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955 orders · Page 13 of 20
The High Court held that the questions of law raised by the Revenue were covered by its previous judgment in the assessee's own case. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The High Court upheld the ITAT's decision, finding that AMP expenses incurred in the normal course of business are not separate international transactions. The court noted that this issue is covered by previous judgments of the High Court in similar cases.
The High Court held that the questions of law raised by the Revenue were covered by its previous judgment. Therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration.
The High Court upheld the ITAT's decision, finding that AMP expenses incurred in the normal course of business are not separate international transactions. The court noted that this issue is covered by previous judgments of the High Court in similar cases.
The High Court held that the deletion of a part of the plaint at a preliminary stage, without allowing parties to lead evidence, was not appropriate. The CFSL report's opinion was not binding, and the allegations of fraud required evidence.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is liable to be set aside. The Court found that the approval for issuing the notice was granted by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT), whereas, given that more than three years had elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year (AY 2016-17), the approval ought to have been obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (PCCIT) as per Section 151(ii) of the Act. The Court noted that this issue is covered by its earlier decisions in Ganesh Dass Khanna v. Income Tax Officer & Anr. and Twilight Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer Ward 25 3 Delhi & Ors., which established an inextricable link between the limitation period for reassessment and the competence of the specified authority to grant approval. Consequently, all proceedings initiated pursuant to the impugned notice were also set aside. The Court clarified that this order would not preclude the Revenue from initiating fresh proceedings in accordance with the law.
The Delhi High Court held that the notice dated 30.07.2022, issued under Section 148A(d) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2014-15, was indeed issued beyond the period of limitation. The Court reasoned that after considering the extensions granted by the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020, and the subsequent directions of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Ashish Agarwal, which included excluding the period from the notice's issuance until 04.05.2022, as well as the time provided for the AO to supply material and for the Assessee to respond, the AO had a limited window to issue the final notice. This window expired on 29.06.2022. As the impugned notice was issued on 30.07.2022, it fell outside this permissible period. The Court found that this controversy was covered by its own previous decision in Ram Balram Buildhome Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and Anr. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and all proceedings initiated pursuant to the impugned notice were set aside.
The Delhi High Court held that the notice dated 29.07.2022 issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and all proceedings initiated pursuant thereto are quashed and set aside. The Court relied on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in *Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal*. Specifically, the Revenue conceded that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion within the period prescribed under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in *Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors.*, which allowed appeals based on this concession. The Court found that the controversy was covered in favour of the petitioner by its own decision in *Makemytrip India Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 16 (1) Delhi & Anr.*. Therefore, the petition was allowed.
The High Court held that the Assessing Officer (AO) lacked the jurisdiction to disregard the appellate order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (CIT(A)). The AO's authority is confined to implementing the CIT(A)'s decision. The Court emphasized that allowing an AO to review an appellate order would undermine the rule of law. The Revenue's remedy, if it disagreed with the CIT(A)'s order, would be to file an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT). The Court found no reason to refrain from entertaining the writ petition, despite the existence of a statutory appeal remedy, because the impugned order was passed without jurisdiction. The Court set aside the AO's order and directed the AO to pass a fresh order giving effect to the CIT(A)'s order dated 27.08.2020. The Court clarified that it had not examined the merits of the addition or disallowance concerning delayed EPF/PF contributions.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and all consequential proceedings. The Court reasoned that the approval for issuing the notice under Section 148A(d) was not obtained from the competent authority as mandated by Section 151(ii) of the Act. The judgment referred to its previous decisions in Ganesh Dass Khanna v. Income Tax Officer & Anr. and Twilight Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer Ward 25 3 Delhi & Ors., which held that the specified authority for granting approval under Section 151 depends on whether three years or less, or more than three years, have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year. In this case, the approval was sought from the Principal Commissioner, whereas Section 151(ii) mandates approval from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General when more than three years have elapsed. The Court clarified that this order would not preclude the Revenue from initiating fresh proceedings in accordance with law.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice dated 31.08.2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2016-17, is barred by limitation. The Court reasoned that the period of six years from the end of the relevant assessment year (AY 2016-17) expired on 31.03.2023. As the impugned notice was issued after this date, it falls outside the permissible time limit as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Union of India & Others v. Rajeev Bansal, which clarifies the interplay between the old and new regimes for issuing reassessment notices. The Court found that the proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the new regime limits the retrospective operation of the extended time limits to protect assessees. Consequently, the Court set aside the impugned notice and allowed the petition. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition. The Court held that the issue raised by the petitioner was covered in their favour by earlier decisions of the same Court in Ireo Fiveriver Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Department & Anr and Asian Colour Coated Ispat Ltd v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr. These decisions, in turn, relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. The principle established is that upon the approval of a resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, all pre-CIRP liabilities, including those not contemplated in the resolution plan, are extinguished. Therefore, the Assessing Officer cannot reopen assessments for liabilities that stood settled under the 'Clean Slate Theory'. The impugned order dated 10.04.2024 passed under Section 148A(d) and all consequent proceedings for AY 2017-18 were set aside.
The High Court found that a subsequent ITAT decision for the same AY 2013-14 might render the earlier directions irrelevant. Therefore, the High Court set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter back to the ITAT for fresh consideration.
The Delhi High Court held that the issue was squarely covered by its earlier decisions in favour of the assessee. Therefore, no substantial questions of law arose for consideration.
The High Court allowed the writ petition. It held that the Designated Authority's rejection of the petitioner's declaration under the DTVSV Scheme was unjustified. The Court reasoned that FAQ No. 26 of CBDT Circular No. 12 of 2024 was not applicable to the present case. The FAQ clarifies ineligibility for the Scheme when a writ petition is filed against a notice under Section 148/148A and no assessment order has been passed, making the disputed tax unascertainable. However, in this case, an assessment order dated 23.05.2022 had been passed by the AO, determining the disputed tax, and this order was the subject matter of the appeal before the CIT(A). Therefore, the disputed tax was ascertainable. The Court found the Designated Authority's reliance on the FAQ to be erroneous. The Court also noted that the petitioner had disclosed the pending appeal and, in a revised declaration, had even mentioned the pending writ petition. The Court directed the Designated Authority to process the petitioner's declaration, considering the date of filing as 23.12.2024, and issue the appropriate certificate within fifteen days.
The Delhi High Court held that the issue was squarely covered by its earlier decisions. Therefore, no substantial questions of law arose for consideration.
The High Court issued notice to the respondents, indicating that the appeal will be heard further. The core issue is whether the Assessing Officer needed to conduct a separate investigation before concluding on the credit card usage.
The High Court held that the impugned notice and the reassessment proceedings initiated are set aside. The Court found that the Assessing Officer (AO) believed income had escaped assessment due to disallowed expenses related to payments to non-filers, personal expenses, and payments for manpower services, totaling ₹9.21 Crores. However, the Court noted that there was no allegation that the escaped income was represented in the form of an asset. The fourth proviso to Section 153A(1) requires possession of books of account, documents, or evidence revealing that income represented as an asset has escaped assessment. Since the escaped income was alleged to be in the form of expenditure and not an asset, this condition was not satisfied. Consequently, the period of limitation for issuing a notice under Section 153A had to be confined to six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year of the search. As the search was in FY 2022-23 (AY 2023-24), AY 2016-17 falls beyond this six-year period. The petition was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had not earned any income from the sale of fly ash. The proceeds were utilized as per statutory mandate and did not result in the acquisition of any asset by the assessee.
The High Court noted that the ITAT's reliance on an older decision was potentially flawed due to a subsequent, more recent ruling in the assessee's own case for AY 2013-14. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside.
The High Court held that the assessment order dated March 18, 2025, could not be sustained. The reasoning was that this assessment order was passed by the Assessing Officer (AO) as a consequence of the order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Crucially, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) had allowed the appeal against the Section 263 order on March 12, 2025. Since the order under Section 263, which formed the basis for the AO's action, was set aside, the impugned assessment order was rendered invalid. Therefore, the High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the assessment order. No issues were expressly left undecided.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition, finding no merit in the petitioner's contention regarding the lack of jurisdiction. The Court noted that the petitioner had applied for his PAN disclosing a Delhi address, which was then recorded. The petitioner had not taken any steps to update this address or migrate his PAN to a new location, and there is no automatic transfer of jurisdiction when an assessee changes their address. The Court also acknowledged the Revenue's submission that the petitioner's online returns were filed within the jurisdiction of the AO who issued the impugned notice. Therefore, the AO was deemed to have exercised jurisdiction correctly based on the available records and the petitioner's inaction in updating his address.
The High Court held that payments for bandwidth to overseas telecom service providers cannot be construed as royalty under Section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act. The questions raised by the Revenue were covered by earlier decisions of the court.
The Delhi High Court admitted the appeal on two specific questions of law. These questions concern the classification of income as FTS and the nature of service rendering between the assessee and HCLT for foreign clients.
The High Court held that payments for bandwidth to overseas telecom service providers cannot be construed as royalty under Section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act. The questions raised by the Revenue were covered by earlier decisions of the court.
The High Court held that the reassessment proceedings initiated by the notice dated 01.04.2024 under Section 148 of the Act for AY 2014-15 are barred by limitation. The Court reasoned that the initial notice under Section 148, dated 30.06.2021, was issued on the last day of the limitation period extended by the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. When this notice was directed to be construed as a notice under Section 148A(b) by the Supreme Court, no further time was available to issue a notice under Section 148 on that date. The High Court clarified that the order remanding the matter for de novo hearing did not obliterate the statutory timelines for issuing a notice under Section 148. The Assessing Officer was still required to pass an order in accordance with law, which includes adhering to the limitation periods. The Court found no merit in the Revenue's contention that the AO was absolved of these timelines. Therefore, the order dated 31.03.2024 under Section 148A(d) and the notice dated 01.04.2024 under Section 148 were set aside, along with any subsequent proceedings. The ratio is that a remand for de novo consideration does not grant immunity from statutory limitation periods for initiating reassessment proceedings.
The Delhi High Court held that the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer (AO) did not contain any tangible material to form a belief that the petitioner had a dependent PE or a fixed place PE in India during the relevant assessment years. The court noted that the petitioner's objections, including the lack of tangible material, were rejected by the AO. The High Court found that the issue was covered by its earlier decisions in similar cases, specifically citing Grid Solutions OY (Ltd.) v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, UK Grid Solutions Ltd. v. ACIT, GE Hydro France v. ACIT, and GE Grid (Switzerland) GmbH v. ACIT. Consequently, the court allowed the petitions and set aside the impugned notices under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice dated 28.05.2021 and all proceedings initiated pursuant thereto, including the reassessment order dated 19.05.2023, are to be set aside. The Court's decision was based on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal. The specific concession, as noted in paragraph 19(f) of the Rajeev Bansal judgment, was that for the assessment year 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion during the period prescribed under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The High Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes, where similar appeals were allowed based on this concession. Consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to examine other issues raised in the petition.
The High Court held that the ITAT did not err in law or fact by not violating Section 13(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act. The Court found that if the salary paid to a related person is reasonable for the services rendered, it cannot be deemed as applied for the benefit of a prohibited person.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside the impugned notice dated March 31, 2024, as being barred by limitation. The Court referred to its earlier decisions in Dinesh Jindal v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 20, Delhi & Ors., KAD Housing Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-6, Delhi, and Pankaj Jain v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 3, Delhi & Anr. The Court noted that while Section 153C of the Act has a sunset clause for searches conducted after March 31, 2021, the First Proviso to Section 149(1) requires consideration of timeframes as they stood prior to the Finance Act, 2021, for reassessment actions initiated after that date in relation to searches. The Court emphasized that the commencement date for reckoning the limitation period, especially in cases involving searches and potential application of Section 153C, is crucial. The Revenue conceded that the issue was covered by the cited precedents. Therefore, the impugned notice was quashed on the grounds of limitation.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice dated 07.06.2021 and all proceedings initiated pursuant thereto, including the reassessment order dated 24.05.2023, are to be set aside. The Court's decision was based on the concession made by the Revenue before the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Rajeev Bansal. Specifically, paragraph 19(f) of that judgment stated that for AY 2015-16, all notices issued on or after April 1, 2021, would have to be dropped as they would not fall for completion during the period prescribed under the Taxation and other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020. The High Court also noted that the Supreme Court in Deepak Steel and Power Ltd. v. Central Board of Direct Taxes and Ors. had allowed appeals based on this same concession. Consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to examine other issues raised in the petition.
The High Court held that the ITAT did not err in law or fact by not violating Section 13(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act. The Court found that if the salary paid to a related person is reasonable for the services rendered, it cannot be deemed as applied for the benefit of a prohibited person.
The High Court admitted the appeal for hearing on two specific questions of law. These questions concern whether the ITAT erred in not treating the income as FTS under Section 9(1)(vii) and in holding that services were jointly rendered, leading to revenue sharing.
The High Court condoned the delay of 37 days in filing the appeal by the Revenue. The Court found the reasons stated in the application for condonation of delay to be sufficient. The application for condonation of delay was allowed and disposed of. The Court then issued notice to the respondent, Amol Awasthi, for the next date of hearing, indicating that the substantive appeal would be heard later. No decision was made on the merits of the appeal itself, only on the procedural aspect of the delay.
The Tribunal held that the block period for assessment under Section 153C should be calculated from the date of receipt of seized material by the jurisdictional AO, not the date of search. Consequently, AY 2012-13 fell outside the permissible block of ten assessment years.
The High Court upheld the ITAT's decision, finding no infirmity in the conclusion that the Assessing Officer's assumption of jurisdiction under Section 153C for AY 2011-12 was invalid. The block of ten years for reopening is reckoned from the end of the assessment year relevant to the financial year in which the satisfaction note was recorded.
The Delhi High Court held that the observations made by the Supreme Court in Principal Commissioner of Income-tax, Central-3 v. Abhisar Buildwell (P.) Ltd. cannot be construed as directions or findings for the purpose of Section 150(1) of the Act. The Court relied on its earlier decision in ARN Infrastructures India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. The Court clarified that the Supreme Court's observations in Abhisar Buildwell were intended to convey that the annulment of search assessments would not deprive the Revenue of its power to reassess, but such reassessment must still be in accordance with law and subject to the conditions envisaged under Sections 147 and 148 of the Act. The liberty accorded to the Revenue to initiate reassessment was subject to the fulfilment of statutory conditions, and the Supreme Court's observations could not be interpreted as a carte blanche to override the restrictions in Section 149 of the Act. Consequently, the petition was allowed, and the impugned notice dated 08.05.2024 under Section 148 and all consequent proceedings were set aside.
The High Court held that the reassessment proceedings were invalid because the notice under Section 148 was issued without the required approval from the Commissioner or Chief Commissioner, as mandated by Section 151(1) of the Act.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice dated 19.12.2023 issued under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2018-19 was invalid. The Court observed that a plain reading of the satisfaction note dated 08.11.2023 indicated that the Assessing Officer (AO) did not find any incriminating material that had a bearing on the petitioner's income for AY 2018-19. The Court noted that absent any such material for the relevant assessment year, proceedings under Section 153C could not be initiated. The Court found this issue to be covered by its own decision in Saksham Commodities Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax-III, Pune v. Sinhgad Technical Education Society, as well as the decision in Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle 20 v. M/s U.K. Paints (Overseas) Ltd. Consequently, the impugned notice and all consequential proceedings initiated by the AO were set aside. The challenge to the assessment being barred by limitation was not examined, as the primary ground of challenge was sustained.
The High Court held that the deposit of Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) by the defendants on specific invoices (No. 370 & 371) amounted to a payment that extends the period of limitation. Therefore, the claim related to these invoices was not barred by limitation.
The Delhi High Court held that the impugned notice dated August 29, 2024, issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for Assessment Year 2016-17, is barred by limitation. The Court reasoned that the period of six years from the end of AY 2016-17 expired on March 31, 2023. As the notice was issued thereafter, it falls outside the permissible time limits. The Court's decision was informed by the Supreme Court's ruling in Union of India & Others v. Rajeev Bansal, particularly concerning the proviso to Section 149(1)(b) of the Act, which limits the retrospective operation of Section 149(1)(b) of the new regime. The ratio decidendi is that notices under Section 148 for assessment years prior to April 1, 2021, must adhere to the time limits prescribed under the old regime, and if the six-year period has expired, such notices cannot be issued. Consequently, the impugned notice was set aside, and the petition was allowed.
The Delhi High Court allowed the present petition and set aside the impugned notice dated 31.08.2024. The Court held that the notice was barred by limitation. The reasoning was based on earlier decisions of the same court in Dinesh Jindal v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 20, Delhi & Others; KAD Housing Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-6, Delhi; and Pankaj Jain v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 3, Delhi & Anr. These decisions established that the ten-year period for reckoning limitation for a Section 148 notice is to be calculated from the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the notice was issued. The Revenue's concurrence with this proposition led to the decision. The operative direction was to set aside the notice.
The High Court held that the respondent's contention regarding the appeal's maintainability was without merit. The court found that Section 260A of the Income Tax Act allows appeals if substantial questions of law are involved.
The High Court held that the appeal is maintainable, rejecting the revenue's contention that a non-filer is barred from appealing. The court admitted the appeal on substantial questions of law concerning taxability of receipts and re-characterization of business income as FTS.
The High Court held that the notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for AY 2018-19 were barred by limitation. The Court reasoned that the condition under Section 149(1)(b) of the Act, requiring income escaping assessment to be ₹50 lakhs or more, must be reckoned in respect of the specified assessment year. While Section 149(1A) allows for cumulative consideration of income escaping assessment across multiple years, this is subject to the income being represented in the form of an 'asset' or 'expenditure in relation to an event or occasion'. The Court found that the allegations against the assessee, namely undercharging for R&D services and overpayment for management fees, did not constitute a singular event or occasion spanning multiple previous years that cumulatively exceeded ₹50 lakhs. Therefore, the AO erred in aggregating income escaping assessment from different previous years to meet the ₹50 lakh threshold for AY 2018-19. The impugned notices and all proceedings pursuant thereto were set aside.
The Delhi High Court has issued notice and listed the matter for hearing. Prima facie, the issue appears to be covered by a previous decision of the Court in the assessee's own case.
The High Court set aside the impugned order passed under Section 148A(d) of the Act. The Court found that the controversy centered on whether the Assessee had made exports under an IEC code linked to PAN AABPS3614F, with the Assessee denying such exports and the AO assuming otherwise based on information. The Court noted that the AO's order under Section 148A(d) did not adequately address the Assessee's contention that the shipping bill in question had been manually corrected and that he had made no exports under a code linked to PAN AABPS3614F. The Court held that for the AO to proceed, he must examine the specific shipping bill and have material to support the assumption of escaped income. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the AO to consider the Assessee's case that no exports were made under a code linked to PAN AABPS3614F. If the AO finds contrary material, he may pass a fresh order under Section 148A(d) within four weeks.
The Tribunal held that the payments received by the assessee for centralized marketing and reservation services were not taxable as fees for technical services or fees for included services under the Act or the DTAA. This decision was based on previous High Court rulings.
The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the impugned notice dated 31.08.2024 as being barred by limitation. The Court relied on its earlier decisions in Dinesh Jindal v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 20, Delhi & Others, KAD Housing Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle-6, Delhi, and Pankaj Jain v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 3, Delhi & Anr. In these decisions, it was held that the period of ten years for reopening assessments under Section 148 must be reckoned from the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the notice under Section 148 was issued. The Court noted that the Revenue's counsel concurred with this proposition. Consequently, the petition was disposed of with the impugned notice being set aside.
The High Court directed the concerned authorities to provide the petitioner with a temporary login ID and password to enable it to file an online appeal against the assessment order dated March 20, 2024. Alternatively, the authorities were permitted to specify any other method, including accepting a physical appeal, to facilitate the petitioner's appeal. The petitioner was granted thirty days from the date of such specification to file the appeal, and if filed within this period, it would be considered on merits without being influenced by delay. The impugned assessment order dated March 20, 2024, was stayed in the interim, with the stay to be vacated if the petitioner failed to avail statutory remedies within the stipulated period. The Court clarified that no observations were made on the merits of the case, and all rights and contentions of the parties on merits were reserved. The petition was disposed of on these terms.