 69A read with Section 115BBE of the Act. The Court noted that on October 31, 2016, the Trust had a cash balance of Rs. 42,92,29,252, making the subsequent deposit of Rs. 39,83,63,741 neither unusual nor taxable. Furthermore, considering the Trust's activity of running a college, it was understandable that more cash might have been collected and deposited during the demonetization period, as parents might have rushed to pay fees in cash from their available funds. The Court found nothing wrong or unusual in the deposit. The appeal was dismissed.
The Delhi High Court held that the ultimate control and supervision, including marketing and scientific know-how, remain with the parent company. The Court found that simply assuming some skill or expertise will be developed by the Indian counterpart does not mean the entire technical skill or scientific know-how has been 'made available'. The Court noted that technical and developmental skills do not appear to have been shared with the Indian counterpart. Having an Indian counterpart is a necessity for smooth business operations in India. Even if some advantage or skill percolates to the employees of the Indian counterpart, it cannot be taken as an enduring benefit to the Indian company itself. The basic ingredient of 'make available' is a necessary condition for treating services as FTS, and there was no evidence to show that scientific or technical know-how was actually made available to the Indian counterpart. This aligns with the Court's decision in CIT (International Taxation)-1 v. M/s Bio-Rad Laboratories (Singapore) PTE Ltd. Therefore, the Court found no substantial question of law involved and dismissed the appeal.
The Delhi High Court held that both issues raised in the appeal stood decided against the appellant (revenue). The Court noted that the first question concerning Section 194H had been decided by a Coordinate Bench in ITA 604/2018 vide order dated April 15, 2024. The second question regarding International Usage Charges was also decided against the department in the same appeal (ITA 604/2018) by an order dated September 23, 2024. Based on these previous decisions, the Court concluded that the present appeal also fails. No specific reasoning from the ITAT's order was detailed, but the High Court relied on its own prior judgments.
The High Court held that the Commissioner erred in strictly interpreting the Circular dated 18.11.2024 to exclude AY 2023-24. The Court reasoned that such a strict approach would lead to anomalous situations and injustice in genuine cases. The Court opined that the purpose of Circular dated 18.11.2024, issued under Section 119(2)(b), was to address genuine hardship, and the reference to specific Assessment Years (2020-21, 2021-22, and 2022-23) was incidental and insignificant. The Court declared that the Circular should apply to all genuine and bona fide cases, irrespective of the Assessment Year, as there is no direct nexus between the Assessment Year and the purpose of mitigating genuine hardship. The Court set aside the impugned order and directed the Commissioner to decide the petitioner's case in accordance with law, holding that the Circular dated 18.11.2024 is applicable to the present case. The petition was disposed of in these terms.
The High Court held that the view taken by the CIT(A) was perfectly justified and legally correct. Regarding the expenditure for obtaining a loan to repay a previous loan from Standard Chartered Bank, the Court reasoned that it is the business acumen of an assessee to take a loan to repay a previous one. This decision can be necessitated by various factors, such as strained relations with the existing banker, obtaining a loan at a lesser rate due to interest rate fluctuations, or other reasons. The Assessing Officer cannot question the commercial wisdom or business acumen of an assessee. Similarly, for the return of share capital money, the Court found it to be a bounden duty of the assessee. If the assessee takes a loan to meet its statutory obligation and financial requirements, it cannot be said that such a loan was taken for pleasure or luxury. Both these expenses were indisputably business necessities and therefore, an expenditure relating to business or incurred to carry on operations to earn income. The Court affirmed that the CIT(A) rightly allowed the contentious amount. The Court also noted that the remaining two components of loan utilization (investment in subsidiary and advance to related party) were considered doubtful by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal, as an assessee company cannot take a loan and disburse it to a related party or subsidiary, which amounts to diversion if not siphoning of funds. The Tribunal committed no error of law in upholding the CIT(A)'s order. The appeal was rejected.
The High Court held that the writ petition is maintainable despite the availability of an alternate statutory remedy. The Court reasoned that the initiation of reassessment proceedings by the notice dated 30.08.2024 was fundamentally void as it was beyond the prescribed period of limitation. Although the petitioner approached the Court after the assessment order was passed, the Court considered that the petitioner had raised the jurisdictional objection before the Assessing Officer, which remained unheeded. The Court found it iniquitous to subject the petitioner to the 'agony of an order which is without jurisdiction on the face of it' and that requiring them to pursue appellate proceedings would be a mere formality when the facts were clear. The Court relied on Supreme Court judgments in M/s Magadh Sugar Mills and Energy Limited vs. The State of Bihar And Others and Executive Engineer v. Seetaram Rice Mill to support its decision to exercise writ jurisdiction in cases where proceedings are 'wholly without jurisdiction' or where exercising jurisdiction would be futile. Consequently, the impugned notice dated 30.08.2024 and the consequential assessment order dated 29.03.2026 were quashed. The writ petition was allowed.
The High Court held that the Assessing Officer (AO) was not justified in making an addition of Rs. 80,42,100/- when he himself had rejected the appellant's claim of collecting this amount from seventeen persons. The Court reasoned that once the assessee's plea is rejected, the AO cannot accept one part of the story (the total amount collected) while rejecting the other (the source of that amount), especially in the absence of other incriminating material. The Court found the addition of Rs. 80,42,100/- to be perverse because it contradicted the AO's own rejection of the appellant's explanation for this sum. The Court concluded that an addition equal to the seized cash, amounting to Rs. 68,47,000/-, was the only amount that could be added to the appellant's income for the Assessment Year 2017-18. The appeal was partly allowed, reducing the addition from Rs. 80,42,100/- to Rs. 68,47,000/-.
The Delhi High Court quashed and set aside the assessment order dated May 21, 2023. The Court found that the assessment order appeared to have been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, as it was passed without considering the assessee's reply or viewpoint. While the assessment order recorded that an adjournment request was made, the petitioner denied this, and no evidence was placed on record by the revenue to substantiate that an adjournment was prayed for. Therefore, in the interest of justice, the Court set aside the order. The Faceless Assessing Officer was directed to issue a fresh notice to the petitioner in accordance with law, provide sufficient opportunity, including filing of reply/written submissions and a personal hearing if opted for, before passing a fresh order. The assessment proceedings were to be completed on or before November 30, 2026. No specific amount in dispute was mentioned.
The tribunal dismissed the appeal, following a previous order. However, it clarified that the Assessing Officer remains free to examine the assessee's eligibility in future years if justifiable grounds exist.
The Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing the petitioner to file an application in terms of CBDT Circular No. 11/2024 dated 01.10.2024 within four weeks. The Court noted that the amount lying in the petitioner's credit could neither be forfeited nor legally appropriated, and keeping it would lead to unjust enrichment, referencing a previous order in M/s Real time Data Services Pvt. Ltd. v. PCIT Delhi-7 & Anr. The Court's direction was based on a fair proposal from the Department. The Competent Authority, upon receiving the application and being satisfied with the credit claimed, is to refund the amount along with applicable interest, preferably within three months of receiving the application. The Court clarified that the Competent Authority should not be influenced by the previous rejection of the Section 264 petition, as the impugned order was practically annulled.
The Delhi High Court, consisting of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Mehta and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vinod Kumar, decided that the writ petition had become infructuous. The Court noted the submission from the petitioner's counsel regarding subsequent developments rendering the petition infructuous. Based on this submission, the Court disposed of the writ petition and the pending application as having been rendered infructuous. No decision was made on the merits of the original grievance that led to the filing of the writ petition. The ratio decidendi is that if a party to a writ petition concedes that it has become infructuous due to subsequent events, the court will dispose of the matter on that basis without delving into the merits.
The High Court held that the buyback of its own shares by a company is not a transaction that attracts Section 56(2)(x) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court reasoned that Section 68 of the Companies Act, 1956 (and its subsequent amendments) permits companies to buy back their own shares, which is essentially a reduction of share capital. The Court emphasized that upon buyback, the shares are extinguished and physically destroyed as mandated by the Companies Act. Therefore, the company cannot be taxed for a deemed profit from property that ceases to exist. The Court found the AO's view to be flawed and untenable in law. While acknowledging that the Tribunal's reliance on a previous judgment concerning Section 56(2)(viia) was misplaced, the Court affirmed that the Tribunal had independently deliberated on the issue and upheld the CIT(A)'s well-reasoned order. The addition made by the AO was deleted, and the appeal was dismissed.
The High Court, instead of deciding the correctness of the Principal Commissioner's order, directed the petitioner to file an application in terms of Circular No. 11/2024 dated 01.10.2024 within four weeks. The Court noted that the amount lying to the petitioner's credit could neither be forfeited nor appropriated by the government, and keeping it would lead to unjust enrichment. The Competent Authority, upon receiving the application, shall consider it in accordance with law. If satisfied about the credit of the amount claimed, the authority shall refund it along with applicable interest, preferably within three months of receiving the application. The Court clarified that the Competent Authority should not be influenced by the earlier rejection of the Section 264 petition, as the Court had practically annulled that order. The writ petition was disposed of in these terms.
The High Court noted that similar appeals for other assessment years had been dismissed based on the principle of consistency. As no distinguishing facts were presented, the present appeal was also dismissed.
The Delhi High Court held that payment for goodwill is not an illegal expense or a purpose prohibited by law. A breach of Bar Council of India Rules does not automatically render an expenditure illegal, especially when the primary purpose is to derive benefit from goodwill.
The High Court held that the issue of limitation is a fundamental jurisdictional aspect that requires examination by the AO. Despite the revenue's contention that the ground of limitation was not raised before the AO, the Court found that since the petitioner approached the Court before the assessment order was passed, the writ petitions could be entertained. The Court, relying on the judgment in Dinesh Jindal's case, concluded that the notices issued on 31.08.2024 were clearly beyond the prescribed period of ten years for AYs 2014-15 and 2015-16. Consequently, the impugned notices dated 31.08.2024, consequential demand assessment orders dated 31.03.2026, and any notice of demand or penalty stood quashed. The ratio decidendi is that a jurisdictional issue of limitation, if apparent on the face of the record and raised before the appellate or writ court before finalization of assessment, can be considered even if not raised before the AO, especially when it pertains to the validity of the reassessment notice itself.
The High Court held that the issue of limitation is a fundamental jurisdictional aspect that requires examination. Although the assessee had not raised this plea before the AO, the writ petitions were entertained as they were filed before the assessment orders were passed. The Court, in light of the judgment in Dinesh Jindal's case, found that the notices issued on 31.08.2024 were clearly beyond the prescribed period of ten years for AYs 2014-15 and 2015-16. Consequently, the impugned notices dated 31.08.2024, the consequential demand assessment orders dated 31.03.2026, and any subsequent demand or penalty notices were quashed. The ratio decidendi is that notices issued under Section 148 beyond the statutory time limit, even if the assessment order has been passed, are liable to be quashed, and the High Court can entertain such pleas in writ jurisdiction.
The Delhi High Court held that the issue of limitation, being a fundamental jurisdictional aspect, requires examination. The Court found that the notice dated 31.08.2024 and the reasons recorded therein did not mention the existence or creation of any asset, which is a prerequisite for initiating proceedings under Section 153A of the Act with an extended period of ten years. The Court referred to its judgment in Smart Chip Private Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, which stated that in the absence of material establishing the acquisition of any asset, the conditions for extended limitation remain unsatisfied. Consequently, the extended period of ten years cannot be applied. The maximum period available should be six years. Since more than six years had elapsed from the end of AY 2016-17 by 31.08.2024, the notice under Section 148 was declared fundamentally without jurisdiction. The notice under Section 148 dated 31.08.2024 for AY 2016-17, the consequential demand assessment order dated 31.03.2026, and any related demand and penalty notices were quashed.
The Delhi High Court held that the payment for goodwill was an expenditure for a purpose not prohibited by law. A breach of Bar Council of India Rules does not constitute an offense, and the payment was for utilizing the firm's goodwill and name, not for sharing fees.
The Delhi High Court held that the payment for goodwill was not an offense or a purpose prohibited by law. It was considered a legitimate expenditure for deriving benefit from the firm's reputation and name, and not a violation of Bar Council of India Rules.
The Delhi High Court held that payment for goodwill is not an offense or a purpose prohibited by law. A breach of Bar Council of India Rules does not automatically render an expenditure illegal. The primary purpose of the expenditure was to use the goodwill and name of the firm.
The High Court held that the payment for goodwill was not an illegal expense or prohibited by law. A breach of Bar Council of India Rules does not constitute an offense, and the payment was for the use of goodwill, not a prohibited profit sharing arrangement.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the department's appeal, affirming the ITAT's decision on all five questions of law. The court found the issues covered by precedents, confirmed energy tax payable on collection, held interest on security deposits as a statutory liability, and allowed higher depreciation for UPS as integral to computers.
The Delhi High Court agreed with the Revenue that the situs of the jurisdictional Assessing Officer determines the jurisdiction. Therefore, the appeals were not maintainable before the Delhi High Court.
The Delhi High Court held that the situs of the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer determines the jurisdiction, following a Supreme Court judgment. Therefore, the appeals were not maintainable before the Delhi High Court.
The Delhi High Court agreed with the Revenue, holding that the situs of the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer determines the jurisdiction of the High Court. Therefore, the appeals were not maintainable before the Delhi High Court.
The Delhi High Court agreed with the Revenue's submission, citing a Supreme Court judgment. The court held that the situs of the JAO determines the jurisdiction for appeals.
The Delhi High Court agreed with the Revenue that the situs of the JAO determines the jurisdiction. Therefore, the appeals were not maintainable before the Delhi High Court.
The High Court noted that the issue of 'Option Price Contribution' had been consistently decided in favor of the assessee across multiple assessment years. Following the principle of consistency and the dismissal of previous appeals on similar grounds, the High Court found no justification to entertain the present appeal.
The tribunal dismissed the appeal, following a previous order. However, it clarified that the Assessing Officer is free to examine the assessee's eligibility in future years if justifiable grounds exist.
The High Court set aside the impugned reassessment order dated 27.02.2026 and all consequential proceedings. The matter was remanded back to the Assessing Officer (AO). The AO is directed to consider the petitioner's reply dated 27.02.2026 in accordance with law. This consideration must include the petitioner's objections in light of the Supreme Court's judgment in the case of Rajeev Bansal. The AO is to pass a fresh order within eight weeks from the date of the order. Furthermore, if the petitioner requests a personal opportunity of hearing, the AO shall grant the same. The petition was allowed accordingly.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, following its own precedent and a judgment from the Allahabad High Court. The dismissal was based on the tax effect being below the prescribed limit in the relevant CBDT circulars.
The High Court held that the reassessment proceedings for AY 2013-14 were barred by limitation, setting aside the notice dated March 31, 2024, under Section 148 and the subsequent notice under Section 143(2). The Court found that the information gathered during the search did not provide a valid basis to reopen the assessment for AY 2013-14 beyond the prescribed time limits. Conversely, for AY 2015-16, the Court sustained the reassessment proceedings initiated by the notice dated March 31, 2023, under Section 148 and the subsequent notice under Section 143(2), finding them not barred by limitation, as the search provided relevant information. Regarding the special audit for AY 2013-14, the Court set aside the direction, finding it unjustified. However, for AY 2015-16, the Court sustained the special audit direction, reasoning that the expanded scope of Section 142(2A) to include 'volume of the accounts' and 'multiplicity of transactions' justified the audit, especially in light of the upheld reassessment proceedings. The Court noted that the intent of the legislature was to broaden the AO's powers under Section 142(2A).
The Delhi High Court quashed and set aside the impugned assessment order dated November 29, 2019. The Court, considering the pendency of the matter for two years and the observations of a co-ordinate bench, deemed it appropriate to set aside the order and allow the petitioner to participate in the proceedings, without delving into the dispute of proper service. The petitioner was directed to appear before the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) on April 20, 2026, to file her reply. The JAO was instructed to pass a fresh order in accordance with the law after considering the petitioner's reply and submissions, without being influenced by the previously set-aside order. No fresh notice was to be issued to the petitioner. The ratio decidendi is that in cases where there is a dispute regarding service of notice and the assessee claims lack of awareness, it is often in the interest of justice to allow the assessee an opportunity to present their case, especially when the matter has been pending for a considerable period.
The Delhi High Court held that the issue was covered by the Supreme Court's judgment in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Pvt. Ltd. V. Commissioner of Income Tax. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The Delhi High Court held that the issue was covered by the Supreme Court judgment in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Pvt. Ltd. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose.
The High Court found that all issues raised were matters of fact and evidence. Consequently, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The Delhi High Court held that the issue was covered by the Supreme Court's judgment in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Pvt. Ltd. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The Delhi High Court held that the issue was covered by the Supreme Court's judgment in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Pvt. Ltd. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The High Court held that the issue was covered by the Supreme Court's judgment in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Pvt. Ltd. Consequently, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The Delhi High Court held that the present appeals should be dismissed. The Court's reasoning was based on the submission by the assessee's counsel that a Coordinate Bench of the same Court had, on April 17, 2025, in Appeal No. 554/2024, rejected the Department's appeal on identical grounds for the very same assessee. The Revenue's counsel was unable to dispute this factual assertion. Consequently, the Court found that the issues involved in the present appeals were exactly identical to those decided in the prior appeal. Therefore, the present appeals were dismissed. No specific IT Act sections were discussed in the judgment provided, and no amount in dispute was mentioned.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated January 31, 2025, cannot be considered time-barred as contended by the petitioner. The Court reasoned that the initiation of reassessment proceedings on the basis of a search provides for an extended period of 10 years, thus curing the potential limitation issue. The Court further noted that the remaining arguments advanced by the petitioner fall within the realm of fact-finding inquiry, which is beyond the scope of its limited jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the Court did not delve into the merits of the factual disputes. The operative direction was to dismiss both writ petitions.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated January 31, 2025, cannot be considered time-barred as contended by the petitioner. The Court noted that the reassessment proceedings were initiated following a search, which, according to the revenue, allows for an extended limitation period. The Court found that the revenue's submission regarding the search and the availability of the extended period of 10 years was a valid basis for assuming jurisdiction. The remaining arguments raised by the petitioner were deemed to be within the realm of fact-finding inquiry, which the High Court, in its limited writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot undertake. Therefore, the Court dismissed the writ petitions.
The High Court of Delhi, in view of the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant (Revenue) that the tax effect in the instant appeals falls below the limits prescribed in CBDT Circular No.5/2024 dated 15.03.2024 read with Circular No. 9/2024 dated 17.09.2024, has dismissed the appeals. The reasoning is directly based on the appellant's statement regarding the tax effect and the applicability of the aforementioned CBDT circulars, which set monetary thresholds for filing appeals. The ratio decidendi is that appeals with a tax effect below the prescribed limits, as per the relevant CBDT circulars, are to be dismissed. No specific issue was left undecided, as the appeals were disposed of on the preliminary ground raised by the Revenue.