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The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court accepted the petitioner's contention that the impugned order and notice were barred by limitation, acknowledging that the revenue's counsel was not in a position to dispute this position. Consequently, the order dated 30.08.2024 passed under Section 148A(d) and the notice dated 30.08.2024 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2016-17 were quashed. The Court held that the principle laid down in Manju Somani v. Income Tax Officer Ward-70(1) & Ors was applicable. The writ petition and pending applications were disposed of.
The Tribunal held that the notice dated 25.07.2022 issued under Section 153C of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, for assessment year 2016-17, was time-barred. The reasoning was that the satisfaction note was recorded on 16.06.2022, which falls within assessment year 2023-24. Calculating backwards from the preceding year (AY 2022-23 or FY 2021-22), and considering the escaped income was less than Rs. 50,00,000/-, the limitation period would extend to 6 years. Therefore, a notice issued on 25.07.2022 for AY 2016-17 was clearly beyond the permissible time limit. The Court relied on its own judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1 (Central-1) v. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. The writ petition was allowed, and the impugned notice was quashed.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated 19.03.2025 issued under Section 153C for assessment year 2012-13 was clearly beyond the limitation period. The Court reasoned that the satisfaction note was recorded on 15.03.2025, which falls within assessment year 2025-26. Calculating backwards, even if the escaped income was more than Rs. 50,00,000/- (implying a 10-year limitation period), the notice issued in AY 2025-26 for AY 2012-13 would be time-barred. The Court found the issue squarely covered by its own judgment in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1 (Central-1) v. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. The writ petition was allowed, and the notice dated 19.03.2025 was quashed. The ratio decidendi is that a notice under Section 153C issued beyond the prescribed limitation period, as determined by the date of satisfaction note and the relevant assessment year, is invalid. The operative direction was to quash the notice.
The High Court held that a statement recorded under Section 132(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, does not, by itself, constitute incriminating material sufficient to justify additions made under Section 153A of the Act. The Court relied on its previous judgments, including PCIT (Central)-3 v. Anand Kumar Jain (HUF), CIT v. Kabul Chawla, and Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi v. Best Infrastructure (India) P. Ltd. The reasoning was that for a block assessment under Section 153A, there must be a nexus between the statement recorded and the incriminating evidence or material found during the search and seizure operations. A standalone statement, without corroborative material unearthed during the search, cannot empower the Assessing Officer to frame a block assessment. The Court noted that such statements, if not relatable to other evidence, could be retracted and might be recorded under undue influence or coercion, thus not forming a sole basis for computing undisclosed income. The additions made by the Assessing Officer were deleted by the ITAT, and this finding of fact, based on the lack of evidence, was not interfered with.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present appeal. Regarding Question A, the Court noted that the ITAT found the profit percentage of the EOU unit in AY 2007-08 to be consistent with AY 2006-07, and the assessee had addressed the AO's prior dispute regarding senior management salary allocation by itself allocating it in the ratio of sales in AY 2007-08. The ITAT did not find merit in the AO's action of reducing the deduction under Section 10B. Regarding Question B, the ITAT accepted the CIT(A)'s conclusion that the AO's method of expense allocation was not justifiable. Question C, concerning depreciation on computer accessories, was noted by the Court as having been conclusively decided against the Appellant/Department in a previous case, CIT v. BSES Yamuna Powers LLD (ITA 1267/2010). Since the ITAT's order was based on findings of fact and established legal principles, and a prior decision covered one of the key issues, the Court found no substantial question of law. The appeal was dismissed.
The High Court held that a statement recorded under Section 132(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, does not, by itself, constitute incriminating material for the purpose of making additions under Section 153A of the Act. The Court relied on its previous judgments in PCIT (Central)-3 v. Anand Kumar Jain (HUF), CIT v. Kabul Chawla, Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi v. Best Infrastructure (India) P. Ltd., and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Harjeev Aggarwal. These judgments established that for additions to be made under Section 153A consequent to a search, there must be existence of incriminating material found during the search. A statement recorded under Section 132(4) can be used in evidence only if it is relatable to other evidence or material found during the search. It cannot be the sole basis for a block assessment, especially if it is subsequently retracted or lacks corroboration. The High Court found that the issue was squarely covered by these precedents. Consequently, the appeals filed by the Revenue were disposed of in light of these pronouncements.
The Delhi High Court held that it was not inclined to entertain the present appeal filed under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, because the tax effect was less than Rs. 2 crores, in accordance with Circular No. 09/2024. The reasoning was based on the policy outlined in the circular, which guides the High Court's discretion in entertaining appeals. Following this observation, the learned counsel for the Appellant sought permission to withdraw the appeal. The Court accordingly disposed of the appeal as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the original ITAT order.
The High Court held that the Petitioner cannot be saddled with the entire amount of interest reflected in the Customs EDI System. While the challenge to the entire interest liability was not accepted, the computation of interest for the period prior to the determination of the amount pursuant to the Order-in-Original dated 28.02.2023 could not be sustained. The Court reasoned that the prolonged delay in adjudication, spanning approximately eight years, was a significant factor. The Court directed the Respondent to recompute the interest liability, excluding the period from the original assessment in May 2015 up to 28.02.2023. Interest for the period subsequent to 28.02.2023 was to be determined strictly in accordance with applicable statutory provisions and the liability determined under the Order-in-Original. The re-assessment on 29.08.2023 and all payments/appropriations were to be considered. The Court clarified that this decision was confined to the liability arising from confiscation proceedings and did not express an opinion on any independent statutory liability for other defaults. The ratio is that interest cannot be levied for periods of unreasonable delay in adjudication attributable to the department, especially when goods are under seizure.
The Tribunal noted the Appellant's submission that the tax effect in the present appeals was less than Rs. 2 crores. Citing Circular No. 09/2024, the Appellant's counsel sought permission to withdraw the appeals. The Tribunal, in light of this submission and the circular, granted permission. Accordingly, the appeals were disposed of as withdrawn. Any pending applications were also disposed of as withdrawn.
The Delhi High Court, acknowledging the submission by the Appellant's counsel regarding the tax effect being less than Rs. 2 crores and the applicability of Circular No. 09/2024, granted permission for the withdrawal of the appeals. The Court held that the appeals are disposed of as withdrawn. Consequently, any pending applications related to these appeals were also disposed of as withdrawn. The ratio of this decision is that appeals with a tax effect below a certain threshold, as stipulated by relevant circulars, can be withdrawn by the Revenue. No specific issues regarding the merits of the original ITAT orders were decided.
The High Court sustained the preliminary objection raised by the respondent. The Court held that the petitioner had approached the High Court against an order passed by the Assessing Officer under Section 154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Against such an order, a statutory appeal lies before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The Court found no special circumstances presented by the petitioner to justify bypassing the available statutory remedy and invoking the writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the High Court refused to entertain the writ petition. However, the Court granted the petitioner liberty to prefer a statutory appeal within one month from the date of the order. If such an appeal was filed within the stipulated period, it would be entertained and considered on its merits without any objection regarding limitation, as the petitioner was bona fide pursuing its remedy through the writ petition. The writ petition was disposed of with this liberty.
The Delhi High Court noted the submission by the learned Counsel for the Appellant (Revenue) that the tax effect in the present appeals is less than Rs. 2 crores. Based on this submission and in light of Circular No. 09/2024, the Appellant sought permission to withdraw the appeals. The Court accepted this request. Accordingly, the appeals were disposed of as withdrawn. Any pending applications were also disposed of as withdrawn. No decision on the merits of the case was made.
The High Court noted that the tax effect in the present appeal was less than Rs. 2 crores. Citing Circular No. 09/2024, the Court expressed its inclination not to entertain appeals with such a low tax effect. Consequently, the learned counsel for the Appellant sought permission to withdraw the appeal. The High Court allowed this request and disposed of the appeal as withdrawn. No decision was made on the merits of the appeal or the underlying ITAT order. Any pending applications were also disposed of.
The Delhi High Court held that the appeals are disposed of as withdrawn. The Court granted the permission sought by the Appellant (Revenue) to withdraw the appeals. This decision was based on the Appellant's submission regarding the tax effect being less than Rs. 2 crores and in accordance with Circular No. 09/2024. The reasoning is that the Revenue is exercising its discretion to withdraw appeals that fall below a certain monetary threshold as per the prevailing circular. The ratio decidendi is that appeals with a tax effect below the threshold specified in the relevant circular can be withdrawn by the Revenue. The operative direction is that the appeals are disposed of as withdrawn, and any pending applications are also disposed of as withdrawn. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court, in view of the Circular dated 17.09.2024 and specifically para (v) of the said Circular, was not inclined to entertain the present appeals. The Court noted the tax effect for AY 2011-12 as Rs. 1,26,51,985/- and for AY 2012-13 as Rs. 1,26,06,998/-. Consequently, the appeals were disposed of as withdrawn. The Court clarified that any question of law was left open to be decided in an appropriate forum. Pending applications were also disposed of.
The High Court, in view of Circular dated 17.09.2024 and specifically paragraph (v) thereof, was not inclined to entertain the present appeals. The Court noted the tax effect for AY 2011-12 as Rs. 1,26,51,985/- and for AY 2012-13 as Rs. 1,26,06,998/-. Consequently, the appeals were disposed of as withdrawn. The Court clarified that any question of law remains open to be decided in an appropriate forum. Pending applications were also disposed of.
The High Court held that the first issue, concerning whether the petitioner's activities fall under the definition of 'works contract' under Section 2(1)(zo) of the DVAT Act, was authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court in Larsen and Toubro Limited (supra), confirming that the petitioner's activities are indeed covered. Regarding the second issue, the Court found that prior to the substitution of Rule 3 of the DVAT Rules with effect from 07.09.2006, there was no provision stipulating the manner of calculation of taxable turnover in respect of works contracts involving builders. Consequently, the demand for the assessment year 2005-06 was deemed unsustainable due to the non-existence of machinery provisions for the determination of taxable turnover. The Court reasoned that while the levy itself might not be disputed, its enforceability is contingent on the presence of such machinery. Therefore, the demand and notice were set aside. The ratio decidendi is that a tax levy, even if legally permissible, is unenforceable if the statutory framework lacks the necessary machinery provisions to calculate the tax for a specific period.
The Delhi High Court held that the questions raised before it were covered by the judgment of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax (International Taxation) v. Travelport L.P. USA, (2023) 153 Taxman.com 176 (SC). The Court also noted that a coordinate bench of the Delhi High Court had followed the Supreme Court's decision in an order dated 24.07.2025 in ITA 239/2025, concerning Travelport International Operations Ltd. In that order, the coordinate bench observed that in view of the Supreme Court's judgment, the issue stood covered against the revenue. The Court further noted that appeals concerning Assessment Years 2007-08 to 2014-15 had been decided against the Revenue on 08.12.2023. Consequently, the High Court concluded that no substantial question of law arose for consideration in the present appeals, as the issue had been decided against the revenue. The appeals were therefore dismissed as being without merit.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue. The Court followed its own prior decisions in PCIT v. M/s Era Infrastructure (India) Ltd. and PR Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) 3 New Delhi v. Krishak Bharti Cooperative Ltd. In these precedents, the Court had held that an amendment to Section 14A, even if stated to be for 'removal of doubts', cannot be presumed to be retrospective if it alters the law as it previously stood. The Court noted that although the judgment in Era Infrastructure (India) Ltd. was challenged before the Supreme Court, there was no stay. Therefore, applying the principles laid down in Supreme Court judgments in Kunhayammed and Others vs. State of Kerala and Another and Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. Vs. Church of South India Trust Association, the appeals were dismissed. The dismissal was made subject to the final decision of the Supreme Court in the special leave petition concerning Pr. CIT v. IL and FS Energy Development Company Ltd.
The Delhi High Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in setting aside the proceedings under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court noted that the satisfaction note reproduced by the Tribunal clearly showed that the AO had not recorded any satisfaction regarding the relatability of the incriminating material to a particular assessment year. The satisfaction note merely recorded the seizure of a hard disk and the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C for assessment years 2010-11 to 2015-16, without indicating how the material was relevant for those years. The Court found the issue squarely covered by its prior judgment in *Saksham Commodities Limited v. Income Tax Officer* (2024) 161 taxmann.com 485. Consequently, the Revenue's appeals were rejected, and the Tribunal's order was upheld. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The High Court held that the issue in the present appeals is squarely covered by its previous decision dated September 18, 2026, in ITA No. 744/2026. In that prior decision, the Court had considered an appeal against an ITAT order that set aside proceedings under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The ITAT's reasoning, which the High Court upheld, was that the satisfaction note recorded by the AO was vague and did not clearly link the seized incriminating material to any specific assessment year. The Court noted that the satisfaction note simply recorded the seizure of a hard disk and the initiation of proceedings under Section 153C for assessment years 2010-11 to 2015-16, without explaining the relevance of the material to those years. The High Court found no merit in the Revenue's appeal in that instance, as the matter was covered by the judgment in *Saksham Commodities Limited v. Income Tax Officer* (2024) 161 taxmann.com 485. Consequently, the present appeals were also disposed of in terms of that prior decision, leading to the rejection of the Revenue's appeals.
The High Court, in the prior order (ITA No. 744/2026), held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in setting aside the proceedings under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found that the satisfaction note, as reproduced by the Tribunal, did not clearly indicate the relatability of the incriminating material to any particular assessment year. The satisfaction note merely recorded the seizure of a hard disk and the initiation of proceedings for assessment years 2010-11 to 2015-16 without specifying how the seized material was relevant to those years. The Court relied on its own judgment in Saksham Commodities Limited v. Income Tax Officer (2024) 161 taxmann.com 485. Consequently, the Revenue's appeal was rejected. The present appeals were disposed of in terms of this prior decision.
The High Court held that the action of the respondent in revoking an already revoked licence is beyond statutory provisions and leads to multiplicity of litigation, which cannot be appreciated. The Court noted that even if there were multiple causes of action for revocation, they should have been part of the same proceedings. Once the licence was revoked, there was no occasion to pass a second order of revocation without prejudice to the earlier one. Regarding the CESTAT's order, the Court found that while the tribunal correctly noted that the licence revocation had been upheld, it failed to adjudicate the issue of the imposition of penalty under the order dated 16.04.2021. Therefore, the impugned order of the CESTAT was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the tribunal to decide the issue of penalty imposition in accordance with the law. The issue of forfeiture of security deposit vide the order dated 16.04.2021 was deemed no longer to survive as the revocation of the licence had already been upheld by the High Court in a separate appeal.
The High Court held that no substantial question of law was involved. It affirmed the concurrent factual finding by the respondent and the Tribunal that the appellant's graduation degree was forged. The court noted that the contention regarding a BBA degree from CSJMU was not raised before the Inquiry Officer, revocation proceedings, or the Tribunal, and factual matters cannot be raised in an appeal on substantial questions of law. The opportunity for cross-examination was not raised before the Inquiry Officer or the Commissioner, nor pressed before the Tribunal, and the Supreme Court's decision in Kanungo and Co. v. Collector of Customs was cited to state that cross-examination of informers is not an unfettered right. Regulation 14 of the 2018 Regulations empowers revocation and forfeiture, which was upheld. Regulation 18 allows for penalties, and its imposition is not contingent upon licence revocation. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the Tribunal's order.
The High Court declined to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, primarily because the petitioner had already availed the statutory remedy of appeal before the CIT(A). However, considering that the appeal had been pending since February 2019 and acknowledging the petitioner's claim that the jurisdictional aspect had been settled by this Court's judgment dated 08.05.2024, the Court requested the CIT(A) to decide the petitioner's appeal within two months. The petitioner was advised to furnish a certified copy of the High Court's order and the judgment dated 08.05.2024 to the CIT(A) to facilitate an early decision on all issues, including jurisdiction. The Court explicitly stated that it had not pronounced on the merits of the petitioner's contentions and that the CIT(A) was free to take an independent view regarding the applicability of the previous judgment to the present facts. The writ petition was disposed of with these observations.
The High Court held that for the first issue concerning ESOP deduction, the position of law has been settled by the Delhi High Court in CIT v. Lemon Tree Hotels Ltd. (ITA No. 107/2015), which affirmed the ITAT's decision to allow the deduction. The Court noted that this judgment has been followed in various other cases. The Revenue's counsel could not dispute this position, leading the Court to answer question (i) in favor of the assessee. Regarding the second issue, the Court observed that the assessment year was 2018-19 (Financial Year 2017-18). The CBDT notification that mandated valuation by a Merchant Banker instead of a CA was issued on 24.05.2018, which was subsequent to the relevant financial year. Therefore, the AO was not justified in discarding the valuation report done by the CA. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal had rightly set aside the addition made by the AO. Consequently, question (ii) was also answered against the Revenue and in favor of the assessee. The appeal was rejected in toto.
The High Court held that the Settlement Commission's order did not amount to bringing a time-barred demand through the "back door." The Court reasoned that the Impugned Order was to be read as a whole. The Settlement Commission first settled the differential duty liability for the period within five years at Rs.45,68,364/-. It then considered the Rs.85,00,000/- already deposited and, based on the factual findings, held that Rs.70,20,348/- towards the differential duty for the period beyond five years stood appropriated. The remaining Rs.14,79,652/- was adjusted towards the settled liability of Rs.45,68,364/-. The Court found that the Petitioner had invoked the Settlement Commission's jurisdiction, made admissions, and the commission's conclusion was based on the material before it. The Court emphasized that it could not re-appreciate factual records in writ jurisdiction and found no jurisdictional error, violation of natural justice, or manifest error of law. The operative direction concerned the appropriation of an amount already voluntarily deposited, not a fresh determination or recovery under Section 28. The finality under Section 127J was noted, subject to constitutional jurisdiction.
The High Court held that it ought not to entertain the writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution due to the availability of an efficacious alternate statutory remedy. The Court noted that the Petitioner had availed the first statutory remedy by filing an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), but it was rejected for non-compliance with the mandatory pre-deposit requirement under Section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962. The Court reasoned that a statutory condition for entertaining an appeal cannot ordinarily be bypassed by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court, especially when the Petitioner's appeal was not rejected on merits but for failing to fulfill a statutory condition. The Petitioner cannot circumvent the statutory appellate mechanism. The Court explicitly stated that it would not express any opinion on the merits of the Petitioner's contentions regarding cross-examination, reliance on statements, retraction of statement, or the legality and quantum of penalty, as these matters are to be considered by the competent statutory forum. The Petitioner was granted liberty to avail the statutory remedy before the competent appellate forum.
The High Court allowed all the writ petitions. Regarding the reassessment proceedings against Teva USA (W.P.(C) 10711/2017, W.P.(C) 10714/2017, W.P.(C) 1295/2023), the Court quashed the notices under Section 148 and consequential proceedings, finding them time-barred and without jurisdiction. The Court set aside the AAR's order (W.P.(C) 12721/2019), allowing Teva Israel's application filed under Section 245Q, thereby holding that the income in question was not exigible to tax in India. Consequently, Teva Israel's petition for refund (W.P.(C) 4065/2022) was allowed. The Court directed the Revenue to refund the TDS amount of approximately Rs. 783 crore along with applicable interest within two months, subject to Teva USA furnishing a corporate guarantee or solvent security and Teva Israel providing a corporate guarantee/surety. The Court reasoned that protective assessments do not permit protective recovery and withholding refunds for extended periods was arbitrary and confiscatory, especially when proceedings against Teva USA were stayed.
The High Court allowed all the writ petitions. For Teva USA's petitions challenging reassessment notices under Section 148 for AYs 2012-13 and 2013-14, the Court quashed the notices and consequential proceedings, finding them time-barred and without jurisdiction. Similarly, for Teva USA's petition concerning AY 2014-15, the Court quashed the order under Section 148A(d) and the consequential notice under Section 148, deeming them time-barred and without jurisdiction. The petition by Teva Israel and Teva USA challenging the AAR's order was also allowed, with the AAR's order set aside and the application under Section 245Q allowed. The Court held that the refund due to Teva Israel for TDS amounting to approximately Rs. 783 crore for AYs 2012-13, 2013-14, and 2014-15 must be refunded with applicable interest within two months, subject to Teva USA furnishing a corporate guarantee/solvent security and Teva Israel providing a corporate guarantee/surety. The reasoning was that the Revenue cannot withhold refunds indefinitely, especially when proceedings against Teva USA were stayed and subsequently quashed.
The High Court allowed all the writ petitions. Regarding the reassessment proceedings against Teva USA (W.P.(C) 10711/2017, W.P.(C) 10714/2017, W.P.(C) 1295/2023), the Court quashed the notices under Section 148 and consequential proceedings, finding them time-barred and without jurisdiction. The Court set aside the AAR's order (W.P.(C) 12721/2019), allowing Teva Israel's application filed under Section 245Q, thereby holding that the income in question was not exigible to tax in India. Consequently, Teva Israel's petition for refund (W.P.(C) 4065/2022) was allowed. The Court directed the Revenue to refund the TDS amount of approximately Rs. 783 crore along with applicable interest within two months, subject to Teva USA furnishing a corporate guarantee or solvent security and Teva Israel providing a corporate guarantee/surety. The Court reasoned that protective assessments do not permit protective recovery and withholding refunds for extended periods was arbitrary and confiscatory, especially when proceedings against Teva USA were stayed.
The High Court allowed all the writ petitions. Regarding the reassessment proceedings against Teva USA (W.P.(C) 10711/2017, W.P.(C) 10714/2017, W.P.(C) 1295/2023), the Court quashed the notices under Section 148 and consequential proceedings, finding them time-barred and without jurisdiction. The Court set aside the AAR's order (W.P.(C) 12721/2019), allowing Teva Israel's application filed under Section 245Q, thereby holding that the income in question was not exigible to tax in India. Consequently, Teva Israel's petition for refund (W.P.(C) 4065/2022) was allowed. The Court directed the Revenue to refund the TDS amount of approximately Rs. 783 crore along with applicable interest within two months, subject to Teva USA furnishing a corporate guarantee or solvent security and Teva Israel providing a corporate guarantee/surety. The Court reasoned that protective assessments do not permit protective recovery and withholding refunds for extended periods was arbitrary and confiscatory, especially when proceedings against Teva USA were stayed.
The High Court allowed all the writ petitions. Regarding the reassessment proceedings against Teva USA (W.P.(C) 10711/2017, W.P.(C) 10714/2017, W.P.(C) 1295/2023), the Court quashed the notices under Section 148 and consequential proceedings, finding them time-barred and without jurisdiction. The Court set aside the AAR's order (W.P.(C) 12721/2019), allowing Teva Israel's application filed under Section 245Q, thereby holding that the income in question was not exigible to tax in India. Consequently, Teva Israel's petition for refund (W.P.(C) 4065/2022) was allowed. The Court directed the Revenue to refund the TDS amount of approximately Rs. 783 crore along with applicable interest within two months, subject to Teva USA furnishing a corporate guarantee or solvent security and Teva Israel providing a corporate guarantee/surety. The Court reasoned that protective assessments do not permit protective recovery and withholding refunds for extended periods was arbitrary and confiscatory, especially when proceedings against Teva USA were stayed.
The Delhi High Court, acknowledging the pending appeal before the ITAT and the parties' agreement on an ad-interim arrangement, disposed of the writ petition with specific directions. The Court held that the Petitioner should file a stay application before the ITAT within two weeks. The ITAT would then consider this application on its merits. Crucially, if the ITAT found it necessary to require a deposit for granting a stay, it was directed to consider the amount of equalization levy already paid (Rs. 13,34,81,786/-) as a substantial deposit. The ITAT would only require the Petitioner to deposit any further amount if it deemed more than the EL amount necessary as a condition for the stay. This arrangement was explicitly stated to be ad-interim, preserving the original character of the EL payment, and the Revenue was restrained from recovering the outstanding demand until the ITAT decided the stay application.
The High Court observed that the issue concerning the interest amount was an apparent error that needed rectification by the Assessing Officer. The Court directed the petitioner to file an application under Section 154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, within 15 days. The Assessing Officer was instructed to rectify the error and issue a fresh demand notice within 30 days of receiving the application. The petitioner was then advised to file an appeal, along with a stay application, within 30 days of the rectified order. Regarding the cross-examination, the Court directed that if the petitioner sought copies of statements from Mr. Manik Dhingra, Mr. Vikrant Sharma, and Mr. Gajendra Kumar Sharma, the Appellate Authority should provide them in accordance with the law. The writ petition was disposed of.
The High Court held that the prosecution of the petitioner was fallacious and unsustainable. The Court noted that the entire basis for initiating proceedings against the petitioner, including the Show Cause Notice under Section 2(35) of the Income Tax Act, the order passed under the said section, the sanction order under Section 279(1), and the complaint itself, was premised on the petitioner being a Director of the accused company, M/s Granite Gate Properties Pvt. Ltd. This premise was crucial for treating her as the Principal Officer. However, the Senior Standing Counsel for the Income Tax Department admitted that the petitioner was never a Director of the accused company. Consequently, the Court found the prosecution to be based on a fundamentally flawed assumption. The petition was allowed, and the prosecution concerning the petitioner was quashed. The Court explicitly stated that this order was in the backdrop of the peculiar facts and circumstances and should not be taken as a precedent.
The High Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) had exhibited undue haste and recklessness in passing its orders, evidenced by common orders being passed and released for appeals heard on different dates, and a lack of application of mind. The Court found the ITAT's orders to be bereft of logic, reasoning, or rationale. Consequently, the High Court quashed and set aside all seven orders passed by the ITAT. The appeals before the ITAT were restored to their original numbers to be decided afresh. The High Court directed that these appeals be heard by a Bench other than the one that passed the impugned order. The Court explicitly stated that no observations were made on the merits of the case, leaving the ITAT free to take an independent view. The ratio decidendi is that procedural irregularities and lack of reasoned orders by the ITAT warrant setting aside the orders and remanding the matters for fresh adjudication.
The High Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) had exhibited undue haste and recklessness in passing its orders, evidenced by common orders being passed and released for appeals heard on different dates, and a lack of application of mind. The Court found the ITAT's orders to be bereft of logic, reasoning, or rationale. Consequently, the High Court quashed and set aside all seven orders passed by the ITAT. The appeals before the ITAT were restored to their original numbers to be decided afresh. The High Court directed that these appeals be heard by a Bench other than the one that passed the impugned order. The Court explicitly stated that no observations were made on the merits of the case, leaving the ITAT free to take an independent view. The ratio decidendi is that procedural irregularities and lack of reasoned orders by the ITAT warrant setting aside the orders and remanding the matters for fresh adjudication.
The High Court found significant procedural lapses and opaqueness in the ITAT's orders, noting the lack of application of mind and undue haste. The Court highlighted that a common order was passed for appeals heard and pronounced on different dates (06.08.2025 and 13.08.2025), indicating recklessness. The Court was unable to comprehend any logic or reasoning in the impugned order. Consequently, the High Court set aside all seven orders passed by the ITAT. The Court restored the appeals to their original numbers to be decided afresh by the Tribunal, directing that they be heard by a different Bench. The High Court explicitly stated that no observations on the merits of the case were made, and the Tribunal would be free to take an independent view. The ITAT's finding that the assessment years were unabated after the Section 153C notice was not adjudicated upon by the High Court.
The Court held that the Petitioner had approached the Respondents within the prescribed period seeking quantification of the applicable duty, which was not provided. The failure to exercise the option of redemption within the stipulated period was not solely attributable to the Petitioner, but also to the Respondents' inaction in quantifying the duty. Therefore, the decision in Gillette India Ltd. did not preclude the relief sought. The Court directed the Respondents to communicate the applicable duty payable within 15 days. Upon receipt of the duty, redemption fine, penalty, and interest at 8%, the Respondents were ordered to release the gold bars to the Petitioner. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided.
The Delhi High Court, comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Mehta and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajneesh Kumar Gupta, held that the appeal is liable to be dismissed. The Court's decision was based on the established precedent of this Court in the case of Smt. Sneh Lata Sawhney (supra). Furthermore, the Court noted that this precedent had been subsequently followed and elaborated upon in another judgment of the same Court in the case of Sanjay Jain (supra). The Revenue's counsel was unable to controvert the position of law as presented by the assessee's counsel, which relied on these High Court judgments. Consequently, the appeal filed by the Revenue against the ITAT's order was dismissed. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court held that the contradictory stand of the Revenue regarding the valuation of shares was not disputed. In light of the Revenue's submission that it proposed to drop the proceedings against Vardhman Financial Services Pvt. Ltd., the Court quashed and set aside the notice dated 12.04.2021 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and any further proceedings in furtherance thereof for Assessment Year 2014-15. The Court found no reason to proceed further against the petitioner given the Revenue's decision. The principle is that inconsistent actions by the Revenue can lead to the quashing of proceedings, especially when the Revenue itself concedes to dropping them. The writ petition was allowed.
The High Court quashed the notice dated April 28, 2023, issued under Section 148 of the Act, holding the proceedings illegal, arbitrary, and beyond the scope of Section 148. The Court reasoned that the AAR's ruling that the receipts were business income and not royalty was binding on the AO. Furthermore, the AO had previously conducted a scrutiny assessment for AY 2016-17 and recorded a categorical finding that the petitioner did not have a PE in India. The initiation of reassessment proceedings under Section 148, alleging income escapement due to PE, was therefore considered a 'change of opinion' and a jurisdictional error. The Court also found the notice to be time-barred, as it was issued after the expiry of the six-year period stipulated in Section 149(1)(b) from the end of the relevant assessment year. The Court emphasized that the pre-condition for invoking the extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 147, namely, failure on the part of the assessee to disclose material facts, was not satisfied, as all relevant facts were disclosed and discussed during the scrutiny assessment. The Court clarified that it quashed the notice only on jurisdictional grounds and did not record any finding on the existence or non-existence of a PE.
The High Court held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) had exhibited undue haste and recklessness in passing its orders, evidenced by common orders being passed and released for appeals heard on different dates, and a lack of application of mind. The Court found the ITAT's orders to be bereft of logic, reasoning, or rationale. Consequently, the High Court quashed and set aside all seven orders passed by the ITAT. The appeals before the ITAT were restored to their original numbers to be decided afresh. The High Court directed that these appeals be heard by a Bench other than the one that passed the impugned order. The Court explicitly stated that no observations were made on the merits of the case, leaving the ITAT free to take an independent view. The ratio decidendi is that procedural irregularities and lack of reasoned orders by the ITAT warrant setting aside the orders and remanding the matters for fresh adjudication.
The High Court held that the Assessing Officer's approach suffered from irregularity and led to a violation of the principles of natural justice. The Court noted that the statute provides 30 days for filing a reply under Section 148A(b). The petitioner was effectively given only about 15 days (from 03.03.2024 to 10.03.2024) to file their reply, which was curtailed. The AO had sufficient time to consider the reply, as the last date for passing the order under Section 148A(d) was 22.03.2024. The Court found that curtailing the petitioner's right to file a reply and not considering the reply filed on 15.03.2024, despite an email request for adjournment on 09.03.2024, prejudiced the petitioner. Consequently, the impugned order dated 18.03.2024 passed under Section 148A(d) and the consequential notice under Section 148 were set aside. The AO was directed to pass a fresh order after considering the petitioner's reply dated 15.03.2024, without being influenced by the earlier order. The Court explicitly stated that no observations or findings on the merits of the case were made.
The High Court held that the reassessment proceedings were not justified and were rightly annulled by the lower appellate authorities. The Court found that the reasons recorded for reassessment clearly indicated that the Assessing Officer had initiated proceedings simply because he disagreed with the view taken by his predecessor. The Court noted that the CIT(A) had recorded that the assessee had provided replies to queries regarding these issues during the original assessment, and the AO, being satisfied, had made no additions. The Court found no merit in the revenue's contention that no questions were asked during the scrutiny assessment, as the assessee had provided specific replies. Therefore, the Court concluded that the subsequent Assessing Officer was not justified in initiating reassessment proceedings when the assessee had furnished satisfactory replies during the scrutiny assessment, and the AO had chosen not to make any addition. Both the CIT(A) and the Tribunal were found to be justified in annulling the reassessment proceedings. The appeal was rejected.
The High Court allowed the petition, quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated December 9, 2025, passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (International Taxation-3, Delhi). The Court held that the CIT (IT) had seriously erred in concluding that there were no special circumstances warranting the exercise of discretionary power under Section 119(2)(b) of the Act. The Court reasoned that the admitted fact of paying tax on the same income for two assessment years (2016-17 and 2018-19) constituted a special circumstance, as tax is only payable once on a particular income. Refusal to grant indulgence was seen as amounting to unjust enrichment for the Union of India. The Court noted the petitioner's promptitude in filing rectification applications and attributed the delay to the respondents' tactics. Paying tax twice on the same income was considered hardship in itself. The petitioner was allowed to file a revised return for AY 2016-17 by October 31, 2026, and the AO was directed to pass an appropriate order within three months of its filing.
The High Court held that the Show Cause Notice (SCN) and the Order-in-Original (OIO) were not barred by limitation. The Court reasoned that the period during which the adjudication proceedings were deferred due to the pendency of the petitioners' earlier writ petition (W.P.(C) 5756/2021) and the interim order could not be counted towards the statutory period for issuing the OIO. The statutory clock for the two-year period under Section 28(9) of the Customs Act, 1962, commenced on 08.12.2023, when the said writ petition was dismissed. Computing from this date, the OIO passed on 29.11.2024 fell within the unextended base period of one year. Therefore, the challenge based on limitation was dismissed. Independently, the Court noted that the petitioners had not controverted the substantive findings of diversion of goods and evasion of duty, and their conduct, including not informing the adjudicating authority about the dismissal of their writ petition, disentitled them to discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court thus declined to interfere with the OIO/SCN and directed the petitioners to avail the statutory appellate remedy.
The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition. The Court found that the Petitioner had failed to make out a case for exercising extraordinary jurisdiction for unconditional release. The petition suffered from unexplained and substantial delay, and crucially, the Petitioner had suppressed material contemporaneous records, specifically her Section 108 statement. This statement contained admissions regarding crossing the Green Channel, intentional non-declaration, and willingness to pay duty, fine, and penalty, and importantly, that she did not require a Show Cause Notice or personal hearing. The Court held that the Petitioner's entitlement to unconditional release could not be determined by omitting this material record. The reliance on Jatin Ahuja and Saba Simran did not assist the Petitioner as the former did not apply without examination of the complete record, and the latter depended on facts not conclusively established. The Court noted that the issue of whether the article was genuine personal jewellery depended on facts, and the Petitioner's admissions complicated this. The prayer for waiver of warehouse and handling charges was left open for the adjudicating authority. The Court directed the competent authority to complete proceedings expeditiously, preferably within three months, subject to the Petitioner's cooperation. The Court clarified it had not expressed any opinion on the ultimate merits of confiscation, duty, fine, or penalty.
The Court held that the Petitioner's claim for unconditional release of the gold bar could not be accepted. The primary issue revolves around whether a notice under Section 124(a) was issued within the statutory period. The Respondent's assertion that an oral show-cause notice was issued on 19.12.2023, supported by the Petitioner's statement waiving the need for a written notice and personal hearing, directly disputes the Petitioner's foundational factual assertion of a complete absence of notice. The Petitioner's allegations that the statement was obtained under coercion and was not voluntary involve disputed questions of fact. The Court, in its writ jurisdiction, is not inclined to conduct a roving factual inquiry into the circumstances of the statement's recording or the alleged coercion, especially when the Petitioner seeks to rely on CCTV footage and the Respondent relies on contemporaneous records. The decision in Jatin Ahuja (supra) was noted as not dispensing with the necessity of determining whether a notice was in fact given. Therefore, the question of whether the oral proceedings constituted compliance with Section 124(a) cannot be conclusively determined based on one version of disputed facts. The Court clarified that its judgment does not express an opinion on the Petitioner's ultimate liability, the confiscability of the gold, or the validity of the statement, leaving these matters to the competent authority. The Petition was dismissed as the Petitioner's claim for automatic release could not be accepted based on the absence of a written notice when an oral notice was asserted.