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955 orders · Page 14 of 20
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice dated July 29, 2022, issued under Section 148 of the Act for AY 2014-15, was indeed issued beyond the period of limitation. The Court noted that the period of six years from the end of the assessment year expired on March 31, 2021. TOLA extended this to June 30, 2021, and the initial notice was issued on June 17, 2021. Following the Supreme Court's directions in Union of India & Ors. v. Ashish Agarwal, the period from the issuance of the notice till May 4, 2022, and the time provided for the Assessee to respond were to be excluded. The AO had thirteen days to issue the notice after receiving the Assessee's reply, which expired on June 26, 2022. Since the impugned notice was issued on July 29, 2022, it was beyond this permissible period. The Court found this controversy covered in favour of the Assessee by its own decision in Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and Anr. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and all proceedings initiated pursuant to the impugned notice were set aside.
The Delhi High Court admitted the appeal for hearing on two specific questions of law. These questions relate to the classification of income as FTS under Section 9(1)(vii) and the nature of services rendered by the assessee and HCLT.
The Delhi High Court held that a notice under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, cannot be issued for an assessment year if no incriminating material is found during the search that relates to that specific assessment year. The Court noted that the information found pertained to FY 2014-15, which was significantly earlier than the AY 2018-19 under challenge. The Court relied on its own prior decisions in Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-III v. Kabul Chawla and Saksham Commodities Limited v. Income Tax Officer Ward 22(1), Delhi & Another, as well as decisions from the Gujarat High Court in Pr. CIT v. Saumya Constructions (P) Limited and the Supreme Court in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-3 v. Abhisar Buildwell Private Ltd. The ratio is that the nexus between the seized material and the assessment year for which Section 153C proceedings are initiated must be established. Since no such nexus was found for AY 2018-19, the impugned notice and subsequent proceedings were set aside. The petition was allowed.
The High Court found that the ITAT had not considered crucial contentions raised by the assessee, including whether the additions were made under Section 68 and the possibility of allowing for gross profit on alleged bogus purchases. The matter was remanded to the ITAT for fresh consideration.
The High Court noted that the Assessee contended the loan was never written off. Since the ITAT had not interfered with the CIT(A)'s order and the crucial fact of write-off was disputed, no substantial question of law arose.
The Delhi High Court admitted the appeal for hearing on two specific questions of law. These questions pertain to the classification of income as FTS and the nature of service rendering between the assessee and HCLT.
The High Court held that the question of whether the assessee's activities qualify as charitable purposes is a question of fact. Since the CIT(A) and ITAT concurrently found in favor of the assessee on this factual matrix, no substantial question of law arose.
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal, holding that the receipts were not taxable as royalty or fees for included services. This decision was consistent with previous years' assessments where the Revenue had not appealed.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the impugned notice dated 31.08.2024. The Court held that the notice was barred by limitation. The reasoning was based on the established position of law as laid down in previous decisions of the same court, specifically Dinesh Jindal v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 20, Delhi & Others, KAD Housing Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-6, Delhi, and Pankaj Jain v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 3, Delhi & Anr. In these precedents, it was held that the period of ten years for issuing a notice under Section 148 is to be reckoned from the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the notice was issued. The Revenue's counsel concurred with this legal proposition. Consequently, the impugned notice was quashed as being beyond the statutory time limit. The petition was disposed of in these terms.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice. The Court relied on its earlier decisions in Dinesh Jindal v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 20, Delhi & Others, KAD Housing Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-6, Delhi, and Pankaj Jain v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 3, Delhi & Anr. In these precedents, the Court held that the ten-year period for reckoning limitation under Section 148 of the Act is to be calculated from the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the notice is issued. The Revenue's counsel concurred with this interpretation. Consequently, the notice was found to be barred by limitation and was quashed.
The High Court held that the genuineness of companies in a previous assessment year cannot be a basis for determining the genuineness of different companies in the current assessment year. The ITAT had failed to examine the capacity and creditworthiness of all relevant companies for the impugned assessment year.
The Delhi High Court considered it appropriate to dispose of the writ petition by directing the concerned authority to pass an appeal effect order as expeditiously as possible, within a period of eight weeks from the date of the order. Furthermore, the Court directed the concerned authority to process the petitioner's claim for refund within a period of four weeks thereafter, in accordance with the law. The Court did not delve into the merits of the original tax dispute, as the ITAT's order had already provided relief to the assessee, and the focus was on the procedural compliance and refund of the deposited taxes. The principle established is that once an appellate authority sets aside a demand and no further appeal is preferred, the revenue authorities are bound to implement the order and refund any taxes collected against the set-aside demand promptly.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated 22.07.2022 was unsustainable on both grounds. Firstly, it was beyond the period of three years as stipulated under Section 149(1) of the Act because the income that could have escaped assessment did not exceed ₹9,43,944/-. The court rejected the Revenue's contention that the initial information value of ₹61,95,000/- should be used for limitation purposes, stating that the AO must determine the escaped income at the Section 148A(d) stage based on the record and the assessee's response. Secondly, there was no material to indicate that the petitioner's income had escaped assessment. The petitioner had declared STCG of ₹9,43,944/- on the PMC Fincorp Ltd. transaction, paid tax on it, and this amount was the only sum received by the assessee. The AO's assumption of fictitious long-term capital gains was not supported by any evidence and contradicted the information on record. Therefore, the impugned order and notice were set aside.
The Delhi High Court held that the notice dated July 29, 2022, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2013-14, was indeed issued beyond the period of limitation. The Court noted that the initial notice under Section 148, construed as a notice under Section 148A(b) per the Supreme Court's directions, was issued on the last date of the limitation period extended by the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The Fourth Proviso to Section 149(1) allowed a further seven days for issuing a notice under Section 148, which expired on June 23, 2022. Since the impugned notice was not issued within this extended period, it was found to be beyond limitation. The Court relied on its earlier decision in Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and Anr. The Revenue did not contest this finding. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and the impugned notice and all consequential proceedings were set aside.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had not proved the genuineness of the gifts beyond doubt. However, the High Court found that the additions were based on surmises and lacked cogent evidence, as the donors had confirmed the gifts and the assessee had established their identity and creditworthiness.
The Delhi High Court, in its prima facie assessment, found that the issue involved in the appeal is covered in favour of the Revenue by its own prior decision in Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-7, Delhi v. Naveen Kumar Gupta (2024:DHC:8917-DB). The Court did not delve into a detailed analysis of the arguments as this is an interim order issuing notice. The reasoning for this prima facie view stems from the precedent cited by the Revenue. The operative direction is to issue notice to the respondent, indicating that the appeal will be heard on merits at a later date. No specific finding on the merits of the case has been made at this stage, and the core question remains to be adjudicated after hearing the respondent. The amount in dispute is not recorded.
The High Court held that the rectification order and demand notice were set aside as they were issued beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The Court found that Form ITNS-150, which sets out the quantum of tax payable, is an order in writing determining the sum payable by an assessee, as per the Supreme Court's decision in Kalyankumar Ray v. Commissioner of Income Tax. Therefore, any amendment to Form ITNS-150 falls within the scope of Section 154(1)(a) of the Act, and such amendments cannot be made after the expiry of four years from the date of the order, as per Section 154(7). The Court rejected the revenue's contention that the omission of Section 234A interest was a mere ministerial error or akin to a judgment-decree variation, stating that the reassessment order clearly indicated that interest under Section 234A, if any, had been charged, and Form ITNS-150 explicitly showed zero interest for Section 234A, indicating the Assessing Officer's conscious decision. The Court did not delve into the merits of whether Section 234A interest was actually payable, noting it was a contentious issue.
The Delhi High Court held that compelling the assessee to deposit any amount against the demand raised would be manifestly erroneous, given the difficulty in comprehending the reasons for the addition in the assessment order. The Court noted that the Revenue's counsel was unable to explain the basis of the addition. Consequently, the Court allowed the writ petition and restrained the Revenue from taking any coercive steps for the recovery of the demand until the disposal of the petitioner's appeal before the CIT(A). The Court did not decide on the merits of the appeal itself, focusing solely on the interim relief concerning the stay of demand.
The Delhi High Court held that it was manifestly erroneous to compel the assessee to deposit any amount against the demand raised, as the reasons for the addition were difficult to comprehend. The Court noted that while paragraph 3.2.1 of the assessment order contained allegations of financial irregularities and payments to H.R. Builders, neither the Court nor the Revenue's counsel could explain the precise basis of the allegation or the transaction leading to the addition. Consequently, the Court allowed the writ petition and restrained the Revenue from taking any coercive steps for the recovery of the demand pursuant to the assessment order until the disposal of the petitioner's appeal. No specific issue was left undecided, as the Court addressed the immediate issue of the stay of demand.
The Delhi High Court held that it was manifestly erroneous to compel the assessee to deposit any amount against the demand raised, as the reasons for the addition were difficult to comprehend. The Court noted that even the Revenue's counsel was unable to explain the exact allegation on which the assessment order was passed. Consequently, the Court allowed the writ petition and restrained the Revenue from taking any coercive steps for recovery of the demand pursuant to the assessment order until the disposal of the petitioner's appeal. The Court did not explicitly decide on the merits of the addition itself but focused on the procedural deficiency and lack of clarity in the assessment order, which made it impossible to ascertain the basis of the demand.
The Delhi High Court noted that the petitioner's grievance was two-fold: non-implementation of the ITAT order and non-release of refunds. Regarding the first grievance, the Court observed that the ITAT's order dated October 27, 2022, in ITA No. 5916/Del/2019, clearly set aside the penalty of ₹1,66,504 imposed under Section 271(1)(c) for AY 2015-16. The Revenue, in its counter-affidavit, confirmed that the portal no longer reflected this outstanding penalty, thereby addressing the petitioner's concern about its implementation. Concerning the refund of ₹1,57,027, the Revenue stated it was due and payable and would be disbursed according to law. The Court did not delve into the controversy surrounding another assessment order for AY 2015-16, as the reliefs sought were for the implementation of the ITAT order and the grant of refund, which were deemed addressed. The Court directed the concerned officer to process the refund claim and disburse the amount expeditiously, preferably within four weeks, while allowing the Revenue to adjust the refund against any other outstanding liability in accordance with law. The petition was disposed of in these terms.
The learned counsel for the appellant, Verve Engineering (P) Ltd., sought to withdraw the appeal. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The pending application associated with the appeal was also disposed of. No decision was rendered on the merits of the case. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn.
The ITAT held that the assessee was a tax resident of Singapore with substantial business operations and was therefore entitled to DTAA benefits. The High Court found no substantial question of law arising from the ITAT's order.
The High Court held that no substantial questions of law arise for consideration, dismissing the Revenue's appeals. The court noted that similar issues for prior assessment years were resolved under the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) and that the Revenue had accepted the income as business income.
The Delhi High Court noted that a final assessment order under Section 143(3) read with Section 144C(13) of the Act had been passed. Given this development, the Court deemed it inappropriate to delve into the controversy of whether the amounts received by the petitioner were chargeable to tax as royalty. Consequently, the writ petition was disposed of. The Court clarified that all rights and contentions of the parties were reserved. It further directed that if the petitioner filed an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal within four weeks, it would be considered on its merits without being influenced by any delay. Interim orders were extended for four weeks.
The Delhi High Court held that the controversy in the present petition is covered by its earlier decision in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-28 Delhi & Ors. The Court reiterated that the Supreme Court's observations in Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd. were not a carte blanche to override the restrictions in Section 149 of the Act. The liberty accorded to the Revenue to initiate reassessment was subject to fulfilling the conditions stipulated in Sections 147 and 148 of the Act. The Court found the Revenue's contention that the time period under Section 149 is not applicable to be erroneous. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and the impugned notice was set aside. The operative direction was the setting aside of the notice. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Delhi High Court held that it would not entertain the writ petition filed by the petitioner. The Court reasoned that the petitioner possessed a statutory remedy of appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) against the order passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT) under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court found it inapposite to intervene when such an alternative remedy was available. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed. The Court also noted that if the petitioner were to file an appeal before the ITAT along with an application for condonation of delay, such application would be considered in accordance with the law. No other issues were decided on merits.
The Delhi High Court held that it was not apposite to entertain the writ petition filed by the petitioner. The court reasoned that the petitioner had a statutory remedy of appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) against the order passed by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT) under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed. The court clarified that if the petitioner files an appeal before the ITAT along with an application for condonation of delay, such an application would be considered in accordance with law. No other issues were decided on merits.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice dated 31.03.2024, issued under Section 148 for AY 2014-15, is barred by limitation. Following its earlier decisions in Dinesh Jindal and Pankaj Jain, the Court reiterated that for searches conducted after 31.03.2021, the period of limitation under Section 153C is to be construed with reference to the date on which the Assessing Officer (AO) initiates action against a non-searched person, as the procedure for recording satisfaction and handing over records under Section 153C is no longer applicable. The Court clarified that the block period of ten years is to be reckoned from the end of the assessment year relevant to the financial year in which the AO decides to initiate action, i.e., the date of issuance of the notice under Section 148. In this case, the notice was issued on 31.03.2024 (FY 2023-24, AY 2024-25). Therefore, the ten-year block period would extend up to AY 2015-16. Since AY 2014-15 falls beyond this period, the notice is invalid. The Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice and all consequential proceedings.
The Delhi High Court held that if the grounds for reopening the assessment are not sustained, the AO cannot make additions on other grounds not forming the basis of the reopening. The court reiterated that reassessment proceedings are not vitiated if the AO discovers other escaped income during the process.
The High Court of Delhi allowed the application for withdrawal of the appeal. The Court noted that the appellant had opted for the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme and their declaration had been accepted. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of as withdrawn. The date previously fixed for the hearing of the appeal, 11.09.2025, was cancelled. The Court did not decide any substantive issues related to the income tax assessment itself, as the appeal was withdrawn based on the settlement under the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme.
The High Court allowed applications for exemption and for a long list of dates. It also dismissed applications for stay as withdrawn with liberty to file afresh.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated 27.07.2022, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2015-16, was admittedly beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 149(1) of the Act. Following the concession made by the Revenue in the case of Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal (2024 INSC 754) that TOLA was not applicable for such notices for AY 2015-16, the Court found the notice liable to be set aside. The reasoning was based on the established precedent and the Revenue's own admission that the extended period of limitation under TOLA was not available for this specific assessment year. Consequently, the impugned notice and all proceedings emanating from it were set aside. The petition was allowed in these terms.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court relied on its previous decisions, including *Dinesh Jindal v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 20, Delhi & Others*, *KAD Housing Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-6, Delhi*, and *Pankaj Jain v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 3, Delhi & Anr.*. These judgments clarified that the block period of ten years, as per the first proviso to Section 149 of the Act, is computed from the end of the assessment year relevant to the financial year in which the Assessing Officer of the searched person recorded satisfaction and handed over material to the Assessing Officer of another assessee. In this case, the search was conducted on 02.03.2022, and the notice was issued on 31.08.2024. The Court noted that the tabular statement provided by the assessee, showing the computation of the ten-year block, was not disputed by the Revenue in principle, although the Revenue contested the interpretation in *Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd.* The Court found that the notice was issued beyond the permissible period of limitation based on the established interpretation of the law.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961. The Court relied on its previous decisions, including Dinesh Jindal v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 20, Delhi & Others, KAD Housing Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-6, Delhi, and Pankaj Jain v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 3, Delhi & Anr. The Court also referred to its reasoning in The Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax - Central-1 v. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd., where it was explained that the block period of ten years is computed from the end of the assessment year relevant to the financial year in which the AO of the searched person recorded satisfaction and handed over material to the AO of the other assessee. The Court noted that the tabular statement provided by the assessee, which calculated the ten-year block period from the end of AY 2024-25, was not disputed by the Revenue in terms of its calculation. The operative direction was to quash the notice.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated 30.07.2022, issued under Section 148 of the Act for AY 2015-2016, is beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 149 of the Act. The Court relied on the concession made by the Revenue in the Supreme Court case of Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal, wherein it was stated that TOLA is not applicable for AY 2015-2016 in respect of notices issued on or after April 1, 2021. Consequently, the notice issued on 30.07.2022, which is after the period of limitation and not covered by TOLA, is liable to be set aside. The Court followed its earlier decision in Ibibo Group Private Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and the Supreme Court's dismissal of an SLP in The Income Tax Officer Ward 1(2) Jaipur v. R.K. Build Creation Pvt Ltd, which was based on a similar concession. The impugned notice and all proceedings emanating therefrom were set aside. The petition was allowed.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961. The Court relied on its previous decisions, including Dinesh Jindal v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 20, Delhi & Others, KAD Housing Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-6, Delhi, and Pankaj Jain v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 3, Delhi & Anr. The Court reiterated the principle laid down in The Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax - Central-1 v. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd., that the block period of ten years for computing limitation under Section 153C read with Section 153A is to be computed from the end of the assessment year relevant to the financial year in which the AO of the searched person recorded satisfaction and handed over the material. In this case, the notice was issued on 29.08.2024, falling within the financial year 2024-25. The tabular statement, which the Revenue did not dispute, indicated that AY 2015-16 fell beyond the ten-year block period computed from the end of AY 2025-26.
The Delhi High Court held that the notice dated 31.03.2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2015-16, is barred by limitation. The Court reasoned that the period of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year 2015-16 expired on 31.03.2022. As the impugned notice was issued after this date, it is beyond the permissible time limit as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Union of India & Others v. Rajeev Bansal. The Court noted that the proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the old regime limits the issuance of such notices. The Court found that the petitioner's argument was supported by the cited precedents. Consequently, the impugned notice was set aside. The petition was allowed in terms of the setting aside of the notice, and the pending application was disposed of.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice and proceedings. The Court held that the reassessment proceedings were indeed barred by limitation. The Court referred to its previous decisions in Dinesh Jindal v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 20, Delhi & Others, KAD Housing Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-6, Delhi, and Pankaj Jain v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 3, Delhi & Anr. The Court also cited The Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax -Central-1 v. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd, explaining that the block period of ten years is computed from the end of the assessment year relevant to the financial year in which the AO of the searched person recorded satisfaction and handed over material. In this case, the notice was issued on 30.03.2024, making AY 2024-25 the first year in the block period, and thus AY 2014-15 was time-barred. The impugned notice and consequential proceedings were set aside.
The High Court held that the tax involvement in the present appeal is below the threshold limit of ₹2,00,00,000/- as stipulated in the Circular dated 17.09.2024. Furthermore, the matter is not covered by any exceptions set out in the circular. Consequently, the Court decided to dispose of the present appeal on account of low tax effect. The reasoning is purely based on the administrative instructions provided by the circular, which sets monetary limits for filing appeals. The ratio decidendi is that appeals with a tax effect below the prescribed threshold, and not falling under any exceptions, are to be dismissed. The operative direction is the disposal of the appeal. Pending applications were also disposed of.
The Delhi High Court held that the disbursement of a refund due to the petitioner cannot be inordinately delayed due to the Revenue facing technical challenges with its systems or processes. The Court noted that the delay would also increase the quantum of refund due to additional interest. Consequently, the Court directed the respondents to process the refund along with further applicable interest as expeditiously as possible, within a period of twelve weeks from the date of the order. The Court further stipulated that if the respondents faced any technical challenges, the refund should be disbursed by processing it manually, emphasizing that the Revenue's technical issues would not be a ground for non-disbursal of the refund. The writ petition was disposed of in these terms.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice. The Court held that the period of limitation for issuing a notice under Section 148, in cases involving Section 153C, is to be reckoned from the end of the assessment year relevant to the financial year in which the AO decided to initiate action against the assessee. In this case, the decision to initiate action was indicated by the notice under Section 148A(b) dated 06.08.2024. The Court noted that a satisfaction note dated 11.03.2023 existed but pertained only to AYs 2015-16 to 2021-22 and did not cover AY 2014-15. Applying the principles laid down in its previous decisions, including Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd., Dinesh Jindal, Pankaj Jain, and KAD Housing Private Limited, the Court concluded that AY 2014-15 fell outside the ten-year block period computed from the end of the assessment year relevant to the financial year in which the decision to initiate proceedings was taken. The tabular analysis showed AY 2014-15 as the 12th year, exceeding the 10-year limit.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice dated 26.12.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the order dated 26.12.2022 passed under Section 148A(d) of the Act for AY 2015-16 are unsustainable. This decision was based on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Others v. Rajeev Bansal. The Supreme Court had noted that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion within the period prescribed under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The Court also referred to a coordinate bench's order in Ibibo Group Pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 10-1 & Anr., where similar notices for AY 2015-16 were set aside. The Revenue's counsel confirmed this position. Consequently, the petition was allowed, the impugned notice was set aside, and all consequential proceedings were also quashed.
The High Court held that the Assessee's application of funds in BARC was not an 'investment' under Section 11(5) read with Section 13(1)(d) as it was not intended to yield income but was made to fulfill charitable objectives under regulatory obligation. Therefore, the exemption withdrawal was not justified.
The High Court held that the deployment of funds in BARC did not constitute an 'investment' as it was not intended to yield income or profit, but was made pursuant to a statutory and regulatory obligation. Therefore, there was no violation of Section 11(5) read with Section 13(1)(d).
The Delhi High Court held that the tax effect involved in the present appeal is below the threshold limit of ₹2,00,00,000/- as stipulated in the Circular dated 17.09.2024 and is not covered by any exceptions set out in the circular. Consequently, the Court disposed of the present appeal on account of low tax effect. The ratio decidendi is that appeals with a tax effect below the prescribed threshold, and not falling under any exceptions, are to be dismissed on that ground. No specific operative directions were given other than the disposal of the appeal.
The High Court held that the impugned notice dated 27.07.2022, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2015-16, is unsustainable. This decision is based on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Others v. Rajeev Bansal (2024 SCC OnLine SC 2693). In that case, the Revenue conceded that the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA) is inapplicable to notices issued for AY 2015-16. Consequently, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, for AY 2015-16, will not fall within the period prescribed under TOLA and must be dropped. The Court noted that a coordinate bench had also set aside similar notices for AY 2015-16 in Ibibo Group Pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 10-1 & Anr. The Revenue's counsel confirmed this position. Therefore, the impugned notice and all consequential proceedings were set aside. The petition was allowed.
The High Court held that the reassessment proceedings for AY 2013-14 are barred by limitation. The Court found that Section 153(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, was inapplicable because the dismissal of the petitioner's earlier writ petition on December 13, 2023, did not involve any positive directions or findings by the court that would necessitate an extension of time under that section. Instead, the Court applied the proviso to Explanation 1 to Section 153. It reasoned that the period during which the assessment proceedings were stayed (from December 20, 2019, to December 13, 2023) meant that the remaining time for the AO to complete the assessment was less than 60 days. Consequently, the proviso granted an additional 60 days from the date the stay was vacated (December 13, 2023). This period expired on February 11, 2024. Since the AO had not completed the assessment by this date, the proceedings were held to be time-barred. The Court allowed the petition, directing the termination of the reassessment proceedings. The petitioner was not precluded from making a separate application for refund of taxes paid, with all rights and contentions reserved.
The High Court held that the wife's income, though present, was insufficient to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during marriage, especially considering the husband's substantially higher earnings. The court enhanced the cumulative maintenance for both the wife and child.