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544 orders · Page 4 of 11
The High Court held that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal had proceeded on incorrect facts supplied by the Department, specifically regarding the tax rate applied to long-term capital gains. The AO's comments clarified that the tax was calculated at 20% on Rs. 14,98,151/-, not 22%. Consequently, the declaration of law made by the CIT(A) and the Tribunal, based on this incorrect assumption, was set aside. However, the question of law regarding the correct tax rate was kept open. Regarding the dispute concerning interest under Section 234B, the AO was directed to provide a copy of the interest calculation to the assessee via email within 15 days, reserving the assessee's right to pursue appropriate legal remedies. The appeal was disposed of in terms of the AO's comments, and the limitation period for any future appeal by the assessee concerning Section 234B interest would be counted from the date of receiving the AO's communication.
The High Court held that the issue in the present appeal was identical to the facts and law involved in the judgment dated 23.05.2025 passed by this Court in ITA No. 173/2025. Following its own prior judgment, the High Court dismissed the instant appeal. The reasoning was based on the principle of judicial precedent and the fact that the Revenue could not dispute the applicability of the earlier decision. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Delhi High Court held that no question of law, let alone a substantial question of law, arises for consideration in these appeals. This conclusion is based on the consistent view of the Delhi High Court and the clear statutory position regarding the mandatory procedure under Section 144C of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court noted that the ITAT had annulled the assessment orders precisely because the Assessing Officer failed to follow this procedure. Furthermore, the Court observed that the amount involved in ITA 596/2026, pertaining to AY 2010-11, falls below the monetary limits prescribed by CBDT Circulars No. 5/2024 and 9/2024, making it liable for dismissal on that ground as well. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that no question of law, much less a substantial question of law, arises for consideration in these appeals. This conclusion is based on the consistent view of the Delhi High Court and the clear statutory position. The Court noted that the ITAT had annulled the assessment orders, which were passed by the Assessing Officer without following the procedure under Section 144C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for foreign companies deemed controlled and managed in India. This aligns with previous judgments of the High Court in Rolland Enterprises Ltd. and Sumitomo Corporation India (P) Ltd. Furthermore, the Court observed that the amount involved in one of the appeals (ITA 596/2026, AY 2010-11) falls below the monetary limits prescribed by CBDT Circulars No. 5/2024 and 9/2024, making it liable for dismissal on that ground as well. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court upheld the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal had correctly set aside the assessment order dated 27.01.2025, which was passed by the Assessing Officer in the name of an erstwhile company. This was done despite the fact that the said company had merged with SFDC Ireland Limited, and this merger had been duly intimated to the Assessing Officer and the Dispute Resolution Panel. The Tribunal's decision was based on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. ([2019] 107 taxmann.com 375 (SC)). As the appellant (Revenue) could not present any distinguishing facts, the High Court found no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's order. The appeal was accordingly rejected.
The High Court held that the assessment for Assessment Year 2011-12 is barred by limitation. The Court noted that the CIT(A) relied on the decision in PCIT vs. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. [2024] 161 taxmann.com 160 (Delhi), which was affirmed by the Tribunal. The Revenue's counsel could not point out any judgment contrary to this view and only submitted that a SLP was pending before the Supreme Court. Following the law laid down in Ojjus Medicare (supra), the High Court dismissed the appeal. The operative direction was the dismissal of the Revenue's appeal.
The High Court dismissed the appeal. The Court reasoned that since the Department's appeal concerning the quantum of income, which was based on the same ITAT order, had already been dismissed by the High Court on 24.07.2026, the present appeal challenging the setting aside of the penalty order would, as a natural corollary, also fail. The principle applied is that if the primary addition or assessment is deleted, the consequential penalty also stands deleted. The Court did not decide the merits of the penalty itself but dismissed the appeal based on the prior decision on the quantum. No issue was left undecided.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal. The Court accepted the submission made by the respondent-assessee that the appeal should be dismissed in terms of CBDT Circular No. 05/2024, dated 15.03.2024. This circular prescribes monetary limits for filing appeals. Since the consequential order giving effect to the revisional order under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, created a liability of Rs. 25 lakhs, which was below the specified limit, the appeal was not maintainable. The Revenue's counsel could not dispute this position. The pending application was also disposed of.
The High Court held that the appellant's contention that the sale deed was executed under misconception, while attractive, lacked substance. The sale deed was executed on 03.04.2017, showing a cash consideration of Rs. 27,25,000/-, and this transaction was not disclosed to the Income Tax Department. The possibility that consideration was paid as part of a family settlement could not be ruled out. The Court found it intriguing that the civil suit for cancellation was filed as late as 2026, suggesting it was an afterthought, especially since it was filed after the Tribunal's disposal of the appeal. The High Court found no substantial question of law arising and dismissed the appeal. However, acknowledging the possibility of the appellant acting bona fide or under misconception and the subsequent cancellation of the sale deed by the Civil Court, the High Court observed that the Department should not impose a penalty. It directed that if the assessee produces the Civil Court's decree during penalty proceedings or appeals, the effect of the decree should be given in accordance with law.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court noted that the assessment year in question, 2011-12, when calculated from the satisfaction date of 24.05.2021, was beyond the 10-year limitation period. This was in line with the High Court's own previous decision in PCIT vs. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. [2024] 161 taxmann.com 160 (Delhi). The Revenue's counsel could not present any contrary judgment and only mentioned that a Special Leave Petition was pending before the Supreme Court. As the law laid down in Ojjus Medicare still held field, the High Court followed that decision and dismissed the appeal. No specific issue was left undecided.
The High Court found little substance in the Revenue's contentions. It noted the Tribunal's observation that the Revenue was unable to point out any incriminating material, which is a finding of fact not requiring interference. The Court acknowledged the Revenue's request for liberty to move a miscellaneous application before the Tribunal. This liberty was granted to the Revenue to approach the Tribunal if an occasion arises after the completion of proceedings under the Black Money Act, 2015. However, the appeal itself was rejected. The operative direction was to grant the liberty as prayed, while rejecting the appeal. No specific issue was left undecided, but the primary appeal was dismissed.
The Court held that the notice for reassessment issued under Section 147/148 of the Act is without jurisdiction, arbitrary, and violative of Articles 14 and 300A of the Constitution. The Court found that the original assessment under Section 143(3) was not summary but a scrutiny assessment where the AO had issued a long questionnaire and examined bank statements. The AO's satisfaction recorded in the assessment order indicated a conscious application of mind to all aspects, including cash deposits and RTGS transactions. The information from the 'insight portal' was merely an intimation about cash deposits. The Court rejected the revenue's argument, relying on *Chetan Sabharwal*, that the AO could examine aspects not examined earlier, stating that when two views are possible and one was taken in the original assessment, a subsequent AO cannot initiate reassessment proceedings merely for a change of opinion. The reasons recorded by the AO failed to mention the prior Section 143(3) assessment, which is a relevant jurisdictional fact. The Court concluded that the assessee had produced bank statements during the original assessment, negating the allegation of failure to disclose material facts. The notice was quashed, along with the consequential assessment order and demand notice.
The High Court held that the order passed under Section 148A(d) and the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were clearly time-barred. The Court reasoned that the surviving period available to the assessing officer was 5 days from the date the petitioner filed their reply to the Section 148A(b) notice, which was June 13, 2022. Consequently, the order under Section 148A(d) ought to have been passed by June 18, 2022. However, the order was actually passed on July 26, 2022, which was beyond the permissible time limit. The Court found that the calculation of the surviving period, as per the principles laid down in Union Of India v. Rajeev Bansal, supported the petitioner's claim. The ratio decidendi is that the period between the issuance of the original Section 148 notice and the expiry of the extended limitation under TOLA constitutes the surviving period for issuing subsequent notices under Section 148A, and if this period is exhausted, the subsequent proceedings are invalid. The Court quashed and set aside the order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148.
The High Court held that the order passed under Section 148A(d) and the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, on July 28, 2022, were indeed time-barred. The Court agreed with the petitioner's calculation of the surviving period. Based on the Supreme Court's judgment in Union Of India v. Rajeev Bansal, the surviving period was determined to be 5 days from the date the reply to the Section 148A(b) notice was filed. The Court noted that the order under Section 148A(d) ought to have been passed by June 18, 2022, at the latest, but it was actually passed on July 28, 2022. Consequently, the Court quashed and set aside the order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148. The writ petition was allowed. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the impugned penalty order dated 31.03.2026 and the consequential demand notice. The Court reasoned that the Assessing Officer had acted arbitrarily by passing the penalty order after the ITAT had already set aside the assessment order. The Court emphasized that the basis for the demand had ceased to exist following the ITAT's decision, which was binding on the AO. Consequently, the foundation for alleging misrepresentation or misreporting of income vanished. The Court also referred to Section 275(1A) of the Act, which mandates that penalty proceedings shall not be finalized until appeal proceedings are pending, implying that the AO should await the outcome of appeals and give effect to appellate orders. The Court noted that if the Department's appeal is allowed, they are free to take appropriate proceedings. The Court exercised its writ jurisdiction despite the availability of an appeal remedy, deeming it warranted due to the arbitrary action of the AO.
The Delhi High Court held that the issue of whether FCCBs constitute capital or revenue expenditure is settled law, with precedents supporting their treatment as revenue expenditure. The Court cited India Cements Ltd. and other cases to emphasize that liabilities incurred for obtaining loans are revenue expenditure, as the loan itself is not an asset of enduring nature and the expenditure is for securing the use of money for a certain period. Regarding the Revenue's argument that the expenditure should be spread over the life of the FCCBs, the Court noted that while this principle was discussed in Jagatjit Industries, it was clarified that the liability to pay premium arises in the year of issue and can be proportionately spread. However, the Court observed that this specific issue (spreading the expenditure) was not raised before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) or the ITAT in the present case. Therefore, the Court concluded that no substantial question of law arose for adjudication, and the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the order passed under Section 148A(d) and the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, on July 20, 2022, were indeed time-barred. The Court reasoned that the surviving period for the assessing officer to pass the order under Section 148A(d) was only 5 days from the date the petitioner filed their reply to the Section 148A(b) notice, which was June 15, 2022. Therefore, the order ought to have been passed by June 20, 2022. Since the order was passed on July 20, 2022, it was beyond the permissible time limit. The Court quashed and set aside the order under Section 148A(d) and the notice under Section 148. The writ petition was allowed, and pending applications were disposed of.
The High Court held that Section 251(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, mandates that the Commissioner (Appeals) shall not enhance an assessment or penalty unless the appellant has had a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement. The Court noted that the disallowance was enhanced by more than Rs. 5,00,00,000/- and no notice in this regard appeared to have been issued to the assessee. The Court found that mere discussion on the merits or detailed directions for scrutiny do not satisfy the requirement of issuing a notice and providing an opportunity. Issuance of notice signifies an explicit intention to take a proposed action. In the absence of such notice, the assessee's statutory and fundamental rights under Article 14 of the Constitution are violated. Therefore, the question regarding enhancement of disallowance without notice is answered in favour of the assessee. The appeal is partly allowed, the orders of the CIT(A) and ITAT to this extent are set aside, and the matter is restored to the CIT(A) to decide the issue afresh after issuing notice to the assessee.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court noted that the appellant-Revenue was unable to produce the original seized documents, which were crucial for examining the veracity of their contentions. The Court observed that the appellant had been granted multiple opportunities to produce the record. The email from the Assessing Officer indicated that the relevant hard disk was approximately 10 years old, and certain files/data had become corrupted and were not readily accessible. The Court concluded that the appellant's contentions essentially revolved around a finding of fact that had been recorded by both the Appellate Authorities (CIT(A) and Tribunal). The Court found no reason to interfere with these findings, stating that they could not be considered perverse. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. The Court also granted liberty to the Department to file an application for revival if they were able to produce the original documents, which would be considered on its own merits.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, holding that no substantial question of law arose for consideration. The Court noted that the addition made in the hands of the appellant pertained specifically to the value of the gold bars, which were treated as unexplained by the revenue authorities. The Court found no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower authorities on this specific aspect. The appeal was dismissed, and the pending application was also disposed of.
The High Court held that the appellate proceedings and hearing of an appeal presuppose a hearing of the assessee or its authorized representative, either physically or in a virtual mode. Consideration of written submissions or memo of appeal cannot substitute for an oral or personal hearing. While notices were issued and the assessee filed written submissions and adjournment requests, the crucial aspect was that the assessee had sought virtual hearing, which was admittedly not provided by the Appellate Authority (NFAC). The Court found that the failure to provide any video conference link or virtual hearing led to a miscarriage of justice. The Court reasoned that an opportunity for personal/virtual hearing could have enabled the petitioner to better explain the nature of transactions. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, the impugned order dated 28.07.2025 was set aside, and the appeal was restored to the CIT(A) (NFAC). The NFAC was directed to issue a fresh notice of hearing and provide a video conference link or use any other virtual mode. The penalty orders under Sections 271AAC(1) and 270(A) were also quashed. The Court further directed the CBDT and NFAC to ensure a video conferencing facility is made available for appellate proceedings within three months.
The Delhi High Court found little substance in the Revenue's contentions. The Court noted the ITAT's observation that the Revenue was unable to point out any incriminating material, which is a finding of fact not calling for interference. The Revenue then sought liberty to move a miscellaneous application before the ITAT if an occasion arose after the completion of proceedings under the Black Money Act, 2015. The Court granted this liberty while rejecting the appeal. The operative direction was to grant liberty to the Revenue to move a miscellaneous application before the ITAT, subject to the condition that such an occasion arises after the completion of Black Money Act proceedings. The appeal itself was rejected.
The High Court held that the addition of Rs. 3,50,00,000/- made by the Assessing Officer was based solely on the statement of Mahendra Sethia, recorded under Section 131 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, after the search concluded. Crucially, no corroborative evidence or incriminating material was found during the search at the assessee's premises to support the claim that the unsecured loan was an accommodation entry. The CIT(A) had deleted the addition, reasoning that in the absence of incriminating material found during the search, no addition could be made under Section 153A. The Tribunal affirmed this view. The High Court found no substantial grounds to overturn these findings, deeming them not perverse or contrary to the material on record. Therefore, the appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.
The High Court held that it should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact by the statutory authorities, as its jurisdiction under Article 226 is one of judicial review and not appellate re-appreciation of evidence. The court found the petitioner's statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act to be voluntary and reliable, noting its elaborate nature, the petitioner's signatures on all pages, and the belated retraction. The court also held that the petitioner could not derive advantage from the destruction of CCTV footage as it was erased in the ordinary course before any order for its preservation was passed. The court found that the authorities had considered all relevant evidence, including the petitioner's statement, declaration form, recovery proceedings, and surrounding circumstances, to arrive at a plausible and legally sustainable conclusion that the petitioner attempted to import gold without declaration. The findings were neither perverse nor arbitrary. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed.
The High Court upheld the Tribunal's order. Regarding the first issue, the Court found that the Tribunal had made a categorical finding of fact that the assessee indulged in issuing bogus donation receipts to facilitate deductions under Sections 80GGB and 80GGC, and that the amounts were paid back to the donors. This finding of fact, being within the Tribunal's domain, could not be interfered with under Section 260A. Consequently, the Tribunal's approach of taking 6% of the total amount as the assessee's income under Section 56, rather than the entire purported donation, was considered correct. The Court rejected the assessee's claim for exemption under Section 13A, stating that a violator of the law cannot claim exemption. Furthermore, the Court noted from the assessment order that the appellant failed to submit the required report to the Election Commission of India as per the second proviso to Section 13A for some assessment years, and in other years, no report was filed at all. This flouting of the proviso rendered the assessee ineligible for exemption under Section 13A. The appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the Tribunal had made a categorical finding of fact that the assessee had indulged in issuing bogus donation receipts to facilitate deductions under Sections 80GGB and 80GGC, and that the purported donations were paid back to the donors. This finding of fact, being unassailable under Section 260A, was upheld. Consequently, the Tribunal's approach of taking 6% of the total amount as the assessee's income, rather than the entire purported donation, was found to be correct. The Court rejected the assessee's claim for exemption under Section 13A, stating that a violator of law cannot claim exemption and that the appellant's books did not reflect a true and correct picture. Furthermore, the Court noted that the appellant had failed to submit the required report to the Election Commission of India as per the second proviso to Section 13A, thereby losing eligibility for exemption under Section 13A. The appeals were dismissed.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petitions, setting aside the impugned orders of the ITAT. The Court followed the reasoning in the coordinate bench judgment of Sahara India Limited v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal's approach in dismissing appeals on territorial jurisdiction grounds, despite the matters being transferred by the President's order, was considered erroneous. The High Court held that a Bench of the Tribunal cannot overturn an administrative order of the President. The reliance by the ITAT on the Supreme Court judgment in ABC Papers Ltd. was deemed misplaced as that case dealt with the situs of appeals under Section 260A after an assessee's case transfer under Section 127, not the transfer of appeals by administrative order. The Court emphasized that the writ petitions concerned the legality of the Tribunal's order rejecting appeals on territorial jurisdiction, making the situs of the Assessing Officer irrelevant and the situs of the Tribunal (Delhi) the determining factor. The appeals were restored to the dockets of the Delhi Bench of the ITAT to be decided on merits. Any appeals or cross-objections filed before the Lucknow Bench consequent to the ITAT's erroneous order were to be deferred and transferred to the Delhi Bench for decision.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petitions, setting aside the impugned orders of the ITAT, Delhi Bench. The Court held that the ITAT, Delhi Bench, erred in dismissing the appeals on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the ITAT, Delhi Bench, was aware that the appeals had been transferred from the Lucknow Bench by an administrative order of the President of the Tribunal. The Court found that the ITAT, Delhi Bench, had effectively disregarded the administrative order of the President, which it could not do. The Court relied on a previous judgment of a Coordinate Bench in Sahara India Limited v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, which had dealt with a similar situation. The appeals were restored to the docket of the Delhi Bench of the ITAT to be decided on merits. The Court clarified that if any appeals or cross-objections had been filed before the Lucknow Bench consequent to the ITAT's erroneous order, their hearing would be deferred, and they would be transferred to the Delhi Bench for decision on merits.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petitions, setting aside the impugned orders of the ITAT. The Court followed the reasoning of a previous judgment by a coordinate bench in an identical case involving Sahara India Limited. The Tribunal's approach in dismissing appeals for lack of territorial jurisdiction, despite the matters being transferred by the President's administrative order, was deemed erroneous. The Court held that a Bench of the Tribunal cannot overturn an administrative order of the President. The reliance by the ITAT on the judgment in ABC Papers Ltd. was considered misplaced as that case dealt with the jurisdiction of High Courts under Section 260A after transfer of cases under Section 127, not the administrative transfer of appeals within the Tribunal. The appeals were restored to the dockets of the Delhi Bench of the ITAT to be decided on merits. Any appeals or cross-objections filed before the Lucknow Bench consequent to the ITAT's erroneous orders were to be deferred and transferred to the Delhi Bench for decision. The principle established is that administrative orders of the President of the ITAT transferring cases are binding on the Benches, and Benches cannot disregard them on jurisdictional grounds.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petitions, following the reasoning of a Coordinate Bench in a similar case. The Court held that the ITAT, Delhi Bench, had erred in dismissing the appeals on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the ITAT's order amounted to disregarding the administrative order of the President of the Tribunal transferring the appeals. The Court clarified that while an appeal under Section 260A against an order on merits might lie before the High Court with supervisory jurisdiction over the Assessing Officer, the appeals before the Tribunal itself were to be heard by the Tribunal, and in this case, the Delhi Bench was the appropriate forum due to the transfer order. The Court set aside all impugned orders passed by the ITAT and restored the appeals to the dockets of the Delhi Bench of the ITAT for decision on merits. The Court also directed that if any appeals or cross-objections had been filed before the Lucknow Bench consequent to the ITAT's erroneous order, their hearing would be deferred and they would be transferred to the Delhi Bench for decision.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petitions, setting aside the impugned orders of the ITAT. The Court followed the reasoning in the cited case of Sahara India Limited v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The High Court held that the ITAT, Delhi Bench, had erred in dismissing the appeals on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that once an appeal is transferred by the President of the Tribunal, a Bench of the Tribunal cannot overturn such an administrative order. The reliance placed by the ITAT on the judgment in ABC Papers Ltd. was deemed misplaced as it dealt with the situs of appellate jurisdiction under Section 260A, not the transfer of appeals by administrative order. The Court reasoned that the writ petitions themselves pertained to the legality of the ITAT's order on territorial jurisdiction, making the situs of the Tribunal (Delhi) the determining factor, not the situs of the Assessing Officer. Consequently, the appeals were restored to the dockets of the Delhi Bench of the ITAT to be decided on merits. The Court also clarified that any appeals or cross-objections filed before the Lucknow Bench as a sequel to the ITAT's erroneous orders would be deferred and transferred to the Delhi Bench for decision.
The High Court upheld the Tribunal's order. It found that the Tribunal had made a categorical finding of fact that the assessee had indulged in issuing bogus donation receipts to facilitate deductions under Sections 80GGB and 80GGC for donors, and that the purported donation amounts were paid back to the donors. This finding of fact, being unassailable under Section 260A, justified the Tribunal's approach. The Court reasoned that the assessee's claim for exemption under Section 13A was misplaced as a violator of law cannot claim exemption, and doing so would lead to mischief with the provisions of Section 13A, especially since the books of accounts did not reflect a true and correct picture. Furthermore, the Court noted that the appellant had flouted the second proviso to Section 13A by filing improper reports or no reports at all to the Election Commission of India in some assessment years, thereby losing eligibility for exemption under Section 13A. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court upheld the Tribunal's order. It found that the Tribunal had made a categorical finding of fact that the assessee issued bogus donation receipts to enable donors to claim deductions under Sections 80GGB and 80GGC, and that the purported donation amounts were returned to the donors. This finding of fact, being unassailable under Section 260A, led the court to agree with the Tribunal's approach of taxing 6% of the amount as income, rather than the entire donation, as it represented the commission for facilitating false receipts. The court rejected the assessee's claim for exemption under Section 13A, stating that a violator of the law cannot claim exemption. Furthermore, the court noted that the assessee had flouted the second proviso to Section 13A by filing improper reports or no reports at all in certain assessment years, thereby losing its eligibility for exemption under Section 13A. The appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the Tribunal's finding that the assessee indulged in issuing bogus donation receipts to enable others to claim deductions under Sections 80GGB and 80GGC was a finding of fact, not to be interfered with under Section 260A. The Tribunal's finding that the purported donations were paid back to the donors was also a factual finding. Consequently, the Tribunal's approach of taking 6% of the total amount as the assessee's income under Section 56, rather than the entire purported donation, was found to be correct, as the assessee facilitated false donation receipts. The assessee's claim for exemption under Section 13A was rejected, as a violator of law cannot claim exemption, and this would lead to a mischief with the mandate of Section 13A. Furthermore, the assessee failed to submit reports to the Election Commission of India as per the second proviso to Section 13A for some assessment years, and in others, filed no report at all, thus losing eligibility for exemption under Section 13A. The appeals were dismissed.
The Delhi High Court upheld the order of the Tribunal. The Court found that the Tribunal had made a categorical finding of fact that the assessee had indulged in issuing bogus donation receipts to various persons to enable them to claim deductions under Sections 80GGB and 80GGC of the Act. The Tribunal also found that the purported donation amounts were paid back to the donors. The High Court held that these findings of fact, being recorded by the Tribunal, could not be interfered with under Section 260A of the Act. Consequently, the Court found no error in the Tribunal's approach of taking 6% of the total amount as the assessee's income under Section 56, rather than the entire purported donation, as the assessee had facilitated false donation receipts. The Court rejected the assessee's claim for exemption under Section 13A, stating that a violator of the law cannot claim exemption. Furthermore, the Court noted from the assessment order that the appellant failed to submit the required report to the Election Commission of India as per the second proviso to Section 13A, thus losing its eligibility for exemption under Section 13A. The appeals were dismissed.
The High Court upheld the Tribunal's order. It found that the Tribunal had made a categorical finding of fact that the assessee had indulged in issuing bogus donation receipts to facilitate deductions under Sections 80GGB and 80GGC for donors, and that the purported donation amounts were paid back to the donors. This finding of fact, being unassailable under Section 260A, led the court to conclude that the Tribunal's approach of taxing 6% of the total amount as income under Section 56, representing commission, was not erroneous. The court rejected the assessee's claim for exemption under Section 13A, stating that a violator of law cannot claim exemption. Furthermore, the court noted that the appellant had flouted the second proviso to Section 13A by filing improper reports or no reports to the Election Commission of India in certain assessment years, thereby losing its eligibility for exemption under Section 13A. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the ITAT had correctly decided the issue. The Tribunal's reasoning, which relied on the provisions of Section 151 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Communist Party of India (Marxist) vs. CIT (Ex), was found to be sound. The Court found no illegality or error in the ITAT's order. The ITAT had allowed the assessee's appeal, quashing the assessment order dated 20.04.2023. The ratio decidendi is that for reassessment proceedings initiated beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the approval for issuing notice under Section 148A(d) must be obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General or Chief Commissioner, as stipulated in Section 151(ii) of the Act, and not from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax. The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.
The Delhi High Court rejected the appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax. The Court noted that the ITAT's impugned order was based on its earlier judgment in TSYS Card Tech Ltd. v. DCIT. Crucially, this ITAT decision had been affirmed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court itself in a prior judgment dated 16.07.2024 in ITA No. 165/2024. The revenue's counsel conceded that they were unable to dispute this established legal position. Consequently, the High Court found no grounds to interfere with the ITAT's order and dismissed the appeal. The operative direction was the rejection of the appeal.
The Delhi High Court held that once Form No. 2 was issued to the petitioner under the VSV Scheme, and the fact was brought to the notice of the appellate authority (CIT(A)/NFAC), the authority ought to have stayed its hands. The Court found that the CIT(A)/NFAC should have disposed of the appeal as withdrawn once Form No. 4 was issued, rather than deciding the appeal and remanding it. The Court noted that while the CIT(A)/NFAC's order might not be technically illegal as it preceded Form No. 4, it was contrary to the mandate of the VSV Scheme. The approach of the CIT(A)/NFAC and the Tribunal resulted in multiplicity of litigation. Consequently, the impugned orders of the CIT(A)/NFAC dated 07.03.2025 and the Tribunal dated 29.09.2025 and 08.05.2026 were quashed and set aside. It was held that the certificate/Form No. 4 dated 14.05.2025 shall remain conclusive. The writ petition was allowed.
The High Court held that the Tribunal had taken a correct view. The assessee, in his statement recorded during the survey, admitted to carrying out the work of issuing bogus bills and earning commission income from it. The Court found that the commission income admitted by the assessee was on the bills he provided. Therefore, the Tribunal's decision to confine the addition to the commission at the rate of 0.15 percent of the credit entries was considered correct and did not warrant interference. The Court also noted that the PCIT's Section 263 order did not contain a specific direction to add the entire credit amount under Section 68 but rather directed the AO to examine the transactions carefully. The Court found that the arguments presented did not raise any question of law, let alone a substantial question of law.
The High Court held that the Tribunal took a correct view and no interference was warranted. The Court noted that the assessee admitted to earning commission income from providing bogus bills and accommodation entries. The Court found that the commission income admitted was on the bills provided. Therefore, the Tribunal's decision to confine the addition to commission at 0.15% of credit entries was upheld. The Court also observed that the PCIT's order under Section 263 did not contain a specific direction to add the entire credit amount under Section 68, but rather directed the AO to examine transactions and explanations for credit and debit entries. The Court concluded that the arguments presented did not give rise to any question of law, substantial or otherwise. The appeals were dismissed.
The High Court held that the order passed by the Tribunal did not warrant any interference. While acknowledging some substance in the appellant's contention that the appeal was argued on the ground of non-service of notice, the Court found it unlikely that the appellant would have conceded to a remand to the CIT(A) if the matter were that simple, especially given the Tribunal's delay in passing the order. The Court observed that the Tribunal's order had to be considered as it appeared. The appeal was rejected, and the appellant was informed that he could move an application before the Tribunal in accordance with law if he wished. All pending applications were also disposed of.
The High Court held that the Tribunal had taken a correct view. The assessee had admitted to providing bogus bills and earning commission income. The AO's assessment order, as quoted by the High Court, noted the assessee's statement that he had been carrying out the work of billing from which he earned commission income and that he had been providing accommodation entries and bogus bills. The Court found that the commission income admitted by the assessee was on the bills he provided. Therefore, the Tribunal's decision to confine the addition to the commission at 0.15% of the credit entries was considered correct, and no interference was warranted. The Court also noted that the PCIT's order under Section 263 did not issue a specific direction to add the entire credit amount under Section 68 but directed the AO to examine transactions carefully. The Court found that the arguments presented did not give rise to any substantial question of law.
The High Court held that all fact-finding authorities under the Income Tax Act, 1961, had concurrently decided against the appellant. The Court found that the assessee was essentially seeking a reappreciation of evidence, which is impermissible at the High Court stage under its limited jurisdiction under Section 260A of the Act. The findings of the authorities below were not considered perverse. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that the Tribunal had taken a correct view. The assessee, in his statement recorded during the survey, admitted to carrying out the work of providing accommodation entries and bogus bills, from which he earned commission income. The AO's assessment order noted that the assessee clarified he had been doing the work of providing accommodation entries and bogus bills. The Court found that the commission income admitted by the assessee was on the bills he provided. Therefore, confining the addition to the commission at 0.15% of the credit entries, as done by the Tribunal, was deemed correct. The Court also noted that the PCIT's order under Section 263 did not issue a specific direction to add the entire credit amount under Section 68, but rather directed the AO to examine transactions and explanations for credit and debit entries. The Court concluded that the arguments presented by the Revenue did not give rise to any substantial question of law, and thus, the appeals failed.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. Regarding the disallowance under Section 14A, the Court noted the assessee's submission that this issue was decided against the Revenue in CIT vs. Caraf Builders & Constructions Pvt. Ltd. and the SLP was rejected by the Supreme Court. Therefore, this ground was decided against the Revenue. Concerning the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia), the Court held that if appropriate tax has been deducted, an assessee cannot be held in default or have the amount disallowed under Section 40(a)(ia) merely because tax was deducted under a different provision, especially when the order holding the assessee in default was set aside by the Tribunal. Thus, these grounds were also decided against the Revenue. For the issue concerning Section 115JB, the Court relied on its own judgment in Pr. CIT v. Bhushan Steel Ltd., which the Revenue's counsel could not dispute. Consequently, this ground was also decided against the Revenue. The appeal was dismissed in its entirety.
The High Court held that the Tribunal erred in taking a hyper-technical view by not considering the appellant's arguments regarding the lack of incriminating material found during the search, as the assessee could support the CIT(A)'s order on any permissible grounds. Legal and jurisdictional issues can be raised at any stage. The Court found no evidence of a notice under Section 143(2) being issued to the assessee during the Section 158BC proceedings, and the Revenue's counsel could not produce any such notice. The Court also noted that the material on which the assessment was based was collected post-search, which cannot be the basis for a demand, citing Hotel Blue Moon. The Court decided Questions 1 and 2 in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee, holding that a notice under Section 143(2) is mandatory and that material found post-search cannot form the basis of a block assessment. The assessment order dated 29.11.2002 and the Tribunal's order dated 20.09.2016 were quashed. Question 3 was left undecided as the assessment order was annulled on jurisdictional grounds.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. Regarding the disallowance under Section 14A, the Court noted that the assessee's counsel submitted that this issue had already been decided against the Department by the High Court in CIT vs. Caraf Builders & Constructions Pvt. Ltd., with an SLP rejected by the Supreme Court. While the Court did not elaborate on its reasoning for Section 14A in this specific judgment, it implicitly accepted the prior High Court ruling. For the disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia), the Court held that if tax has been deducted, the assessee cannot be held in default or the amount disallowed under Section 40(a)(ia) merely because a different provision was cited for deduction, especially when the Tribunal had set aside the orders holding the assessee in default. Therefore, these grounds were decided against the Revenue. The operative direction was the dismissal of the Revenue's appeal.
The Delhi High Court granted the petitioner's request to withdraw the writ petitions. The court explicitly stated that permission was granted for the withdrawal. Consequently, all three writ petitions, along with any pending applications, were dismissed as withdrawn. The court did not delve into the merits of any tax-related issues or disputes that might have formed the basis of these petitions. The decision is purely procedural, allowing the petitioner to discontinue their legal challenge without any adjudication on the substantive matters. No specific legal provisions were discussed in relation to the withdrawal itself, beyond the court's inherent power to manage its proceedings.
The Delhi High Court granted permission to the petitioner, M/s Danieli Corus BV, to withdraw the present writ petitions. The Court noted that learned counsel for the petitioner sought permission to withdraw the writ petitions. Following this request, permission was granted. Consequently, the Court dismissed all three writ petitions as withdrawn, along with any pending applications. The decision to dismiss the petitions as withdrawn means there was no adjudication on the merits of the case. The ratio decidendi is that a party has the right to withdraw their legal proceedings, and the court will grant such permission unless there are compelling reasons not to, which were not present here. No issues were left undecided as the case was disposed of by withdrawal.