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The High Court held that it ought not to examine the legality and validity of the Order-in-Original as the Petitioner has an efficacious statutory remedy under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962. The Court found considerable force in the Respondent's contention concerning delay, noting that the Impugned OIO was passed on 14.06.2024 and dispatched on 21.06.2024, while the present Petition was instituted only in 2026. Even accepting the Petitioner's assertion of receiving a copy on 19.02.2026, the delay and the Petitioner's conduct did not warrant invoking extraordinary writ jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that the challenge raised concerned the manner in which jurisdiction was exercised, not an absence of jurisdiction, and that such matters could be examined by the appellate authority. The Petitioner's reliance on the principle that an act must be done in the prescribed manner was acknowledged, but the question of compliance required examination of documents and circumstances, which did not justify bypassing the appellate remedy after substantial delay. The plea of violation of natural justice was not accepted as an automatic exception to the rule of alternative remedy. The Court clarified that it had not examined the merits of the Petitioner's challenge to the confiscation or penalty, leaving these issues for the appellate forum.
The High Court held that the writ petition seeking unconditional release of the gold bars at this stage was not maintainable. The Court clarified that its conclusion did not amount to accepting the Respondent's submission that a person can waive the statutory requirement of a show cause notice merely by making a statement. The ratio of Jatin Ahuja (supra) regarding the mandatory consequence of Section 110(2) remains binding. The Court found that the Petitioner had an opportunity to appear before the adjudicating authority, present his version, challenge the circumstances of the Section 108 statement, raise objections regarding the alleged oral show cause notice, and seek consideration of all material. Since no Order-in-Original had been passed, the Petitioner's challenge to the admission's evidentiary value and ultimate liability was premature. The Court directed the Petitioner to appear before the adjudicating authority on 24.09.2026 for completion of proceedings, including appraisement, and granted him a personal hearing. The adjudicating authority was directed to pass an Order-in-Original within six weeks from the Petitioner's appearance, subject to his cooperation. The Court expressed no opinion on the merits of the allegations, the validity of the statement, the oral show cause notice, or the liability of the goods to confiscation or penalty, leaving these for the adjudicating authority. The question of detention/warehouse charges would abide by the adjudication outcome.
The Court held that the Petitioner's claim for unconditional release of the gold bar could not be accepted. The primary issue revolves around whether a notice under Section 124(a) was issued within the statutory period. The Respondent's assertion that an oral show-cause notice was issued on 19.12.2023, supported by the Petitioner's statement waiving the need for a written notice and personal hearing, directly disputes the Petitioner's foundational factual assertion of a complete absence of notice. The Petitioner's allegations that the statement was obtained under coercion and was not voluntary involve disputed questions of fact. The Court, in its writ jurisdiction, is not inclined to conduct a roving factual inquiry into the circumstances of the statement's recording or the alleged coercion, especially when the Petitioner seeks to rely on CCTV footage and the Respondent relies on contemporaneous records. The decision in Jatin Ahuja (supra) was noted as not dispensing with the necessity of determining whether a notice was in fact given. Therefore, the question of whether the oral proceedings constituted compliance with Section 124(a) cannot be conclusively determined based on one version of disputed facts. The Court clarified that its judgment does not express an opinion on the Petitioner's ultimate liability, the confiscability of the gold, or the validity of the statement, leaving these matters to the competent authority. The Petition was dismissed as the Petitioner's claim for automatic release could not be accepted based on the absence of a written notice when an oral notice was asserted.
The High Court held that it has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the alleged Green Channel violation, declaration or non-declaration of goods, ownership, importability, liability to confiscation, duty payable, redemption fine, or penalty. The Court clarified that the dismissal of the petitions does not affirm the Department's contention that a mere waiver of a Show Cause Notice or personal hearing satisfies the requirements of Sections 110(2) and 124 of the Act. The competent adjudicating authority is directed to consider the objections of the Petitioners independently, including those concerning the Section 108 statements, circumstances of document execution, alleged waiver, and the applicability of Section 110(2). The adjudication must be undertaken expeditiously, within six weeks from the date of appearance, and the authority must consider the Supreme Court's ruling in Jatin Ahuja. The prayer for unconditional release of goods and waiver of detention charges was not granted at this stage, and these will abide by the determination of the adjudicating authority. The petitions were dismissed with these directions.
The High Court held that the Petitioner failed to establish an undisputed case of statutory violation warranting a mandamus for the release of the goods. While acknowledging that Section 110(2) mandates a Show Cause Notice and that the first proviso to Section 124 permits oral notices at the request of the person concerned, the Court found that the Petitioner's case could not be decided solely on his assertion of no notice. The Court relied on the Petitioner's written acknowledgement dated 08.05.2023, stating he received an oral Show Cause Notice and did not want a written one, and his Section 108 statement waiving the need for a Show Cause Notice and personal hearing. The Court noted that the Petitioner had not adequately explained why he made such specific recitals in his written request, which also contained an admission of opting for the Green Channel without declaration. The Detention Receipt also recorded the goods were detained at his request and sealed in his presence over his signature. The Court concluded that it could not, in its extraordinary writ jurisdiction, accept the Petitioner's disputed version of events over contemporaneous documents bearing his own signatures. The Court explicitly stated it had not adjudicated upon the ultimate liability to confiscation or penalty, nor expressed a final opinion on the confiscation of the gold bars, leaving those matters to be dealt with by the competent authority. The dismissal of the petition was based on the particular factual record and the nature of the relief sought, not as an approval of mechanical waivers.
The Tribunal held that the Impugned Order could not be sustained. The primary reasoning was that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), specifically Section 31(1) and Section 238, gives precedence to an approved Resolution Plan. Once the Resolution Plan was approved by the NCLT on March 17, 2026, and the petitioner had duly notified the Customs Department of this fact and the relevant clause extinguishing unfiled pre-CIRP claims, the Customs Department could not proceed to enforce a pre-CIRP claim that had not been submitted during the CIRP and stood extinguished under the Resolution Plan. The Tribunal emphasized that the IBC's objective is to allow the successful resolution applicant to commence business on a 'clean slate', and allowing creditors to bypass the CIRP and enforce claims later would defeat this purpose. The failure of the Customs Department to submit its claim within the prescribed timelines could not prejudice the Corporate Debtor or the Resolution Applicant. The Tribunal clarified that this decision did not negate the applicability of the Customs Act but addressed the consequence of the IBC on claims arising prior to the Insolvency Commencement Date after the approval of a Resolution Plan. The merits of the classification and duty computation were rendered academic.
The High Court held that the Petitioner is not entitled to the release of the detained goods. The Court noted that the writ petition was instituted before the issuance of the Show Cause Notice, but during the pendency of the petition, a Show Cause Notice was issued on 23.02.2026, which was within the extended period of six months granted under the proviso to Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962. The extended period was to expire on 25.02.2026. Therefore, the principal basis of the Petitioner's claim for release of goods, which was the expiry of the original six-month period without a Show Cause Notice, no longer survived. The Court found the reliance on Jatin Ahuja (supra) misplaced, as that judgment considered the power of extension under Section 110(2) and did not lay down that goods are automatically released upon expiry of the initial period despite a valid extension. Similarly, the decision in Ms. Shubhangi Gupta (supra) was distinguished as it dealt with a situation where no Show Cause Notice was issued at all. In the present case, a written Show Cause Notice was issued within the extended period. Consequently, the Court deemed it unnecessary to examine the validity of the purported waiver or the allegations regarding the recording of the Petitioner's statement under Section 108. The Petitioner was granted liberty to raise all permissible objections in the adjudicatory proceedings pursuant to the Show Cause Notice. The Court clarified that its judgment did not express an opinion on the merits of the allegations or the validity of the statement. The petition was dismissed.
The High Court held that it ought not to entertain the writ petition at this stage. The principal issue was whether the court should exercise its writ jurisdiction when a statutory appellate remedy is available. The court noted that the adjudication proceedings had culminated in an Order-in-Original, and the petitioner had an efficacious statutory remedy under the Customs Act, 1962. While acknowledging that the existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction, the court found that the petitioner's challenge involved disputed questions of fact, such as whether the statement under Section 108 was voluntarily made, whether an oral Show Cause Notice was given, and the nature of communications made to the petitioner. These factual matters are more appropriately examined in statutory appellate proceedings where the entire adjudication record is available. Therefore, the court concluded that the case did not warrant the exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction, and the petitioner's assertion of a breach of natural justice was insufficient to bypass the statutory appeal. The court explicitly stated it had not examined the merits of the challenge, including the validity of the statement, the Show Cause Notice, the waiver, or the legality of the confiscation. All such contentions were left open for the appellate authority.
The High Court did not entertain the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It held that there was a direct dispute regarding what transpired between the Petitioner and the Customs authorities, involving the character, voluntariness, and legal effect of contemporaneous documents. These disputed matters could not be appropriately considered in writ proceedings and were better suited for statutory proceedings where the entire record could be examined. The Court acknowledged the Supreme Court's decision in Jatin Ahuja but stated that its applicability and precise application to the alleged oral SCN and documents could be raised before the statutory revisional authority. The Court noted the Respondent's statement that they were willing to afford the Petitioner a personal hearing and reconsider the matter. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, granting liberty to the Petitioner to avail the statutory remedy of revision under Section 129DD of the Customs Act, 1962, against the Order-in-Appeal. The Court clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the allegations, including the Green Channel violation, ownership of the gold, validity of the statement, or legality of confiscation and penalty, leaving all such issues open for the competent authority.
The High Court held that the Petitioner is not entitled to unconditional release of the gold bars at this stage. While no written show-cause notice was issued, the Respondent asserted that an oral show-cause notice was given on 20.01.2024, and the Petitioner's contemporaneous statement under Section 108 waived the need for a formal notice and personal hearing. The Court found that the question of whether the proceedings on 20.01.2024 constituted compliance with Section 124, including the oral notice and the voluntariness of the Petitioner's statement, requires adjudication by the competent authority. The Court declined to decide these issues in a writ petition, especially when the Respondent offered a personal hearing and adjudication within a time-bound period. The Court clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the allegations, confiscation, duty, fine, or penalty, leaving these matters for the competent authority.
The High Court held that the writ petition seeking the release of the detained gold bars at this stage is not maintainable. The Court found that the Petitioner's statement under Section 108, coupled with the Detention Receipt and the admitted position that the Petitioner did not approach the Department for appraisement or further proceedings despite an opportunity, warranted examination by the adjudicating authority. The Court reasoned that while the absence of a separate written show cause notice was noted, the Petitioner's statement waiving the need for one, and the Department's willingness to afford a personal hearing and adjudicate the matter expeditiously, meant the statutory adjudication process should be allowed to complete. The Court explicitly stated it was not expressing any opinion on whether the Petitioner had declared the gold bars, whether they were liable for confiscation, eligibility for import, or the voluntariness of the statement, leaving these for the adjudicating authority. The Petitioner was directed to be afforded a personal hearing and the matter to be adjudicated within four weeks of his appearance.
The High Court declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to examine the Order-in-Original dated 07.06.2023. The Court reasoned that the Petitioner's grievances, including allegations of non-service of a show cause notice, denial of hearing, and the validity of the Section 108 statement, required an examination of the adjudication record and material, which is best suited for the statutory appellate remedy provided under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962. The Court noted that while the existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction, the principle of exhausting such remedies is well-recognized. The significant delay of several years in approaching the Court, despite the Petitioner's admitted awareness of the seizure and the subsequent Order-in-Original, weighed heavily against exercising discretionary writ jurisdiction. The Petitioner's prolonged inaction and failure to challenge the Order-in-Original before the appellate authority were considered critical factors. The Court explicitly stated that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the Petitioner's challenge to the Order-in-Original, including contentions related to Sections 110(2) and 124 of the Act, waiver of notice, the Section 108 statement, the Green Channel violation, or the confiscation and penalty.
The High Court held that the notices of personal hearing dated December 16, 2018, December 11, 2018, and December 13, 2018, as contemplated under Section 35A(3) of the Act, were not served upon the appellant. The Court found no document placed on record by the respondent demonstrating service of these notices. The appellant's contention of having appeared for a personal hearing in another case between the same parties on the same day before the Commissioner (Appeals) further supported the claim of non-receipt of notices. The Court noted that the Commissioner (Appeals) proceeded ex-parte despite the lack of proof of service. Consequently, the High Court directed the Commissioner (Appeals) to consider the appellant's claim afresh. The appellant undertook to appear before the Commissioner (Appeals) on September 21, 2026. The appeal was accordingly partly allowed.
The High Court held that the penalty of Rs. 4,50,000/- imposed under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994, was unwarranted. The Court noted that the Tribunal, while setting aside the demand for the extended period, had found no willful suppression of facts with intent to evade service tax, a finding not challenged by the revenue. This finding was considered to have a material bearing on the penalty imposition. The Court relied on Section 80 of the Act, which provides for waiver of penalty if the assessee proves a reasonable cause for the failure. Citing precedents like Bharat Hotels Ltd. and M/s Bajaj Travels Ltd., the Court held that a bona fide belief regarding the non-taxability of services, coupled with the Department's own contemporaneous view supporting this belief, constitutes a reasonable cause. The Court found that the non-payment of service tax was not a deliberate or contumacious default but arose from a bona fide understanding of the legal position. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the levy of penalty was set aside. The issue concerning the service tax levy for the normal period was dismissed as not pressed.
The Delhi High Court set aside the order dated 17.07.2025 passed by the CIT(A). The Court reasoned that the CIT(A) had dismissed the petitioner's appeal on the ground of delay without considering the application for condonation of delay, which was admittedly filed. The Court directed the CIT(A) to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law, after first deciding the application for condonation of delay, and to consider the delay sympathetically. Furthermore, the Court quashed and set aside a penalty order passed by the Assessing Officer (AO) during the pendency of the appeal, citing the mandate of Section 275 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which prohibits passing a penalty order during the pendency of an appeal. The AO was permitted to pass a fresh penalty order if required, in accordance with law. The petition was disposed of accordingly.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court noted that the issues involved in the present appeal were identical to those considered in ITA 260/2024, which related to AY 2015-16. In that prior case, the High Court had upheld the ITAT's decision that the Assessee had not earned any taxable income from the sale of fly ash. The reasoning in the prior judgment, which the present Court followed, was that the Assessee was not free to utilize the sale proceeds of fly ash as they were required to be used for specified purposes, and this did not result in the Assessee acquiring any asset. The Court found no infirmity with the ITAT's decision and held that no substantial questions of law arose for consideration. Consequently, the present appeal was dismissed following the judgment in ITA 260/2024.
The High Court held that the assessee was justified in not filing the return by the due date as they were bona fide awaiting the outcome of their application before the Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) concerning the taxability of the transaction. The Court directed that the return filed by the assessee pursuant to the Section 148 notice be treated as a return akin to a regular Return of Income under Section 139. The Court found that the Revenue could not deny credit for the amount of tax deducted at source (TDS) or prepaid taxes of Rs. 16,58,02,551/-. It reasoned that denying a refund of excess TDS would mean it remains with the Union of India indefinitely and cannot be treated as tax revenue. The Court distinguished the reliance on Sun Engineering Works (supra), stating that the judgment was limited to substantive computation items and did not concern credit for prepaid taxes. The appeal filed by the Department was allowed, and the matter was remanded to the AO to pass a fresh assessment order, giving credit for TDS in accordance with law. The ITAT's order and the AO's earlier assessment order were set aside. The penalty order dated 28.04.2023 was also quashed, with the AO being free to take up penalty proceedings afresh if occasion arose. The AO was directed to pass the assessment order within two months, and any unutilized TDS or prepaid taxes found refundable were to be paid within two months thereafter, along with applicable interest.
The Delhi High Court held that the assessee was justified in not filing the return by the due date as they were bona fide awaiting the decision of the AAR on the taxability of the transaction. The Court directed that the return filed pursuant to the Section 148 notice be treated as a return akin to a regular Return of Income under Section 139. The Court found that the Revenue could not deny credit for the tax deducted at source (TDS) amounting to Rs. 16,58,02,551/-. The judgment in Sun Engineering Works was distinguished as it pertained to substantive computation items and not credit for prepaid taxes. The appeal filed by the Department was allowed, and the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer (AO) to pass a fresh assessment order, granting credit for TDS in accordance with law. The ITAT order and the AO's assessment order dated October 28, 2022, were set aside. The penalty order dated April 28, 2023, was also quashed, with the AO being free to initiate fresh penalty proceedings if necessary. The AO was directed to pass the assessment order within two months, and any unutilized TDS or prepaid taxes found refundable were to be paid within two months of the assessment order, along with applicable interest under Sections 244A and 244A(1A).
The High Court held that the fact that the assessment order was set aside, whether on technical grounds or otherwise, is undisputed and has attained finality. The court reasoned that once the assessment order is set aside, the basis for initiating penalty proceedings, as stated in the assessment order ('that it is a fit case for initiation of penalty proceedings'), is lost. Consequently, the penalty proceedings, even if they culminated in a penalty order and were affirmed by the PCIT, cannot withstand legal scrutiny. The court's view was fortified by the Supreme Court's judgment in K.C. Builders, particularly paragraphs 14 and 27, which state that if additions made in the assessment order for which penalty was levied are deleted, there remains no basis for levying the penalty, and it cannot survive. The writ petition was allowed, and the impugned penalty order and the PCIT's order were quashed and set aside.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. It held that while the respondent might have been justified in disallowing the TDS amount if the deductor (Kingfisher Airlines) had not deposited it, the petitioner (assessee) could not be blamed for the deductor's failure and thus should not be deprived of his legitimate right to credit. This principle was stated to be in line with the High Court's judgment in Satwant Singh Sanghera (supra). The Court quashed and set aside the intimation dated 23.09.2025 for AY 2011-12 to the extent it related to the non-grant of credit of TDS by Kingfisher Airlines. The consequential demand and the recovery made from the petitioner's refund were declared illegal. The Respondent was directed to refund the recovered amount along with applicable interest under Sections 244(1) and 244(1A) of the Act of 1961 within three months. The order was confined to the TDS deducted by Kingfisher Airlines.
The High Court held that the Tribunal had proceeded on a completely wrong factual premise. It was undisputed that the assessee had not taken proceedings before the DRP, yet the Tribunal's entire order was based on the factual foundation that the assessee had followed the DRP route. The court found the Tribunal's findings to be clearly perverse due to this factual error. Instead of admitting the appeals and potentially remanding the matter after a long delay, the High Court set aside the Tribunal's order and remanded the matter back to the Tribunal for a fresh decision. The court explicitly stated that it had not pronounced on any contentions regarding the assessment being barred by limitation, leaving both parties free to make their submissions on limitation and other issues. The Tribunal is to decide all issues afresh in accordance with law.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court held that while the respondent department might have been justified in disallowing TDS if the deductor had not deposited it, the petitioner cannot be blamed or deprived of their legitimate right to credit. This principle was affirmed by the Court's prior judgment in *Satwant Singh Sanghera (supra)*. Consequently, the intimations dated 09.04.2011, 04.03.2013, and 27.02.2014 for AYs 2010-11, 2011-12, and 2012-13 were quashed and set aside to the extent they related to the non-grant of TDS credit from Kingfisher Airlines. The consequential demands and recoveries made from the petitioner's refunds were declared illegal. The Department was directed to process the refund and TDS credit for AY 2010-11 within two weeks and refund the amount recovered from the petitioner, along with applicable interest under Sections 244(1) and 244(1)(A) of the Act of 1961, within three months. The order's scope was confined to TDS deducted by Kingfisher Airlines.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court held that while the respondent might have been justified in disallowing the TDS amount if the deductor (Kingfisher Airlines) had not deposited it, the petitioner cannot be blamed for the deductor's default and should not be deprived of his legitimate right to claim credit for the TDS. This principle was affirmed by this Court in its judgment in Satwant Singh Sanghera (supra). Consequently, the impugned demands for AYs 2009-10, 2010-11, 2011-12, and 2012-13 were quashed and set aside to the extent they related to the non-grant of credit for TDS deducted by Kingfisher Airlines. The order clarified that it applies only to the amounts deducted by Kingfisher Airlines and would not affect any other demands raised by the Assessing Officer. The petition and pending applications were disposed of.
The High Court held that the Settlement Commission's order dated 14.11.2019 did not suffer from any jurisdictional error, contravention of statutory provisions, prejudice, fraud, bias, or malice, and therefore, did not warrant interference under Article 226. The Court found that the direction in Clause (e) of Paragraph 51(ii) was a consequential direction for the jurisdictional Commissioner to quantify the interest liability, and it did not revive or reopen the adjudication of the underlying duty liability. The petitioners' own computation of interest was not accepted as definitive. The Court reasoned that the liability to pay interest is a statutory consequence of the liability to pay duty and is not extinguished by settlement. The subsequent determination of interest by the Commissioner, even if higher than the petitioners' computation, was referable to the Settlement Commission's direction and could not be treated as an independent adjudication reopening the settlement. The challenge to the SCN dated 18.06.2018 on the ground of limitation could not be reopened in the present proceedings. The Court found no infirmity in the direction for quantification of interest. The writ petition was dismissed.
The High Court held that the Tribunal had proceeded on a completely wrong factual premise. It was undisputed that the Assessee had not taken proceedings before the DRP, yet the Tribunal's entire order was based on the factual foundation that the Assessee had followed the DRP route. The Court found the Tribunal's findings to be clearly perverse due to this factual error. Instead of admitting the appeal and remanding it, which would lead to further delays, the High Court set aside the Tribunal's order and remanded the matter back to the Tribunal to decide it afresh. The Court clarified that it had not pronounced on any contentions regarding the assessment being barred by limitation, and both parties were free to make their submissions on limitation and other issues before the Tribunal, which was directed to decide all issues in accordance with law.
The High Court held that the ITAT had proceeded on a completely wrong factual premise. It was undisputed that the assessee had not taken proceedings before the DRP, yet the entire order of the ITAT was based on the factual foundation that the assessee had taken the DRP route. The Court found the ITAT's findings to be clearly perverse due to this factual error. Instead of admitting the appeal and potentially remanding it after a long pendency, the Court set aside the ITAT's order and remanded the matter back to the ITAT to decide it afresh. The Court clarified that it had not pronounced upon any of the parties' contentions regarding the assessment being barred by limitation, and both parties would be free to make their submissions on this and other issues before the ITAT, which would decide all issues in accordance with law.
The High Court dismissed the appeal. Regarding the addition of Rs. 8,48,89,345/-, the Court found that both the CIT(A) and the ITAT had concurrently held that this amount had already been assessed to tax or considered while framing the assessment under Section 143(3) of the Act, particularly in relation to the issue of capital gains. The Court considered this a finding of fact concurrently held by two authorities below and thus found no question of law arising to warrant interference under Section 260A. Concerning the addition of Rs. 42,08,00,000/- for alleged fictitious long-term capital loss on sale of shares, the Court agreed with the Tribunal and CIT(A) that no new information or material had come to the notice of the Assessing Officer during reassessment proceedings, and that this issue had been considered in the original assessment under Section 143(3). The Court found no error in the orders of the appellate authorities. The appeal and all interlocutory applications were dismissed.
The High Court rejected the revenue's appeal. The Court found that the CIT(A) had meticulously examined the transaction, noting that the assessee company was incorporated for real estate development and entered into an investment-cum-collaboration agreement with the foreign investors. The company's name was changed, and its Memorandum and Articles of Association were revised post-agreement. The foreign investors acquired shares and invested in CCDs, with details of remittances and audited balance sheets of the investor companies being filed. The CIT(A) and the Tribunal had based their findings on this material, which the revenue failed to demonstrate as perverse. The Court observed that the AO had completely ignored the documents and replies filed by the assessee, which amounted to a breach of natural justice and procedural fairness. The ratio decidendi is that an AO must objectively deal with the assessee's submissions and documents, not just watch the interest of the revenue. The appeal was dismissed.
The Delhi High Court held that the submission made by the learned Counsel for the respondent (assessee) is correct. Upon reviewing sub-section (1) of Section 245W of the Income Tax Act, 1961, the Court found that the appeal was indeed filed by the wrong authority, i.e., the PCIT, instead of the Assessing Officer. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed on the grounds of being filed by the incorrect authority. However, the Court granted liberty to the Assessing Officer to file a fresh appeal in accordance with the law.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court held that while the respondent (revenue) might have been justified in disallowing the TDS amount if it was not deposited by the deductor, the petitioner (assessee) cannot be blamed for the deductor's failure and should not be deprived of her legitimate right to the credit of TDS. The Court relied on its previous judgment in Satwant Singh Sanghera (supra) for this reasoning. Consequently, the intimation dated February 15, 2013, for Assessment Year 2011-12 was quashed and set aside to the extent it related to the non-grant of credit for TDS deducted by Kingfisher Airlines. The Court clarified that its order was confined to the TDS amounts deducted by Kingfisher Airlines and would not affect any other demands raised by the Assessing Officer. The petition was disposed of in these terms.
The High Court held that Sections 200A and 201 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, operate in different spheres. Section 201 deals with the assessment of TDS, while Section 200A pertains to the adjustment of TDS at the CPC level prior to assessment. Rule 31A and Form 26B are procedural mechanisms for such adjustments. Once an assessment under Section 201 is made, or an appellate authority passes an order resulting in a refund, the assessee has a vested right to receive that refund along with interest, subject to legal challenges. Such a right is not subservient to Section 200A or Rule 31A. The Court categorically held that once an assessment under Section 201 is made, Rule 31A does not apply, and the AO or CPC cannot compel the assessee to furnish Form 26B. Refunds found due after giving effect to appellate orders must be paid with interest, unless an order under Section 245 of the Act is passed for withholding or adjustment. Since the respondents failed to show any order under Section 245, their plea of withholding refunds due to outstanding demands on sister TANs was deemed untenable, arbitrary, and violative of constitutional rights. The Court directed the payment of Rs. 53,09,56,470 along with applicable interest by September 30, 2026, with a penalty interest of 1% per month if not paid by the due date.
The Delhi High Court held that the proceedings and the assessment order were passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The Court noted that the petitioner, a Singapore-based company, had a demand raised against it without being afforded an opportunity to be heard. The Court found it unnecessary to delve into whether the notice was sent to the specific employee. In the interest of justice, the Court quashed the assessment order dated 27.05.2025 and the order under Section 148A(d) dated 31.03.2024, as well as the consequential penalty order dated 16.12.2025. The matter was restored to the Assessing Officer (AO) from the stage of issuing notice under Section 148A. The petitioner was directed to file a reply by 15.09.2026, and the AO was to pass an order under Section 148A(d) by 31.10.2026, after obtaining necessary approval. The ratio decidendi is that an assessment order passed without affording a hearing to the assessee, especially when there's a possibility of non-service of notices due to outdated contact information, violates natural justice and warrants setting aside.
The High Court held that while the assessee might have adopted a device to avail set-off of capital gain against capital loss, the AO was not justified in resorting to Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for making the addition. The Court reasoned that the amount of Rs. 10 crores was admittedly received by the assessee in FY 2006-07. Adding this amount in AY 2016-17 was against comprehension and could not be sustained. The Court found no error in the orders passed by the lower appellate authorities (CIT(A) and ITAT). The ratio decidendi is that Section 68 cannot be invoked for an amount admittedly received in a prior financial year, even if the assessee's conduct suggests a colourable device to avail tax benefits. The appeal filed by the Revenue was rejected.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the revenue's appeal, upholding the ITAT's decision. The Court found that the Supreme Court judgment in S.V. Angidi Chettiar was distinguishable as it dealt with the recording of satisfaction at the assessment stage, whereas in the present case, the AO had admittedly recorded satisfaction for initiating penalty proceedings. The Court noted that the issue in S.V. Angidi Chettiar was about *whether* satisfaction was recorded, not *how* it was recorded. Regarding K.P. Madhusudan, the Court observed that it dealt with the necessity of referencing explanations to Section 271 when the section itself was mentioned. However, the High Court emphasized that Section 271(1)(c) uses the disjunctive 'or' between concealing particulars and furnishing inaccurate particulars, making them distinct. The Court held that the AO must put the assessee on notice as to which specific part of Clause (c) is being invoked, as the assessee cannot defend themselves without this clarity. The issuance of notice is not an empty formality. The Court followed its own judgments in Unitech Reliable Projects (P) Ltd. and Gragarious Projects Pvt. Ltd., which had been affirmed by the Supreme Court through rejection of SLPs, and dismissed the revenue's appeal.
The High Court held that neither the Assessing Officer nor the Commissioner had recorded any finding regarding the unearthing or existence of any undisclosed or unaccounted assets or investments. The absence of unexplained investments made the applicability of Section 69 of the Act of 1961 questionable. Consequently, since the applicability of Section 69 was not established, the higher rate of tax under Section 115BBE was also not applicable. The Court found no merit in the appeal. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal.
The Court considered the arguments presented. The learned counsel for the petitioner sought to withdraw the petitions, stating that arguments on charge had been addressed and only the final order was awaited before the learned ACJM. The petitioner requested liberty to take appropriate steps in accordance with law, if and when required. The Court allowed this request. Consequently, the present petitions, along with any pending applications, were dismissed as withdrawn. No specific findings were made on the merits of the case, as the petitions were withdrawn by the petitioner.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petitioner's request to withdraw the present petitions. The court noted that arguments on the charge had been addressed before the learned ACJM, and only the final order was awaited. Considering this, and the petitioner's plea for liberty to take appropriate steps later, the court dismissed the petitions as withdrawn. The operative direction was the dismissal of the petitions along with any pending applications. No specific issues regarding the merits of the tax dispute were decided, as the petitions were withdrawn before any substantive adjudication.
The High Court considered the arguments presented. The learned counsel for the petitioner sought to withdraw the present petitions, stating that arguments on the charge had been addressed before the learned ACJM and only the final order from that court was awaited. The petitioner requested liberty to take appropriate steps in accordance with law, if and when required. The Court acknowledged this request. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the present petitions, along with any pending applications, as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the case. The operative direction was to dismiss the petitions as withdrawn.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice under Section 148A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was issued on 31.03.2023. Consequently, the relevant Assessment Year for this notice is AY 2023-24. The Court found that a notice issued for AY 2012-13, when the notice itself was issued in AY 2023-24, is clearly beyond the period of 10 years. Therefore, the appeal filed by the Revenue challenging the ITAT's order was dismissed. The ratio decidendi is that a notice issued under Section 148A in a subsequent AY cannot revive or extend the limitation period for a prior AY if it falls outside the prescribed time limits for that prior AY.
The High Court held that the appeal filed by the assessee merits acceptance and the question framed by the Court deserves to be answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee. The Court found the facts undisputed and the core issue to be whether the assessee was justified in claiming set-off of the loss of its Gurgaon unit against the profits of other undertakings. The Court reasoned that while Section 10B(1) requires separate calculation of profit or gain for each eligible unit to determine the quantum of deduction, this calculation does not alter the treatment of profit or loss of each unit when calculating the assessee's combined profit. The calculation of export profit under Section 10B is confined to that section and does not affect Sections 70, 71, or 72. Therefore, denial of set-off or carry forward of the loss of an eligible undertaking is not permissible. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's affirmation of the Karnataka High Court's view in Yokogawa India Ltd., which held that losses are subject to inter-source and inter-head set-off and can be carried forward. The Court also referred to CBDT Circular No. 7/DV/2013, which supports the carry forward and set-off of losses from eligible units. Consequently, the impugned order of the Tribunal and the assessment order were set aside.
The High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue, following its own prior judgments in Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications India Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax and Maruti Suzuki Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax. The Court clarified that the Revenue would not need to file separate appeals against the instant order. However, it was stipulated that if the SLPs/appeals filed by the Revenue against the Sony Ericsson and Maruti Suzuki judgments were allowed by the Supreme Court, the law declared therein would mutatis mutandis apply to the assessee's case, and consequential actions would follow. The Court did not decide the merits of the AMP adjustment itself but disposed of the appeals based on existing High Court precedents and the pendency of related matters before the Supreme Court.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue. The Court followed its own previous judgments in Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications India Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax and Maruti Suzuki Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, which held that the Bright Line Test is not a sanctioned method for determining AMP expenses. The Court clarified that the Revenue would not need to file separate appeals against the instant order. However, if the Revenue's pending appeals before the Supreme Court in the Sony Ericsson and Maruti Suzuki cases are allowed, the law declared therein would apply mutatis mutandis to the assessee's case, and the consequences would follow. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided, but the ultimate outcome for the assessee is contingent on the Supreme Court's decision in the pending appeals.
The High Court held that the ITAT had committed a procedural irregularity by passing an ex-parte order without hearing the appellant. The Court noted from the ordersheets that on three previous dates, the Tribunal did not function, and the matter was adjourned. Crucially, on 24.12.2025, when the matter was adjourned to 02.02.2026, no notice of hearing was issued to the appellant. The Court emphasized Rule 20 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, which mandates the Tribunal to intimate parties about the date and time of hearing. The absence of service of notice upon the appellant was considered a complete non-compliance with Rule 20, leading to a manifest failure of justice. Consequently, the order passed by the ITAT on 02.02.2026 was set aside. The appeal was restored to the ITAT for a fresh decision in accordance with the law, with a direction to intimate a fresh date of hearing to both parties and to hear the appeal without being influenced by the previous ex-parte order.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned order passed by the Competent Authority (PCIT) could not be sustained in law due to a non-application of mind. The Court observed that the Competent Authority dealt with the case as if it were a case of non-filing of a tax audit report, rather than a case seeking condonation of delay in filing the statutory Form 10DA. The Court noted that the petitioner's application clearly indicated that the UDIN was generated and uploaded on the income-tax portal on 30.09.2024, with only subsequent formalities remaining pending. The Court found the delay of 62 days to be bonafide and that this delay had resulted in the denial of the petitioner's substantive right to accelerated deduction. Therefore, the Court set aside the impugned order, allowed the petitioner's application under Section 119(2)(b), and condoned the 62-day delay in filing Form 10DA. The Assessing Officer was directed to take Form 10DA on record and grant the accelerated deduction if the petitioner was otherwise eligible.
The High Court held that the appeal cannot continue. The court accepted the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent (assessee) that the tax effect involved in the present appeal is below the limits prescribed in CBDT Circular No.5/2024 dated 15.03.2024 read with Circular No. 9/2024 dated 17.09.2024. The assessment order dated 31.03.2022, which gave effect to the Principal Commissioner's order under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, determined the assessee's total income at Rs.3,42,45,148/-. The court found that the tax calculated on this income would fall below the prescribed monetary limits. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed on this ground. No other issue was decided on merits.
The Delhi High Court, while acknowledging the genuine grievance of the petitioners regarding the prolonged seizure and attachment of their assets for over 27 years, noted the department's positive role in persuading the authorities to act. On July 6, 2026, the competent authority expressed an in-principle decision to release all seized assets, assuring completion within 1-2 weeks. The petitioners confirmed that most assets, including FDRs, have been released, except for a sum of Rs. 14,89,406/- (rent attached in Neera Narang's case) and specific movable assets in Virender Narang's case (cash of Rs. 1,00,000/-, Rs. 48,92,230/- from income tax report, and DDs totaling Rs. 29,10,940/- from Shree Rathnam Restaurant Ltd.). The Assessing Officer cited the age of the records for the delay, assuring release within two weeks. The Court appreciated the department's efforts and closed the proceedings, expecting the remaining assets to be released within four weeks and directing the respondents to pay applicable interest as per law.
The High Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal. Regarding the Upfront Fee, the Court found that the Supreme Court in India Cements Ltd. v. CIT had settled the position that expenditure incurred towards securing a loan is revenue in nature, even if the loan is utilized for capital assets. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was not justified in treating the Upfront Fee as capital expenditure. The Court also noted that the matter related to Assessment Year 2002-03, and after more than 20 years, holding the expenditure as capital would lead to administrative hazards. For the other issues (questions 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, and 2.5), the Court referred to its own prior decision in ITA 1427/2006, which had also decided these issues in favor of the assessee, finding no substantial question of law. The reasoning in that prior judgment, which affirmed the concurrent findings of the CIT(A) and the Tribunal, was applied here. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court, while acknowledging the prolonged seizure of assets for over 27 years, noted that the department had played a positive role in persuading authorities to act. On July 6, 2026, the department expressed an in-principle decision to release seized assets, with an assurance of completion within 1-2 weeks. The petitioners confirmed that most assets, including FDRs, had been released, except for specific amounts of attached rent (Rs. 14,89,406/- for Neera Narang) and certain movable assets for Virender Narang (cash of Rs. 1,00,000/-, income tax report of Rs. 48,92,230/-, and DDs attached from Shree Rathnam Restaurant Ltd. totaling Rs. 29,10,940/-). The Revenue assured that these remaining assets would also be released within two weeks due to the old records. The Court closed the proceedings, expressing hope for completion within four weeks and directing the respondents to pay applicable interest as per law. The petitions were disposed of.
The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Court acknowledged that in the Rajesh Projects case, it was held that GNOIDA does not fall within the ambit of 'Government' and tax is deductible on annual lease rent. However, the Court also observed that no adverse action would be taken against assessees who did not deduct tax due to the insistence of the authority. While the present assessee was not a party to the Rajesh Projects case, the High Court in that judgment (para 21) directed the Assessing Officer to hear all similarly situated assessees. The Court found that the respondent/assessee was not heard and thus could not present evidence that it was also insisted by GNOIDA not to deduct tax. The Court was not convinced by the Revenue's argument that the assessee failed to prove this insistence. The Court reasoned that an authority's stand would naturally be similar towards all similarly situated persons. The Court also noted that the assessment year in question (2012-13) was covered by the period of the Rajesh Projects judgment, and the assessment of GNOIDA, if any, must have been finalized. Therefore, the Court was not inclined to interfere with the ITAT's order.
The High Court condoned the 600-day delay in filing the appeal by the Revenue, finding the explanation regarding procedural lapses and transfer of files to be sufficiently explained. Regarding the valuation of shares, the Court held that the assessee's use of the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method was justified. The Court reasoned that while the DCF method was notified in Rule 11UA of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, on November 29, 2012, it was a recognized method of valuation in the financial and corporate world even before its notification. The Court found that the AO erred in arbitrarily changing the cost of capital and assuming the role of an economist to determine the expected rate of return. The Court emphasized that procedural rules should not deprive an assessee of substantive rights, especially when the method used was recognized. The concurrent findings of the CIT(A) and the ITAT were affirmed, and the appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed.